

The
Punjabi Sentence
as a
Form-Meaning Complex

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कथं पुनरिदं भगवतः पाणिनेराचार्यस्य लक्षणं प्रवृत्तम्
सिद्धे शब्दार्थसम्बन्धे

On what premises then does the great teacher Pāṇini proceed
to write up his grammar?

On the assumption that the relationship between linguistic
elements and their meanings is continuous.

- Patañjali

ABSTRACT

The study aims at setting up a dialectical semanto-syntactic framework that should explain the formal idiosyncrasies of Punjabi syntax and their meaning in contextual-functional terms. The dependency approach to syntactic analysis is followed.

Punjabi verbs have morphological forms (called phases in this study) indicating variations, both quantitative and qualitative, in the valency set of the verb. These variations are related to case-assignment too. Causativization and anti-causativization in Punjabi primarily involve valency-variation.

Punjabi is an aspect-prominent language. Aspect is here the basis of the notion of transitivity. Case-marking is metaphorical in spatial terms. It symbolically represents the source and the goal of the action, the affected entity, etc. Discourse pragmatics also plays its role here.

Compound verbs and serial verbs in Punjabi represent the Indian culture's way of symbolizing time atomistically. An action is viewed as a series of actions arranged in time and in mutual dynamic dependence. A serial verb construction often involves nuclear- and core-level junctures and has an intricate dependency network in terms of valency. Transitivity, valency, verb-catenation, etc. are interlocking elements within a total syndrome (the sentence) in Punjabi.

There are no well-defined passive constructions in Punjabi. Various "passive" features such as foregrounding of

the patient, backgrounding of the agent, stativization of the situation, etc. and their formal manifestations can be explained in terms of the dynamics of verb-catenation, valency and transitivity.

The sort of ergativity found in Punjabi can be explained in similar ways. Since the syntactic category of subject of a clause is not clearly and unambiguously identifiable in Punjabi, its ergativity cannot be called simply morphological. Though Punjabi uses different morphological strategies for case-marking in different types of constructions, there is a perfectly consistent semantic logic behind its "split" ergativity, which is sensitive to transitivity and discourse pragmatics.

DECLARATION

No portion of the work referred to in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institution of learning.

PREFACE

Among the most widely spoken of the nearly 5000 languages of the world, Punjabi stands 13th. (McWhirter 1985:88). Its speakers (numbering about 65 million in India and Pakistan alone, according to the latest reports) not only constitute a substantial part of the population of the Indian subcontinent but are found settled in all parts of the world. The largest of the immigrant communities in Britain speaks this language. Punjabis, whether they are Pakistani Muslims or Indian Sikhs and Hindus, are known all over the world as sturdy, vigorous, industrious, adventurous and innovative people. Their presence anywhere becomes conspicuous. Moreover, they love their culture and language so much that they have kept them alive for generations in areas hundreds or even thousands of miles away from their native land. Without waiting for the educational authorities of these countries to make arrangements for the teaching of their language, the Punjabis themselves have started their own community schools. At the same time, they have kept putting pressure on the authorities (with considerable success) to make Punjabi a part of the school curriculum. So the Punjabi language (like its speakers) has to be taken seriously by many governments.

Conversly, when we consider the studies of the grammar of this language produced so far, we are faced with the

tragic situation that Punjabi is one of the least (and worst) studied of the principal languages. As a researcher on the European Science Foundation Project on Second Language Acquisition by Adult Immigrants, I became painfully aware of the fact that although grammars of Punjabi have been appearing at the rate of one major grammar per quarter of a century, approximately, since 1812, there does not yet exist a single grammar of Punjabi which can help a linguist hypothesize why, for example, tense as a grammatical category does not appear in the English naturally acquired (in social intercourse) by adult Punjabi immigrants while it does appear in the English naturally acquired by adult Italian immigrants. This is just one of the numerous problems of explanation I encountered. Of course, grammars are not written primarily to offer such "practical" help, but they are not intended to be elegant toys either. The fact that they fail to account for a linguistic phenomenon casts serious doubt on the validity of the specific philosophy and the theoretical framework of categories underlying them. Most writers on Punjabi grammar have been blissfully assuming the supposedly universal validity of linguistic categories like Tense, Subject and many others and fitting selected data from Punjabi into preconceived frameworks. While the efforts of these writers, many of whom worked honestly on their mainly pedagogical grammars according to their light, should be appreciated, it is most important that their "universal" theoretical frameworks of categories be transcended. Punjabi (or any other language,

for that matter) must be properly analysed in order both to establish its distinct character and the features it shares with other human languages. Unless this is done, not only will our knowledge of a major language remain fragmentary and distorted but also the progress of the science of general linguistics will be retarded.

It is in this spirit and with this motivation that an attempt is made in this study to analyse the living physiology of Punjabi. The study is divided into two unequal parts. Part I tries to distinguish the living-physiology approach from the more prevalent and "unmarked" dead-anatomy approach. What the title of this study signifies is explained in detail. This part was, unfortunately, necessary because the approach of this study is in direct confrontation with the dominant or "unmarked" paradigm of linguistics, whose supporters are declaring that theirs is the "scientific" paradigm, and that the other "unscientific" approaches are inferior, (and some of them even believe that it is their pious duty to free the field of linguistics from the "unscientific" approaches). The intention is to demonstrate that the underlying presuppositions of their so-called "revolutionary" paradigm are in conflict with the presuppositions of the emerging paradigm of modern science. The old paradigm is neither revolutionary nor fully scientific if science is viewed as an analysis of reality and a search for truth and not simply as constructing "abstract" formal models at the cost of shutting out the vitally significant aspects of the reality we are supposed

to analyse and explain. The purpose of this part is to argue that linguistics is not the monopoly of any one school and that other schools and paradigms have the right to exist honourably and as equally scientific and respectable approaches to language, and to contest the view that, since one particular school in linguistics is "revolutionary", all other schools should now get converted to their new paradigm. It is nowhere suggested that the contribution of the older approaches has been zero. The emphasis throughout is that science must never be static and that its horizons should always be widening. Of course, the over-inflated claims that one particular paradigm is the "scientific" one must be punctured and deflated a little for the good health of any science. This part is included reluctantly, hoping that the arguments presented therein will be unnecessary in the future, when the field of linguistics is peopled by scholars who have a better and more tolerant understanding. Part II deals with some aspects of the grammar of Punjabi. This study is programmatic in the sense that it demonstrates the validity and usefulness of a certain approach in illuminating and understanding the salient features of Punjabi syntax. As a native speaker of Punjabi and as a creative writer in this language, I know that the assertion that this is the correct analysis of Punjabi would be preposterous. I hope to have demonstrated that the study of any aspect of the grammar of Punjabi requires that the use of the language in real life situations and (if known) the historical evolution of that aspect of the language in the

socio-cultural context should be taken into account. This "philosophy" of grammar is very similar to Halliday's.

I have not slavishly followed any linguist or school of linguistics. But I have been deeply influenced by Edward Sapir, B.L. Whorf, J.R. Firth and M.A.K. Halliday. The influence of the Indian linguist Bhartrhari (circa 5th century AD) on me is perhaps the deepest. I am intellectually indebted to many other linguists as well, and I have indicated this indebtedness by quoting them with approval or disapproval. Among the non-linguists who influenced my thinking, mention must be made of Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, William James, George Herbert Mead, Ernst Cassirer, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Jacob Bronowski, Ilya Prigogine, Erich Jantsch, Paul Ricoeur, Paul Feyerabend and Richard Rorty.

My teachers in University of Manchester, particularly Professor N.E. Collinge, Professor William Haas and Mr Edward Carney, with their teaching, guidance and encouragement, helped me shape my own ideas and approach. Professor Collinge, my research supervisor, greatly improved the quality of what appears on the following pages with his critical comments and suggestions for improvement.

A research scholarship (1980-82) awarded by University of Manchester enabled me to start my research work. I am deeply grateful.

During the course of this research, I made use of the resources of many libraries. Most of this work was done in the libraries of the universities of Manchester, Salford,

Birmingham, Aston, York, London (School of Oriental and African Studies, Senate House, and University College), Amritsar (Guru Nanak Dev University), Chandigarh (Panjab University), Patiala (Punjabi University), and in the libraries of India Office and British Museum, London. I am thankful to the staff of these libraries for their help and co-operation.

I discussed my views with many Punjabi scholars and benefited greatly from their criticism and comments. These scholars and the Punjabi informants I worked with are too numerous to be mentioned by name. I am grateful to all of them. My colleagues on the ESF Project, particularly Celia Roberts and Margaret Simonot, played a great role in sharpening my awareness of the social dimension of language. Here I must make a special mention of Dr K.C.Bahl of University of Chicago. He photocopied and sent to me at his own expense an entire book of his which was not available in Britain.

Last, but not the least, I must mention the great sacrifices my wife Usha and my sons Vikas and Vishal made for me to enable me to pursue my studies in England. It was tender love and encouragement from them that kept me going.

A NOTE ON TRANSCRIPTION

All the symbols used in phonetic transcription in this study have their standard IPA value except that

c	represents the palato-alveolar affricate	tʃ
ɟ	" " " " "	dʒ
y	" " " semi-vowel	j

Because of the problem of printing the phonetic symbols, the IPA symbol g appears in Part II as g

In the transliterated passages, the usual convention for transliterating Sanskrit is followed. The notable points here are:

(i) h represents a voiced ɦ , and h (with a dot underneath) represents the voiceless h

(ii) ɖ , ɗ and ɳ with dot underneath represent, retroflex ɖ , ɗ and ɳ respectively.

(iii) h following a stop consonant indicates aspiration, e.g. $\text{th} = \text{t}^{\text{h}}$
 $\text{bh} = \text{b}^{\text{h}}$, etc.

(iv) ̃ following a vowel signifies the nasalization of the vowel
i.e., $\text{Vh} = \text{Ṽ}$

(v) ṇ represents ɳ
 ṇ " ɳ

(vi) A vowel symbol with a bar (i.e., ā , ī , ū) represents a long vowel where the long-short contrast is traditionally believed to exist. All other vowel symbols represent long vowels.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A	Actor
Aci	Actor-causer (involved)
Acn	Actor-causer (non-involved)
Ar	Actor-recipient
Au	Actor-undergoer
Cm	Causer-mediator
CMP	Case-marking postposition
Conj Par	Conjunctive participle
CPF	Conjunctive participle formation
Cs	Causer-source
Hi	Hindi
Imp Par	Imperfect participle
Pbi	Punjabi
Per Par	Perfect participle
Pl	Plural
Pot Par	Potential participle
PQd	Principal qualified
PQr	Principal qualifier
Pr	Present tense
Pt	Past tense
R	Recipient
Sg	Singular
U	Undergoer
Ua	Undergoer-actor
Unm	Unmarked form

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Part One

THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES

CHAPTER I

THE STATUS OF LINGUISTICS AS A SCIENCE

The symptom that a particular branch of science or art is ripe for a change is a feeling of frustration and malaise, not necessarily caused by any acute crisis in the specific branch...but by a feeling that the whole tradition is somehow out of step, cut off from the mainstream, that the traditional criteria have become meaningless, divorced from living reality, isolated from the integral whole.

- Koestler

Quoted by Hart (1983:1)

Scientific models are like the shell of a crab which contains the contents of the crab for a time. As the crab grows the shell splits, and the crab grows a larger one more appropriate for the larger animal. The process of casting off an old shell and growing a new one is slow and painful.

- Birch and Cobb, Jr (1981:68)

Everything that people have done billions of times with a given thing, everything that it could give people in their actions, has become the assimilated flesh and blood of the word - its sound, its ability to combine organically with other words of the given language. The social function of a word is thus objectified in its sound. And it is now the sound that determines its linguistic function, that is, its function of guiding relations between people and people's relations to things.

- Mikhailov (1980:226)

1.1 Two incommensurable paradigms of modern linguistics

A linguist working in the eighties of this century must inevitably become aware of the fact that the community of linguists is getting divided into two opposing camps - the formalist and the functionalist camps. Though many linguists at present would not regard themselves as belonging to either camp, the time has come for them to critically examine the theoretical (and ultimately philosophical) assumptions, presuppositions and world-views underlying and guiding their practice. One of the aims of this chapter is to argue that these two theoretical approaches or paradigms are diametrically opposed, and that eclecticism or picking and choosing the best from the two for synthesis into a theory cannot work in the field of theoretical linguistics, whatever the advantages of this attitude and practice may be in the fields of "applied" linguistics and language teaching. In fact, the two camps can hardly be said to be dealing with the same phenomena, so that debates between them generate only heat and smoke but scarcely any light.

Although linguists in each camp have been aware for quite some time how their own views about language, linguistics, research methodology, theoretical constructions, scientific explanation etc. differ from those of their colleagues in the opposite camp, a detailed study of these differences has not yet been published. It is relatively recently that functionalists have started examining their theoretical standpoint in relation to and as

opposed to that of formalists. (Firth and his followers like Halliday are notable exceptions). Brief but succinct accounts can be found in Halliday 1978, Dik 1978, and Foley and Van Valin 1984. There are, of course, factions within each camp and each faction has its own version of the "theory" of language, conceptual framework of categories and research methodology. What unites the members in each camp is their consensus view of language. All the formalists, however widely they may differ from one another regarding their formalisms, preferred "logics" and psychological orientation, derive their inspiration and guiding metaphors from mathematics and (in these days) from computer science. They start with a basic assumption which can be stated (in the words of the functionalists Foley and Van Valin 1984:7) that "a language is a potentially infinite set of structural descriptions of sentences." All the characteristic features of their theories follow directly or indirectly from this assumption. All the functionalists, on the other hand, take a clearly humanist view of language and many of them have their intellectual roots in ethnography, anthropology and literature. They believe that not only the use but also the very structure of human languages must be studied in relation to their role in human communication in the socio-culturally defined activities and situations. Structure and function are inseparable, and neither is ontologically or logically prior to the other. It is important to mention here that Chomsky, the archformalist, has very explicitly denied that the communicative role of language is relevant

for a study of its structure:

"The need of locomotion influenced the fact that humans developed legs and birds wings. This observation is not very helpful to the physiologist concerned with the nature of the human body." (Chomsky 1976:58).

"If language is to be thought of on the analogy of a physical organ such as the heart, the functional explanations are unlikely to carry us very far, and we should concern ourselves with the structure of the organ that serves these functions." (id. 59).

"As a graduate student, I spent two years writing a lengthy manuscript, assuming throughout that it would never be published or read by anyone." (id. 61).

"Once a year, along with many others, I write a letter to the Bureau of Internal Revenue explaining, with as much eloquence as I can muster, why I am not paying a part of my income tax. I mean what I say in explaining this. I do not, however, have the intention of communicating to the reader, or getting him to believe or do something, for the simple reason that I know perfectly well that a "reader" (probably some computer) couldn't care less." (id. 61).

The last two extracts, as arguments against functionalism, are so absurd and beside the point that we dismiss them without any further comment. They are included here as an example of how the functionalist position is misunderstood and grotesquely misrepresented by formalists. As far as the first two passages are concerned, they reveal not only Chomsky's ignorance of the science of living physiology (what he has in mind is dead anatomy), but, more significantly, his mindscape or world-view that shapes and controls his thinking. It is a typically post-Cartesian Western mindscape which is firmly committed to unilinearity and has a built-in blindness or hostility towards the dialectical thinking that characterizes functionalism in linguistics. The first half of this chapter is devoted to elucidating this point. It is necessary to examine why Chomsky's words sound as pure, distilled wisdom to those who share his basic assumptions (mindscape) and seem absurd to those whose mindscape is totally different.

1.2 The concept of mindscape

The concept of mindscape was introduced by a Japanese anthropologist Magoroh Maruyama (1981). A person's or culture's or scientific paradigm's mindscape is what is loosely called a world-view or a philosophy. It consists of cosmological assumptions or ontological commitments, views about men and society, aesthetic and ethical principles, "logic", epistemology, standards of excellence in science,

etc. Maruyama has shown that a person's or tradition's mindscape shows a great deal of internal consistency and coherence. He (along with many other modern thinkers, only a few of whom can be mentioned here) emphasizes that the traditional Western mindscape, which emerged in Europe with the Enlightenment (but with roots going as far as Plato), is now under serious threat from a new mindscape. It is hard to predict in the present age of intellectual turmoil what the future mindscape of science is going to be like. But we can be certain that many of the traditional Cartesian values are doomed and that a new synthesis of some Western and Eastern values has already begun to develop. What is of more immediate interest here is the change sweeping over the mindscape of modern physical and life sciences and, belatedly and slowly, human sciences and philosophy. Viewed in this light, Chomsky's "revolution" in linguistics appears to be a thoroughgoing reactionary movement. The "feeling of frustration and malaise" mentioned by Koestler quoted above which is felt by many serious students of language is because of the fact that linguistics is "ripe for a change" but the guardians of the older mindscape are endeavouring their best to prevent this change. A modern scientist observes that "It is somewhat cynically said that the eminence of a scientist is measured by the length of time that he holds up the progress in his field." (Lovelock 1979:70). Some modern linguists will probably go down in history as "eminent scientists" in this sense.

The most important constituent of a mindscape is its "epistemology" or "the framework and the internal structure of reasoning." (Maruyama 1976:198). Of the four principal epistemologies that Maruyama analyses - Homogenistic, Independent-event, Homeostatic, and Morphogenetic - it is the first and the last that are relevant here because they happen to be the general epistemologies of the formalist camp and the functionalist camp (at least of the Firth-Halliday faction) respectively in linguistics. It is argued below that not only can there never be a compromise between or a synthesis of the two positions, but also that the functionalist position is a forward-looking and progressive one and that the formalist position is a thoroughly reactionary one.

1.2.1 The traditional homogenistic epistemology

The homogenistic epistemology has been the general or unmarked traditional epistemology of the Western scientific thinking at least since the Enlightenment. (The existence of a few microscopic minorities and scattered individuals who were exceptions does not count much). This is the epistemology of a stable and static universe consisting of objects whose identity is taken for granted and the substance they are made of is permanent. The world is a "great chain of being", which has been timelessly constructed upon deductive logic; therefore, the "more perfect" cannot be generated by the "less perfect". (Lovejoy 1936, Bateson 1979:28). The existence of change is (very

grudgingly) recognized but change is regarded as disequilibrium and disturbance in an essentially stable and conflict-free system. Moreover, every effort is made to seek permanence behind change and to prove that the effects of change are at the most temporary. Plato's ideas, Saussure's langue, Chomsky's competence and Katz's language as an "abstract" or Platonic object are the entities that result from such endeavours. Such abstractions, for this way of thinking, have a "higher" reality than the changing, imperfect and "degenerate" objects they are abstracted from. The categories used for analysing the world (which exists neatly divided and categorised "out there" independently of anyone doing the dividing and categorising, so that one only has to "discover" its structure - in order to exploit it) must be universally valid, exhaustive and mutually exclusive. The logic of scientific and philosophical enquiry, must be deductive and axiomatic. Classification, quantitative measurement, rank-ordering (with unidirectional causal flow) and reductionism (atomisation of reality and viewing the whole as nothing but a mathematical sum of its parts) are basic to science and scientific knowledge. The most remarkable feature, however, is monopolarization.

"Monopolarization is a psychological need to believe that there is one universal truth, and to seek out, depend on, find security in, and hang on to one authority, one theory, uniformity, homogeneity, standardization and so on." (Maruyama 1976:207).

In its pathological form, this need manifests itself as "Cartesian anxiety":

"a quest for some fixed point, some stable rock upon which we can secure our lives against the vicissitudes that constantly threaten us. The specter that hovers in the background of this journey is not just epistemological skepticism but the dread of madness and chaos where nothing is fixed, where we can neither touch bottom nor support ourselves on surface." (Bernstein 1983:17).

Predictably, those who dread "relativism" most invariably turn out to be holding on to this epistemology. They are also the most intolerant people, in whatever intellectual or social field they may be active. In this age of socio-political and intellectual transition, when the supremacy of this mindscape and ideology are being challenged, such people will rally behind and become fervent and fanatical followers of any champion of this ideology who they think can keep them on the solid earth and can rid them of "Cartesian Anxiety".

1.2.2 The morphogenetic epistemology

How the salient features of American Structuralism, European Structuralism and Chomskyism in linguistics stem from the Homogenistic epistemology is not difficult to see. But

before we analyse this, it is necessary to examine the emerging epistemology of science in the twentieth century. This new epistemology (for the modern Western world; "non-scientific" cultures like India, China and many American Indian cultures have always had it) is called Morphogenetic by Maruyama. The very name suggests the cosmological principle of incessant change, evolution, growing diversity, heterogenization and irrepeatable and irreversible processes. Reciprocal and mutualistic causality (dismissed as "circular" by the old-fashioned logic) is the rule rather than an exception. This "circular" logic of reciprocal causality, as we shall see, is quite acceptable to many modern scientists. The wisecrack "A cause is the effect of its own effect", attributed to the Persian mystic Ibn Arabi, which would have mortally offended Aristotle, is the normal logic of evolution in life sciences. The modern name for this type of thinking is dialectical thinking. Complex patterns are generated by simple rules. As complex structures interact with one another and thus grow, heterogenization increases. Similar conditions in two cases may give dissimilar results. What appears as an object is an imperceptible process. The universe is not a collection of objects but an ever-evolving harmony of diverse processes. The new science is holistic and not reductionistic. The whole and the part are dialectically related: neither is ontologically or logically prior to the other and neither can exist without the other. The whole can be more or less than a sum of its parts, depending upon whether we are

interested, for example, in the emergence of new properties during chemical processes that generate the properties not possessed by the parts or in the loss of energy in electromagnetic bonding. ("The atom is lighter than the sum of its parts" - Reeves 1984:159). If we are interested in the delimitation of the meaning potential of the individual lexical items in a sentence, the meaning of a sentence is less than the sum of the meaning of its parts. While the world is in fact "out there" existing independently of any observer, what counts as reality is to a great extent an observer-created reality. In this sense, people do not simply observe a pre-categorized world. They participate in the creation of the world by categorising it.

"Man is not opposite the world which he tries to understand and upon which he acts, but within this world which he is a part of, and there is no radical break between the meaning he is trying to find or introduce into the universe and that which he is trying to find or introduce into his own existence." (Goldmann 1977:6).

A perceiver's or a scientist's knowledge process is a spiral one. He moves from the world to his schemata and back to the world (or the other way) in endless spirals. Each return to the same point enriches his perception and he is changed by the intervening experience. There is no Truth (with a capital T) but only truths (in plural) relative to

perspectives. Universally valid, exhaustive and mutually exclusive (binary, in the extreme case) categories apply only to an abstract world of ideas which does not exist. The real world is far from being a logically and mathematically perfect one. If it were, there would be no evolution, which is largely the result of the dynamicity generated by the internal tensions and contradictions within a particular system and between that system and its environment, which consists of other dynamic and evolving systems. Truth and, more fundamentally, human reason itself, is created by people in the course of their social intercourse and their collective interaction with the real concrete world. There is no absolute principle of Reason or Truth independent of any human tradition. "Man is the measure of all things," said the sophist Protagoras.

This account of the Morphogenetic epistemology is not based exclusively on Maruyama. Writings of many eminent modern scientists have also been consulted. Some of these scientists are Battista 1982, Birch and Cobb 1981, Bohm 1980, Capra 1982, Charon 1983, Davies 1983, Gribbin 1984, Hart 1983, Jantsch and Waddington 1976, Jantsch 1980, Levins and Lewontin 1985, Lovelock 1979, Maturana and Varela 1980, Pagels 1982, Prigogine and Stengers 1984, Primas 1983, Reeves 1984 and Wolf 1985.

1.3 The emerging mindscape of modern science and philosophy

Every argument in science and philosophy is advanced against the background of and involves a mindscape with all its epistemology and cosmological assumptions which must be believed; otherwise the argument does not make any sense. Most often, the unmarked or dominant epistemology in a field of enquiry is taken for granted and arguments advanced are evaluated by the standards provided by that epistemology. Arguments with a different set of underlying assumptions are hastily dismissed as senseless. Very often, arguments between people with different or incommensurable (Kuhn's term) mindscapes (between Christians and Marxists, for example) either do not take off the ground or prove futile. Each of the debators tries to fit the other's views and opinions into his own schema, and when they do not fit, he declares that these views are "confused", "illogical", "inconsistent" and the like. The standards of clarity, logicality and consistency are, of course, his own.

A person's mindscape is the result of his cultural and religious background, temperament, education and the general intellectual atmosphere he breathes in. But there is nothing deterministic about it. His mindscape may change as a result of his experience and a change in the intellectual climate in his field. Most often, he is unconscious of the absolute presuppositions and the epistemology underlying his views, arguments and ways of thinking. It is, however, rare to find a scholar who is not emotionally attached to his mindscape

and would not feel uneasy and insecure if doubts were cast on the validity of his absolute presuppositions.

(Collingwood 1940, Palmer 1985). The most famous example from the intellectual history of the present century is that of Einstein, who rejected Quantum Mechanics not because it was mathematically inconsistent or because experimental evidence went against it but because it emotionally upset him. In the subatomic world envisioned by Quantum Mechanics, there is no strict determinism. The quantum reality is statistical, not certain. There are only probabilities. Moreover, according to this theory, it is meaningless to talk about the physical properties of the subatomic particles without precisely specifying the experimental arrangements by which you intend to measure them. Quantum reality is, in part, an observer-created reality. Both these things were outrageous to Einstein, who believed in a mechanical, clockwork universe with strict determinism and objectivity (that things in all their multifarious aspects exist even if there is nobody to observe them). "God does not play dice," he protested. He went to his grave clinging to his views in spite of what the later developments in physics signified. But intellectual history is no respecter of such emotional attachments of the individual scholars. Today's physicists cheerfully accept that God does play dice after all. A contemporary physicist rejoices that "the God that plays dice has set us free." (Pagels 1982, 134). A modern American thinker Marilyn Ferguson elaborates it as:

"Acknowledging our uncertainty encourages us to experiment, and we are transformed by our experiments. We are free not to know the answer, we are free to change our position, we are free not to have a position. And we learn to reframe our problem....An appreciation of process makes uncertainty bearable. A sense of freedom requires uncertainty, because we must be free to change, modify, assimilate new information as we go along. Uncertainty is the necessary companion of all explorers." (Ferguson 1989:114).

This attitude is sure to be judged as irresponsible and unscientific by many who believe in a mechanistic and deterministic universe. But such a judgement presupposes the validity of the Cartesian standards and the mindscape. To those who reject these standards and mindscape such adverse judgements mean nothing.

Hundreds of extracts from the writings of eminent modern scientists could be given to support our contention that the modern natural sciences have moved far away from the Cartesian Homogenistic mindscape to which the "revolutionary" linguists are still passionately clinging. But it should be enough to quote only a few. Ilya Prigogine, who won the Nobel prize in 1977 for his work on the thermodynamics of non-equilibrium systems, is the most outspoken among the modern scientists who are "process thinkers." The fundamental assumption behind Prigogine's work is that "most of reality, instead of being orderly,

stable and equilibrated, is seething and bubbling with change, disorder and process." (Prigogine and Stengers 1984: xv. These words are Alvin Toffler's in the foreword to the book). Prigogine and Stengers reject at the very outset the approach of the great founders of modern science who have stressed the universality and eternal character of natural laws and who "set out to formulate general schemes that would coincide with the very ideal of rationality." (id. 1). The search for such all-embracing schemes and universal unifying frames has proved futile.

"Still the fundamental level remains obscure.

Wherever we look we find evolution, diversification and instabilities. Curiously, this is true on all levels, in the field of elementary particles, in biology, and astrophysics, with the expanding universe and the formation of black holes." (id. 2).

The search for the "fundamental level" which has been carried out for centuries by the founding fathers of the Western science, notably by Galileo and his followers, conceived of science as being capable of discovering global truths about nature. Since nature is (for them) written in a mathematical language, the world must be a homogeneous one. According to Prigogine, this is the "myth at the origin of science." The similarities of this myth with the "language myth" (Roy Harris's term) set up by the modern formalistic linguistics that culminated in Chomsky's "Galilean style" of

enquiry are unmistakable. We shall deal with it later. But it must be pointed out here that this myth is not essential for a scientist who wants to present the results of his work in a rigorous mathematical form. Prigogine's own work is a fine example.

Modern physicists have given up the Galilean myth. "Scientists do not deal with truth; they deal with the limited and approximate descriptions of reality." (Capra 1982:33). They are "hocus pocus" physicists and not "God's truth" physicists like Galileo and other classical physicists.

"The world is not classically determined in a simple, linear billiard ball manner; rather, each level of the universal system operates on every other. Events are thus partially determined from above (more complex and encompassing levels) and from below (less complex and encompassing levels) as well as from the same level of complexity. Thus we can never know the absolute cause of anything, or whether an event is totally determined." (Battista 1982:145).

"The universe can't be dissembled into simpler and simpler parts. Everything is in dynamic interaction; it is a seamless, fluid web of process structures." (Briggs and Peal 1985:182).

When we move from the lifeless to the living matter, we encounter further complexities and puzzles. Here, the "static" universe and its logic completely break down. The living systems and their structures exist because they are evolving systems and process structures.

"Evolutionary processes cannot be contained indefinitely in structures which are stabilized by external management. Life will eventually try to break through any artificial system boundaries." (Jantsch and Waddington 1976:63).

"Self-transcendent systems can never be fully represented through formal approaches. No formal model will ever be adequate to describe all facets of life, and in particular the complex expressions of human life." (id. 71).

Language is one of the most complex expressions of human life. This is not to say that formal models are completely useless in language studies. They do have their uses and can often be extremely helpful. But to argue that the construction of such models should be the aim of linguistics and to exaggerate the importance of such models by calling them "explanatory" is wrong. Moreover, our present knowledge of a vast majority of the world languages is so poor that we cannot sensibly claim that a single model can accommodate all the diversity found in the languages of the world.

The search for systems and structures in the universe is a legitimate one. (This is what science is about). But no scientist who is seriously aware of the changing climate on the mindscape of science can now lose sight of the fact that a system, especially a human system like a language or a legal system or an economic system, is not a spatial or even a spatio-temporal structure, nor even a changing configuration of particular components, nor even a set of internal or external relations.

"Rather, a system now appears as a set of coherent, evolving, interactive processes which temporarily manifest in globally stable structures that have nothing to do with the equilibrium and solidity of technological structures." (Jantsch 1980:6).

Whether it is the structure or the function (or, in linguistics, the form or the meaning) that is more important is a non-question or a senseless question. Structure and function are not fixed but evolve jointly. Chomsky's argument from "physiology" quoted above appears totally irrelevant and senseless to a process thinker who thinks in terms of evolution. Is it the heart that sustains the circulation of blood or is it the circulating blood that sustains the heart? It is a chicken-and-egg question but not a trivial one. The structure of the heart, in relation to

the body as a whole, is of interest to a real (as opposed to Chomsky's imaginary) physiologist precisely because of its function. When we undertake a study of a living and evolving system, the Homogenistic epistemology proves to be a big hindrance. Autopoiesis or self-regulation or self-renewal, which is the defining characteristic of such systems, is the result of a dynamic and dialectical relation between the function and the form. It is this interaction that is responsible for the great complexity and flexibility exhibited by such systems. (No one can deny that human languages are highly complex, flexible and dynamic). The very notion of structure implies components but, say the real physiologists Maturana and Varela (1980:75),

"Our interest will not be in properties of components, but in processes and relations between processes realized through components."

If we define structure as the relation among the components at the same level and the function of a part as the relation between the part and the whole, we find that the dynamic and evolutionary picture is of considerable complexity.

"It is not that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, but that the parts acquire new properties. But as the parts acquire properties by being together, they impart the whole new properties, which are reflected in changes in the parts and so on. Parts and wholes evolve

in consequence of their relationship, and the relationship itself evolves." (Levins and Lewontin 1985:3).

Even "part" and "whole" are relative, and not absolute, terms. Every whole (except perhaps the universe as a whole) is a part of a greater whole, so that a particular whole is a "contingent structure in reciprocal interaction with its own parts and with the greater whole of which it is a part. Whole and part do not completely determine each other." (id. 136). This being the case, it would be absurd to assert that analysis "must start" with "the" parts or with "the" whole. It can start at any level (and in the case of language at the phonological or morphological or syntactic or even discourse level, depending on what the analyst is focusing on) provided that what is said above about the parts and the wholes is kept in mind.

The traditional Cartesian and post-Cartesian philosophy was thoroughly deterministic, mechanistic and an attempt to escape from history. The historically evolving, changing and heterogeneous reality gives nothing but "Cartesian Anxiety" to a mind that runs after absolute certainties and mathematical regularities. But rebels have been appearing regularly since Hegel and Marx. In our times, later Wittgenstein, later Heidegger and other Existentialists, Dewey, Gadamer, Foucault, Derrida, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Rorty and others have, in one way or the other, struck at the very roots of the Cartesian-Kantian mindscape. They have all

fought against the Cartesian dualisms, especially the philosophy of the independently existing ahistorical cogito that faces a lifeless, static and mechanistic world existing independently "out there". These philosophers

"glimpse the possibility of a form of intellectual life in which the vocabulary of philosophical reflection inherited from the seventeenth century would seem as pointless as the thirteenth-century philosophical vocabulary had seemed to the Enlightenment." (Rorty 1980:6).

In such a changing intellectual climate, anyone who explicitly bases his thinking on Cartesian ideas and philosophy and calls it "revolutionary" either does not understand the spirit of the times or uses his rhetoric in the service of an outdated ideology. Ours is an age of transition very similar to the Renaissance but with the significant difference that what was novel and revolutionary and victorious at that time is old and reactionary now. If we learn any lesson from the history of the changes in world-views, the outcome of the battle between the old and the new is predictable.

1.4 The congenital mindscape of modern linguistics

Modern linguistics was conceived and born in an atmosphere of "Cartesian Anxiety". Saussure, the "father" of modern

linguistics delivered his lectures in the years 1907-1911, when, as the literary theorist Terry Eagleton points out, Europe was "on the brink of the historical collapse" which occurred in the form of the World War I. It was precisely at this time that other people like Husserl, Yeats, Eliot, Pound, Lawrence and Joyce were also engaged in intellectual and spiritual endeavours very similar in spirit to Saussure's. They were trying to develop closed symbolic systems in which phenomenology, tradition, theosophy, the male and the female principles, medievalism and mythology were to "provide the keystones of complete 'synchronic' structures, exhaustive models for the control and explanation of historical reality." (Eagleton 1983:110). According to Eagleton,

"...it was not just a matter of shutting out something as general as 'the world': it was a question of discovering some toehold of certainty in a particular world where certainty seemed hard to come by." (ibid.)

An escape from the world of the living reality of natural language into an abstract world of mathematical relations is the distinguishing feature both of the European and the American varieties of Structuralism, whatever their differences. In America, Sapir and Whorf's school of humanistic linguistics was submerged, after their death, by the rising tide of the Bloomfieldian positivistic scientism. On the continent of Europe, Cartesian rationalism, which had

no rival to seriously contend with, assumed its twentieth-century avatar of Structuralism. J.R.Firth in Britain was the only major linguist who refused to float with the current and, from the very beginning of his career in the thirties, adopted a philosophy and style of linguistics which many disillusioned linguists are adopting now. He had the courage to say in 1934 that

"Saussurean synchronic linguistics is a static study of what is assumed to be a self-existent structure. It is not a study of structure actively maintained in purposive behaviour in many diverse fields of action, but a quasi-mathematical study of a highly intellectualized static structure. It is the anatomy of the dissecting room, not physiology of a whole living man in his habitat or Lebensraum." (Firth 1934:19).

Correctly sensing the change taking place in the fields of the natural sciences, Firth wrote:

"A review of the movements of the age we are living in will show that we have moved from static structure to dynamic function as the principal tool of scientific explanation and interpretation... Saussureans...are somewhat behind the general scientific movement, as linguists often are." (id. 24. Emphasis added).

Firth added that terms like "substances, static structure are practically defunct." But he seriously underestimated

the power of the prevailing general mindscape and its ideology and the role that the reactionary philosophers might play. He also failed to take into account the fact that "the sweet siren song of formal, deductive logics recurrently proves so irresistible to linguists." (Givón 1982:83).

It needs no stressing that what Firth said about the Saussurean linguistics applies verbatim to all the modern formalistic approaches to language. It is their Homogenistic mindscape and a desire to strut about in the "scientific" plumage borrowed from logic and mathematics that compel many modern linguists of formalistic persuasions to create language myths (Roy Harris's term). In the light of what we have said above, the real motivation behind the "revolutionary" linguist Chomsky's "Galilean style" of linguistic enquiry is very clear. This style involves

"a readiness to undertake perhaps far-reaching idealization and to construct abstract models that are accorded more significance than the ordinary world of sensation, and correspondingly, by readiness to tolerate unexplained phenomena or even yet unexplained counter-evidence to theoretical constructions that have achieved a certain degree of explanatory depth in some limited domain..." (Chomsky 1980:9-10).

The readiness of Chomsky and his followers to tolerate the unexplained (and very often explained) counter-evidence

well-known. But whether or not any "explanatory depth in some limited domain" is achieved by his abstractions depends solely on his own definition of explanation. Chomsky's and his followers' views about what counts as "explanation", "simplicity" etc. are highly idiosyncratic and are constantly changing. (For a critical commentary of these views about "explanation", see Givón 1979:Chapter 1). Most commonly, a linguistic phenomenon is said to be "explained" if it can be shown to be related to the "innate" genetic endowment or following from it. This is fine as long as one believes in the existence of the "innate language organ."

The trouble with this "innateness" hypothesis is that there is, and can be, no empirical evidence about the existence of this mysterious entity. All the arguments to support the hypothesis, as is well-known now, have been indirect, a priori and scholastic in nature. This is the myth of myths at the very foundation of Chomsky's grand theoretical edifice. Understandably, he has to cling to this myth and will go on using all his great intellectual power and ingenuity for this purpose. His arguments (repeated ad nauseam by his followers and himself) are too well-known to be explicated in detail here. Briefly, a child acquires his first language with wonderful rapidity and ease although he is exposed to spoken utterances which are "degenerate". Certain syntactic principles are so abstract and so far removed from the linguistic data that only highly intelligent and trained linguists can discover them. A "mere child" would be unable to accomplish this intellectual feat.

Therefore, he is innately programmed, or provided (by God, let's say), with an innate "knowledge" of language. Being biologically given, this knowledge is universal for mankind. The theory of Universal Grammar (or UG) follows from this innate "knowledge". "Each human language will conform to UG; languages will differ in other, accidental properties." (1976:29). The UG is

"the system of principles, conditions, and rules that are elements or properties of all human languages and not merely by accident but by necessity." (id. 29).

That human beings are innately "programmed" by God to acquire language rapidly and to use it is hardly a new or controversial, let alone a "revolutionary", idea. Bhartrhari, an Indian linguist probably of the fifth century, argued on very similar grounds (but without mentioning any "degenerate" input) that a human child is born with śabdabhāvanā - roughly translatable as "an insight into the soul of language." Few philosophers or psychologists today would object to the suggestion that the human ability to spatialize and temporalize the reality and to establish causal links between events (grammaticalized and/or lexicalized by every known human language but not limited to thinking through language) may largely be innate. What is controversial in Chomsky is the special status he allots to this "innate language faculty" or "language organ" and his persistent argument that on the basis of the study of a single language you can understand these and other

innate "language universals". The trouble, however, is that the same argument can be used to establish the existence of many other "mental organs", such as for touch-typing, piano-playing, bicycle-riding, mathematics and countless other skills. For example, the biochemical and neural processes going on in the central nervous system and the physiology of the neuro-muscular system of a touch-typist who types at the rate of a hundred words per minute are so complex that not even the greatest physiologist can claim to understand them completely. But a "mere girl" learns this physiological feat from the "degenerate" instructions and two or three hours' daily practice for about five years. Salthouse (1984) points out that the rate at which typists (even the average ones) perform exceeds the rate that laboratory tests in psychology would lead a psychologist to predict. He says that there is "the strong subjective impression among most skilled typists that they need only think of a word and it seems to be typed automatically." (p. 98). It seems "as though the individual keystrokes were under the control of a single motor programme." (pp. 96-97). Salthouse admits that the feat that a typist is able to accomplish is poorly understood. But nothing would be more absurd to regard the single motor programme (if any exists) as an "innate typing organ". All that we can say is that God has constructed the human brain in such a way that we can master a large number of skills. We can use the term general intelligence for this capacity of the human brain. We do not need a separate mental organ for each skill. The list of

such "innate" mental organs would be very long and, paradoxically, open. "Such a mental organization" says Hilary Putnam,

"would not be scientifically explicable at all; it would mean that God simply decided to produce these structures at a certain point in time because they were the ones we would need half a million (or whatever) years later... And, in any case, this is such a messy miracle to attribute to Him! Why should He pack our heads with a billion different "mental organs" rather than just making us smart?" (Piattelli-Palmarini 1980:298).

Chomsky, of course, refuses to admit general intelligence as an explanation for a child's feat of first language acquisition. The reason is simple: that would snatch from him an excuse for setting up "abstract" language universals on the basis of an intensive study of a single language (English) and making linguistics mysterious and formal enough to be a science of his dreams. The Wittgensteinian philosophers Baker and Hacker (1984:166) suggest that the "innate language organ" is a genuine myth.

"An archetypal theory does admit genuine alternatives, and it is to be surrendered in the light of accumulated disconfirming data. Moreover, it is weakened to the extent that it generates unresolved problems or leaves

relevant data unexplained, and it is annihilated by internal contradictions and antinomies. A myth differs in all these respects: it portrays what must be so, and hence thrives despite raising insoluble problems and leading to paradoxes. Whereas adversities ultimately kill theories, they are a food to myth."

Baker and Hacker's understanding of the real problems of linguistics is inadequate, and they seem to be unjustifiably equating the whole profession of linguistics with the generative schools. But their attacks on the preposterous claims of Chomsky and other generativists are apt and timely. People who have actually studied language acquisition by children in family situations (e.g., Ervin-Tripp 1973, Snow 1977, Halliday 1978, and many others) have pointed out the false assumption of the "degenerate" data and, implicitly, the inappropriateness of the computer analogy. Halliday, who minutely studied language acquisition by his own son for a number of years, says that

"the ordinary everyday speech that typically surrounds the small child...is fluent, highly structured, and closely related to the non-verbal context of situation. Moreover it tends to have very few deviations in it; I found myself when observing the language spoken to, and in the presence of, a small child that almost all the sequences were well formed and whole, acceptable even to the sternest grammatical lawgiver." (1978:18).

But all this has had no effect on Chomsky or his followers. Anyone except a committed Chomskyan can see that the Chomskyan picture of first language acquisition is a gross distortion of the rather familiar facts. A child is not simply exposed to strange noises. He acquires his first language in the company of his parents, siblings and friends who, directly and indirectly, teach him, encourage him, train him to imitate and correct his mistakes. He acquires his first language while he is engaged in other activities such as naming and asking for objects and attention, listening to and telling stories, playing games and repeating nursery rhymes. "The linguist's tale", conclude Baker and Hacker,

"is patent nonsense, delivered by the ill-conceived services of the computer analogy, and bred from a miscegenous crossing of bastardized rationalism with Skinnerian bahaviourism." (1984:290).

"Patent nonsense" is perhaps too strong an expression, but any functionalist can see that Chomsky's arguments that some linguistic constructions involve the understanding of structures which are so complex that a child could not understand them and that understanding and production of those constructions by analogy is not possible is a totally bogus problem. It is true that mere analogy is no explanation. (No functionalist ever said that). But all the "serious problems" mentioned by Chomsky are bogus. In his

latest book (Chomsky 1986:9), for example, one of the "serious problems" is that we can form "the dancing bear" (corresponding to "the bear that dances") but not "the eating man" (corresponding to "the man who eats"). Such facts of the English grammar, according to Chomsky, "pose a serious problem that was not recognized in earlier work." It is true that language learning and use by analogy does not explain this. But it does not follow from this that we have an innate language faculty which does this. There are simple functional explanations for many of the "serious" problems mentioned by Chomsky. As far as this particular problem is concerned, we can argue that all the bears do not dance. The one that does is a special animal which we need to talk about. So we have the expression. All the men, on the other hand, eat. We do not say "the eating man" because we need not. We do not have any occasion to use the expression. It is perfectly possible to say "the pork-eating jew" corresponding to "the jew who eats pork". Most problems in Chomsky's writings are bogus because they are the result of his "idealizations" or his habit of abstracting his language learners and users out of the real life and social intercourse and viewing them as computers.

Baker and Hacker point their finger rightly at the very foundation stone of Chomsky's theory of language - his psychology. This psychology is the computer-age version of the traditional Cartesian individualistic psychology. Notwithstanding Chomsky's famous attack on Skinner, both Skinner's rodentomorphic "behaviouristic" psychology and

Chomsky's robotomorphic "cognitive" psychology belong to the same tradition that originated with Descartes's cogito. The perfectly Cartesian image of a person was neatly drawn by Chomsky's follower and ally Jerry Fodor: "An organism is a closed system proposing hypotheses to the world."

(Piattelli-Palmarini 1980:152). Fodor expressed this idea during the Chomsky-Piaget debate held in France in 1975. He was immediately contradicted by Anthony Wilden. Fodor did not attempt to reply. The modern system thinking, which is gaining popularity in various disciplines, denies that any living system (and many non-living systems) can be closed ones. (Jantsch 1980). An open system - a human being or a whirlpool in a stream, for example - is one that is able to maintain itself only by exchanging matter and energy with its environment and by thus constantly renewing itself. It is a matter of commonsense now that in about seven years' time all the cells of the human body are replaced. There is a powerful school of psychology associated with famous names like Mead, Vygotsky, Lacan and others that holds that even the human mind is an open system very much like a whirlpool. This school rejects the traditional, ahistorical cogito or "subject" of Descartes. It gives priority to the "symbolic order" or the order of signs and meanings which pre-exists a human organism and only through which does an organism become a person. Neither the person nor the symbolic order is a stable entity or a closed system. They only appear to be so, but are, like the flame of a candle, open process systems. While the symbolic order creates the individual minds, it gets, at the same time, restructured by those

minds in interaction with it and with one another. There is no fixed structure, either of an individual mind or of the world. There is only incessant structuration. And structuration is creation. A "mind" is not a genetic programme (akin to a computer programme) but a process that extends spatio-temporally beyond an organism's spatial location and temporal existence.

The significance of this variety of psychology is increasingly being recognized by many linguists, psycholinguists and psychologists. A leading modern scholar in the field says that

"If Chomsky's LAD exists, it hovers somewhere in the air between mother and child." (Bruner 1981:35).

The LAD (Language Acquisition Device, supposed to be innate by Chomsky) is not innately packed into an organism's brain by God. Another modern psychologist argues that it is not possible to draw a line between mental life and social life at any age. (Kaye 1982:3). That this school of psychology is alive and flourishing is shown by a recently published book called Changing the Subject (Henriques et al 1984), in which the authors "begin with a critical rejection of psychology's individualistic concept of subject" and argue that "the individual is not a fixed or given entity, but rather a particular product of historically specific practices of social regulation." (pp. 11-12). Indeed a far cry from Fodor's closed system that proposes hypotheses to the world!

If we accept this variety of psychology, we have to recognize that Halliday's inter-organism perspective on language is more basic and encompassing than the more popular intra-organism perspective of Chomsky and others. In fact the latter perspective should be a special case of the former. Similarly, language-as-knowledge linguistics should become a special case of language-as-behaviour linguistics. Language is primarily a socio-cultural resource before it is a matter of individual knowledge. A language as a code pre-exists an individual in whose head God need not plant neurons (like micro-chips in a computer) with tree diagrams, noun phrases, transformation rules, X-bar syntax, core grammar, etc., but only make him smart and clever enough to learn to make an effective use of the already existing social code (and typewriters, bicycles, computers etc.). Chomsky and his followers reject the "general intelligence" approach apparently because their theory of "universal grammar" and "abstract language universals" and their practice of imposing the features of a single language on all the languages depend on the innatist hypothesis. On the other hand, a linguist who thinks in terms of open process systems and evolution finds Chomsky's static and Platonistic linguistics an intellectual aberration. Such a linguist will reject Chomsky's "far-reaching idealizations" and the resultant mythology, in which each myth is supported by another. In order to superficially ape the formal-mathematical models of physical scientists and logicians, Chomsky has set up a "language myth" (as Harris (1981:11)

points out) which views a language as "a finite set of pairs, of which one member is a sound-sequence or a sequence of written characters and the other its meaning." The inherent variability and indeterminacy of a natural language, which are a must for it if it is to serve the socio-cultural needs of its speakers, are totally ignored by Chomsky. Language is treated "as if it were, on the formal plane, a closed linguistic system of the type devised for the purpose of mathematical logic within which well-formedness of a formula can be 'proved'". (id. 76. Emphasis added). This myth requires another myth - the mind of an ideal speaker-listener as a sort of Platonic heaven where the abstract entity called language "can exist in tranquillity, accessible to contemplation but immune from observation." (id. 74). The myth of myths that supports all these myths is, of course, the "innate language organ." The whole Chomskyan system is so coherent and well-knit that it must be either accepted or rejected as a whole. You cannot make selections from it. Those who reject the mindscape and ideology behind this system reject this system as a whole. They cheerfully accept the diversity and poly-systemicity within a language and across languages and do not run away from this reality, for the sake of attaining spurious respectability as "scientists", into a realm of shadows by "far-reaching idealizations."

1.5 The pathology of the "revolutionary" linguistics

The English pragmatist philosopher F.C.S. Schiller (1966 (1909):85) mentioned two types of intellectual barbarism - the barbarism of temper and the barbarism of style.

"The former displays itself in the inveterate tendency to sectarianism and intolerance... For what could be more ludicrous than to keep up the pretence that all must own the sway of some absolute and unquestionable creed?"

The barbarism of style is that

"most of the technicalities which disfigure philosophical writings are totally unneeded, and that stringing together of abstractions is both barbarous and dangerous."

Schiller had contemporary philosophers in mind. But what he said applies to many modern linguists equally well (or perhaps better). Linguists have complained about Chomsky that he makes his writings "artificially mysterious" (Matthews 1981b:61) in order to create an illusion of profundity (Matthews 1980:1314). This applies to most formalists, of course. Formalisms, most often, have no value other than a cosmetic one: "they make the argument look more

impressive." (Matthews 1982b:9). The Chomskyan and the post-Chomskyan American linguistics of the formalist variety, according to Givón (1979:26), is

"an orgy of empirical irresponsibility with one formal model chasing another in rapid succession, with data-free arguments hinged upon purely formal notions of "economy" and "simplicity", and with linguistics as a whole becoming a sad caricature of late medieval scholasticism."

More serious, however, is the "barbarism of temper." Fanaticism, intolerance, cowboyish manners, unnecessary confrontations, unclean politics and power game, shabby treatment of opponents, wilful and wholesale distortion of historical facts - these are some of the traits of the temperament and actions of the "revolutionary" American linguists (cf. Koerner 1983, Maher 1980, Murray 1980, 1981). Ironically, Galileo, whose "style of enquiry" Chomsky professes to follow, also used some of these methods in order to win debates and to promote self-interest. (Cf. Koestler 1964, Feyerabend 1978). In their desperate bid to prolong the life of a mindscape and its ideology, many of its fervent supporters are becoming increasingly bitter and hostile towards new developments, particularly the liberal trends, in linguistics. Bernard Comrie, referring to a predictably hostile review by a generativist of his book Language Universals and Syntactic Typology (1981a), in which

he chose to study the concrete cross-linguistic universals empirically and did not adopt the Chomskyan methodology of studying the "abstract" universals based on the "deep" study of a single language (English), complained that

"Only too often one finds in the generative literature ...the assumption that linguists outside the generative paradigm must be either ignorant, or stupid or perverse in their failure to accept the generative paradigm."
(Comrie 1984:162).

This "barbarism of temper" is pathological. It is, to borrow an expression that Richard Rorty (1982:229) uses for the similar behaviour of many philosophers whose ideology is in danger, "the mask behind which lurks the cruelty and despair of a nihilistic age." However, this "barbarism of temper" has proved ineffectual. It has not succeeded in stopping the (re)emergence of functionalism and the rise of the Greenbergian school in linguistics.

The altogether gloomy picture of the Chomskyan "revolution" painted above is not intended to give the impression that his or the formalists' contribution to linguistics is zero or negligible. He made an important breakthrough in linguistic theory by making syntax the focus of attention and analysis. Modern linguistics before him was, by and large, word-based. Its syntactic tools were rather clumsy. The work he initiated and carried on with so much (and a lot unnecessary) zeal and gusto made a number of

extremely useful tools available to linguists and made detailed and sophisticated analytical syntactic descriptions possible and attainable. One might ultimately disagree with what Chomsky says in most of his writings about the centrality of syntax, and one might opt for what McCawley (1980:168) calls an "un-syntax", arguing that "syntax (is) largely a reflection of other things, e.g., morphology, logic, production strategies, principles of co-operation etc." But such an insight would not have been possible without Chomsky's historical role. While linguistics should be grateful to him and his followers for this, it is very clear now that if linguists cling to the TG or any other formalist paradigm as the paradigm of linguistics, there is nothing but "a feeling of frustration and malaise...that the whole tradition is somehow out of step, cut off from the mainstream, that the traditional criteria have become...divorced from the living reality, isolated from the integral whole." It is clear now that the formalist variety of linguistics

"has trapped itself in a labyrinthine prison out of which no graceful natural exit is possible, short of plowing under the entire edifice and starting afresh... the only hope for a different linguistics lies in the actual practice of doing linguistics differently."

(Givón 1979:1).

As more and more scholars from all over the world who love and respect their native languages, cultures and traditions enter the field of social and human sciences, the future holds nothing but despair and frustration for the armchair universalists in any discipline who would like to imperialistically impose (on "logical" or whatever grounds) the traits of the various facets of one particular culture (language, art, literature, music, law etc.) as "universals" on all cultures. That Chomsky (whatever his political views may be) has been guilty of theoretical imperialism is now well-known. R.A.Hall has pointed out that, after the Chomskyan "revolution",

"when it comes to other languages than English, their deep structure always turns out to be that of English; in other words, we are now witnessing the forcing of all languages into the mould of English, just as in earlier periods they were forced into that of Classical Latin." (Hall 1968:53).

There is nothing wrong, however, in empirically investigating (as Greenberg and his followers have been doing) the features shared by many genetically unrelated and geographically non-contiguous languages. However, the term "universals" is pretentious at this stage because we know so little about a vast majority of the world languages. But to simply impose the features of a single language or a few languages as "abstract" universals on all languages is sheer

imperialism. The often advanced argument that there are so many languages in the world that it is impossible to study them all is a lame excuse. There are more animal species than languages, living and extinct, on this earth but not even the maddest Arab zoologist would ever suggest that because of this the features discovered by a "deep" study of the camel should be regarded as the "abstract" zoological features underlying the anatomy and physiology of all the animals. There is no urgency to claim the "scientific" laurels by pretending that our present "scientific" framework of linguistics is universally applicable to all languages. We can accumulate - over generations - our knowledge of the features of the world languages and go on developing cross-linguistic generalizations as we go along, and in the light of these generalizations study more languages and, if need be, go on revising our generalizations, and so on. This is how knowledge was accumulated by the scientists whom linguists are so envious of. To appeal to some specially chosen philosophers (who have no experience of any type of scientific research) in order to justify the pseudo-Popperian "conjecture and refutation" methodology (making conjectures about language "universals" without taking any trouble to study a substantial number of languages and challenging others either to accept them or to bring counter-evidence to refute them, and having more imagined "universals" ready by the time the earlier ones are rejected by other on empirical grounds), or to argue against the empirical methodology and the

"statistical universals" it discovers, simply shows the laziness of those who indulge in this pseudo-philosophizing.

1.6 An alternative linguistics

If we look for a really revolutionary innovator in the field of the 20th century linguistics, one who wholeheartedly embraced the reality of the living language and did not, like the "father" of modern linguistics, seek refuge in spectral abstractions and never subscribed to any "universalistic" dogma, we must choose J.R.Firth, who never proclaimed himself (or get his followers proclaim him) a revolutionary. He abandoned the traditional mindspace (to which many are deperately clinging even today) at the time when the modern physisists were doing this. Later on in this chapter, we attempt to sketch a morphogenetic functional perspective on language. Needless to say, there is nothing original about this perspective. ("There is not a single important scientific idea that was not stolen from elsewhere." - Feyerabend 1982:105). The main ideas that have gone into the delineation of this perspective are Firth's. But the perspective itself is at least some centuries older than Pāṇini. (Firth, during his stay in India, not only studied the ancient Indian linguists but also had discussions with many Sanskrit scholars). This is also the perspective of one of the most promising modern scientific paradigms, the theory of self-organizing systems (Jantsch 1981), which has arisen at the intersection of physics,

chemistry, biology and sociology. Lindblom et al (1984) is a good attempt to apply it to phonology. The philosophy behind this paradigm as applied to language was expounded by the Russian linguist Vološinov (1973 (1929)) and Firth (1934) (and much earlier by the Indian linguist Bhartr̥hari). Linguists like Givón (1979), Halliday (1985) and Foley and Van Valin (1984) have analysed languages from this perspective. The theoretical ideas underlying and guiding this study are taken mainly, but not exclusively, from these linguists. It must be clearly understood that functionalism is not a "universal" theoretical framework (into which each language must be fitted) or a dogma to be accepted on the authority of an archtheorist or "logic" but a common vision and mindscape shared by many linguists.

1.7 A close examination of formalism and functionalism in linguistics

So far, we have discussed some of the irrational prejudices and arbitrary decisions behind the traditional scientism in general and in the field of linguistics in particular. In the light of these observations, and narrowing down our focus to language and to the problems that are specifically linguistic, we now examine the formalist and the functionalist trends in linguistics. The latter trend, as we have mentioned earlier, is much older and has a respectable history in India. Our argument is that the most fundamental principle guiding the theory and practice of a true

functionalist in linguistics is what can be called the Principle of Triadic Functionalism. Borrowing terms from modern biology, we insist that a study of the three aspects of language - anatomy, physiology and ecology - and of the interaction of the three is a must for any serious science of linguistics. This necessitates a critical examination and rejection of the traditional narrow structuralist orthodoxy and the mindscape supporting this orthodoxy.

1.7.1 The two strands of formalism in linguistics

It has been observed that

"The whole history of linguistics appears to have been a continuous pendulum-like swing between a priori superimposition of theory over data, and collection and arrangement of data dispensing with any degree of theory that implies grammatical and/or semantic descriptive models." (Fernández-Guizzetti 1978:311).

The writer, who is presumably referring to the modern Western linguistics, is careful to use "appears to have been" and not "is" or "has been". The Sapir-Whorf tradition, the Prague tradition and the Firthian tradition have run parallel to the formalist traditions - the empiricist and the rationalist - between which the mainstream Western linguistics has been swinging pendulum-like.

It is necessary here to make the meaning of the term formalist clear. According to the formalist position in linguistics, the object of enquiry is the formal system of language. Some linguists of the formalist persuasions are interested in finding the formal universals of human language(s). A formal system (algebra, for example) is a relational system which is defined purely by the set of the mathematical-like relations that hold within it and not by its actual content or substance. Man, the user of the system, finds no place in a formalistic study of any system. The term 'formal' or 'formalist' or 'formalistic', used to describe this position is not a derivative of 'form' used in the sense of the acoustic or visual shape of a linguistic unit. Another concept 'formalization' needs to be distinguished. 'Formalization' means presenting a theory or a description in an explicit, well-defined, system. A grammar (Dik's Functional Grammar, for example) can be formalized without being formalist. (This account and what follows in this section is partly based on Salverda (1985)).

Since the functionalist view of language is not fully in tune with the traditional Western Homogenistic mindscape and cannot satisfy the linguists who are afire with the ambition of making linguistics an exact and predictive science, it is understandable why the formalistic trend has been attracting more adherents. The two principal trends of formalism in linguistics have been deriving inspiration from the two main traditions in Western philosophy - Rationalism and Empiricism - both of which are individual-centred

philosophies of a static and mechanistic universe which is atomistic in nature. Since the positivist-inductivist trend inspired by Empiricism and the rationalist-deductivist trend inspired by Rationalism share the same mindscape, they differ like Tweedledum and Tweedledee. All the principal theoretical battles have been fought between these two trends. As is always the case with such battles, they have been indecisive. But the rationalist side has always had an upper hand.

Parallel to the mainstream has been running the stream of humanistic linguistics which, in the West, originated with Humboldt and Herder. The humanistic linguists (along with philologists) never divorced language from the humans using it in their socio-cultural intercourse. The Sapir-Whorf tradition in America, the Prague tradition on the continent of Europe and the Firthian tradition in Britain share a lot and are explicitly or implicitly functionalist. There never has been any serious confrontation between the formalist and the humanist traditions on the whole. In order to engage in a fruitful debate, the disputants must share many assumptions and their mindscapes must overlap considerably. But in the case of these two traditions, each side has usually completely rejected the philosophy and the resultant methodology of the other side. The current position is that of a deadlock,

"with each side fundamentally questioning the validity and the relevance of the other's presuppositions. At the

same time, each of them takes its own point of view as axiomatic." (Salverda 1985:110).

The formalists assert that the functionalist explanations do not satisfy the strict formal standards of what counts as scientific explanation. According to Chomsky and most other formalists,

"linguistic theory, in order to be scientific, must be a formal theory of the form-structure of the language system and nothing more. Anything else is ipso facto declared unscientific. This position prevents any serious exchange with serious alternatives." (id. 75).

Each tradition has developed its own more or less coherent package of epistemology, psychology, philosophy of science, methodology and object of enquiry, and this package can be either accepted or rejected as a whole. The worst that has happened is the development of what Salverda calls a "semiotic knot". There is a close correspondence between each side's view of language and the scientific standards. It is the scientific standards that determine what the object of enquiry should be. Since linguistics should be a formalist-deductivist science, language itself is a well-defined formal system (at least at a "deep" or "abstract" level which is beyond observation). This reminds one of a pious hangman in a Punjabi short story who sincerely believed that God gave the human neck the shape it

has for him to fit his noose around it! Whatever in language cannot be fitted into a formal system is "accidental" and "uninteresting". The functionalistic view of language, such as Mathesius's:

"a system of signs, manifested in actual communication as the sum total of the possibilities available to the members of the same language community at a given time in a given place for the purpose of communication" (Mathesius 1975:13),

is rejected outright by formalists who have to indulge in "far-reaching abstractions" without which "language is a chaos not worth studying." (Chomsky 1979:182). According to Chomsky,

"Opposition to idealization is simply objection to RATIONALITY; it amounts to nothing more than an insistence that we shall not have MEANINGFUL intellectual work. Phenomena that are complicated enough to be worth studying generally involve interaction of several systems. Therefore you must abstract some object of study, you must eliminate those factors that are not PERTINENT. At least if you want to conduct an investigation that is not TRIVIAL. (id. 57. Emphasis added with CAPITALS).

This assertion begs a few question at once: Whose standards.

of rationality? Objection to rationality or rationalism? Meaningful by what standards? How do you distinguish between the pertinent and its opposite? Who decides what is trivial and what is profound and what are the standards used? In other words, in the absence of any universally valid and acceptable standards of rationality, meaningfulness, pertinence and profundity, is not "idealization" simply a method of conveniently eliminating what does not fit into a formal and deductive model?

Roger Sperry, a Nobel-laureate in neurophysiology, has remarked that there are two kinds of scientists:

"those fired-up by a problem and searching for methods to get answers, and those highly trained in some method who are searching for some amenable problems." (Sperry 1983:104).

It is very clear by now what type of scientists Chomsky and most other formalists are. Chomsky has singled out the problem for an "explanatory" linguistic theory - to account for the possibility of language acquisition by children - because, in his view, the problem can be turned into a logical one. (For a thorough criticism of this position, see Romaine 1985). Why, it may be asked, have the problem of the metaphorical and creative use of language by poets and children, language change, emergence and decay of ergativity and a thousand other problems not been listed as the ones to be accounted for by an "explanatory" linguistic theory? The

reason is obvious: linguistics must be made (to look like, at least) a formal-deductive science, whatever may be the cost involved.

Chomsky's criticism of the (post-)Bloomfieldian linguistics (like the criticism made by many scholars of positivistic, inductivistic and statistical analyses in the fields of social sciences and psychology) that these analyses are not explanatory is perfectly valid. Mere inventories of items and statistical tables and graphs always leave in the mind of a thoughtful scholar the uneasy questions: "So what?", "What is the point?", "What is all this about?", etc. But, then, the practitioners of this style of research have their own philosophy of science: going beyond what is observable (and hence any attempt at explanation) is unscientific. Chomsky rejected their arbitrary standards of science simply because they were different from the equally arbitrary ones of his own. In a similar way, functionalists reject Chomsky's formal-deductive view of science. Explaining a linguistic phenomenon, they could argue, means showing that it is an immediately obvious and necessary part of the larger context of culture and situation. Of course, this begs many questions. But so does any view of science and scientific explanation. Each view fits well into its holder's general philosophy. The choice is rarely made on any independent and rational grounds (if at all such grounds exist). A great deal depends on the chooser's mindscape and also on whether he is interested in the working of the living language or in

aping the mathematical formalism and rigour of physical scientists and logicians.

The situation seems pretty hopeless. But it would be wrong to blame any modern or ancient linguist for this. Scientism crept into language studies in the West as soon as the Homogenistic mindscape established itself in the Western culture. The rationalistic grammarians, the Neogrammarians, Saussure, Bloomfield, Hjelmslev, Chomsky and most other leading modern linguists have been guilty of this. Reification and alienation, the two principal diseases of the modern bourgeois society according to Marx, are manifesting themselves in linguistics, as everywhere else. Language, a socio-cultural process, has been turned into an abstract object and theoretically alienated from the people who actively maintain it by using and constantly recreating it in their sociocultural intercourse. The factors on which the very existence of language depends are considered as irrelevant and are "idealized" away for the sake of making linguistics "scientific".

There seems to be no way of breaking the deadlock between the formalist and the functionalist sides. The two approaches are incommensurable. Attempts such as Kuno's "functional syntax" (1980) which seek to graft a pragmatically oriented "functional" component onto the essentially generative syntax, or attempts at adding a new component called "pragmatics" to linguistics, though well-motivated, are no real solutions. People who make such attempts take for granted the alienation of language from

men and society, which is the real cause of the trouble, and then attempt to bridge, and not to fill, the gap. The attempt is similar to that of the vitalist school in biology, which took the mechanistic conception of an organism for granted and then added an élan vital (or a ghost) to make the machine work. It is not the case that the topics studied by pragmatics are unworthy of study or are irrelevant. But the status of pragmatics as a "remedial discipline" (Levinson 1983:xii) raises all sorts of doubts as to its "remedial" power. An organism was "essentially" a machine. (How else could biology be made a science?) So in order to explain the "accidental" property of the machine - that it also worked and reproduced itself - a ghost was added to the machine. Similarly, a language is an abstract formal system. (How else can you make linguistics a science?) But it also has an accidental property (cf. Chomsky quoted earlier) - that it is all used in social intercourse by humans. So let us add a "functional" or "pragmatic" component to a generative grammar. Such moves may appear revolutionary but are in fact reactionary. (Julian Huxley said somewhere that an élan vital no more explains the working of an organism than an élan locomotif would explain the working of a railway engine). Such a move is reactionary "because it means accepting in full the rigid opposition between the pure and the contaminated which is just the cause of all the trouble." (Halliday 1984:4). There is no hope until "pragmatics" has penetrated deep into the most "central" part of linguistics - syntax. In other

words, we need a pragmatic syntax, and not an autonomous syntax. The real remedy, as Givón (1979) says, lies in plowing down the entire formalistic edifice and starting afresh. This is precisely what many serious students of language have started doing.

1.7.2 Re-examination of the concept of the linguistic sign

In his rhetorical move to make his opponents look like enemies of "rationality", Chomsky has thoroughly idealized (misrepresented to suit his polemical purpose) their objections to idealization. No linguist has ever objected to idealization as such. Every grammarian ignores false starts, pauses, self-corrections, hesitations etc. in his data (unless he has some theoretical interest in such phenomena).. Very often, dialectal (geographical and social) and idiolectal variations, too, are eliminated. What many linguists really object to is the Chomskyan style idealization. One of the earliest and most damaging objections is Hockett's:

"Any approximation we can achieve on the assumption that language is well-defined is obtained by leaving out of account just those properties of real languages that are most important. For, at bottom, the productivity and power of language - our casual ability to say new things - would seem to stem exactly from the

fact that languages are not well-defined, but merely characterized by certain degrees and kinds of stability ..." (Hockett 1967:10).

Chomsky's idealized picture of language is like an idealized picture of a bicycle with firmly fixed and immovable handle bars.

Salverda (1985:115 ff.) suggests that in order to understand the source of the productivity and power of language and how formalists have idealized it away we must re-examine the concept of the linguistic sign. Without bringing into the picture the complications of semiology, we can say that a linguistic sign involves, basically,

1. the sign itself, or the signifier,
2. the entity that the sign "stands for", or the signified, along with the "stand for"-relation,
3. the subject for whom the sign "stands for" something, or the signifying agent.

An examination of all these aspects and their interrelation is a must for every serious student of language. The formalists view each language as self-contained system of signs in which each sign is defined relationally - by virtue of being different from all other signs. "In a language there are only differences." Of course, a sign consists of a form connected with some meaning, but the meaning plays no role in defining and delimiting a sign. Signs are algebraic

entities. The signified (whose relation with the sign is "arbitrary") and the signifying agent are effectively idealized out of the science of linguistics. But this idealization has no justification apart from that the science of linguistics has to be modelled on (the philosophers' now obsolete picture of) physics, in which the subject or his relations with the entity under observation are not allowed to enter. (The fact that Chomsky claims to be dealing with "mind" and also claims that linguistics is a branch of "cognitive psychology" does not alter the picture). The basic "sign assumptions" (Salverda's term) underlying this study are:

1. A linguistic sign is a form-meaning complex. The relation of the form and the meaning parts of a sign is conventional (and not just arbitrary). A language is an open and dynamic process system, and the formation and interpretation of the existing and new signs follows from the system and is governed by social conventions.
2. A sign does not simply "stand for" an object or objects in the world. It acts more like a pointing finger (Haas 1951). But we retain Salverda's useful expression "Stand for-relation" as a technical term. "Signs and objects belong to different orders of reality, but in order to understand the one, we will always have to consult the other." (Salverda 1985:125).
3. Signs depend for their existence and functioning on a community of sign-givers and sign-users who create

and use signs according to shared conventions. To study a system of signs without any reference to this community of subjects is a totally misguided venture.

None of the three aspects mentioned above can be ignored by a student of a living language. It is when we start studying a system of linguistic signs in abstraction from its use and users that many problems (and pseudo-problems) arise in linguistics (and in philosophy, as Wittgenstein has argued). Language as an inter-organism phenomenon is thoroughly social.

"It is not correlation with things in the world by means of a curious mental mechanism that invests signs with their significance, but the rule-governed potentiality for use and its corresponding realization in actual use. Appreciating this short-circuits the appeal to the mental." (Baker and Hacker 1984:120).

Still more significant for comparative linguistics that respects the individuality of each language is the "stand for"-relation which was arbitrarily described as "arbitrary" and was excluded from linguistics by formalists, who naively assumed that a sign always unambiguously represents the object it stands for.

A linguist who is interested in all the three aspects of the sign will understandably reject the reified and alienated formalistic conception of language. But this also

implies the rejection of the possibility of his becoming a "scientist" of the formalists' dreams. He must be content with being an "ordinary grammarian". (Matthews 1981b).

"Ordinary grammarians are usually students of detail who are not under the delusion that rules of grammar are like laws of nature. They know that the limits of constructions may be indeterminate, and that particular collocations may be torn between one structure and another ... Only if we are not content with being ordinary grammarians, but are determined to ape a scientist's account of natural phenomena are we likely to imagine that ours actually is a subject, so that simple laws can be formulated. For the same reason, an ordinary grammarian will often welcome what a would-be scientist may see as no more than an 'ad hoc' explanation." (Matthews 1981b:172).

1.7.3 The ancient Indian theory and practice of grammar

There is nothing humiliating and disgraceful in being an ordinary grammarian. Pāṇini, regarded by linguists like Bloomfield as the greatest linguist who ever lived, was a perfect ordinary grammarian. A careful study of Pāṇini's methodology reveals that:

"He knows that he is not building a logical system where consistency is to be prized. He is rather discovering a system underlying the facts of language which strangely enough turns out to be of a heterogeneous nature and not

always amenable to explanation in terms of its units. Language is a system where elements are drawn from various sources and forged into a system by forces of time, space and numerous currents and cross currents of human behaviour. This frees him from the responsibility to stretching linguistic facts to conform to the Procrustean framework of thought in our terms of linguistic units alone. The prime task of a linguist, according to him, is to seek an explanation in terms of total human behaviour." (J.D.Singh 1971:263)

Whatever the shortcomings of Pāṇini's grammar (and there are some), he never ran away from the heterogeneous and complex reality of the living language. Most probably, he did not write about his grammatical theory. But there have been theoretical linguists like Patañjali (3rd century B.C.), Bhartrhari (5th century A.D.), and Nāgeśa (18th century A.D.) among his followers who have elaborately explicated his theory. The work of Bhartrhari is particularly important and remarkable. If we ignore his metaphysics, his belief that a study of grammar leads to salvation and his now quaint-sounding style, his views appear very modern. The following account of linguistic sign is indebted to Patañjali and Bhartrhari.

The best way to understand Pāṇini's views about the relation of the linguistic form with its meaning is to examine Whitney's (in)famous criticism of Pāṇini:

"Pāṇini does not take up cases as forms of nouns, setting forth the various uses of each, AFTER OUR MANNER; he adopts the VASTLY MORE DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS METHOD of establishing a theoretical list of modes of verbal modification by case, or of ideal case-relations (he calls them kāraka, 'factor' or 'adjunct'), to which he then distributes the cases. Almost as a matter of course, however, his case-relations or kāraka are not an independent product of his logical faculty but simply a reflection of the case forms; they are of the SAME NUMBER AS THE LATTER, and each corresponds to the GENERAL SPHERE OF A CASE ..." (Whitney 1972 (1893): 166. Emphasis added with CAPITALS).

Whitney is a typically old-fashioned American scholar addicted to unilinear thinking and getting confused and bewildered at a superior mind's dialectical thinking which he can neither accept nor dismiss or ignore. If the number of the kāraka relations is the same, the question arises, why did Pāṇini not follow "our" practice of starting straightaway with these case-forms? What was the point in adopting the "vastly more difficult and dangerous method"? He could have used Whitney's method of starting with the forms or Fillmore's method of starting with the "semantic" or "logical" case relations. Whitney realises, however, that in Pāṇini's grammar there is no one-to-one correspondence between a case-form and the kāraka relation it expresses. Only the meaning of each kāraka corresponds to the "general

sphere of a case-form", and Whitney dislikes this.

"As for the definitions of the case-relations, it may suffice to say that the karman is described as belonging first to that which the actor in his action especially desires to obtain or attain (as in "he makes a mat"...), or, second, to that which, though itself undesired or indifferent, is connected with the action in a similar manner. ANYTHING MORE CRUDE AND UNPHILOSOPHICAL THAN THIS COULD NOT WELL BE IMAGINED." (ibid.)

A wonderfully intelligent and learned man living in an age of intense intellectual and philosophical activity, Pāṇini certainly was not capable of "crude and unphilosophical" thinking. He must have been aware of the philosophical implications of what he was doing. But if meanings of words and of grammatical relations and categories are ill-defined and flexible (this does not mean "chaotic"), why should he deceive himself and others, in the interests of producing an "elegant" and "philosophical" grammar, that they are not? If he can account for the use of the forms of language in real life by this "crude and unphilosophical" method, why should he not use it?

This is the real Pāṇini. But since it was inconceivable to many modern linguists suffering from the monopolized delusion of "one true method" that a great linguist could have used a method totally different from their unilinear one, attempts were made by many scholars to mythologize

Pāṇini by arguing that he did in fact start with the extra-linguistic and logical case relations. Kiparsky and Staal's often-quoted paper (1969), for example, presents Pāṇini's system as a curious hybrid of Generative Semantics and Chomsky's Standard Theory. But such attempts, says Cardona, have grossly misrepresented Pāṇini.

"For any modern linguist confiding in such Sanskritists would come away with the impression that Pāṇini was at best a confused linguist, and at worst an exemplary of that much misused 'mystic' India. On the contrary, Pāṇini proceeded as any linguist would: he isolated the formal categories of the language necessary for a statement of rules capable of producing desired sentence and he also considered the semantic correlations of these categories. That he then introduced the semantic correlations directly in the definitions of the grammatical kāraka terminology is of interest. For in doing so Pāṇini accounted quite neatly for relations among sentences - though, note, not between positive and negative or declarative and interrogative - and the interrelations of paradigmatic case forms." (Cardona 1967:214. Emphasis added).

Clearly, there lies behind Pāṇini's formidable and algebraically formalized "monument of human intelligence" (Bloomfield's expression) a philosophy of the linguistic sign that is very different from Saussure's, Chomsky's and other formalists'.

First of all, Pāṇini takes the linguistic sign as a form-meaning complex seriously and does not simply pay a lip service to the notion as Saussure did, who simply said that linguistics is a branch of semiology but refused to face the implications of his own characterization of linguistics by ignoring the signified and the "stand for"-relation in actual practice. Pāṇini knows that while both the form and the meaning of the linguistic sign are significant, the relation between the two is indeterminate and flexible (but not arbitrary and chaotic). Language is a social phenomenon and, therefore, this relation is controlled by the language-using community's conventions.

"Linguistic structure (and meaning is a part of it) relies on usage and usage alone and therefore the relationship between word and meaning is an established one, it is not dependent on the whim of an individual speaker." (Misra 1970:4).

As for the "stand for"-relation, Pāṇini and his followers believed that since language is a social product it must be objective. Language has a being of its own. It depends on and reflects the real world but is not a copy or a picture of it. (Misra 1970, Coward 1980, Iyer 1969, Matilal 1971). Grammar is not accountable to any outside reality or to any system of logic other than its own. Moreover, a sign does not represent all aspects of reality but only a selected few. Bhartr̥hari's stand on this point is unambiguous:

"Words are based on cognitions which do not reveal the full reality and so present things in another form, not determined by their real form." (Vākyapadīya III.3.54).

"Verbal communication in the world is done with meanings of words fashioned by the mind, and in the science of grammar, it is the meanings adopted in the world on the basis of which the work (of explaining the forms) is done." (id. III.3.38).

"Since the universe which is a bundle of powers is always there in all its aspects, some power or other is intended to be conveyed in a particular context." (id. III.7.2)*.

Bhartrhari uses the expression "power" in the sense of "aspect". His views about the role of the signifying subject are also very clear. He says that within the limits imposed by the social convention, a speaker is free to employ language creatively because language is not simply a reflection of the independently existing reality. To a great extent the reality is cognized linguistically.

* Translation of Bhartrhari used in this study is taken from

Book I: Pillai 1971,
Book II: Iyer 1977,
Book III: Iyer 1971, 1974.

"The speakers impose on objects a form which is the creation of their own mind and thus difference of power is brought about." (id. III.7.6)

A linguist's business is to analyse the "meaning of words" (śabdārtha) and not the "meaning of things" (vastvartha). The Case Grammarian could have learnt a lesson from Bhartṛhari.

"As far as the birth of a son is concerned, both the parents are said to be agents. When one wishes, there can be a distinction and (then one would say): he, in her and she, from him." (id. III.7.19).

The choice of the grammatical agent or source or goal depends on the intention of the speaker. In "The sword cuts with its sharpness", the sword is the agent and sharpness is the instrument, but if the speaker wants to focus on and emphasize the sharpness, he can make it the agent and say "The sharpness of the sword cuts". (id. III.7.26). That this creative aspect of the use of language makes language thoroughly symbolical and metaphorical was always recognized by the ancient Indian linguists.

Words in isolation do not mean anything. They, like the universe they "stand for" are simply "bundles of powers". They have meaning potential only, and only a part of this meaning potential is conveyed when words are used.

"A word does not convey its meaning without its being employed (for it). It is considered that the relationship between the meaning and the word conveying it has utterance as its gateway." (id. II.399)

"Just as the eye serves for seeing only when directed (towards the object), so the word expresses its meaning only when it is purposefully uttered." (id. II.400).

A sentence has an organic unity. It is not simply a sum of its parts.

"It (i.e., the meaning of the sentence) is not really localized anywhere in the individual word-meanings or in the aggregate. (Only), it is apparently divided into the word-meanings." (id. II.438).

It is for the sake of analysis and for the teaching of grammar that we have to assume that the sentence can be meaningfully divided into its constituent words. In reality, there is no such division, either at the phonetic or at the semantic level.

We have been examining, so far, Pāṇini's and his followers' views about

1. the nature of the linguistic sign,
2. the nature of the "stand for"-relation,
3. the role of the signifying agent.

We find that not only are these views very different from those of the orthodox formalists but also that they never thought of separating the three aspects of the linguistic sign in theory or practice. They started neither with the disembodied meaning (there is no such thing for them) or with the language-independent "meaning of things" as many Case Grammarians and Generative Semanticists did nor with the mere distribution of forms only as many structuralists did. They knew that form and meaning are autonomous but to some extent only. So they started with form-meaning complexes, bearing in mind how these complexes are employed in real life by their speakers. Sentence, which is for them a unit of discourse rather than a unit of language code or resource, is the actual meaningful entity, and its meaning is created in social intercourse. Since language is a social resource, its rules and tendencies are governed by social conventions. These rules and tendencies not only constrain and restrain a speaker, so that communication may take place, but also provide great freedom for the play of human ingenuity and creativity, making language not only a powerful instrument of social intercourse but also a vehicle of great literature.

The analogy of the eye used by Bhartṛhari shows that he did not think that words actually "stand for" objects. They are more like a pointing finger (to use Haas's analogy). A pointing finger, says Haas,

"does not analyse a situation, it organizes it, or, more precisely, re-organizes it: it imparts to everything present in the situation a new distribution of

experinced entity, it determines a new focus of emphasis, it constitutes a new field of attention." (Haas 1951:153).

A word is able to do this because of its history and the accumulated semantic field or meaning potential, because of the role it has played in the life of the community and the individual user. Each word has ultimately its own unique semantic field which nevertheless shares many features with the semantic fields of other words. The unity of the sentence meaning arises from these shared features and novelty from the differences in the semantic fields. Each new use of a word enriches its semantic field.

"Entering a new sentence, a symbol contributes its meaning, i.e., the semantic field, which is the result of its previous uses; having been part of a new sentence, its meaning is changed - changed by the superimposition of the sentence-meaning upon the meaning with which it contributed towards it." (id. 162)

Since language is not an object but an open process structure which is maintained by humans in their socio-cultural intercourse, a language is never static. Forms, meanings and their interrelations are always evolving. Saussure's insight that a language is a system, and not just a collection of signs, as the Neogrammarians' practice implied, was indeed a very great one. But he could not

resist the gravitational pull of the traditional Homogenistic mindscape and the lure of scientism. (Here, we are referring to the published Saussure of the Cours. The real historical Saussure was perhaps somewhat different). The usefulness of his views is demonstrated by the tremendous success of the Prague phonology and the distinctive features approaches. (However, a totally non-reductionistic phonology is possible. Lindblom et al (1985) propose a rigorous and mathematical but dynamic variety of phonology which is diametrically opposed in spirit to the static structuralistic approaches). But since phonemes and their features are not signs and the phonological system of a language is relatively stable, this approach works. But when we come to the lexico-grammatical system of a language and its semantics, where change and emergence of novelty is the rule, the patent absurdity of the static and reductionistic approaches needs no pointing out. A change in any part of a dynamic self-organizing system forces a restructuring of the entire system, so that at any time such a system is tension- and contradiction-ridden. There are "structuring operations rather than structured inventory." (Ricoeur 1974:91).

It would be instructive to give a brief description of Bhartr̥hari's "model" of language here. Actually, this "model" is even older than Pāṇini and its roots go right upto the Vedic times. According to Bhartr̥hari, language

operates at the following three levels (Iyer 1969, Coward 1980):

paśyanti madhyamā vaikharī

The paśyanti ("seeing") level is the level of cognition. However, cognition itself, according to Bhartrhari, is linguistic.

"There is no cognition in the world in which word does not figure. All knowledge, as it were, is intertwined with the word." (Vākyapadīya I.110)

"It is through the word that the object is established." (id. I.115).

Here, we must remember that Bhartrhari is a grammarian who, instead of unskillfully poaching upon the territory of the philosopher as many modern linguists are doing, very explicitly says that philosophy is not his business. What counts as reality for a grammarian is the one established and organized by the language he analyses. At the paśyanti level, the words and their meanings are not yet differentiated. The next level is the madhyamā or the "middle" level. At this level buddhi (intellect) comes into play. Here, words and their meanings are differentiated, but not completely divorced, from each other. The semantic fields of individual words fuse organically and reality is

symbolized in language at this level. The vaikharī level is the phonetic level of the actually uttered phones and prosody.

It must be emphasized that all these levels are linguistic and that they interact organically (like different organs within a single organism), and not mechanically. There is no unidirectional causal flow or hierarchical control. One is not surprised to find that these levels are very similar to Halliday's semantic, lexicogrammatical and phonetic levels. The philosophies underlying the two approaches are very similar. Bhartrhari's semantics is neither "generative" nor "interpretive". Both these views are unilinear. On the other hand, Bhartrhari's views (like his intellectual ancestor Pāṇini's) are clearly dialectical. Each level controls and delimits the others. This is especially the case with the paśyantī and the madhyamā levels. The semantic system of a language is the "meaning of words", or the reality as symbolized and divided by the language and not the "meaning of things". A linguistic form, according to Bhartrhari, is a meaningful form. A meaningless phoneme is not a form. The semantic system is thoroughly social, and not individual. Language operates at the "worldly level", which is not enclosed within the "mind" of an individual speaker.

"The child and the scholar, when they are both at the worldly level, see things and communicate them.

Therefore, they are in the same position as far as cognition and words are concerned." (id. III.3.55).

The relationship between words and their meanings is "continuous". According to Patañjali, (quoted earlier), this basic assumption underlies the whole Pāṇinian system. But this "continuity" is not a fixed, everlasting, "steady state" but a "stream-like continuity" (pravāhanirantartā).

In the light of what we have said above, it becomes very clear why the ancient Indian linguists insisted that a grammarian should find his data in lokavyavahāra or the (linguistic) social intercourse. This view of language is very similar to Wittgenstein's, who insisted that since reality is a shadow of grammar there is harmony between the two and that both the grammar and the reality result from human action, a part of which is language as a form of life. (Hacker 1972: 145-184). It is only when we run away from the social reality of language, which is a "chaos not worth studying" by a linguist who is after elegant and mathematically perfect systems, that we create mythical abodes for the language myth. Whether such an abode is the mind of an ideal-speaker listener or a Platonic heaven makes little difference.

1.8 The place of syntax in grammar

1.8.1 Deautonomization of syntax

No one would deny the existence or importance, in grammar, of syntax in the sense of "putting words together" or "arrangement of words." But what is, in linguistic theory,

the place of syntax, which, according to Chomsky, should be "central" and "autonomous" in any grammatical theory? Many modern linguists, of course, disagree. Generative Semanticists denied this and, following the tradition, McCawley has opted for an "un-syntax", arguing that

"Syntax (is) largely a reflection of other things, e.g., morphology, logic, production strategies, principles of cooperation, etc." (McCawley 1980:186).

Obviously, McCawley (who goes rather too far) regards the list as an open one. Halliday is reluctant to use the term "syntax" and regards the "lexicogrammatical" system as the most central one. The most serious of the recent challenges, however, is Hudson's, who has elaborated his theory of Word Grammar (1984). At first sight, Hudson's views seem intriguing. There is no need, he argues, to refer to any items larger than single words or coordinated strings of words. The internal structure of a word can be generalized to act as the basis for generating syntactic structures, so that there is no fundamental distinction between "rules" and "lexical entries". The fact that Hudson lists Pāṇini (p. 16, 96) as one of his predecessors who practised "word grammar" is still more intriguing because we have the testimony of some ancient Indian linguists that Pāṇini regarded the sentence as the proper meaningful unit of grammatical analysis. However, he never explicitly says this in his grammar. The popular opinion (in the West, but also adopted

by many modern Indian linguists as well) is that he deals with the "forms of words only". The most intriguing fact, however, is that everybody is partly right! Our theoretical position, however, is that since the sentence is a linguistic unit (however difficult to define it may be), it is necessary to have a syntactic component in grammar. But an autonomous syntactic component or level is untenable.

Pāṇini does make use of the theoretical category of the sentence (vākya), but the sentence does not form the backbone of his system. We shall comment briefly on this in the next chapter. It appears that Pāṇini theoretically viewed the word and the sentence as belonging to different orders of linguistic reality: the word as belonging to the resource and the sentence to the use of language. (Mahavir 1984:59). Saussure's insight that the sentence belongs to the parole and not to the langue was correct. His mistake, however, was to ignore the dialectical relation between the langue and the parole and his (or perhaps his editors') insistence that only the langue should be the object of a science of language. (Since the concept of the langue is too static, we shall use the term 'resource'). A root word or an inflected word or a closely knit string of words has only meaning potential but no definite and well-defined meaning. This meaning potential includes its capacity to combine organically with other words to form phrases, clauses and sentences uttered by someone to another in a particular context to achieve certain ends. (An excellent analogy is the "genetic potential" of a female egg and a male sperm).

All the rules in Pāṇini's grammar involving the sentence (vākya) deal with the sentence-level prosody only. But he gives a metarule at the very beginning of the grammar part proper of his book (II.1.1) that all the subsequent rules apply to samartha words only. A samartha word is the one that is (or is capable of entering) in meaningful syntactic relations with other words in a sentence. (Mahavir 1984). It is clear that Pāṇini had in mind the most general and relatively central (or prototypical) part of the meaning potential of each word-form. The meaning potential of a word, it must be emphasized, includes its sāmarathya (i.e., the quality of being samartha). He dealt with "words and their forms" because certain very general meanings affect the morphology and the syntax of the word forms, which have the capacity to combine with other word-forms to make sentences. He would never have succeeded in following this programme if he had not regarded the sentence as the proper meaningful unit because

"It is on the level of the sentence that language says something; short of it, it says nothing at all."

(Ricoeur 1974:87).

A close scrutiny of Pāṇini's rules for assigning case-marking to the nuclear arguments kartr and karman shows that the "immediate syntactic relation" of these arguments with the inflected verb is significant. (Mahavir 1984:66). An "immediate syntactic relation" can obtain only within a

clause/sentence. This presupposes "syntactic" considerations in the narrower sense.

But still, the ancient Indian grammarians who dealt with Sanskrit did not set up in their grammatical theory or practice any "syntactic component" or "syntactic level" in the modern sense of the term. It may partly be because in Sanskrit, which is a highly inflected language, word-order was very "free" and nearly all the "syntactic" functions were served by "morphology". But as linguists they were too refined not to have any better reasons for not creating a "syntactic theory". More than a quarter of a century after the syntactic "revolution" in linguistics, we still do not know where to draw non-arbitrary boundary lines between lexis, morphology and syntax, or whether it is indeed advisable to draw such lines or whether it is preferable to use, as Halliday does, the concept of a lexicogrammatical system as the most central one and draw the lines only if it is useful to do so for analysing individual languages. Hudson, who denies that there is any fundamental distinction between syntactic rules and lexical entries is indeed close to Pāṇini and Halliday.

1.8.2 Non-autonomous syntax and Dependency Grammar

It is significant that many linguists who reject Chomsky's views about syntax also reject his Constituency Grammar and opt for some variety of Dependency Grammar. (Matthews 1981a, Hudson 1984, Van Valin and Foley 1984, Halliday 1985). We

deal with the two varieties of grammar in the next chapter. But it should be mentioned here that for a linguist who starts with form-meaning complexes, Dependency Grammar is the most natural (though not logically necessary or inevitable) choice. He does not need a hierarchy of nodes with the higher nodes controlling the lower ones. For him, grammar does not grow on trees. A Dependency Grammar is a completely horizontalized grammar which has only one syntactic "level" at which some linguistic units "depend upon" others, and units are linked to form clauses and sentences. This single lexicogrammatical level is simply itself; it is neither "deep" nor "shallow" nor "surface". All the "depth grammar" is located at this level. The real "depth grammar", according to Wittgenstein, does not lie beneath the surface but

"in the subtle articulation of the material of the language. There are no atemporal syntactic rules underlying the diversity of uses which can assimilate new cases to their pattern, but only the patterns of actual words and actions present to us as spatiotemporal phenomena." (Staten 1985:79-80).

It must be honestly admitted that the notion of the clause as a unit in grammar is highly problematic. The fact that some linguists have tried to manage by simply ignoring this fact or evaded the complexity of the issue by the terminological fiat of calling a clause a "primitive" does

not change the reality. There is in Punjabi, as we shall see, an additional complication created by serial verbs. The Constituency technique simply cannot handle the phenomenon without making the grammatical analysis messy beyond redemption. This technique presumes, without any justification other than translational equivalence, that a clause in every language has a certain structure (which is essentially the classical Subject-Predicate structure imposed on all languages). Our aim is to discover the structure (if any) of a Punjabi clause and to see if indeed it is useful to have the concept of the clause or the sentence in Punjabi grammar. So we have to use the Dependency technique. But more about this in Part II of this study.

1.9 An ordinary grammarian's science

If a living natural language really is what we have so far been saying it is, the validity, usefulness and explanatory power of the formalistic (whether the positivist-inductivist or the rationalist-deductivist varieties) is doubtful. Our view of language is perfectly in harmony with the emerging mindscape of modern science. Our concept of modern cosmology is based on the writings of modern scientists and not on those of philosophers of science (who have, sadly enough, been responsible in the past for directing many social scientists into the blind alley of obsolete scientism). If language is really creative and is an open process system

which is for ever evolving, it is presumptuous and foolish to try to model linguistics on a predictive or formal-deductive science. If we take science to be a search for the systems controlling the multifarious and dynamic reality (of language, in our case), then, of course, linguistics is a science. As a human science, linguistics has undeniable links with neurobiology, psychology, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, literary criticism etc. But if a linguist starts "setting problems" for neurologists and psychologists and claiming that his science can become a basis for a "universal grammar of faces", he not only invites the well-deserved ridicule upon himself but also brings his innocent colleagues into disrepute. (Cf. Baker and Hacker's treatment of the generative enterprise in linguistics as if it represented the whole profession). Since natural languages are far from being internally coherent and well-defined (but not chaotic, it must be emphasized) systems, their grammars, if they claim to be genuinely scientific, must reflect all this.

But such an approach is sure to invite the prompt charge of being "anti-theoretical". This is indeed a very serious charge because this part is an attempt at explicating the theoretical basis of the study. We must be very clear here about our own concept of a theory.

Toulmin (1982:239-240) points out that since the Greek times, theoria has been opposed to praxis in the traditional Western thinking. Adopting a non-participating spectator's viewpoint, armchairism and passion for axiomatic-deductive

and mathematical methods in science and philosophy have characterized the traditional theoretical thinking. From Plato to Descartes and thence to Popper, there has been an unbroken chain of theoretical philosophers and scientists. Their methods, it must be admitted, have succeeded remarkably well in the fields of physical sciences and mathematics. But whether this theoretical attitude is useful in social and human sciences is a well-known and hotly debated issue. There is no need to mention the arguments and the counter-arguments here. But as far as natural languages are concerned, there are only two options before a linguist: either to accept their true character and abandon all hopes of constructing a predictive and hypothetico-deductive science of linguistics whose theories are testable on Popperian lines, or construct an object for such a science. Predictably, the theoretical linguists in the traditional sense have adopted the latter alternative. Chomsky's latest pronouncements (Chomsky 1986) are worth quoting here. (His E-language is "externalized" or the actually spoken language and I-language is the language "internalized" by the speaker's "mind". Emphasis in all these quoted passages is added).

"The E-language that was the object of study in most of traditional or structuralist grammar or behavioural psychology is now regarded as an epiphenomenon at best." (Chomsky 1986:26).

"...E-languages are mere artefacts. We can define 'E-language' in one way or another or not at all, since the concept appears to play no role in the theory of language." (ibid.)

"Statements about I-language, about the steady state, and about the initial state S_0 are true or false statements about something real and definite, about actual states of the mind/brain and their components... Theories of E-language, if sensible at all, have some different and more obscure status because there is no corresponding real life object." (id. 26-27).

The shift towards the study of I-language, according to Chomsky, "a shift toward the commonsense notion of language." (id. 27).

These Platonistic auguries are nauseating enough to anyone interested in a wide variety of languages. But such beliefs are necessary for making linguistics a science capable of following the hypothetico-deductive and the formalistic methods. The traditional sense of theoretical science is exactly this, and therefore an ordinary grammarian of the variety mentioned above is anti-theoretical and a system of grammar capable of making "statistical predictions" only is unscientific by these standards.

But there is no reason on earth why the word 'theory' should retain for ever its traditional meaning. To many

linguists today a 'theory' simply means a dynamic set of ideas and presuppositions that guides, and is in dialectical relation with, their practice. It is also sometimes used in the sense of well-tested explanatory generalizations (capable of making statistical predictions) based on an analysis of data. The word is also used in some more slightly differing senses. But all these meanings are related and complementary. Let us say that there are two homophonous words 'theory', and let us spell the more traditional one with a capital 'T' as 'Theory'. Many eminent linguists today are anti-Theoretical, and if being Theoretical involves an acceptance of Chomsky's Platonistic aberrations mentioned above, they would proudly describe themselves as anti-Theoretical.

It has been cynically (but aptly) observed that the Law of Conservation of Ignorance is as universal as the Law of Conservation of Energy. More than half a century ago, logicians and mathematicians themselves blasted the pretensions of their axiomatic-deductive method. But most would-be scientists in the fields of social and human sciences have not heard about this. The cumulative result of the work of Gödel, Church, Turing and Tarski in the thirties is that no axiomatic system can be complete or can be guaranteed to be consistent or can be made to generate a description of the world which matches it fully, point by point. It either leaves unfillable holes or generates two contradictory deductions. When such contradictions turn up (as they invariably do sooner or later), such a system

becomes capable of proving anything and can no longer distinguish the true from the false. (Bronowski 1977:60). These limitations apply not only to formal systems but also to

"any system of thought which attempts to set up a basis of fundamental axioms and then to match the world by making deductions from them in an exact language - the language of physics, for example, or the chemical language inside the brain." (id. 59).

We can add Chomsky's " S_0 " or "the steady state" to the list because these, too, are exact languages. Bronowski (who was a good scientist and mathematician) draws a damaging conclusion:

"Tarski's theorem demonstrates, I think conclusively, that there cannot be a universal description of nature in a single, closed consistent language." (id. 60).

He adds:

"The unwritten aim that the physicists have set themselves since Isaac Newton's time cannot be formulated as an axiomatic, deductive, formal, and unambiguous system which is also complete." (id. 60-61).

Ironically enough, when the developments in mathematics and logic from which Bronowski draws these conclusions were taking place, linguists like Hjelmslev were trying to realise in linguistics "the unwritten aim". The formal models have cast such a strong spell on many linguists' minds that they are almost pathetically clinging to the view that languages ("really" or at some "deep" or "abstract" level) are in fact objects that are amenable to Theoretical (formal and axiomatic-deductive) treatment.

Nothing more need be said about the charge that ordinary grammarians are anti-theoretical. If we use the word "linguistic theory" (with a small 't') to mean a set of ideas and assumptions gained by the past and the present experience in the profession to guide future practice and a set of explanatory generalizations, no grammarian has ever been anti-theoretical. But as far as Theory (with a capital 'T') is concerned (as discussed above), many linguists have consciously decided to be anti-Theoretical. So the accusation is defused.

A really modern and forward-looking science of linguistics must be an anti-Theoretical science practised by ordinary grammarians studying natural languages individually and comparatively, pooling their findings and developing their ideas, generalizations and guiding principles. The dialectical relation between theory (with a small 't') and practice must be maintained at all levels and at all times. In an age such as ours, when the world is shrinking, many Western scholars find it hard and painful to give up the

traditional thinking and come to terms with the bewildering diversity of the world cultures and languages which the changing times are thrusting upon their attention. (Most of them vehemently resist the very suggestion that this is the case with them). Until now the traditional Greek thinking that the categories of thought are universal and only their expression differs in the individual languages has kept most philosophers and linguists comfortable. They either kept their thinking confined within the limit of their own culture or looked at other cultures through ethnocentric glasses. Anyone who has studied the grammars of the non-European languages written during the past two hundred years by European scholars and their followers knows how they distorted those languages to fit them into the preconceived "universal" (=European) categories. Typically, sentences exemplifying these categories were taken from English or French and were translated into the language under investigation. The translation was supposed to represent those categories too. (As if the categories were language-independent Platonic objects which get incarnated in the individual languages!) The translational equivalent of the subject of the English sentence was also the "subject" in the target language sentence; if the English sentence was in the past tense, its translation in the target language was also in the "past tense", and so on. The question whether or not a category had any system-internal justification was almost never asked.

The main reason behind this practice appears to be the principal guiding metaphor of the traditional folk linguistics of Western Europe. Reddy (1979) lists four aspects of this metaphor:

1. Language functions like a conduit, transferring thoughts bodily from one person to another;
2. in writing and speaking, people insert their thoughts or feelings in the words;
3. words accomplish the transfer by containing the thoughts and feelings and conveying them to others;
4. in listening or reading, people extract the thoughts and feelings once again from words." (Reddy 1979:290).

Reddy gives hundreds of the most common English expressions exemplifying this "conduit metaphor". This metaphor is so pervasive that it represents the "unmarked" thinking of the speakers of many languages. This metaphor combined with the ancient thinking that the categories of thought are universal not only gave us the variety of grammars we have just mentioned but has also made many Western scholars allergic to the very suggestion that different languages conceptualize the reality differently. In such circles, "Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis" is a term of abuse. The argument that the possibility of translation refutes this "hypothesis" has been repeated for decades by those who have no practical experience of translating from one language into a very dissimilar one (from German to Chinese, for

example). Every translator who has had this experience knows that each language uses its lexical, grammatical and prosodic resources in its own ultimately unique way to perform ideational, interpersonal and textual functions (to use Halliday's terminology). Very often, the situation is tragi-comical. Speaking of a translation of Hegel into Chinese, Graham observes:

"It is curious to watch Chinese translators struggling to reproduce Western fallacies in a language which, whatever its defects, does not permit one to make these peculiar mistakes." (Graham 1967:35-36)

This is indeed a sardonic commentary on the claim that the categories of thought are universal and are simply "expressed" in different languages.

But old habits, especially those for which the traditional mindscape is responsible, are difficult to change. Any theoretical programme that appeals to the traditional prejudices and fears such as the "Cartesian Anxiety" and promises "abstract" universals which are ultimately Euramerican is likely to attract fervent and fanatical followers in the West. But the number of those linguists all over the world who take language diversity seriously and refuse to swallow the Theorist's opiate is also rising. Like other scholars who are ahead of their times, Sapir and Whorf (especially the latter) slightly misunderstood the relation between language and thought

(or perhaps could not properly express themselves). But their living legacy will go on haunting linguists and inspiring thoughts such as:

"Having blindly and stubbornly turned their backs on ethnic diversity for more than a century and a half - and begrudgingly obliged to accept the phenomenal national resurgence - it is small wonder that many linguists are inclined to ignore the equally repugnant linguistic divergence ... For such self-deluded scholars the dilemma is a real one, and it dogs their steps incessantly... It appears that language diversity will continue indefinitely to remain a horrendous specter hovering over the field of linguistic study till scholars approach the subject with fewer illusions and a greater sense of reality." (Jessel 1978:101-102).

The grandest illusion that many linguists are suffering from is that they can make linguistics a Theoretical science by shutting out all inter- and intralanguage diversity.

CHAPTER II

SOME FUNDAMENTAL THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

An enquiry into language must proceed "genetically": this does not mean that we must pursue its temporal genesis and seek to explain its development by specific empirical-psychological "causes", but that we must recognize the finished structure of language as something derived and mediated, which we can understand only if we are able to reconstitute it out of its factors and determine the type and direction of these factors.

- Cassirer (1955:159)

The universal syntax is a human way of analysing experience, not of putting together sentences.

- Bronowski (1977:148)

2.0 Introduction

This chapter aims at introducing some fundamental theoretical concepts used in Part II of this study, and not at developing a rigid system of categories or a theoretical framework into which the data are to be unilinearly fitted. As explained in Chapter I, a theoretical system means to us a flexible set of ideas, concepts and categories derived by the past and the present linguists from their experience of analysing and explaining phenomena in a wide variety of languages and a set of explanatory generalizations based on their analyses. Since the work of science never comes to an end, such generalizations are always tentative and are meant to guide and inform further research, in the light of which they are liable to modification or even total abandonment. In Chapter I, we dealt with the grammatical theory (in our sense and with a small 't') of Pāṇini and Bhartṛhari because many of their theoretical ideas guide the present study.

There is also an additional reason for adopting the theoretical ideas of these linguists. As will become clear in Part II, Punjabi has retained some semanto-syntactic features of Sanskrit. Here, Bhartṛhari's views assume great significance. His mother tongue was some Apabhraṃśa dialect. (If he is the same person as Bhartṛhari (modern Punjabi pronunciation pār^ht^hərī) of numerous Punjabi folk tales, he spoke some variety of the North-Western Apabhraṃśa which later on became Punjabi). At the Apabhraṃśa stage, the Indic languages had become sufficiently "analytic" and many of the

characteristic features of the modern Indic languages, such as serial-verb constructions and the use of spatial postpositions for case-marking, had started appearing. Some of the observations Bhartṛhari and later grammarians make about Sanskrit apply more to the modern Indic languages than to Sanskrit. (In classical Sanskrit itself, there are many constructions which are literal translations from the contemporary vernaculars). For example, Bhartṛhari's concept of an action which is a part of the meaning of the verb:

"a collection of parts produced in a sequence and mentally conceived as one and identical with parts which are subordinate to it," (Vākyapadīya III.8.4),

applies more to the modern Indic languages than to Sanskrit. No better description of the semantics of a serial-verb construction has ever been given. Similarly, concepts like "fruit of action", "substratum of the fruit of action" (phalāśraya) etc., used by Bhartṛhari's followers like Kaunḍa, Nāgeśa and others, are as useful for an analysis of Punjabi as they are for Sanskrit. The spatial metaphor of the "fruit of action" moving from the "substratum of the activity" (kartṛ or Actor) to the "substratum of the fruit of action" (karman or Undergoer) is very explicit in the modern Indic languages, in which case-marking postpositions translatable as "to" and "from" and auxiliaries literally translatable as "go", "come", "give", "take", "throw", etc. work in perfect harmony. If the native speaker's intuitions

are significant (and hardly anyone would question this), the grammatical theories of the ancient Indian linguists are indispensable for any linguist who is seriously interested in the grammatical structure of the modern Indic languages.

However, it should be made clear that everything that Bhartr̥hari said is not uncritically accepted here. For example, his rather extreme view that the sentence is the only meaningful linguistic unit and that words are only unreal abstractions and fictions is unacceptable. He seems to have held a strongly pragmatic, instrumental and situational view of meaning. For example, he says that the sentence "The tiger eats any child who cries", when spoken to a child, means "Don't cry" and that "Look at the sun" may actually mean "It's late". (Vākyapadīya II.312, 322. Cf. Collinge 1985:39). If we take into account such "conversational implicatures" (Grice 1975), it is impossible to disagree with Bhartr̥hari. But most grammarians believe that words as lexical units do have their meaning potential, though the well-known difficulties of setting up the word as a grammatical unit apply as much to Punjabi as to English. Moreover, a word (in Punjabi at least) is a phonological unit because some phonological processes such as tone generation, spreading of nasality, stress-assignment, vowel-gemination etc. apply to a phonological unit which is most often identical with what is semantically regarded as a word. (Bhardwaj 1980). Pāṇini seems to have been aware of this. But Bhartr̥hari, unlike Pāṇini, was not a phonologist. Such considerations apart, a great deal of what Bhartr̥hari

says is extremely useful for an understanding and analysis of the syntax and semantics of Punjabi. In this study, we deal with the comparatively literal meaning, without taking into consideration the conversational implicatures of the extreme type such as those in the examples from Bhartrhari. But it must be admitted that it is very difficult in actual practice to separate the literal meaning from the implicature. It is a more-or-less rather than a yes-or-no matter. We do not make any distinction between the sentence-meaning and the utterance-meaning of the Bhartrharian variety because we shall not be dealing with the latter, although we admit that the latter is not in any way unworthy of serious study. Moreover, we use the term sentence to mean both a clause and a sentence. When further specification is needed, a sentence can be described as simple or compound or complex or mixed.

2.1 The sentence as a symbolic vignette of a situation

Bhartrhari's view about what a sentence is about is very simple:

"The observer watches the play of forces in the universe, understands them and gives expression to them in words. As a speaker, he has a certain amount of liberty in describing what he understands. He uses sentences to describe it. The normal sentence expresses a complex meaning in which some action or process is

the central element and the concrete objects which co-operate in accomplishing the process are the other elements associated with it. Normally, it is the verb which expresses the central element and the nouns express the other elements. The other kinds of words like adverbs and adjectives denote some peculiarity in the elements expressed by the verbs and the nouns." (Iyer 1969:284. Emphasis added).

A sentence is only a symbolic vignette of a situation, which has innumerable aspects (or "powers" as Bhartṛhari would call them). Only a few aspects are selected by a speaker for linguistic expression. Broadly, the aspects thus selected can be classified under the following heads:

1. dik ("direction")
2. sādhana ("means" or "accessories")
3. kriyā ("action")
4. kāla ("time")

In other words, a sentence presents some action or process which is viewed as "a particular mode of behaviour on the part of the accessories" (kāraḥkāṇām pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ) and which is spatio-temporally located. (ibid. 330). It is important that Bhartṛhari uses the term dik ("direction") and not ākāśa ("space"). The "means" or kāraḥ (literally, "do-ers") are symbolically viewed as spatially related and the result of the action is viewed as moving or not moving

from the kartr (Actor) to the karman (Undergoer). Hence the use of the term dik.

In the passage quoted from Iyer, we emphasize some expressions. The speaker enjoys a certain amount of freedom within the social conventions and the limits of intelligibility in linguistically symbolizing the reality. One and the same aspect of the situation may be viewed as a process (as in 'John cooks') or as a "means" (as in John's cooking pleases me').

"Speaking of something as the means is a matter of the speaker's intention. Difference in things, whether real or unreal, is conceived by the intelligence." (Vākya-padiya III.7.3).

"That which was action before becomes the means in the next stage." (id. 16-17).

The "means" can play various roles, such as the agent, the patient, the instrument, the goal, the source, etc. To some extent, the speaker is free to assign the kāraka roles to the persons of the objects involved. We have already seen Bhartṛhari's unforgettable observation that in the act of procreation both the parents, biologically speaking, are agents, but linguistically one of them can be viewed as the agent and the other as the source or the goal. It is with the reality as linguistically symbolized that a grammarian is concerned.

An "action" (kriyā) is not simply a process, particular or general, but a particular mode of behaviour of the accessories. (Iyer opp. cit. 330). Typically,

"What is called action is a collection of parts produced in a sequence and mentally conceived as one and identical with parts which are subordinate to it." (Vākyapadīya III.8.4).

"Verbs express things in that condition (that is, having sequence, nouns, on the other hand, operate as though suppressing this sequence." (id. III.8.29).

In the science of grammar,

"The action-part of the meaning of a sentence is first picked out because of its primacy. The nominal accessories used to effect the object-to-be accomplished (i.e., the verbal action) are (therefore) secondary." (id. I.427).

Bhartrhari's grammar, like Pāṇini's in India and Thrax's and Priscian's in the Graeco-Roman world, is verb-centred.

2.2 The valency theory

Coming to the modern verb-centred approaches to syntactic analysis and description, revived in the modern times largely by Tesnière (1953, 1959), we find that many valency-

based analyses proceed exactly as Bhartrhari says.

Tesnière's great insight was that some nominal accessories can be regarded, for various syntactic purposes, as being more intimately connected than others with the action/process-denoting verb. He called such nominals the "actants" of the verb. The other nominals are "circonstants". The number of the "actants" a verb has is the valency of that verb. There are many problems with this theory. Some of these problems are discussed in part II. In this study, which is verb-centred and makes use of the insights of the various valency theories, we adopt Foley and Van Valin's (1984) concepts:

NUCLEUS	[verb(s), in our case]
CORE	[NUCLEUS+"actants" or nuclear arguments]
PERIPHERY	["circonstants" or non-nuclear arguments (+adverbials)]

The main attraction, for us, of Foley and Van Valin's framework (which is not uncritically accepted here) is that they seriously deal with serial-verb constructions, which are found widely in many genetically unrelated and geographically non-contiguous languages. Their analysis of these constructions is, by and large, applicable to Punjabi, although they do not deal with any Indian language in their treatment of the phenomenon. Their semantic interpretation of these constructions is not incompatible with Bhartrhari's (and Cassirer's, as we shall see) although they do not

mention him anywhere. According to Foley and Van Valin, serial-verb constructions involve JUNCTURES at the NUCLEAR and/or CORE layers. As we shall see in Part II, this accounts for a great deal of the semantics of such constructions in Punjabi.

In a serial-verb construction, verbs or verb-forms with different valencies may enter. Since this construction has one complex nucleus or core (so that the sentence is simple or monoclausal) the valency of the complex nucleus can be affected in rather complex ways by the interaction of the valencies of the member verbs. This is the theoretically most interesting part of the Punjabi grammar. A full chapter in Part II is devoted to this.

Like many other unrelated languages (e.g., Japanese and Turkish), Punjabi has causative verb-forms. It also has the more interesting anti-causative verb-forms. The increase or the decrease of valency both as a result of causativization/anti-causativization and as a result of verb-serialization is one of the most fascinating complexities of the Punjabi grammar. The phenomenon of causativization in Hindi received some attention from linguists in the recent past. Their findings are by and large applicable to Punjabi because the two languages are very similar and mutually intelligible. But anti-causativisation is not found in Hindi. Valency-variation as a result of verb-serialization and its semantic implications, as far as Punjabi and other Indian languages are concerned, remains virtually a virgin field of enquiry.

It is not enough in a grammatical theory simply to consider the valency (in numerical terms) of a verb(-form) and to say whether the verb is zero-valent or monovalent or bivalent, and so on. It is also important to take into consideration the semanto-syntactic role of the "actants". So it is the concept of the valency-set (Lyons 1977:487) that is needed. Verbs in both (1) and (2) below are bivalent.

(1) Fido saw me.

(2) Fido became (an) expert.

But the valency-set of (1) is SUBJECT, OBJECT and that of (2) is SUBJECT, PREDICATIVE. (Allerton 1982:145).

We shall argue in Part II that the categories "subject" and "object" are unnecessary for an analysis of Punjabi. We need semanto-syntactic categories useful for an analysis of Punjabi and not the supposedly universal semantic categories like Fillmore's cases or syntactic categories like the Relational Grammarians' "subject" and "object". Whether or not there are universal categories is a question for the "God's truth" linguists. The approach adopted here is frankly a "hocus pocus" one. We need categories which may account for the Punjabi phenomena like the so-called split ergativity, passive-like constructions, the grossly misunderstood and mythologized "dative subject" and some other phenomena. Pāṇini's kartr and karman etc. are the most suitable for our purpose. But since we have borrowed some

concepts from Foley and Van Valin, their ACTOR and UNDERGOER as "macroroles" (and as equivalents, in our framework, of kartr and karman respectively) can also be adopted. These "macroroles", in their framework,

"constitute an interface between syntactic relations such as subject and semantic relations such as case roles or thematic relations. We assume actor and undergoer to be universal semantic relations, and as such part of the grammar of every language." (Foley and Van Valin 1984:32).

In our framework, these macroroles are semanto-syntactic, and not simply semantic or syntactic. They are not to be confused, respectively, with the agent and the patient or with the subject and the object. In order to avoid confusion, we spell the words Actor and Undergoer with the initial capitals. This study deals with Punjabi. So whether or not these macroroles are universal is irrelevant here. We adopt and adapt these categories for our own purpose. As we emphasize again and again, one of our fundamental assumptions is that human languages are highly symbolical and metaphorical and their speakers are creative and enjoy considerable freedom in symbolizing the reality. Foley and Van Valin do not explicitly recognize this. One of the criticisms of Current Approaches to Syntax (Moravcsik and Wirth eds. 1980), which contained an earlier version of Foley and Van Valin's theory, called Role and Reference Grammar (Van Valin and Foley 1980), was that

"Figurative language, idiomaticity, and semantic extensions are totally ignored. Nobody considered the possibility that these pervasive phenomena might provide the key to understanding grammatical structure - that the optimal theory of syntax might be one which takes these phenomena as fundamental (rather than pathological), and gives a unified account of both these and 'normal' grammatical constructions." (Langacker 1982b: 411).

Langacker's complaint that the theories under review displayed

"certain communal reluctance to take the surface evidence of linguistic form seriously, in its own terms, and to ask certain obvious and natural questions", (ibid.),

does apply to Foley and Van Valin's 1984 framework as well. For example, they say that the subject NP is actor in (3) and undergoer in (4) below:

(3) Mary swam for an hour.

(4) The janitor suddenly became ill. (p. 29).

The reason they give is that Mary in (3) is wilful and intending participant and thus the actor but the janitor in

(4) simply experiences or undergoes a change of state. (p. 29). We leave aside the question whether or not this is a true analysis of the English NPs for explaining the formal syntactic peculiarities of English. The trouble, however, is that Foley and Van Valin claim that these macroroles are applicable to all languages. This implies that their defining criteria (wilfulness etc.) should also be of universal validity. This, as we shall see, is not the case in Punjabi. In the Punjabi equivalents of both (3) and (4) the equivalents of the subject NPs are Actors. If case-marking, verb-agreement and other phenomena in all types of constructions indicate that the language symbolizes both Mary and the janitor as actors, considerations such as wilfulness become irrelevant for that particular language. If we learn any lesson from the confusions into which Case Grammar got itself entangled (cf. Cruse 1973), it is simply this: we cannot set up any universal semantic criteria to define the nuclear and the non-nuclear arguments of verbs. The symbolizing (paśyanti) stage is also language-specific. (This is not to deny certain universal tendencies). In the Sanskrit sentence

(5) aṅkuro jāyate

"The sprout is born."

("Middle voice" in Sanskrit),

the sprout must be regarded as an Actor (or kartr in the Pāṇinian system) for the purpose of accounting for the

formal characteristics of the sentence in terms of the grammar of the language, in spite of the fact that it comes into existence as a result of the very process of which it is symbolized as an Actor. Since each language has finite resources in the form of lexicon, grammatical patterns and prosodic means and the uses to which these resources are to be put are infinite, these resources must have very general meanings, and therefore the symbolical and metaphorical uses of these resources must necessarily be resorted to. Ordinary speakers cannot afford the luxury of being scientists. They treat the sprout as if it were the agent. Incidentally, a botanist speaking Sanskrit would have to use (5) whether he liked it or not. There is nothing common in the "coming" of a train and the "coming" of the summer season. If we started setting up case-roles on such delicate semantic considerations, the number of such roles would be infinite. Langacker's view that the surface evidence of the linguistic form should be taken seriously cannot be over-emphasized.

2.3 The transitivity theory

In some Punjabi constructions, the Actor NP is marked with the postposition tō ("from") or nū ("to"). But the Undergoer NP may also be marked by nū in some other constructions. Very often, the Actor or the Undergoer NP is marked by the absence of a postposition. (We shall call it zero-marking and symbolize it with \emptyset). A zero-marked NP also agrees with the verb (or some of the verbs) in the nucleus. tō and nū are

definitely spatial postpositions and are used as such elsewhere in the language. Many native speakers feel that the NP that agrees with the verbal nucleus is somehow more central and more intimately linked with the action expressed by the verb. These are the facts that any respectable grammatical theory must explain and not just explain away as nothing more than "surface structure" or "morphological" facts. The phenomenon of the verb agreeing with the Undergoer in an "active" construction is known as ergativity. Punjabi is said to have "split ergativity" because the verb does not agree with the undergoer in all the "active" constructions. (We are using the term "active" within quotation marks because the distinction between the "active" and the "passive" voices is not very clear-cut in Punjabi). This "split ergativity", with its connotations that the system is somehow internally inconsistent or incoherent, needs thorough examination. Internally incoherent and inconsistent systems are possible. But does Punjabi have such a grammatical system? We reject at the very outset the suggestion and the argument that Punjabi is "morphologically ergative" but "syntactically accusative" or that ergativity in Punjabi is a "superficial surface structure phenomenon." In the theory we have been developing so far, there is nothing that is "merely morphological". The theoretical views that lie behind such reasoning are pretty discredited now. The distinction between what is syntactic and what is morphological is a totally arbitrary one.

For us tō and nū as case-markers are spatial postpositions as they are elsewhere in the language. Modern linguists have started realizing that human languages are highly symbolical and metaphorical. (Langacker 1976, Lakoff and Johnson 1980, and many others). There are honourable linguistic traditions started by Patañjali in India and Planudes in the West which are committed to the position that grammatical case-relations are basically spatial metaphors. Many modern linguists believe that most, if not all, case relations in natural languages can be viewed thus. (Cf. Anderson 1971, Lyons 1977, Collinge 1980). We shall discuss this "localist hypothesis" in Part II. Suffice it to say here that viewing transitivity in terms of the "fruit of action" passing on to the Undergoer is an excellent explanation for some semanto-syntactic phenomena in Punjabi. If a grammarian's object language uses spatial metaphors, why shouldn't his meta-language do so? This dik ("direction") aspect of the Punjabi grammatical metaphorization is fully explored in part II.

But there is also the kāla ("time") aspect of transitivity. Punjabi, like most other South Asian and South-east Asian languages, is an aspect-prominent language. It pays more attention to whether or not an action is (actually or potentially) completed than to relating the action to another (and outside) point in time. A detailed treatment of the Punjabi TMA (tense, mood, aspect) system is reserved for Part II. But it should be mentioned here that a completed action implies that the "fruit of action" has

passed on to the Undergoer if there is any Undergoer in the valency set of the verb. This partly accounts for the "split" ergativity and the peculiarities of case-marking in Punjabi. In this way, the situation-internal kāla (aspect) and the situation-external kāla (tense) enter the picture.

This is, in an outline form, the intricate interaction of dik, kāla, kriyā and kāraka, the four "powers" suggested by Bhartṛhari, "a most intriguing figure in the profession" of linguistics (Collinge 1985:34). Within the limits imposed by the grammar and the social conventions, the speaker is free to manipulate these "powers" to achieve his communicative ends. A speaker of Punjabi can refer to the same non-linguistic situation in one of the following ways:

- (6) mē kḷṛī toṛī
 I clock broken
 "I broke the clock."

- (7) mɛt^hō kḷṛī tʊt gəɪ
 me-from clock having-broken gone
 (Roughly) "The clock got broken by me."

The non-linguistic "agent" NP in (7) lies outside the valency set of the complex nucleus formed by two monovalent verbs, whose single argument is the clock. We must regard this NP symbolically as an Actor NP for the purpose of explaining (in our sense) the form of the sentence. Wilfulness, animacy etc. are irrelevant considerations. The

meaning of the auxiliary ja "go" is simply a semantic extension of that of the lexical ja . (This point is argued at length in a later chapter). If the valency set of the lexical monovalent ja is the ACTOR, this is the case with the auxiliary ja too. Grammatically, "me-from" is simply a source NP that is symbolically an unwitting source of an event that happened accidentally. Whether or not this is true or whether or not the speaker follows the Gricean maxim of quality (i.e., is sincere) are immaterial. In (6) "I" is the Actor and lies within the valency set of the bivalent verb. Even a child knows that by uttering (6) he invites punishment or rebuke and that (7) may save him. In this way we find that there is no dividing line between what is morphological or syntactic, or semantic or pragmatic. All these "components" are inextricably mixed. Indian grammarians from Pāṇini onwards, who believed in studying language in terms of total human behaviour, were always ready to take into account all such and many other types of factors. The argument that (6) "underlies" (7) or that both are derived from the same "abstract" semantic structure is a purely arbitrary one unless the usefulness of such reasoning in explaining the formal properties of the constructions is demonstrated. That the two sentences have "truth conditionally" the same meaning may be of interest to a logician, but such considerations are irrelevant for a grammarian. The question whether it is the semantic or the pragmatic or the syntactic considerations that are "basic" and "control" others or which of these "components" is

central are misleading questions. (It is like asking whether the brain controls the working of the heart by controlling the movements of its muscles or whether the heart controls the working of the brain by supplying it blood. And to ask whether it is the heart or the brain that is more basic would be sheer madness). Only those who think in mechanistic and unilinear terms ask such questions.

2.4 The genesis of the sentence

Above, we quoted Cassirer saying that an enquiry into language must proceed genetically in the sense that "we must recognize the finished structure of language as something derived and mediated, which we can understand only if we are able to reconstitute it out of its factors and determine the type and direction of these factors." We have seen in the Punjabi sentences partly analysed above that these factors which determine the phonetic form of a sentence are numerous and their interaction is always complicated. According to the theoretical views we have been elaborating, diagrams with boxes (representing "components") connected with arrows representing unidirectional or even bidirectional causal flows present a falsified picture of the genesis of the sentence. But these factors should at least be classified in order to establish some sensible order. Halliday's Ideational (symbolizing the reality), Interpersonal (dealing with the social dimension) and Textual (maintaining coherence and cohesion in discourse) components is such an

attempt. (Halliday 1978, and other writings). These are the factors which enter the picture. Bhartr̥hari's paśyanti, madhyamā and vaikhari stages represent the direction. These linguists attempt to build models or maps. They would never claim that the components they set up can be neatly separated by analysis any more than the various genes determining the physical features of a man can be identified and attributed to his various ancestors. A sentence is always a part of a linguistic discourse and is a microcosm of that discourse. So the textual function it has to perform must be reflected in its morphology, syntax and, more conspicuously, in its prosody. The linguistic discourse is a part of the socio-cultural intercourse. So the relations between or among the interlocutors and the sociocultural ends to be achieved must also be reflected in the form of the sentence. (Cf. the Punjabi examples given above). The textual and the interpersonal factors can influence the way the speaker ideationally symbolizes the reality at the paśyanti stage itself. The way the speaker selects the aspects of the reality in terms of "direction", "time", "action" and "means" may partly be influenced by the textual and the interpersonal factors. At the madhyamā stage, processes like case-marking, verb-agreement, and other morphological processes and word-order, insofar as it performs syntactic functions, are also partly determined by all the three functions. At the vaikhari or the phonetic stage, the interaction and dialectical relation between word-order and prosody also shows an intricate interplay of the various components.

The picture we have outlined above is simply a model designed to make sense of the complicated phenomenon of language. No claim as to its psychological reality is made. The three stages postulated by Bhartr̥hari are not temporally ordered, or, indeed, may not be there at all. The model is set up for the sake of an analysis and explanation of the forms of the language. An explanatory analysis of a sentence, for us, is the one that demonstrates that the structure of the sentence is such that its parts fit harmoniously into it according to the symbolical conventions that the language as a whole uses to perform its various functions. (Following Halliday, we have decided to concentrate on three). Additionally, the sentence must be shown to fit harmoniously into the linguistic and the socio-cultural discourse. (The two are not ultimately different, but we have to proceed as if they were). "Fitting harmoniously" means being an immediately obvious and integral part. There are problems, it must be admitted, with concepts like "fitting harmoniously" and "immediately obvious and integral part". But, then, there are problems with (and certainly problems can be created for) any theoretical concept in heaven and earth. The rest of this study is an exemplification of the theory (with a small 't') elaborated in this part.

2.5 Form versus meaning

We have always emphasized that a linguist must, ultimately, account for and explain the forms of his object language or

of human languages in general. All his forays into fields like sociology, anthropology, psychology, biology and any other field must be motivated and guided by this primary purpose. Arguments of the "scientific" Theorists (i.e., those with unilinear thinking) apart, a grammarian who is seriously interested in explaining the forms of a single language without worrying too much about logical niceties knows that he must

"take into account both form and meaning. There clearly must be some kind of semantic basis to the concept ..., yet at the same time precisely what is to be handled within that concept will depend on the formal features of the language being described.... In this sense the formal analysis is more basic; it allows us to set some fairly clear limits. Yet a formally defined category will contain some semantically heterogeneous items." (Palmer 1979:2).

In Chapter I, we saw that this is exactly how Pāṇini proceeded. And this is how we proceed in this study. The meaning of a form may roughly be described as the role it plays in the immediate larger context and beyond. When we study the individual word-forms, we study only the samartha forms, as Pāṇini did. A controversy has been going on for more than two thousand years as to in what sense Pāṇini uses the term samartha in the metarule II.1.1 in his grammar. (Mahavir 1984). This Sanskrit word is derived by joining sam

("together") and artha ("business", "work", "aim", "purpose", "cause", "meaning", etc.). It is used in the sense of "adapted", "fit", "proper", "suitable", "qualified", "competent", "connected in meaning" etc. All these meanings are related. Following Mahavir, we can say that Pāṇini's grammar deals with only those words which are samartha or in "immediate syntactic relation" with other words. (p.6). There are rules in Pāṇini's grammar, for example those dealing with case-marking of the nouns by affixes in Book III, which clearly presuppose the use of the nouns concerned as arguments of a verb in a larger structure. In other words, even a study of the word-forms in isolation presupposes their use (at least potential) in a sentence. Words in isolation (stored in the lexicon) are no more than ghosts of their former usage. It is only when they are actually used in sentences that they become "competent", "adapted" and "connected in meaning" by delimiting and highlighting the relevant aspects of one another's semantic fields and meaning (or behaviour) potential. One cannot be a very strict Hudsonian Word Grammarian in the sense that mere consideration of words and their concatenated strings will not do. Some organizational principles must be there and we must discover them. We may not call them the "higher level" principles in the hierarchical sense. The word "level" in expressions like "syntactic level", "semantic level" etc., which are commonly employed by linguists these days, is used by us in non-hierarchical sense. Our grammar is completely horizontal. As far as Punjabi is concerned,

these organizational principles are discussed in Part II. But it is necessary to mention here that we study word-forms with syntactic implications and sentences (viewed as organically composed of words) with discursal implications in mind.

2.6 The social semiotic

The context of discourse and situation is a part of, but does not constitute by itself, the total human behaviour. A language is part of a culture, which is a socio-historical phenomenon. Thus a language is a part of a social semiotic, which is

"a system of meanings that constitute the 'reality' of the culture. This is the higher level system to which language is related; the semantic system of language is a realization of the social semiotic. There are many other forms of its symbolic realization besides language; but language is unique in having its own semantic stratum." (Halliday 1978:123).

The other forms of realization of the social semiotic are art, religion, science, literature, mythology, etc. Halliday correctly says that the meaning potential of language as a resource should be studied in the context of the culture as a whole. If the meaning potential which a grammarian discovers in the lexical, grammatical and prosodic resources

of a language does not fit harmoniously into the culture as a whole, his grammatical analysis is suspect. For example, atomization of time (viewing an action as a sum of its parts arranged temporally) symbolized by the serial-verb constructions in the modern Indian languages (which belong to more than three families) is also found in many schools of philosophy and in the writings of many scientists, mathematicians and poets in India. Moreover, this phenomenon appears to have developed simultaneously in all these fields. This cannot be a coincidence. Therefore, atomization of time is a correct semantic interpretation of the serial-verb constructions in Punjabi. A consideration of how the culture generally conceptualizes the reality is a must for a grammarian. The following examples from Punjabi are instructive:

(8) iʃvər antəryami hɛ

God omniscient is

"God is omniscient."

(9) *iʃvər antəryami hunda hɛ

God omniscient happening is

" ? "

(10) k^hʌŋd mɪt̪^hi hɛ

sugar sweet is

"(This particular sample of) sugar is sweet."

(11) k^hΛŋq mɪt^hi fʊndɪ fɛ
 sugar sweet happening is

"It is the general property of sugar to be sweet."

The nuclear verbal complexes in (9) and (11) denote iterative events, and the grammarian must accept this. It is no use arguing that (11) "really" (or in the "abstract deep structure") refers to a state simply because English happens to conceptualize both the situations in the same way. It is not for nothing that Punjabi makes the distinction between (10) and (11) and that it is difficult to imagine a context in which (9) could occur. For a culture that has always believed the universe to be a Buddhistic (=Heraclitean) flux, there is an eternal God but no eternal or everlasting sugar or sugarhood. As far as sugar is concerned, either the individual samples are sweet or there is an iterative process of the individual samples happening to be sweet. (There are, of course, no individual samples of God!). Such considerations can save a grammarian from imposing the conceptual categories of one language or culture upon others. The evidence of the form symbolizing the reality at the level of the sentence must be respected.

Another important thing that a grammarian must keep in mind is that syntax is a microcosm of the historically developed discoursal habits of the culture. There is no "autonomous" syntax. Again, an example is required. The South Asian and the South-east Asian cultures use a narrative style that is different from the standard European

"omniscient author" style. The typically modern European style is to observe the series of events and to manipulate the narrative from a point that lies spatio-temporally outside the narrative. But a Punjabi story-teller, on the other hand, uses an "ego-shift" style. His ego imaginatively drifts along the flow of the narrative, halts at a significant point to look before and after, and then moves on to the next significant point, and so on. (Bhardwaj 1986). This situation-internal perspective differs from the standard European situation-external perspective. We also find that most Western European languages are tense-prominent in the sense that the verbal complex in a finite clause must be marked for tense, i.e., the action must be deictically related to an external point in time. The South Asian and the South-east Asian languages, on the other hand, are aspect-prominent. Aspect denotes situation-internal time - whether the process is symbolized as completed or non-completed or iterative etc., and does not relate the situation to another point in time. It appears that in a language it is the discourse itself that shrinks into a clause. But unmindful of all this, grammarians go on setting up various types of the "present", "past" and "future" tenses for Punjabi and other Indian languages solely on the testimony of the translational equivalence of some constructions to the tensed constructions of English and other European languages.

The situation-internal perspective in a narrative forces the narrator to pay meticulous attention to details

and to atomise time. It is but natural that this ancient Indian habit should get grammaticalized in the form of serial-verb constructions. The Punjabi grammar forces one to say

(12) mē̃ pʌtəɾɪ te sutta pia si te '

I pavement -on slept fallen was and

koi	mera	kambəl	lá	ke	le	gia
someone	my	blanket	having- removed	having- done	having	gone grasped

"I was in a state of having fallen asleep on the pavement and someone, having removed and having grasped my blanket, gone,"

whereas in English he would simply say

(13) I was sleeping on the pavement and someone took away my blanket.

What a language can express is not of much interest. (Any language can express almost anything). But what a language must express is of paramount importance. (Cf. Jakobson quoted by Dahl 1985:15). If Punjabi forces one to atomise time, it is no use running away from the fact. (13) does not "really mean" or "underlie" (12) any more than vice versa. We deal with such constructions in Part II.

It could be argued that such considerations may take the linguist well beyond what is the proper subject-matter of linguistics: to account for and explain the linguistic forms. That the proper subject-matter for linguistics, ultimately, is the linguistic forms is undeniable. A linguist's analysis must start and end with the forms of the language. But forms are signs or combinations of signs. One of the defining characteristics of a sign is that it is meaningful, and meaning, according to us, is nothing if it is not socio-cultural. So considerations of total human behaviour become indispensable for a linguist. It is right and proper for a linguist to make use of the findings of sociologists, anthropologists, historians, neuroscientists, psychologists, philosophers etc. as long as he does not lose sight of his true vocation.

2.7 Language universals

At present we know so little about a vast majority of the human languages, past and present, that we cannot say for certain whether or not they "obey general laws." (Cf. Matthews 1982a). Even the expression "language universals" is pretentious and misleading until our knowledge about the world languages becomes much more advanced. But we do know, however, that many genetically unrelated (at least according to our present knowledge) and geographically non-contiguous languages share a great many features. (Or have these features been projected upon them by our own theoretical and

methodological assumptions? The footprints we have discovered on the distant alien sands may be our own! It is the task of any respectable science of linguistics to take note of and account for these shared features. The question whether there is a genetic or a functional explanation for these shared features (or the "universals"), when put in this strongly dichotomous form, is misleading. Both these factors may be in operation. Moreover, the genetic and the functional (or socio-cultural) dialectically interact with and complement each other. (For example, the genetic fact that human infancy is long and helpless and the socio-cultural fact that man is a cultured and linguistic animal have, throughout the human evolution for millions of years, been in dialectical interaction). The facts that the sense of sight has played enormous role in the biological and cultural evolution of humanity, that approximately two thirds of the nerve fibres entering the human central nervous system come from the eyes, and that within the human brain the areas dealing with speech and those dealing with the visual perception seem to be intimately linked, may be responsible for the fact that spatial imagery and metaphors are omnipresent in all the known human languages. On the other hand, social and situational (i.e., functional) factors may be responsible for the fact that in most human languages the given and the pragmatically more salient information (e.g., a human being is pragmatically more salient than an abstract quality) tends to precede the new and the pragmatically less salient information in a

sentence. But when the given information is pragmatically less salient or the new information is more salient interesting things may happen. Cross-linguistic studies of such shared features must guide and inform the studies of the individual languages, and vice versa. But it cannot be overemphasized that in such studies the individuality of each language must be respected and that the forms of each language must be studied meaningfully in terms of total human behaviour.

Part Two

TOWARDS

A FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR

OF

PUNJABI

CHAPTER III

THE WORD AND THE SENTENCE IN PUNJABI

We actually change levels when we pass from the units of language to the new unit constituted by the sentence or utterance....In the dictionary, there is only (an) endless round of terms which are defined circularly, which revolve in the closure of the lexicon. But then someone speaks, someone says something. The word leaves the dictionary; it becomes word at the moment when man becomes speech, when speech becomes discourse and discourse a sentence.... Thus the word is, as it were, a trader between the system and the act, between the structure and the event. On the one hand, it relates to structure, as a differential value, but it is then only a semantic potentiality; on the other hand, it relates to the act and to the event in the fact that its semantic actuality is contemporaneous with the ephemeral actuality of the utterance....

- Ricoeur (1974:79-96)

3.1 The sentence as a linguistic unit

A grammarian's predicament about the sentence is very similar to St. Augustine's about time: he knows what the sentence is as long as you do not ask him to define it! No universally applicable and acceptable definition of the sentence has been given although linguists and philosophers both in the East and the West have been proposing definitions for more than two thousand years. Some of these definitions are purely formal and thus language-specific. But many definitions recognize the fundamental truth that a sentence is a form-meaning complex. And this is where the trouble starts. The form and the meaning of a sentence are different entities but determine and sustain each other to such a degree that we can describe (but this is not a definition) a sentence as a meaningful formal linguistic structure which expresses a formally structured meaning. A definition is by definition analytical: it dichotomizes, i.e., clearly and unambiguously separates an X from whatever is non-X. But if you study language as a form of life, any boundary line drawn between form and meaning, and between language and the rest of the culture, is bound to be arbitrary and intuitively unsatisfactory. The trouble with the definitions of the sentence is that they are either language-specific or intuitively unsatisfactory or both.

In India, Pāṇini did not explicitly define the sentence, in general or in Sanskrit. All his rules which take the sentence (vākya) into consideration are rules about

the sentence accentuation and intonation only. His successor and critic Kātyāyana (circa 4th-3rd century B.C.) gave a purely formal definition: "A sentence is that (cluster of words) which possesses a finite verb (as an element)." (eka-tiñ vākyam). This definitions, with minor additions and variations, was accepted by the Indian grammarians dealing with Sanskrit. They did not think it necessary to bring in semantic criteria until the logicians of the Nyāya school attacked this definition and started developing their own variety of logical grammar. They were interested less in the formal properties of the sentences than in the truth value of the propositions expressed by those sentences. It was then that the grammarians responded by bringing in semantic considerations. The Indian tradition of theoretical and philosophical linguistics continued for more than two millenia until the middle of the eighteenth century. It would be unnecessary and irrelevant to mention here the controversies about the definition of the sentence. It is the formal peculiarities of Sanskrit that largely feature in these controversies. Kātyāyana's definition, as we shall see, does not apply to Punjabi. The logicians argued that it did not apply even to the Sanskrit language as a whole. For our purpose, two of the most significant theoretical concepts that emerged from these controversies are śābdabodha ("integrated verbal cognition") and ākāṅkṣā ("expectancy"). These concepts and the linguistic philosophy behind them developed over centuries.

Śābdabodha or "integrated verbal cognition" is distinguished from śabdārtha or the "meaning(s) of words". While there were some philosophers who believed that words in isolation have their well-defined meanings, the majority consisted of those who denied this and agreed with the grammarians that since without already knowing the nature of the sentence one cannot collect isolated words to form a sentence, the sentence meaning is primary. Moreover, words can be used in speech only because each word has a meaning related to the meanings of other words. Some extremists like Bhartrhari believed that only the sentence is the actual meaningful entity, and since the sentence meaning is conveyed in a flash and is not computed by the listener from the meanings of the individual words constituting the sentence, words are not the proper meaningful linguistic entities. Many philosophers, however, defined verbal cognition as padajñānakaraṇakam jñānam "the cognition of the meaning (of the sentence) effected by the efficient instrumentality of the cognition of the meanings of words." (Rao 1969:1-2). Individual words are able to be "effective instruments" of cognition of verbal meaning precisely because their meaning is incomplete, relative and ill-defined in itself. Each word stored in the lexicon (to attribute a modern notion to them) possesses, as part of its meaning, the quality of "expectancy" (ākāṅkṣā), or is in "a condition that requires a mutual connection of words for syntactic completeness of utterance." (Bilimoria 1981: 87). Annambhaṭṭa's definition of expectancy is

"If a linguistic item X cannot generate an integrated meaning-cognition due to the absence of a linguistic item Y, then X is said to have mutual expectancy with respect to Y." (id. 93).

According to Viśvanātha,

"A word has expectancy with regard to that word without which it cannot convey any idea of syntactical connection." (ibid.).

It is notable that the Indian tradition never located language exclusively in the "mind" of the speaker but primarily in lokavyavahāra or social intercourse. Ākāṅkṣā is basically a desire or expectation on the part of the listener roused by the incompleteness of an utterance. But gradually in grammar and philosophy, the word came to mean the syntactic property which a sentence lacks when it is not "grammatical". (Matilal 1966:383). A grammatical sentence is, therefore, a group of mutually expectant words which conveys a unitary thought. (ekārtha padasamūho vākyaṃ).

Priscian, working within the Graeco-Roman tradition, must have had, consciously or unconsciously, very similar ideas in mind when he defined an oratio or utterance as

"a concordant ordering of words... which expounds a complete idea." (Quoted in Matthews 1981a:27).

Similarly, the OED definition of the sentence:

"a series of words in connected speech or writing, forming the grammatically complete expression of a single thought." (ibid.---Emphasis added),

mentions a grammatically single thought. A grammatically single and complete idea is conveyed by a sentence when it contains properly inflected words arranged according to the rules of the grammar of the language and with appropriate prosody (or punctuation) in such a way that the mutual expectancies of all the words are satisfied. A single and complete idea is a grammatically single and complete one at the level of the sentence. Of course, sentences in discourse have their own expectancies. The meaning of

(1) She found it at seven o'clock.

does not convey a discoursally complete idea or meaning. It does not tell us anything about the referents of the pronouns 'she' and 'it' and whether the event took place in the morning or in the evening. But as far as the grammar of English is concerned, (1) does not leave the listener with the feeling that "something is missing" in the utterance. Syntactic completeness is like the completeness of an organism which has to depend on an environment for food and oxygen. Moreover, completeness is relative to the established structure (or "grammar") of the species. A bee

is complete with six legs; a spider is not, and must have eight. The sentence

(2) *She lived.

is incomplete if the verb 'live' is used in the sense of "dwell". The grammar of English is such that this verb expects a locative adverbial which must be either mentioned or be contextually understood or recoverable. An example of contextual recoverability is:

(3) "Did you kill the man-eater?"

"No, just wounded it."

"Too bad."

The pronoun 'I' and the word-group 'It is' are contextually recoverable in the utterances in (3), which are fully acceptable, albeit as elliptical sentences.

A general formal-functional definition of the sentence

"...must abandon all appeal to ideas. If a sentence is grammatically incomplete, it is so precisely by virtue of its grammar, not because there is an object on some other plane... one of whose parts does not find expression in it." (Matthews 1981a:28-29).

It must be added here that since our approach is not "purely syntactic" as understood in the Western tradition, but

semanto-syntactic in the Pāṇinian tradition, we abandon all appeal only to the supposedly language-independent ideas, not to all ideas. The meaning of an expression consists, among other things, of notions and ideas. We do appeal to notions and ideas concerning the reality symbolized by the Punjabi grammar, but not to any pre-linguistic reality "on some other plane".

It was on such considerations that the Nyāya philosophers' definition of the sentence -

"a group of words possessing the qualities of mutual expectancy, compatibility and (spatio-temporal) proximity" (ākāṅkṣāyogyatāsannidhimataṁ śabdānāṁ samūho vākyam) (Rao 1969:73) -

was objected to by the Indian grammarians, who themselves made use of semantic considerations in their grammatical analyses. We have already discussed mutual expectancy. Compatibility (yogyatā), according to the logicians, is the semantic compatibility. According to them,

(4) He sprinkles with water. (jalena siñcati)

is a sentence, but

(5) He sprinkles with fire. (vahninā siñcati)

is not. The latter, they argued, does not effect verbal

cognition (śābdabodha) because the words 'fire' and 'sprinkle' lack mutual semantic compatibility. The grammarian Nāgeśa objected to the definition, saying that the grammarians were not interested in the truth of the proposition expressed by a sentence. (5) and expression like "barren woman's son", "hare's horn" and "sky flower" do effect verbal cognition because one can say, for example, "A hare's horn does not exist." The fact that there happen to be no real life objects or situations to which these expressions refer is irrelevant for a grammarian. The Indian philosophers used expressions like "hare's horn" and "sky flower" metaphorically to mean non-existent objects. We can indeed imagine a Sanskrit-knowing Vietnamese Buddhist priest saying in the sixties

(6) vahninā siñcati niksano 'smākam udyānam.

"Nixon sprinkles our garden with fire."

Some linguists have imagined contexts in which Chomsky's "Colourless green ideas sleep furiously" can be used as a perfectly sensible metaphorical utterance. As far as a grammarian's task is concerned, Nāgeśa argued, semantic compatibility was not a part of the definition of the sentence. As regards spatio-temporal proximity (sannidhi or āsatti), Nāgeśa said, only the speech of the extremely dull-witted persons lacked it. Words in the normal everyday speech with which the grammarian was concerned always had this quality. So it was not necessary to make it a part of

the definition of the sentence in the normal speech. (Rao 1969:76). So a grammarian's definition of the sentence is "a group of words which are capable of expressing a single thought". (samartha padasamūho vākyaṃ).

~~We have already dealt with the Pāṇinian concept of~~
samartha in Part I. The samartha words (capable of entering into syntactical relations with other words) are also mutually expectant words. The valency theory can also be called the expectancy theory. The valency (or capacity or sāmarthya) of a verb,

"...seen as the capacity a verb has for combining with particular patterns of other sentence constituents,"

(Allerton 1982:2),

can also be seen as the expectancy of that (form of the) verb, for the particular patterns of the occurrence of other sentence constituents, in order for it to be able to be a constituent of a grammatically complete sentence. It is important to remember that not only verbs but also other "parts of speech" such as nouns, adjectives, adpositions etc. have expectancies and valencies. (The two concepts, which concentrate, respectively, on the negative and the positive aspects of the same phenomenon, can be used interchangeably).

We have not been able to give a perfect universal definition of the sentence. (Nor has anyone else, so far). But with the few theoretical conceptual tools at our

disposal, we can start an exploration of the syntax of Punjabi.

3.2 The most general semantics of a sentence

In Part I, we mentioned Halliday's views about the three functions of language: ideational (conceptualizing the reality), interpersonal (establishing, maintaining and expressing socio-cultural relations between the interlocuters), and textual (maintaining coherence in discourse). Since each sentence in discourse performs all the three functions simultaneously, its structure reflects this fact. No linguist can tell which parts of a sentence (a Punjabi sentence, at least) perform one function or the other. Bhartrhari was perfectly right in asserting that the meaning of a sentence is indivisible and that it is only for the sake of grammatical analysis (i.e., explaining the forms of words) that we have to proceed as if it were divisible. All the grammatical analyses are as if analyses. It is in this as if spirit that we focus our attention on the ideational function of language and the sentence.

As we said in Part I (pp. 94-95), a normal sentence, according to Bhartrhari, refers to "a particular mode of behaviour on the part of the accessories." The aspects of the situation that a sentence highlights can be classified under four heads: "direction", "means or accessories", "action" and "time". Briefly, a sentence refers to a spatio-temporally located situation involving an action or


event or state (we shall use the general term 'situation' for all the three), and some "do-ers" participating in the situation. Whether it is the situation or the "means" or "do-ers" that a sentence "primarily" refers to has been a topic of centuries-long debate in India. The grammarians believed that a sentence effects an integrated verbal cognition wherein the meaning of the verbal root is the principally qualified entity. The logicians, on the other hand, argued that in this verbal cognition it is the meaning of the word with a nominal case-ending that is primarily qualified. The logicians' view is akin to the traditional Western subject-predicate view which underlies the Constituency approaches to syntactic analysis. The grammarians' view is akin to the theory guiding the valency-based approaches. Whether it is the "action" part or the "subject" in a sentence that is really the principally qualified entity in a sentence is a nonsensical question. As far as Punjabi is concerned, a theoretical system which regards the "action" part as the principally qualified entity is able to discover simpler, more coherent and sensible semanto-syntactic patterns in Punjabi and can account for the formal peculiarities of Punjabi in a better and more economical way than the alternative approach is able to. A hocus pocus linguist working on Punjabi would, therefore, prefer this system. The same linguist working on some other language may prefer the subject-predicate view and the Constituency approach as more practicable. The view that all languages are similar at the level of the "abstract

deep structure" is simply an unverified (and unverifiable) dogma.

The theory behind the verb- (or, more broadly, the predicator-) based grammatical analyses is that a verb has its valency or "capacity...for combining with particular patterns of other sentence constituents, in a similar way to that in which the valency of a chemical element is its capacity for combining with a fixed number of atoms of another element." (Allerton 1982:2). As we said earlier, we can also use the expression 'expectancy' instead of 'valency'. The valency set of a verb consists of nominals, adjectives, adpositional phrases, adverbial expressions, etc., with further semantic specifications depending on the meaning and syntactic behaviour of the verb. This set is specified both in terms of quantity (or the number of the expected members of the set) and quality (the semanto-syntactic nature of the members). Quantitatively, verbs can be zero-valent, monovalent, bivalent, and so on. Tesnière (1959) drew an important distinction between members that a verb must have in its valency set (actants) for the sentence (of which this verb is the nucleus) to be grammatically complete and the members which are grammatically optional and may be found in the sentence (circonstants). The corresponding English terms most commonly employed these days are 'complements' and 'adjuncts' respectively. Many linguists in the recent past adopted this distinction though they used different terms, (for example, 'participants' and 'circumstantials', Halliday 1970; 'arguments' and

'satellites', Dik 1978; 'nuclear' and 'peripheral' roles, Longacre 1976). There are problems with not only this clear-cut distinction but also in assigning elaborators (Allerton's term) both in qualitative and quantitative terms to verbs. (Cf. Allerton 1982, Somers 1984). These problems exist in Punjabi as in English (and probably in all the languages). This study, as far as we know, is the first attempt to analyse Punjabi in terms of the valency theory. We aim at demonstrating the usefulness of this theory in explaining some semanto-syntactic peculiarities of Punjabi. So our analysis is on the lower level of delicacy. A detailed and delicate valency grammar and lexicon of Punjabi can be prepared only after an analysis such as ours has been made. So this analysis is at best tentative and suggestive.

In Punjabi, as in many other languages, it is useful to divide the optional elaborators or adjuncts into those which modify the meaning of the verb and those which do not. In this study, we propose the following classification of the verb-elaborators in Punjabi:



In Punjabi, the adjuncts that modify verb meaning are considered backgrounded (in our sense, to be elaborated below) when they form a part of the meaning of the verb.

Some non-backgrounded adjuncts, when used, can also modify the meaning of verb in some ways. An abstract discussion will not be very helpful here. So these elaborators are discussed with proper exemplification in the next chapter.

3.3 The Punjabi sentence as a multi-layered structure

We have already indicated (in Part I) our preference for a Dependency model of grammar. The alternative, the Constituency model, is basically the traditional subject-predicate model borrowed from the traditional logic. The two models are not exactly equivalent (cf. Matthews 1981a:88). It has been claimed (cf. Hudson 1984) that the Dependency model is decidedly superior. There are languages like Kalkatungu (Blake 1983) about which it is claimed that they do not "have" a constituency structure. In these languages, each clause constituent is said to depend directly on the verb and the word-order is very free. This is no place to discuss in detail the relative merits and demerits of the two approaches either. Our hocus pocus view is that a language does not "have" a constituency or dependency structure. It can just be analysed in a simpler and more economical manner either in one way or the other (or perhaps in ways not discovered yet). A dependency analysis of Punjabi sentences (like that of Kalkatungu sentences) is intuitively (i.e., aesthetically) more satisfying because it is less messy.

Chapter VII, the one dealing with the serial verb constructions will make this point clear. The intuitively obvious semantic relatedness of the causative and the corresponding non-causative constructions (the subject of the next chapter) can be captured in a more satisfying way in a valency-based Dependency analysis. In terms of the variety of the Dependency grammar we are using, a simple sentence (or a clause) in Punjabi is a three-layered structure. These layers are

NUCLEUS	[verb or a serial verb construction]
CORE	[NUCLEUS+obligatory complements (nuclear arguments)]
PERIPHERY	[modifying and non-modifying adjuncts, adverbials, etc.]

As already acknowledged in Part I, this model is adopted and adapted from Foley and Van Valin (1984). The rest of this study is an elaboration and application of this model. But it must be mentioned that the model, as used here, is not hierarchical. In a true hierarchical structure (an army or a church, for example), the control proceeds unilinearly from above and information from below. While the Constituency model with the "higher" nodes "controlling" the "lower" ones is a hierarchical one, our model is not. This model is horizontal and has no higher or lower nodes or strata. Even our use of the word 'layer' in the expression 'multi-layered structure' is misleading, but no better currently used

expression is available. There are only the inner and the outer (metaphorically speaking, of course) layers in a sentence. In the inner (or CORE) layer, the nuclear arguments control the verb as much as vice versa. The PERIPHERAL layer is a bit loosely connected with the inner layers, but, as we shall see, some adjuncts in the outer layer can influence the semantic interpretation of the verb in a rather radical way.

3.4 Towards a valency lexicon of Punjabi

Punjabi, like other Indian languages and many non-Indian and genetically unrelated languages like Turkish and Japanese, has causative constructions involving verbs having a morphologically causative form. Such constructions are discussed in the next chapter, where we shall see that the semantics of these constructions is such that it would be wrong to derive these causative constructions from the non-causative ones by grammatical rules of transformation. So in the valency lexicon of Punjabi, complements and modifying adjuncts should be assigned to the causative and the anti-causative verb-forms as well. The broadly general semantic nature of the verb-forms and of the (quantitatively specified) complements should be clearly mentioned. All this information is necessary for explaining the formal and the semantic peculiarities of the Punjabi sentences. But it has to be admitted that this model (and in fact the whole of this study) is only preliminary and programmatic because it

is the first study of its type in the field of Punjabi linguistics. It is possible to analyse and explain here only a few formal features and peculiarities of the Punjabi sentences. A more detailed and delicate analysis of Punjabi may necessitate a thorough revision or even a total abandoning of this model.

3.4.1 Classification of the Punjabi verbs

The Punjabi verbs used in the sentences analysed in this study can be divided into two broad classes. To these two classes can be added the copular-existential verb *hē* (the equivalent of the English BE in some uses), which constitutes a class by itself and has been behaving erratically and lying outside the main verb system ever since the time of Sanskrit. (We deal with this peculiar verb in Chapter VI). Here we deal with the major classes only. Since causativization in Punjabi (as in many other languages) involves change in the valency set of the verb, the non-causative and the causative forms are here referred to as the PHASES of the verb. The morphological forms resulting from other types of inflections are referred to as FORMS of the verb. Verb phases are more basic in the sense that inflections for valency-variation are inner inflections and each phase of a verb can be inflected for TMA (tense, mood, aspect), number, gender etc. Where there are no chances of confusion or ambiguity, the general term 'form' will be used to refer to the phonetic shape of a linguistic element. The

theoretical distinction between a phase and a form (as different from a phase) of a verb is necessary and useful. A phase is a bare stem that has not yet undergone other inflections (which may be zero-inflections). For mainly technical reasons, we regard the monovalent phase as the basic one and the other phases as derived from it by increasing or decreasing valency. We emphasize the expression 'mainly technical' because the morphological and historical evidence very often tells the opposite story. Many intransitive verb phases are historically derived from the transitive phases or their passive forms. (See the historical note below). For imposing a certain amount of order on our data we have to proceed as if the monovalent 'A' phases were the basic ones. Some Class II verbs, for historical reasons, have no A Phase. In the case of these verbs, it is the Phase B that is basic. We think it prudent not to give names like 'intransitive', 'transitive' and 'causative' etc. to these phases. Such labels, as the next chapter will show, can often be misleading. It is safer to refer to these phases algebraically as Phases A, B, C, D, *A, *B, *C and *D. Similarly, we can refer to the classes of verbs as Class I and Class II. (The two classes may not cover all the Punjabi verbs). There are features of the semantic role relevant to the morpho-syntactic behaviour. This semanto-syntactic nature of the complements and modifying adjuncts of each phase must be specified in the most general way. As already mentioned, we adopt Foley and Van Valin's terms Actor and Undergoer and adapt them for our

purpose. They are used here in the sense of Pāṇini's kartr and karman respectively. To account for certain formal characteristics of the Punjabi sentences, we have to further specify the various types of Actors and Undergoers and bring in some more elaborators such as the Recipient and the Causer (corresponding to Pāṇini's sampradāna and hetu respectively). It is important to mention that these names are purely technical terms, though meant to reflect the semantic role of the elaborator. Every verb and its elaborators have ultimately their own unique semantics. The labels indicate only the very general semantic features relevant for a study of the formal features of the sentences (case-marking, verb-agreement etc.). The following abbreviations and symbols are used:

A	Actor
R	Recipient
U	Undergoer
Ar	Actor-recipient
Au	Actor-undergoer
Cm	Causer-mediator
Cs	Causer-source
Ua	Undergoer-actor
Aci	Actor-causer (involved)
Acn	Actor-causer (non-involved)
[]	Backgrounded modifying adjuncts
{ }	Other modifying adjuncts

We see that there are primarily three obligatory complements - Actor, Undergoer and Recipient. The capital letters in the hybrid names suggest that the referent is basically an Actor or an Undergoer or a Causer for the purpose of case-marking. But in order to explain some of the semanto-syntactic peculiarities of the sentence, we have to further specify the elaborator in (rather general) semantic terms.

Chart I on page 144 gives a list of the phases of each class of the Punjabi verbs. A phase marked with an asterisk (e.g., *A) is called a subtractive phase in this study for reasons which will become clear later. But it must be mentioned here that this phase is not subtractive in the morphological sense because it is morphologically derived by adding the affix -i- to the phonetic form of an ordinary phase. In order to refer to individual phases, we use symbols such as IIC (interpreted as Phase C of a Class II verb), I*B (the Subtractive B Phase of a Class I verb), etc.

The idea of the normal and the subtractive phases is based on John Beames's idea of the positive and the negative phases of verbs in some North Indian languages. In the third volume of his monumental A Comparative Grammar of the Modern Aryan Languages of India (1872-79), Beames suggested that "Those phases which are expressed by one word may be ranged as regards meaning in a regular scale of grades of action, according to the degree and kind of activity they express". (Vol III:29. Emphasis added). For assigning phases to verbs, Beames clearly used the purely notional or semantic criteria, as the words emphasized in the extract quoted

above show. The diagrammatic representation given by Beames is as follows:




Figure 1. Phases of the verb in North Indian Languages according to John Beames (1879:29)

The phases themselves are defined by Beames in purely semantic terms. For example:

"The neuter verb (0) expresses neither action nor passion. It concerns the subject as in a condition of mere existence, as being something, not doing, and is therefore the simplest phase of verbal description."
(id. 30).

The next phase is the active intransitive (+1), which concerns the subject as indeed acting, but acting in such a way that his action does not pass beyond himself to affect an external object. In this way, Beames describes all the phases. The negative phases are passive in nature like our subtractive phases. We do not mention Beames's analysis in

CLASS I

Phases	*C	*B	*A	A	B	C
Numerical valency	1	1	Zero	1	2	2
Obligatory complements	U/Ua	U/Ua		Au	A/Aci	Acn U/Ua
Optional complements	[Cm]		{Cs}	{Cs}		[Cm]
Example	bəŋvai	bəŋai	bəŋi	bəŋ	bəŋa	bəŋva

CLASS II

Phases	*D	*C	*B	*A	A	B	C	D
Numerical valency	2	2	1	Zero	1	2	3	3
Obligatory complements	R U	R U	U		A	Ar	U Acn	R U
Optional complements	[Cm]			[R]	[R]			[Cm]
Example	duk ^h vai	duk ^h ai	dek ^h i	disi	dis	dek ^h	duk ^h a	duk ^h va

Chart 1. Punjabi verb-classes and their phases

full because our own analysis is very different. But Beames's analysis is insightful in its own right, and our analysis is certainly indebted to his. The distinction we draw between an involved and a non-involved Actor-causer was first suggested by Anuradha Saksena (whose own analysis is not valency-based and who uses the traditional terms like 'agent', 'patient' etc.). This distinction is described and justified in the next chapter.

3.4.2 A representative set of the Punjabi verbs

In this study, we are concerned with the semanto-syntactic aspects of Punjabi. The morphological, morpho-phonological and phonological aspects of the constructions will be dealt with and commented upon only insofar as they are indispensable to, or throw some interesting light on, what is our primary concern. Before we proceed any further, it would be necessary to have before us an inventory of the phases of a representative set of Punjabi verbs. On the following pages, we provide such an inventory. The verbs were carefully selected from a Punjabi dictionary in such a way that all the variety found in both the classes was represented. There are forms of the phases that are less commonly or rarely used and those which are merely possible (in the sense that they are generated by the currently productive morphological rules (such as adding -a or -va to the Phase A form, with some predictable phonological changes in the original stem) but are never normally used by this

researcher). For the purpose of eliciting some native speakers' responses to these forms, they were used in sentences, and these sentences were put, along with other sentences, in short dramatic monologues in such a way that the monologue made the non-linguistic context clear. The monologues were spoken with natural word-order, accentuation, intonation and "style". The informants were asked if they found anything odd or un-Punjabi-like or contrived or forced in the whole monologue. The forms marked with a question mark were judged by some informants as "contrived" or "unnatural" etc. There are gaps in the lists. The reasons for the existence of these gaps are various and complicated. There are, first of all, historical reasons: the forms simply do not exist, and the informants rejected the hypothetical form generated by the currently productive rules. Then there are phonological reasons: the possible form is unpronounceable by a speaker of Punjabi. Other reasons are social: the possible form is homophonous to some obscene and taboo word in the language. Last, but very significantly, there are system-internal reasons: the possible form is homophonous to some phase-form of some other verb and is thus a possible source of ambiguity. For some possible forms we can imagine a context, but no such context happens to exist in real life. For example, we can imagine some god making the clouds thunder, but the Punjabis do not normally talk about this topic. So the Punjabi verb meaning "thunder" has no causative Phase B. There may be some other reasons, but we need not go into them. People in

the normal social intercourse are interested in what a language does rather than in what a language is. The "unnatural" and "contrived" forms are very often used and remain unnoticed if they serve the purpose of communication. English translation of all the phases is not given. If the meaning of one phase is known, the meaning of all other phases is predictable from it. Very often, straightforward English translation is not available.

Class I Verbs

<u>Phase A</u>		<u>Phase B</u>		<u>Phase C</u>
a	"come"	lia	"bring"	məŋgva
akəɾ	"become firm"	əkəɾa		əkəɾva
ʌɾ	"stick"	ʌɾa		ʌɾva
bʌdəl	"change"	bədla		bədəlva
bʌk	"talk nonsense"	bəka		bəkva
bɛ̃	"sit"	bəfià		--
bɛtʰ	"sit"	biɬʰa		?biɬʰva
pɔ̃	"rotate"	puà		--
bʌŋ	"become"	bəŋa		bəŋva
pìɾ	"clash"	pèɾ / piɾà		?piɾvà
pʌɾ		pʌɾ	"fill"	pəɾà / pərvà
pʌɹɹ	"run"	pəɹà		pəɹvà
pʌɹɹ		pʌnn	"break"	pənà / pənvà
pìɹɹ		piõ	"moisten"	--
pùɾ	"crumble"	pòɾ		puɾà / purvà
cʌɾ	"rise"	cʌɾ cəɾà		cəɾvà
cɪɾ		cɪɾ	"cut open"	cɪɾa / cɪɾva
cúb		cób cubà /	"prick"	cubvà
cʰʌŋ		cʰʌŋ	"filter"	cəŋa / cʰəŋva
cʰʌp		cʰʌp	"print"	cʰəpa / cʰəpva
cʰutt		cʰʌdd	"release"	cʰudà / cʰudva
cik	"cry"	--		--
--		tʌk	"cover"	təkà / təkva
--		tù	"pull"	--

<u>Phase A</u>		<u>Phase B</u>		<u>Phase C</u>
--		dó	"milk"	--
tùp / tùl		tò	"wash"	tuà
dɪg	"fall"	dég		dɪga / dɪgva
dʌr		dəra	"frighten"	dərva
dúll		dól	"spill"	dulà / dɪlvà
gʌl	"become soft"	gal		gəla / gəlva
--		gɔl	"notice"	--
gʌɾək	"thunder"	--		--
kùmm	"rotate"	kumà		kumvà
kùsəɾ		kəsòɾ	"thrust"	?kusəɾvà
ho	"become"	kʌr	"do make"	kəra / kərva
hʌss	"laugh"	həsà		həsà
hʌt	"get aside"	hətʌ	"remove"	hətva
hɔk	"gasp"	--		--
ja	"go"	pèj	"send"	pɪjvà
jæg		jəga	"light"	jəgva
jaɟ	"get up"	jəga		jəgva
--		cʌɾək	"give jerk"	--
--		cətka	"behead"	cətəkà
juɾ		joɾ	"join"	juɾa / juɾva
cʌɾ		càɾ	"shake off"	cəɾà / cəɾvà
--		kʌtt	"cut"	kəɾa / kətva
--		ké	"say"	kəfà
kʌɾ		káɾ	"boil"	kəɾà / kəɾvà
kɪɾ		ker	"pour"	kɪra / kɪrva
kʰɪsk	"slip"	kʰɪska		?kʰɪskva
kʰɪʃ		kʰɪʃà		kʰɪʃvà

<u>Phase A</u>		<u>Phase B</u>		<u>Phase C</u>
kh _u ss		khó	"snatch"	?kh _u sa / kh _u à
kuss		kó	"slaughter"	?kuà
kh _u ll		khól	"open"	kh _u l _a / kh _u lv _a
kh _u g	"cough"	kh _u gà		?kh _u gvà
kuk	"cry"	--		--
--		kutt	"beat"	ku _t a / ku _t va
l _a tt _h	lé	lá	"remove"	l _a h _a
l _a lca	"get tempted"	--		--
mar	"die"	mar	"kill"	m _a ra / m _a rva
--		mar	"beat"	--
mar	"be in love"	--		--
mit		met / m _i ta	"erase"	mitva
nik _a l	"come out"	kádd		k _a d _a / k _a dv _a
--		mó	"fascinate"	--
mukk		muka	"finish"	?mukva
nà	"have bath"	n _a l _a		n _a lv _a
nucc _a r		n _a co _r	"squeeze"	nuc _a ra / nuc _a rva
p _a l _r	"read"	p _a r _a		p _a rv _a
--		pu _n	"filter"	pu _n a / pu _n va
p _i g _a l	"melt"	p _i g _a l / p _i gl _a		p _i g _a lv _a
r _u l _r		ró _r	"wash away"	ru _r a / ru _r va
ruk		rok	"stop"	ru _k a / ru _k va
russ	"get annoyed"	rusa		?rusva
--		rac	"create"	r _a ca
rac	"permeate"	r _a ca		r _a cva
r _a l _r		r _a l _r	"bake"	r _a l _a / r _a lv _a
sa	"sleep"	su _l a		su _l va

<u>Phase A</u>		<u>Phase B</u>		<u>Phase C</u>
sik		sek	"heat"	sika / sikva
sarək	"creep"	sərka		?sərkva
sāvər		sāvar / suar	"decorate"	sāvra
tar	"swim float"	tar / tərɑ		tərɑ / tərva
tul		tol	"weigh"	tula / tulva
--		tar	"rebuke"	tərɑ / tərva
tar		tar	"enclose"	?tərɑ / tərva
tutt		tor	"break"	turɑ / turva
tik	"settle"	tika		?tikva
vé	"flow"	vəhà		--
vag	"flow"	vəga		?vəgva
vik		vec	"sell"	vika / vikva
vʌʒʒ		vəʒɑ	"play music"	vəʒva
vʌr	"rain"	vərà		?vərvà
--		pʌr	"read"	pərà / pərva
--		lik ^h	"write"	lik ^h ɑ / lik ^h va
mil	"meet"	mel / mɪlɑ	"join"	mɪlva
--		ʒʌŋ	"give birth"	ʒəŋɑ / ?ʒəŋva
p ^h ir	"turn"	p ^h er		p ^h irɑ / p ^h irva
bʌʒʒ		bʌnn	"bind"	bənà / bənvà
p ^h ʌt		p ^h ar / par	"tear"	pərɑ / pərva
p ^h utt	"burst"	--		--
ré	"stay"	rʌkk ^h		rək ^h ɑ / rək ^h va
utər	"descend"	utar		?utərɑ / utərva
sar		sar	"burn"	?sərɑ / sərva
tal		tal	"put off"	təla / təlva
ur	"fly"	urɑ		urva

Class II Verbs

<u>Phase A</u>	<u>Phase B</u>		<u>Phase C</u>	<u>Phase D</u>
--	sikk ^h	"learn"	sik ^h a	sik ^h va
--	cak ^h	"taste"	cək ^h a	cək ^h va
--	c ^h ak	"eat"	c ^h əka	c ^h əkva
--	cər	"graze"	cəra	cərva
--	catt	"lick"	cəta	cətva
--	cúŋg	"suck"	cunɡà	cunɡvà
dis	dek ^h	"see"	dik ^h a	dik ^h va
dis	vek ^h	"see"	vik ^h a	vik ^h va
labb / lǎjj	labb	"find"	ləbà	ləbvà
--	labb	"search"	--	--
mil	lɛ	"take"	de	"give" dua
--	pǎŋ	"read"	pəŋà	pəŋvà
	p ^h ɛŋ	"catch grasp"	p ^h əŋa	p ^h əŋva
--	pi	"drink"	pi la	pi lva
suŋ	suŋ	"hear"	suŋa	suŋva
--	--		dass	"tell" --
a	jaŋ	"know"	--	
--				

3.5 Some comments on the verb-phases

The gaps present no serious problem for a speaker of Punjabi. Like any other language, Punjabi is a flexible and dynamic system. There are many different ways of saying more or less the same thing in a given context. While the causative version of

- (7) ram ne fərab piti
 Ram Agt wine drunk
 "Ram drank wine."

is

- (8) mē ram nū fərab pilai
 I Ram -to wine made to drink
 "I made Ram drink wine,"

the verb cá used in (9) has no causative Phase B.

- (9) ram pəse cǎda si
 Ram money wanting was
 "Ram desired money."

But this does not prevent a speaker of Punjabi from saying "I made Ram desire money." He can say something like

- (10) mẽ ram de man vic pesiã dí cá peda kiti
 I Ram -of mind -in money -of desire created

"I created in Ram's mind a desire for money".

As we shall see in Chapter V, morphological causativization and anti-causativization are not the only ways of increasing and decreasing, respectively, the valency of a verb nucleus. Serial verb constructions can also do this. The forms of the subtractive phases are not shown in the lists given above. The phonetic form of a subtractive phase is predictable from that of the corresponding ordinary phase: just add the vowel /-i-/ to the latter. For example, the ordinary phases of the verb jur "join" are

A	B	C
<u>jur</u>	<u>jor</u>	<u>jura/jurva</u>

The corresponding subtractive phases, therefore, are

*A	*B	*C
<u>juri</u>	<u>jori</u>	<u>jurai/jurvai</u>

The lists also show that very often a phase of a verb has two or more forms. These forms can sometimes be, and are, used interchangeably. A speaker may have preference for one of them. But very often, the two forms have a rather subtle difference of meaning. The Phase A of the verb tar is translatable as both "swim" and "float". But the Phase B tar

is used either with lifeless objects in the sense of "make float" or in a religious sense - "to save a human soul from sinking in the ocean of existence", whereas tara as Phase B means "make swim". Very often, in the case of the Class I verbs, when a phase has two alternative forms, the two differ in meaning, often subtly.

In the case of some verbs (e.g., a "come", ho "become", le "take"), suppletion is involved. Phases B and C (and, therefore Phases *B and *C) are those of lexically different verbs. The reasons for this, to a great extent, seem to be phonological (coupled with the fact that some different lexical verbs with related meaning were available in the language). The form resulting from the addition of the stressed suffix /-a-/ according to the productive rule to the stem / a/ "come" is unpronounceable in Punjabi. So the transitive verb lia "bring" (derived historically by combining le "take" and a "come"), which happened to be there in the language, came in handy. But this was not the end of the trouble. The addition of the suffix /-va-/ to derive Phase C was equally problematic. So the Phase C angva of the verb ang "demand", was usurped and given the meaning "get something brought". The original meaning of angva - "get something demanded" - was lost. In the case of the verb le "take", it is not possible to derive Phase B by the regular morphological rule. lea would be liable to be confused with lia "bring". lua is already the Phase B of another verb la "fix/attach". But since there is the verb de "give" in the language, there is no problem. de "give" is

the causative Phase B of le "take". "I give you a pen" is simply another way of saying, in Punjabi at least, "I make you take a pen." Suppletion as a morphological device (if at all it can be called this) is, for historico-structural reasons, found in many (probably all) languages. In English, 'went' as the past tense form of 'go' and 'better' and 'best' as the comparative and the superlative forms, respectively, of 'good' are the best known examples.

3.6 A historical note

This study does not deal with the history of Punjabi. But some interesting historical facts are relevant. Many IA verb phases are historically derived from the passive forms of Sanskrit. The Punjabi IB phase bánn "bind" comes from the active form of the Sanskrit bandh "bind", but the IA phase comes from the passive form of bandh. (Sanskrit badhyate, Pali bajjhati, Prakrit bajjhai, Punjabi bájj). This is true of the Punjabi IA phase pàjj "break (of itself)" also. The Sanskrit active bhaj "break" has become pànn in Punjabi. (Sanskrit bhañjanti, Pali bhañjati, Prakrit bhañjai, Punjabi pànn). But the passive form of the Sanskrit bhaj (through Sanskrit bhajyate and Prakrit bhajjai) has become pàjj "get broken" in Punjabi. Many IA and IIA phases of the Punjabi verbs are derived from the Sanskrit active or "middle" roots, and the corresponding IB and IIB phases are derived

*For a discussion of the historical processes that resulted in the emergence of tones and the loss of the voiced-aspirated consonants in Punjabi, see Bhardwaj (1980).

from the causal forms of the Sanskrit roots. The Sanskrit active form juṭ "join" (intr.) became the Punjabi IA jur "join", and its causal form joṭaya- became the Punjabi IB jor "join" (tr.). Similarly, the Sanskrit active form mṛ "die" became the Punjabi IA mar "die", and the Sanskrit causal form māraya- became the Punjabi IB mar "kill". This being the case, we must not be surprised by the fact that, depending on the context, the Phase A of a Punjabi verb can have either an "active" or a "passive" meaning, and that the Phase B can have either a "transitive" or a "causative" meaning. This is the main reason why we did not attach semantic labels to the phases. Interestingly enough, although the "middle" root labh "get" of Sanskrit gives us the Punjabi IIB labb "get" or "find", the passive form of labh gives the Punjabi IIA lajj "be found", this "middle" root has also developed into another lexical verb of Punjabi le "take". (Sanskrit labhate, Pali labhati, Prakrit lahai, Punjabi le). The passive form of the Sanskrit chuṭ "tear/cut/release" developed into the Punjabi IA chutt "get released", but the corresponding IB chadd "give up/leave" of Punjabi comes from a different Sanskrit root chrḍ "vomit". (Sanskrit chrṇatti, Pali chaḍḍati, Prakrit chaḍḍai, Punjabi chadd). From chrṇatti also comes another Punjabi IB chand "shake loose" of a now different lexical verb (having its own phases) of Punjabi. This shows how the phonetic and the semantic similarity between words figure in language change and development. Languages not only function synchronically but also develop diachronically, and this latter is partly

because their speakers use them creatively and metaphorically and often get confused by phonetic similarity and reanalyse the linguistic forms semantically. Beames, from whom this historical information is taken, comments on a general tendency in the history of the Indic languages... from Sanskrit onwards: "Where the root is conjugated actively, or is active in meaning in the ancient languages, the modern active is derived from it, and in that case the modern neuter [Phase A in our system] is derived from the Prakrit form of the Sanskrit passive.... Where the ancient root is neuter, the modern neuter is derived from it, and in that case the active is derived from the ancient causal." (Vol III:67).

The origin of the productive causal affixes in modern Punjabi- / -q-/ and / -va-/ is the Sanskrit causal affix (accented) -áya- . (e.g., gaṇ "count" → gaṇáya "cause to count"). The origin of the Punjabi stressed / -q-/ from the Sanskrit affix is perfectly understandable. The history of / -va-/ is not so direct. In some Sanskrit roots ending in vowels the consonant /p/ came between the root and -áya-. (e.g., śrā "cook" → śrāpáya "cause to cook"). Later on in Pali, this /p/-augmentation was extended to many other roots as well. The / -va-/ causative affix of Punjabi and some other North Indian languages like Hindi is believed to have come from the Sanskrit -páya . The intervocalic /p/ got voiced and "softened" and became the approximant /v/. But the origin of both the / -q-/ and the / -va-/ affixes (often used contrastively) in these language suggests that

something is missing in this story. As we shall see in the next chapter, /-ḡ-/ indicates an involved Actor-causer and /-va-/ a non-involved one. Did this distinction develop in the Middle Indic parent dialect(s) of Punjabi and Hindi so that the affixes coming from the Sanskrit -áya and -páya began to be used distinctively? This question will probably never be answered. Contrary to popular belief, there are huge gaps in the history of the Indic languages from the time of Pāṇini until the tenth century. There are reasons for believing that the literary Prakrit and Apabhraṃśa languages used during this period are as artificial creations as Classical Sanskrit. The oldest form of Buddhist Pali was based most probably on an eastern dialect. Traditionally, Pāṇini is said to have analysed the variety of Sanskrit which he himself spoke as his first language. He is also believed to be a native of an area which lies in Pakistan now and where Punjabi is spoken these days. Believing the tradition to be true (on faith), we have related the modern Punjabi forms to their supposed origins in Sanskrit and mentioned those Pali and the Prakrit forms which seemed to form a link. But it should be admitted that this section is, to a great extent, speculative.

3.7 Summing up

In this chapter, we made an attempt to roughly characterize the sentence in general and the Punjabi sentence in particular. We suggested that a Punjabi sentence is a three-

layered structure, with the NUCLEUS consisting of a verb or a verb-group as the innermost layer. If we add the middle layer consisting of the obligatory complement elaborators to the NUCLEUS, the combination is called the CORE of the sentence. The outer layer consisting of optional adjuncts, supplements, adverbials and anything else is called the PERIPHERY of the sentence. In the second half of the chapter, we divided the Punjabi verbs into two major classes. Since each verb in Punjabi has morphological causative and anti-causative phases with different valency sets, the valency set of each phase in each class was mentioned. A list of the different phases of a representative set of the Punjabi verbs was also provided. We did not say anything about the syntax and semantics of the anti-causative phases. This is a subject for the chapter on the passive construction in Punjabi.

CHAPTER IV

VERB VALENCY AND CAUSATIVIZATION

...after a minute Humpty Dumpty began again. "They've a temper, some of them - particular verbs, they're the proudest - adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs -

- Lewis Carroll
Through the Looking Glass

4.0 Introduction

For a theoretical study of the type we are attempting, the tradition of grammatical analysis of Punjabi is one more to be avoided than built upon. It would be grossly unfair to blame the traditional pedagogical or descriptive grammarians working on Punjabi before the sixties of this century for imposing on Punjabi the grammatical categories of English which are not system-internally justified in a Punjabi grammar. Some of them (e.g., John Beames, E.P. Newton, Grahame Bailey, Ram Singh and Duni Chandra) were indeed conscientious linguists who worked according to their lights and within the limits of the task they set themselves. One does occasionally encounter insightful findings in their works (e.g., Beames's analysis of the phases of the verb-forms of the North Indian languages including Punjabi, mentioned in the last chapter). Gill and Gleason's Reference Grammar of Punjabi (1962/1969), having been written in the post-Bloomfieldian tradition is purely descriptive and does not attempt any discussion of the theoretical issues involved. K.C. Bahl's A Grammatical Sketch of Punjabi (1964) is true to its name, though it is a very good sketch. His contribution to Current Trends in Linguistics, Vol. 5 (Sebeok 1969) mentions a few problems of an analysis of Punjabi, but does not provide any detailed solutions.

The variety of eastern Punjabi used by the educated speakers in their formal and semi-formal speech (sometimes called Kendri Punjabi or "Central Punjabi"), which is

analysed here, is so similar to the "standard" variety of Hindi that the two languages are mutually intelligible, and sentences from one language can often be phonologically translated into the other. So it is natural for a linguist working on Punjabi to turn to his colleagues who have worked or are working on Hindi. It is here that a great shock and disappointment awaits a Punjabi linguist whose theoretical principles are the ones (or similar to the ones) explicated in Part I of this study. The philosophical principle "theory determining the data" in its most vulgar form is at play in most of the theoretical work recently done on Hindi. Typically, a fashionable theoretical framework with universalistic ambitions and pretensions was picked up and conveniently selected data (often, sentences prepared by the linguist him-/herself if (s)he happened to be a speaker of Hindi) that would fit into the framework were analysed. The framework itself was considered sacred and was never questioned. It was tacitly assumed that the Hindi language was a homogeneous system so that the sentences analysed represented the whole system. (There were only a few linguists like K.C. Bahl and Anjani Kumar Sinha who were exceptions). In this way, Hindi was forced into Chomsky's "Standard Theory" (Kachru 1965, 1966, 1973, (Anil) Sinha 1970, Kleiman 1971), Fillmore's Case Grammar (Balachandran 1971) and Generative Semantics (Sah 1971, Shapiro 1976, Abbi 1980). These works (except Abbi's) are just a representative sample dealing with the causative constructions of Hindi. But it would be unnecessary to mention the views of these

writers on the subject. They would not defend those views today because the theories they were based on are now dead, having taught many (but not all) linguists a sobering lesson that a theoretical framework that attempts to accommodate all the languages ends up by accommodating no language. So criticizing these views would amount to flogging dead colts. But the work of one Hindi linguist - Anuradha Saksena - is very relevant and helpful to us. In her Ph.D. thesis (1979) and a number of subsequent publications based on it (1980a, 1980b, 1980c, 1982, 1983a, 1983b), she adopted a theoretical (with a small 't', cf. Part I) standpoint which is, in certain respects, similar to ours. Her aim was to explain and account for, and not to explain away as "superficial surface structure" or "simply morphological features" the formal peculiarities of the Hindi sentences. There are in Hindi (as also in Punjabi and any other language) irregularities and idiosyncrasies and Saksena accepted them instead of ignoring them or glossing over them. Many of the findings of her detailed study (whose scope is rather narrow, being limited to the causative constructions and the problem of case-marking in Hindi) are applicable to Punjabi. But since the causative constructions form only a small part of this study, the similarity can only be taken note of here. Most of these findings are extremely simple explanations of the obvious ("surface structure") features of Hindi, and any linguist with an attentive ear (and watchful eye) for the language and free from any blinkering commitment to a pre-existing theoretical framework could

arrive at them. But her explanatory concept of Contact in Causation is really an original and insightful contribution to the Hindi grammatical analysis. We borrow the concept from her. It should be mentioned here that there are important structural differences between Hindi and Punjabi in spite of the obvious similarities. So our analysis (and the theory underlying and guiding it) is not exactly like Saksena's.

4.1 The two major verb-classes in Punjabi

The division of verbs into two major classes (originally based on a sort of voice distinction) has always been there in the Indic languages (with the roots going as far as Proto-Indo-European). The Sanskrit verb-roots can be divided, for morphosyntactic reasons, into the parasmaipada and the ātmanepada voice classes. Semantically, the Actor (kartr) of an ātmanepada root is thought to be more immediately concerned with or benefiting in some way from the activity denoted by the root. In our terms, such an Actor is an Ar (Actor-recipient). The Class II verbs of Punjabi are, in this way, similar to the ātmanepada verbs of Sanskrit. Such verbs are found in Hindi as well. (Cf. Saksena 1980, where what in our terms is the Actor of Phase B of such a verb is called an "affected agent"). It is not enough just to assign a feature +ātmane to such verb in the lexicon (as Kachru 1973) does; what is needed is an elaborate treatment of all the facets of the phenomenon. The

verb k^ha (IIB) "eat" in Punjabi, for example, has in its valency set an Actor engaged in an activity (ingesting something). Since he is viewed as obviously and immediately benefiting from the activity (a variety of benefit which he can bring only to himself and to nobody else), the explicator auxiliary de "give" is not compatible with k^ha . (It is physically impossible for him to "give" the immediate benefit of "eating", i.e., ingesting, to anybody else even if he wants to). (For a detailed discussion of the explicator auxiliaries of Punjabi, see Chapter VI). We can say, for example,

- (1) ram ne roṭi k^ha lai
 Ram Agt bread having eaten taken
 "Ram ate (the) bread."

but not

- (2) *ram ne roṭi k^ha ditti
 Ram Agt bread having eaten given

When we come to Phase C or Phase D of k^ha , involving some involved or non-involved Actor-causer (Aci or Acn), making the original Actor (now Recipient) eat something, the Recipient is marked with nũ "to" and not with tõ "from" as is the case with Phase C of a Class I verb (pəka "cook", for example). Examples are:

- (3) mā ne ram nũ roṭi k^huai
 mother -Agt Ram -to bread made to eat
 "Mother made Ram eat the bread."

- (4) mā ne ram tō roṭi pakvai
 mother -Agt Ram -from bread made to bake
 "Mother made Ram bake the bread."

According to our valency lexicon, Ram is the obligatory Recipient in (3) but an optional Causer-mediator in (4) because (4') is grammatically complete.

- (4') mā ne roṭi pakvai
 mother -Agt bread made to bake
 "Mother got the bread baked."

The most natural English translation of (4') is a passive construction. Later on in this chapter, we shall see why this is the case. Since nũ "to" and tō "from" are definitely spatial postpositions here (as elsewhere in the language), though they are used rather metaphorically here, our technical terms Recipient, Causer-mediator, Causer-source etc. are fully justified.

4.2 "Intransitive", "transitive" and "first causal" phases

We put these terms within quotation marks because the verb phases in our lexicon are not "transitive", "first causal/causative" etc. but can sometimes be used transitively,

causatively and in other ways. That is why we have given algebraic names to these phases. In the case of many verbs, Phase A is historically derived from the morphologically passive form of Sanskrit. In the working life of a language, history is not as dead as many linguists, in their synchronistic zeal, imagine it to be. The short historical note in the last chapter was included simply to stress the fact that the often made "passive" interpretation of Phase A is not entirely unjustified if English is used as a filter rather than as a metalanguage for a grammatical description of Punjabi. (In the following chapters, we give examples of how, in the past, many grammarians derived categories of Punjabi and Hindi grammar from the English translation of sentences from these languages, rather than from the original sentences themselves). In fact, grammarians have smelt the "passive" almost everywhere in the Punjabi and Hindi grammar. Simply because the English translation of a Punjabi sentence happens to be a passive construction does not mean that the original is also an incarnation of a Platonic entity called "passive voice". This problem is discussed in detail in Chapter VII. In this chapter, we discuss briefly the broad general semanto-syntactic behaviour of the verb-phases and their elaborators.

4.2.1 Class I verbs

In the case of Class I verbs, both Phase B and Phase C are bivalent. The Causer-mediator of Phase C is implied by the meaning of the phase, but it is not syntactically obligatory

(cf. sentence (4') above). So it is an optional elaborator. It is not an accident that among the Phase B forms we find both the older type derived by internal vowel change (e.g., mur → mor, k^húll → k^hól) and those derived through the currently productive rule of adding the causal affix -a (e.g., duk^h → duk^ha, k^hum → k^hum^a). Often, we find both the forms of the same root which appear to be alternants used in free variation. tar → tar / tara are good examples. The fact is that a Phase B form of this class can be used both transitively and causatively. Depending on the linguistic and the non-linguistic context, one interpretation or the other is possible, While in

- (5) mē pipe vicō tel káddia
 I can -from oil taken out.
 "I took out oil from the can."

kádd is used transitively to mean "take out", in

- (6) mē kàṇṭi vəja ke ram nū kàrō
 I bell having rung Ram -to house-from
 bār káddia
 out made to come out.

"I made Ram come out of the house by ringing the bell."

the meaning of kádd is clearly causative. The interpretation of

(7) mē ram nū khic ke bār káddia

I Ram -to having pulled out made to come out.

"I pulled Ram out" or "I made Ram come out by pulling him."

depends on how the listener visualizes the context of situation - whether or not Ram was co-operative.

Grammatically, I am the Actor and Ram is the Undergoer. But situational-pragmatic factors may affect the interpretation. If he was co-operative and himself walked out, he is the Undergoer-actor and I am the involved Causer-actor in a genuinely causative construction. But if I literally pulled him out as if he were a piece of furniture, he is simply the Undergoer and I am a simple Actor (rather than an Actor-causer) and the construction is non-causative. In our valency lexicon, the valency set of Phase B of a Class I verb is <A/Aci,U/Ua>.

It has been aptly observed that

"If a language permits a contrast in form to survive, it ought to be for a purpose." (Bolinger 1977:19).

Forms of words very often come into existence as a result of the blind processes of analogy. But when, as a result of such processes, alternants come into existence (cór ~ càrà ,

for example), they often develop subtle differences in meaning. Saksena (1982:86) has observed insightfully that the causative ending -ā in Hindi indicates that the causing agent (our Actor-causer) is immediately involved in making the causee agent (i.e., Undergoer-actor) work. Additionally, in Punjabi, we find that when two Phase B forms, the older one with the internal vowel change and the more modern one derived with the affix -ā, exist, the latter is a true causative one. The use of cārā in (8) and of cār in (9) below is noteworthy:

(8) mē ram nū gaddi cārā

I Ram -to train made to ascend

"I helped Ram enter the train" or "I helped Ram start his train journey."

(9) mē ram nū gaddi cār

(Glosses as under (8))

(9) indicates that Ram was forced into the train. (It is not uncommon in the Punjab to lift someone bodily and push him into a train). Punjabi also has an idiomatic expression gaddi cārna (literally, "make someone enter the train") "to murder", i.e., forcing someone into a train to the next world. It is significant that the form cār, and never cārā, is used in this idiom.

Phase A of a Class I verb is monovalent. The Phase A form is often used in such a way that the situation referred

to is viewed from a perspective that is the opposite of the perspective of a Phase B form. This opposition of perspective is similar to the opposition of the perspectives of the English active and passive constructions. (As mentioned in the last chapter, many Phase A forms are historically derived from the Sanskrit passive forms). Many Punjabi sentences with the nucleus consisting of a Phase A form could be translated as passive sentences in English. A typical example is

- (10) et^he tazi macch^hi vikdi he
 here fresh fish "selling" is
 "Fresh fish sells here."
 "Fresh fish is on sale here."

In the English glosses, the word "selling" is enclosed within quotation marks because English has no verb form which could translate the Punjabi intransitive form exactly. "Is sold" is not a good translation. A true Punjabi translation of the English "Fresh fish is sold here" would be

- (11) et^he tazi macch^hi veci jandi he
 here fresh fish sold going is

The meaning of (10) is closer to that of (13). We shall deal with sentences like (11) in a later chapter. As far as Punjabi is concerned, the single argument of Phase A of a

Class I verb is the Actor-undergoer. It is basically an Actor but has some properties which the Undergoer of some other phase possesses. The lexicon also shows an optional Causer-source which is not always and necessarily implied by the meaning of the verb (as in the case of Phase C of this class). The perspective adopted in (10) is the direct opposite to the one adopted in (12) below:

- (12) et^he ram tazi macchⁱ vecda hε
 here Ram fresh fish selling is
 "Ram sells fresh fish here."

(11) may be described as a passivized version of (12), but (10) is certainly not simply so and nothing more. It is not for nothing that "fresh fish" is used morpho-syntactically as an Actor in (10). Compare (10) with

- (13) et^he sirf tazi macchⁱ vikdi hε. befⁱ nãĩ
 here only fresh fish "selling" is stale not
 "It is only fresh fish, and not stale fish, that
 sells here."

The English translation of (13) is quite appropriate. It is the fish itself, because of its quality, that seems to be controlling the process. Considerations such as the fish being dead and a human agent doing the selling etc. are grammatically irrelevant. (Cf. Bhartrhari's dictum that a linguist is concerned with the meanings of linguistic

elements and not with meanings of things). Utterances like (14) can be frequently heard

(14) kiõ tũ do tʌkiõ badle

why you two small-coins in exchange of

vɪk giɑ hẽ?

"sold" gone is

"Why have you sold yourself for a petty amount of money?"

An English translation reflecting the true grammatical character of (14) is impossible. The Actor-undergoer of the monovalent phase vɪk is both the seller and the "object" sold. There is no other verb-elaborator, not even in the background.

In the lexicon, we mention an optional Source-causer, which, as we said above, is not necessarily implied by the meaning of the verb. The sentence "The child sleeps" does not imply by itself that somebody puts him to sleep. The sentence (15) below is perfectly "active":

(15) é bacca sirf rat nũ sõnda hẽ

this child only night -to sleeping is

"This child sleeps at night only."

But in nearly all the uses of a Punjabi Phase A form of a Class I verb, a Source-causer marked with the postposition tõ "from" can be mentioned, with the result that the

sentence conveys a somewhat "passive" meaning. This adjunct, though optional, changes the interpretation of the sentence considerably. In

- (15') é bacca sirf mā tō hī sōnda hē
 this child only mother -from Emph. sleeping is
 "This child can be put to sleep by mother only"
 (Literally, "This child sleeps from mother only.")

The child is the Actor in both (15) and (15') for all the morpho-syntactic purposes (case-marking, verb-agreement, etc., which cannot be fully described until we have discussed transitivity in a later chapter). We consider this single elaborator as an Actor-undergoer because a separate Causer-source can almost always be brought into the picture.

Why sentences like (15) in Punjabi and Hindi often have capabilitative meaning should be perfectly understandable now. The child in (15) is capable of deciding whether or not to sleep. So if the mother can influence his decision, she surely has a capability to do so. The capabilitative meaning is there even if the Actor is inanimate. The Causer-source is always viewed, symbolically as the one that makes the Actor-undergoer work.

- (16) é kar met^hō nāī caldi
 this car me-from not moving
 "I cannot drive this car."

has a systematically ambiguous meaning, with two interpretations: (i) "I don't have the capability to drive this car," and (ii) "This car is such a bloody damned thing that I cannot drive it." The fact that the car in (16) is morpho-syntactically an Actor (and hence symbolically an agent) is not without semantic consequences.

4.2.2 Class II verbs

A look at the lists of verb phases in Chapter II will reveal that very few Class II verbs have Phase A, and that suppletion is common here. For most verbs of this class, Phase B is the basic one. As these verbs denote processes such as eating, drinking, learning, perceiving, finding, reading (to oneself) etc., Phase B always has an Actor-recipient. Since what is eaten, drunk, perceived etc. is most often (but not invariably) a lifeless object or an abstract idea, a causative interpretation of this phase is not possible. Therefore, the Undergoer of this phase is not characterized as an Undergoer-actor. In the case of Class II verbs, Phase C and Phase D can be regarded as the first causal and the second causal respectively. (But we shall use better terms below). As in the case of Class I verbs, the perspective of Phase A is the direct opposite of that of Phase B. For example, in

(17) ram ne sapp vek^{bia}

Ram -Agt snake seen

"Ram saw a snake."

a Phase B form vek^h "see" is used. In

(18) ram nũ sapp disia

Ram -to snake become visible

"A snake came into Ram's view."

Phase A dis "be visible" is used. The English glosses and translation of (18) are approximate. (18) is the grossly misunderstood and therefore much mythologized "dative subject" construction, a pan-Indian phenomenon which is regarded as one of the defining features of India as a linguistic area. (Masica 1976). A whole chapter is needed to explode this myth. Briefly here, Ram is alleged to be "dative subject" in (18) in spite of the fact that "in the surface structure" it is marked as a dative NP with the postposition translatable as "to". The fact that the normal English translation of (18) is "Ram saw a snake" is the real source of the mischief. In Chapter IX we shall take up this matter. Suffice it to mention here that the dative NP is an optional adjunct and is not thus a part of the valency set of Phase A of a Class II verb. It is hard to imagine an NP that is not even a "term" (using a term from Relational Grammar) as being the "subject" of a clause. It is for situational-pragmatic, rather than purely grammatical, reasons that Ram is indispensable in (18). But the dative NP is not obligatory in a sentence having a Phase A form like dis. An example is:

- (19) sial nũ et^he surəj kətt̃ fi disda
 winter -to here sun rarely rather visible
 h̃e
 is

"The sun is rarely visible here in winter."

Our lexicon recognizes that the meaning of a Phase A form of a Class II verb implies a Recipient, which is syntactically optional. Since Phases C and D of Class II verbs are always true causative phases, we deal with them in the following section.

4.3 Causative constructions in Punjabi

Causative constructions in Hindi have been, for about half a century, the most discussed topic both by traditional grammarians and by modern linguists. But we find in retrospect that not much that is of theoretical interest has been achieved. The traditional grammarians' aims were descriptive, and they can be said to have succeeded admirably in describing the morphology of the causative verbs and case-marking etc. in the causative constructions. As far as Punjabi is concerned, grammarians like Ram Singh (1924), Karam Singh (1929) and Duni Chandra (1964) have done similar work. But these grammarians made no attempt to explain the phenomenon (in our sense of showing a phenomenon as related to other phenomena and fitting harmoniously into the system as a whole). But this was not their aim. By the time the modern linguists working on Hindi and Punjabi

entered the field in the sixties, American Structuralism, though on the retreat, was still quite influential. But it was generativism inspired by Chomsky with its universalistic ambitions and pretensions that was the order of the day. So, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Hindi causative constructions were fitted into the preferred frameworks. Consequently, linguists grappled with theoretical problems such as whether the causative clauses were derived transformationally from a deep structure consisting of non-transformational clauses ("Standard Theory" version, cf. Kachru 1965, Sinha 1970)), or there was an abstract verb CAUSE in the syntactic deep structure (Kachru 1965) or in the semantic deep structure (Generative Semantics version, cf. Sah 1971). Attempts were also made to fit the phenomenon into Fillmore's Case Grammar (e.g., Balachandran 1971). We need not mention these writers' views and the controversies they indulged in. They are dead issues now. The most recent views expressed by Saksena (in the works already mentioned) are not based on any particular Theory. The authors of the views she has criticized have not made any attempt to reply. Saksena's model is "lexicalist" and, therefore, similar to ours in some respects. (If the two can be called models). She recognizes "a lexicon with fully specified lexical entries. That is to say, both causative and noncausative verbs are listed and their entries contain both predictable and idiosyncratic information. In addition to fully specified lexical entries this model posits a set of lexical redundancy rules...." (1982:72-73). She also gives a

diagrammatic representation, with boxes and arrows, of her model. Here, our approach is different. Her approach is not contextual-functional in our sense. There are very simple functional explanations for many things for which a model such as hers has to set up rules and elaborate lexical entries. A human language is such and is used in such a variety of situations and for such diverse purposes, that "fully specified lexical entries" cannot be posited. Behind such an attempt lies a view of language as a closed and self-contained system of signs, a view we have explicitly rejected because this view is implicitly deterministic and denies the creativity of language. A certain amount of vagueness and indeterminacy is a must for any human language, and the lexicon of a language, viewed as a social resource, must be an open system with a "stream-like continuity" in which "fully specified lexical entries" are out of question. The context and the co-text are extremely important. The Punjabi sentences discussed above argue in favour of our point. Still, Saksena's work is very significant. Her explanatory concept of Contact in Causation is really insightful.

4.3.1 Contact in Causation

According to Saksena, the notion of contact in causation should be considered

"a semantic composite, being a sum of contact initiation and contact completion. Initiation and completion, furthermore, can be stated as conditions on the parties involved... in order for causative contact to be initiated, the causer must be personally involved in the verb activity; and in order for causative contact to be completed, the causee must be the target of this activity." (1982 :84-85).

In Hindi (and Punjabi also), a personally involved causer is signalled by the affix -ḡ on the verb, and a non-involved causer is signalled by the affix -vḡ on the verb. What she calls "the NP in these causatives that corresponds to the subject of the Base" (the Actor-recipient or the Undergoer-actor of Phase B in our model) is marked by the postposition ko "to" or \emptyset in Hindi and by nũ "to" or \emptyset in Punjabi. The non-affected causee (Causer-mediator in our model, which is semantically a causee and causer at the same time, and hence the name mediator) is marked by se "from" in Hindi and by tõ "from" in Punjabi.

The two-way contrast mentioned above yields four possible combinations. The following table adopted from Saksena (id. 86) is "translated" into Punjabi and into our system.

	+involved causer Aci -a	-involved causer Acn -va
+aff causee Ua,R nũ	-a, nũ	-va, nũ
-aff causee Ci tũ	-a, tũ	-va, tũ

Since contactive causation involves both an involved causer and an affected causee, only one of the combinations -a / nũ - indicates a contactive causation. All other combinations indicate non-contactive causation. We shall see in a later chapter that the use of nũ in Punjabi (ko in Hindi) is also controlled partly by the "reference" properties such as definiteness. But Saksena's hypothesis is fine for our present purpose. There is nothing particularly remarkable or mysterious in this use of tũ "from" and nũ "to" in Punjabi. It is predictable from the semantics of the two classes of the Punjabi verbs. Spatial imagery and metaphorization are omnipresent in human languages. The meaning of the verb pi "drink" is such that Ram in

(20) ram ne cá pítí

Ram -Agt tea drunk

is viewed as benefiting from the activity of the verb of which he is the Actor (or, more accurately, Actor-

recipient). This is not apparent in (20). But when we come to the causative version of (20):

- (21) mā ne ram nū cá pīlai
 mother -Agt Ram -to tea made to drink
 "Mother made Ram drink tea."

The mother as the causer is viewed as indirectly giving that benefit to Ram or causing Ram to give the benefit to himself. It is notable that the explicator auxiliary de "give" cannot be used in (20) - so that the verb-combination *pi de "drink-give" is not possible in Punjabi. One cannot give the immediate benefit of one's drinking to anyone else. (The liquid must go into the agent of drinking; cf. Newton 1898:347). But this explicator auxiliary is possible in (21) for reasons which should be very clear now. pīla de "(cause-to-drink)-give" is sensible in Punjabi; *pi de "drink-give" is not.

The semantics of Class I verbs is different. Both de "give" and le "take" as explicator auxiliaries are possible with these verbs. The semantics of the verb tò "wash" is such that Ram in (22) is not concerned with washing in a way he is concerned with drinking.

- (22) ram ne kappare tòte
 Ram -Agt clothes washed
 "Ram washed the clothes."

So in the causative version of (22) Ram, the optional Causer-mediator, is marked with the postposition tõ "from".

- (23) mā ne ram tõ kappəre tuðe
 mother -Agt Ram -from clothes made to wash
 "Mother made Ram wash the clothes."

Both de "give" and le "take" can be used as explicator auxiliaries in (22) and (23). The verb pár "read" belongs to both the classes. A person can read something aloud to others for their benefit or aloud or silently to himself for his own benefit, (and in the latter case he is an Actor-recipient). Accordingly, in the causative constructions in which pə̀ra "cause-to-read" is used, a causee can be marked either with tõ "from" (as an optional Causer-source) or with nũ "to" (as an obligatory Recipient).

- mā ne ram tõ ciṭṭ^{hi} pə̀raṭ
 mother -Agt Ram -from letter made to read
 "Mother made Ram read the letter (to her)."

- (25) mā ne ram nũ ciṭṭ^{hi} pə̀raṭ
 mother -Agt Ram -to letter made to read
 "Mother made Ram read the letter (for his information)."

But what about the fact that in the case of many class I verbs Phase C has two forms - one with the -g affix and

one with the -va affix? It could be plausibly argued that the phenomenon arose historically because a Class I verb has only three ordinary phases. Many verbs in this class have Phase B forms derived through the process of internal vowel change. So both the -a-forms and the -va-forms derived analogically were, in some cases, pushed into the box of Phase C. The case with the Class II verbs which have (theoretically) four normal phases was different. This argument may indeed be valid. But Saksena's hypothesis is also correct. When a Phase C of a Class I verb has two forms, they tend to differ subtly in meaning, though they may often be used in free variation. A native speaker feels that (26) and (27) below

(26) ram ne nai tō val kəʈae

Ram -Agt barber -from hair made to cut

"Ram made the barber cut his hair."

(27) ram ne nai tō val kəʈvae

(Glosses and translation as under (26))

do not have exactly the same meaning. In (26), Ram appears to be a willing and personally involved participant in the activity. (Perhaps he had a hair-cut in order to look smart). In (27), on the other hand, Ram does not seem to be very much involved in the activity, or at least not actively involved. (Perhaps he, being a Hindu, had to have a ritual shave of his head on the thirteenth day after his father's

death). (Cf. Saksena 1982:89-90). That the -ḡ suffix also indicates an involved causee also comes out in our discussion of cāḡ and cārū in section 4.2.1 above.

4.3.2 Some semantic peculiarities of causativization

As we saw above, a Phase B form of a Class I verb can be used either transitively or causatively depending on the context and on the semantic nature of the verb and its elaborators. This fact and numerous other idiosyncrasies associated with the meanings of the causative constructions, especially those having a Phase B form of this class (cf. Saksena 1982 for a detailed treatment of very similar phenomena in Hindi), argue strongly against the transformational "Standard Theory" and the Generative Semantics approaches to causativization in Punjabi and Hindi. Here we mention only one of these idiosyncrasies - the "try"-interpretation, as induced by the second clause in the following compound sentence:

- (28) mē tã cabī nū bat^héra kumāra
 I PARTICLE key -to quite a lot made to turn
 pər é nãĩ kumī
 but it not turned
 "I tried my best to turn the key but it did not
 turn."

The particle tã in (28) indicates that the information

preceding is the "given" one in the given context. This utterance was encountered in a real life situation in Manchester in 1982. Such a "try"-interpretations was first suggested by Balachandran (1971:85) as a counter-example to Kachru's transformational analysis. Balachandran's typical (Hindi) example was

- (29) me laṛke .ko kḥana kḥilata hū
 I boy -to food making to eat am
 par vah kḥata nahī
 but he eating not

"I try to make the boy eat the food, but he does not eat it."

The interpretation "I cause the boy to eat food...." of the first clause (in which a causative verb is used) is clearly wrong. A CAUSE-interpretation implies the successful completion of the first activity. On the other hand, the first clause of (29) as a simple sentence would clearly support a CAUSE-interpretation. (29) should serve as a warning against hasty generalizations based on a few decontextualized sentences. Words in the lexicon and even isolated and decontextualized sentences simply tend to mean various things. It is only in the actual use that one possibility or the other is realized. In (29), it is the conjoined clause that forces a "try"-interpretation on the first clause. It is only because of the conjoined clause that the imperfective aspect of the verb in the first clause

also joins hands to support this interpretation. If the verb in the first clause in (29) were in perfective aspect, (29) would be ungrammatical. In an unsuccessful attempt to refute Balachandran's argument, Kachru (1973) did not face Balachandran's counter-example itself but constructed other sentences on this pattern but with the verbs in the perfective aspect, declared these sentences ungrammatical and thus "refuted" Balachandran. But the fact remains that (29) is grammatical and it does argue against the setting up of a CAUSE-clause in the deep structure. The verbs in (28) are in perfective aspect. But here, it is the adverb bat^hera "quite a lot" that is mainly (but not exclusively) responsible for the "try"-interpretation. The expression that indicates that the key was "made to turn quite a lot" surely also indicates that there was a problem with the key. This adverb by itself is not enough to prevent an interpretation of the success of the effort, but it does help. Then, significantly, the verb does not agree with the Undergoer as it normally should, being in the Perfect Participle form expressing perfective aspect. The typical Punjabi device of adding the postposition nũ "to" to the Undergoer that prevents the verb agreeing with it is also used. The verb agreeing with the Undergoer also tends to indicate that the Undergoer is affected, and thus indirectly hints at the success of the venture. nũ "to" is added generally to make the Undergoer definite (and the key is in fact a definite key in the situation). (All such phenomena are discussed in detail in Chapter VI). Then, the

"incomplete" mid-level intonation of the first clause in which the adverb bathéra modifies the action of turning a key, also contributes towards the "try"-interpretation. Last, but not the least, of all, the speaker with a wretched-looking face standing in the rain and holding the key in his hand is also there! The source of the "try"-interpretation is not located at any single point in the sentence. Rather, all the parts of the sentence and the non-linguistic context contribute towards it. All this argues not only against Kachru's CAUSE-analysis but also against Saksena's fully specified lexical entries for the verbs. Is it enough to imagine that the feature [+TRY] is there in the lexical entry of some or all verbs? To escape from one closed system of signs only to fall into another is no real progress. Bhartrhari was right that since the meaning of a sentence is understood in a flash and is not mathematically computed from the meanings of the individual words, the sentence meaning is ultimately indivisible, and it is only for the sake of grammatical analysis that we have to proceed as if it were divisible. This "as if" provision requires that a student of a living language take into account the fact that the words and the sentences he analyses only tend to mean various things.

The Phase C of of a Class I verb, unlike the Phase B, is truly and unambiguously causative. The optional complement Causer-mediator (Cm) of this phase is backgrounded in the sense that it is implied by the meaning of the verb phase, exactly as a syntactically optional agent

is implied by the English verb combination 'was lifted' in

(30) The luggage was lifted (by the porter).

This is why some grammarians like Newton and Bailey (to mention just two) have argued that such causative constructions "always have a passive sense" (Newton 1898: 347), and even that "the so-called causals of the trans[itive] verbs are causals of their passives." (Bailey 1933-35:503). Bailey, though his knowledge of Urdu and Punjabi was superb, and in his life he enjoyed the reputation of being able to speak these languages even better than a native speaker could, had an unfortunate habit of equating the meaning of a Punjabi/Urdu expression with its English translation. In other words, he used English not only as a metalanguage but also as a filter language for an analysis of other languages. (In the same vein, an Arab could argue that the English word 'camel' has more than three hundred meanings!). Urdu, about which Bailey's observation was made, has no morphologically passive form of the verb of which the "so-called causals of transitive verbs" could be the causals. Newton's more reserved observation is, on the other hand, perfectly valid. The sentence

(31) profesar ne (kuli tō) saman
 professor -Agt porter -from luggage
 cukvaia
 made to lift

is best translated into natural English as "The professor got the luggage lifted (by the porter)". In Punjabi/Urdu, the backgrounded verb-elaborator is morphosyntactically an optional Cm. We shall discuss in detail in Chapter VII why this "passive" reading of sentences like (31) is possible.

Backgrounding of an elaborator in a causative construction is not limited to Punjabi. Comrie (1974,1976), in his crosslinguistic study of causative constructions, has found it in number of unrelated languages. Comrie starts with a general assumption that causativization involves increase in valency.

"If the noncausative verb has a valency n (takes n arguments), then its causative equivalent will normally take n+1 arguments, since in addition to the arguments of the noncausative verb, the causative verb also includes reference to the causer of the action."
(Comrie 1974:2).

Comrie assumes "for the sake of argument" a transformational analysis of causative constructions, which sets up the operator CAUSE and an embedded clause in the syntactic deep structure. This clause has its "embedded subject" (ES), "embedded object" (EO), "embedded indirect object" (EIO) etc. Comrie observes that in many languages the "embedded subject" (ES) or the agent of the activity denoted by the verb is "demoted" in the surface structure of a causative sentence because of restrictions on "syntactic doubling",

e.g., there being two "subjects" in the surface structure.

"Where the restrictions on doubling requires one of the arguments of the causative verb to be demoted to a different syntactic position, it is always the ES that is so demoted." (id. 8).

Comrie also quotes Shopen and Konaré (1970):

"There are only a limited number of syntactic nodes available to verbs and if there are too many semantic functions, one of them has to be left out."

In Punjabi and Hindi-Urdu, it is the immediate causer of the action that is made syntactically optional and thus "demoted". The valency set of a Punjabi verb-phase must have the initiator of the action and an NP representing the person or thing finally affected by the action (or the "substratum of the fruit of action"). Any intermediary, although implied by the meaning of the verb, is optional. The deep structure CAUSE analysis and grammatical categories like "subject" are not useful for an analysis of Punjabi. (But this is not to deny their usefulness for the analyses of other languages). However, Comrie's analysis of this cross-linguistic phenomenon, which takes note of Punjabi also (1974: 12), shows that it is quite widespread.

4.4 The subtractive phases of verbs

The subtractive phases *A, *B, *C and *D are not found in Hindi. We call the derivation of these phases the process of anti-causativization for purely technical reasons. If the increase in valency is called causativization, the decrease in valency should be called anti-causativization. This is why these phases are called subtractive phases. But with these phases it is the main and the first initiator of the action, i.e., the obligatory Actor (of whatever variety) of the original phase that is not simply backgrounded but often positively eliminated: it must not be mentioned in most cases. If the ordinary phase already has a backgrounded complement, it remains backgrounded in the subtractive phase too. If the original phase is monovalent, the corresponding subtractive phase is zero-valent, and so on. Our use of the term 'derive' here denotes a process of morpho-lexical derivation in a grammatical description. It does not mean that sentences are transformationally derived from other sentences. The meaning potential of a subtractive phase form is extremely restricted and is clearly "passive" in nature. The use of these phases is discussed in Chapter VII, where we discuss all sorts of "passive" constructions of Punjabi.

4.5 Summing up

We have discussed how some of the morpho-syntactic and semanto-syntactic features and peculiarities of some types

of Punjabi sentences can be explained, or at least fruitfully discussed, in terms of the valency theory. Keeping in view the scope of this study, only a few salient features of the causative constructions of Punjabi (an important topic in its own right) could be discussed. As we pointed out in Part I, verb valency is only one of the major constituents of Punjabi grammar. The other major constituent is transitivity. Until we have studied that, our discussion is bound to be selective and fragmentary (as it has been so far). Transitivity is partly the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

TRANSITIVITY AND THE VERB - I

VERB-FORMS

The directions from past to future and from future to past are not interchangeable - each is peculiar to itself. But where consciousness is limited to spatial intuition and apprehends temporal relations only through spatial analogies - this unique character of the direction of time must remain obscure. As in the intuition of space, everything here is reduced to the simple distinction of near and far. The only essential difference that is grasped and clearly expressed is that between "now" and "not-now" - between the immediate present and that which lies "outside" it... The fully developed consciousness, particularly the consciousness of scientific cognition, does not content itself with this simple opposition of "now" and "not-now" but raises it to its richest logical development. It produces abundant gradations of time, all encompassed in a unitary temporal order in which every moment has its specific position... . The simple distinction of separate points in time must be transformed into the concept of a mutual dynamic dependence between them... Zeno's paradox applies to the form in which these languages express motion and action; ... The developed consciousness of time frees itself from this difficulty and paradox by creating entirely new means of apprehending a temporal "whole." Time is a substantial aggregate, pieced together from distant moments, but is apprehended as a functional and dynamic whole: as a unity of relation and causality.

- Cassirer 1955 (217-222)

5.0 Introduction

The last two chapters dealt with the valency system of the Punjabi verb - with the number and semantic nature of the complements of the various phases of the Punjabi verb roots. This chapter deals with a component of the transitivity system of Punjabi - the contribution that the various verb-forms of Punjabi make to the transitivity expressed by a clause. As already pointed out, we distinguish a verb-phase, i.e., the phonetic form which a root assumes when it is inflected for valency variation, from a verb-form, i.e., a verb-phase inflected for tense, mood, aspect, number, gender, etc.

5.1 Transitivity and aspect in Punjabi

Transitivity, understood as the carrying over or transferring of the activity (the fruit or the result of the activity, to be more precise) from an agent to a patient; is a global property of an entire clause. (Hopper and Thompson 1980). For the purpose of grammatical analysis, however, transitivity can be broken down into component parts, each part focusing on a different facet of this carrying-over in a different part of the clause. Taken together, these components can make clauses more transitive or less transitive. Transitivity is not a binary feature. Kinesis, aspect, tense, punctuality, volitionality, affirmation, mode, agency and affectedness and individuation of the

patient are the components of transitivity according to Hopper and Thompson.

"...although the implicational interrelationships among the elements of the transitivity continuum have a certain validity at the sentence level, the explanation for the salience of THESE PARTICULAR FEATURES is to be found in discourse, specifically in the distinction between foregrounded and backgrounded discourse."
(Hopper and Thompson 1980:294).

Hopper and Thompson point out that the properties associated with high transitivity turn out to predominate in the foregrounded portions of discourse.

Since we deal, in this chapter, with the contribution that the various verb-forms of Punjabi are potentially capable of making to the transitivity expressed by a clause, we keep the discoursal-contextual and all other factors in the background and mention them only when it is absolutely essential to do so.

"A form must have a consistent meaning value or else communication is impossible; we cannot have linguistic forms which derive all their meanings only from context." (Hopper 1982:4).

In place of Hopper's expression "consistent meaning value", we use the expression "consistent meaning potential", which

is more in accordance with our semantic philosophy, and this chapter deals with the consistent meaning potential of the Punjabi verb-forms as far as expression of transitivity is concerned. How much and which components of the meaning potential of a form are actually realized depends on the interaction of the meaning potential of all other words in the sentence within the given context.

Considerations of transitivity inevitably lead us to considerations of aspect. It so happens that in Punjabi the study of transitivity in the verb system is the study of aspect at the same time. An independent study of tense and aspect in Punjabi is hardly possible or desirable.

Since transitivity and aspect are so closely related semantically, it is but to be expected that aspect itself is more a discorsal than a sentence-level phenomenon. To quote Hopper again,

"although in a given language the morphological or syntactic means for expressing this function may intersect with, or even be identical with, other morpho-syntactic systems, ... the encoding on percepts in the world always takes place within a discourse rather than as a sentence framework." (Hopper 1982: 5-6).

Aspectual distinctions, though expressed at the level of the sentence, derive ultimately from discourse. We shall argue below that the syntax of a language is a microcosm of its

historically developed discourse habits and strategies. Word-forms and syntactic rules employed in discourse do not just happen to exist in a language.

"...we do indeed find syntax to be a DEPENDENT, functionally motivated entity whose formal properties reflect - perhaps not completely, but nearly so - the properties of the explanatory parameters that motivate its rise." (Givón 1979:82).

Here again, we look at the aspectual meaning potential of the verb-forms, keeping the discoursal-pragmatic factors in the background but not out of sight.

5.2 The Indian theory of the meaning of the verb-forms

Ancient and medieval Indian linguists had a rudimentary but interesting theory of the meaning of verb-forms, and this included some consideration of transitivity. (Rao 1969: Chapters 3 and 4). None of these linguists, with the possible exception of Pāṇini, was a native speaker of Sanskrit, the language with which they were almost exclusively concerned. The variety of Sanskrit they wrote and spoke during scholarly discussions was largely modelled syntactically on their native tongues, which, as we pointed out in Part I also, were in the process of becoming the modern Indic languages. The modern Indic languages are believed to have assumed their present form during the

period from the seventh to the eleventh centuries. Some of the Indian linguists lived during or after this period. A prominent theoretician among them - Nāgeśa - lived as recently as in the eighteenth century. So although they profess to be dealing with Sanskrit, many of their findings and insights are clearly relevant to an analysis of the modern North Indian languages. Theirs were very much the native speakers' intuitions which must be respected or at least carefully examined.

According to some of these linguists, the verbal root has two meaning components:

(a) Activity (vyāpāra)

(b) fruit or result of activity (phala).

The fruit component is secondary and attributive to the activity component by the relation of favourability (anukūlatva-) or productivity (janakatva-), so that the activity denoted by a verbal root is actually "activity favourable to the fruit" (phalānukūla vyāpāra-) and the fruit is "fruit produced by activity" (vyapārajanya phalām). The sense of "being favourable" is supplied by syntactical relation (samsarga), and the two are signified by the same root. In the case of the intransitive roots, the activity and the result subsist in the same substratum (āśraya); in the case of the transitive roots, they may subsist in different substrata, depending on the nature of the verbal affix. (It may be pointed out here that "substratum" is not a very good

translation of the Sanskrit word āśraya even when it is used as a grammatical term. An āśraya is someone or something that someone or something else leans upon, not subsists in. In grammar, an āśraya is the nominal denoting an entity most involved in or most affected by the activity denoted by the verb. But since this translation is now current, we adopt it as technical term).

The verbal affix signifies

- (a) time factor (kāla)
- (b) substratum factor (āśraya)

The affix in a personal or finite verb-form of Sanskrit indicates tense and shows agreement in person and number with either the Actor (kartr) (in an active clause) or with the Undergoer (karman) (in a passive clause) or is in the third person singular neuter form and does not show any agreement (in a clause in the impersonal voice). In the first case, the result of the activity is said to subsist in the Actor; in the second case, it is said to subsist in the Undergoer. In the case of the impersonal voice, the affix is said to express the meaning of the verbal root (bhāva) itself. The meaning of the root, since the days of Pāṇini, has been expressed by the Sanskrit grammarians by using noun forms. The verbal form may represent the activity as not yet accomplished (sādhya or "to be accomplished") or as "accomplished" (siddha) (or as a reality or an eventuality respectively. Cf. Kurylowicz 1973:77). We shall see in the

next chapter that a verb expressing a siddha activity (or a reality) can be without a principal qualifier (PQR) which denotes the substratum of the result.

In his discussion of this theory, Rao gives examples of the personal verb-forms only. But it is clear that the authors of the theory also had in mind the participial or gerundival forms. It is among the latter forms that the distinction of the siddha and the sādhya forms of activity are most clearly discernible. This theory can be fruitfully applied to an analysis of transitivity expressed by the verb-forms of Punjabi.

5.3 The Indian view of time

Since this study focuses more on the Punjabi language as a system and code than as a process and behaviour, and a linguistic system, according to the philosophy behind our approach, must be studied in the context of culture (cf. Part I), the Indian view of time, as it developed over the past centuries, during which Punjabi, too, was assuming its present form, has to be taken into account for a proper understanding of the meaning of the Punjabi verb-forms.

Punjabi has the same word kāl for both "yesterday" and "tomorrow", parsō for both "day before yesterday" and "day after tomorrow", cot^h for both "day before the day before yesterday" and "day after the day after tomorrow", panjot^h for This is the case with all the major languages of North India, though they may not employ the same words as Punjabi does. Secondly, all the Indian languages divide what

in English would usually be viewed as a single action into component parts arranged in sequence. The Punjabi equivalent of the English "Bring the book" is literally "Having grasped the book, come". We have already pointed out in Part I that the situation denoted by the English sentence "I was sleeping on the pavement and someone took away my blanket" is represented by Punjabi as "I was in a state of having fallen asleep on the pavement and someone, having removed and having grasped my blanket, gone." These two peculiarities of Punjabi must not be dismissed as "superficial surface structure features" or explained away by invoking the arbitrariness of the sign. They are found in many other genetically unrelated and geographically non-contiguous languages as well. Cassirer (1955:215 ff) points out that in such languages "the qualitative differences of past and future are often totally blurred." In the Shambala language, the same adverb refers to the earliest time and the distant future.

"Ntus regard time as a thing, so that for them there is only a today and a not-today; whether the latter was yesterday or tomorrow is all the same to them." (ibid).

He also points out that in many African languages, every action is described in all its particulars, and each of these particular actions is expressed by a special verb. "He drowned" is expressed as "He drank water, died", "cut off" becomes "to cut, to fall", and the action of bringing

becomes "take, go there". (The Punjabi verb meaning "bring" is literally "grasp, come"). This phenomenon is also found in Quechua, the lingua franca of the Inca empire in Ecuador and, significantly, has begun to penetrate the Spanish now spoken in that region (Hook 1977:348). Cassirer thinks that both these things happen when temporal distinctions are viewed spatially, when they are "reduced to the simple distinctions of far and near." Then

"the only essential difference that is grasped and clearly expressed is that between 'now' and 'not-now' - between immediate present and that which lies outside it ... For this form of primary temporal intuition, the whole consciousness and its contents falls, as it were, into two spheres: a bright sphere illumined by the light of the 'present' and another, dark sphere... only that segment of time is apprehended, in opposition to other non-present segments, and the same material fragmentation occurs in the representation of action and activity. The unity of action literally breaks into bits. At this stage, language can represent an action only by dissecting each one separately..." (ibid).

But this "dissective" stage is not the final one. A language raises this division "to its logical development". It produces abundant gradations of time, as we have seen in the case of the Punjabi words for "yesterday" etc. Moreover, the components of the "dissected" action are "all encompassed in

a unitary temporal order in which every moment has its specific position." The significance of this last remark will become clear in the next two chapters.

Significantly, Cassirer does not give any example from Indian languages. He probably did not know that these phenomena occur in these languages; otherwise, he would not have ignored these languages spoken by millions.

The spatialization and atomization of time occur not only in the Indian languages but in other symbolic systems of India as well. Indian religions and philosophy in particular view time atomistically. (Here it must be admitted that "Indian philosophy took an interest in time primarily from a consideration of grammar and language (Panikkar 1976:70), and that "If the Greeks built their science and philosophy and culture on mathematics, especially geometry, the Indians built theirs on language" (Murti 1980:viii)). The well-known Buddhist doctrine of momentariness - dividing time into a succession of atomic moments and viewing only the present moment as real - was not invented by the Buddha or any other known thinker. Most probably, it is non-Aryan and popular in origin (Thomas 1951:165). It is shared by many non-Buddhist thinkers, astronomers and mathematicians in India (Stcherbatsky 1923: 43; Eliade 1969:375; Panikkar 1976:73). The word kal "yesterday/tomorrow" of the North Indian languages comes from the Sanskrit kāle "in time", implying that today or the present is not "in time". The Buddha asked his followers to "seize the moment" and to get "instantaneous illumination"

(Eliade 1973:185) in order to go beyond kāla, which means both "time" and "death" in Sanskrit. Patañjali recommended "meditation on the instant and succession of instants in order to attain knowledge born of discernment" (Panikkar 1976:72). The same philosophy of time can be found in a Shaiva book Vāyaviya Saṁhitā (9th or 10th century A.D.) and in Vaishnava book Bhāgavata Purāṇa (12th century). (Dasgupta 1922:164).

Coming to linguists, we have already quoted in Part I Bhartrhari's definition of an action as "a collection of parts produced in a sequence and mentally conceived as one and identical with the parts which are subordinate to it." According to him, "Verbs express things in that condition (i.e., having parts). Nouns, on the other hand, operate as though suppressing the sequence." Nāgeśa, suggested that action may be explained as a genus subsisting in such innumerable individual activities and it is through these individuals that the activity is said to be achieved. (Rao 1969:108). Nothing could be nearer the spirit of Cassirer's observations quoted earlier. In the quotation from Bhartrhari, emphasis must be laid on "mentally conceived as one and identical with the parts". As we shall see in the next chapter, parts are not simply strung together. There is always a dynamic dependence among the parts, and often there is implication of causality.

An analysis of the socio-cultural, economic, political and other types of factors responsible for the emergence and development of this view of time is beyond the scope of this

study. Suffice it to say that the phenomenon is ethnically non-Aryan and linguistically non-Indo-European in origin, and that over the centuries following the Aryan conquest of India, it developed as a result of the intermingling of the two (or more) races, their cultures and world-views.

5.4 Temporality in the Punjabi narrative discourse

The Indian view of time discussed above is an integral part of all Indian thinking, both linguistic and non-linguistic. A close and careful study of the Punjabi (all South Asian and South-east Asian languages, in fact) narrative style clearly shows that a speaker of Punjabi always takes a situation-internal perspective. Spatialization (regarding the past and the future as similar) and atomization of time may seem logically independent, but psychologically they are the outcome of the cultural propensity and predisposition to assume a situation-internal participator's perspective which is opposed to the situation-external observer's perspective. If you imaginatively place yourself spatio-temporally outside the story you are narrating and relate everything you thus observe to the deictic HERE and NOW of the speech event, there are past, present and future relative to this deictic NOW or the speech moment. You manipulate the narrative from the outside and can synthesise the parts into a single action. But if you imaginatively place yourself inside the situation and observe it from there as it unfolds in time, your synthesizing activity is minimum. Signifi-

cantly, indirect speech, which also involves assuming a situational-external perspective, is conspicuously missing from the Indian languages). Moreover, you have to use an ego-shift technique of narrative. (Cf. Bhardwaj 1986). You imaginatively float along the flow of the narrative, halt at a significant point to "look before and after", then move on to the next significant point, and so on. Since there is no single deictic point of spatio-temporal reference, there is no single past or present or future. A speaker of Punjabi does not have to relate every finite clause in his speech deictically to the NOW of the speech event.

Since syntax is discourse in miniature, a typical Punjabi sentence has time-atomizing serial verbs representing a situation-internal perspective. Such a sentence looks like a microscopic photograph of a narrative. It may not be an accident that the South Asian and the South-east Asian cultures, which use an ego-shift style of narrative, have aspect-prominent languages. A longitudinal study of the natural acquisition of English by adult Punjabi and Italian adult immigrants reveals that tense as a grammatical category did not appear in the English naturally acquired by any Punjabi informant while it did appear in the English acquired by some Italian informants. (Bhardwaj 1986). Aspect, as we shall see below, indicates situation-internal time as opposed to tense which relates a situation to an outside point in time. Tense, however, is not completely missing from Punjabi. The copular-existential verb hē of Punjabi is inflected for tense and can relate an

event to the speech situation whenever a speaker wishes to do so. But once a situation is located in time relative to the NOW of the speech event, either contextually or with the tensed form of the copula, the speaker usually takes it for granted and does not have to, as in English, relate every finite clause to this point of deictic reference. This is not without significance. What a language can express is not of much significance. (Any language can express almost anything). What a language must express is of utmost significance, for herein lies the real genius of the language. (Cf. Jakobson quoted in Dahl 1985:15). While English forces its speaker to relate most of the situations under reference to the deictic NOW, Punjabi forces its speaker to atomize time. Whorf was not basically wrong; he only slightly exaggerated a vital truth.

5.5 From tense to aspect in the Indic languages

The evolution of the Indic languages from Vedic to the modern languages reflects the evolution of the Indian concept of time. Languages, however, are more conservative and slower to change, and the more "inner" languages like the eastern variety of Punjabi (being analysed here) and Hindi-Urdu have progressed further than the "outer" languages like Lehandi (Western Punjabi), Marathi and Oriya. The elaborate tense system of Vedic started decaying and crumbling, and finite verb-forms gradually dropped out of use, and those that survived almost lost their primary

function of denoting situation-external time. Verbal nouns (gerunds) and verbal adjectives (participles) have all along been replacing the finite forms. The elaborate system of the Sanskrit past tenses, for example, shrank considerably in Pali. Later on, in Classical Sanskrit, which literally translated many constructions from the contemporary vernaculars, the Perfect Participle almost replaced the past tense forms. Later still, the present tense forms became semantically almost tenseless in most modern Indic languages and the function of referring to an ongoing action was taken over by the Imperfect Participle. Throughout this period, the serial verb constructions involving Conjunctive Participles went on gaining prominence. The participial and gerundival forms do not relate an action or event to an outside temporal point but refer to situation-internal time or aspect only. The Conjunctive Participle forms, as we shall see, are ideal for representing an action as a succession of parts which are subordinated to the whole so that the action is viewed as one. A more faithful microscopic photograph of a Punjabi narrative is difficult to imagine. It is interesting to observe that though atomization of time has always been implied by the Buddhist metaphysics, no extensive philosophical discussion of this topic took place until the seventh century A.D. From the seventh century to the tenth, this doctrine was vigorously discussed. (Dasgupta 1922:158-162). It was during this period that the modern Indic languages assumed their present form. To sum up, tense went on yielding and giving way to

aspect as the apparently non-Indo-European view of time and the situation-internal discourse perspective went on gaining prominence.

5.6 Tense, aspect and modality.

Before we discuss tense and aspect in Punjabi, we should have some idea of what these categories are. Tense, aspect and modality are usually, and usefully, discussed together as a triumvirate. "Tense, in those languages which have tense, is part of the deictic frame of temporal reference: it grammaticalizes the relationship which holds between the time of the situation that is being described and the temporal zero point of the deictic context." (Lyons 1977: 678. Emphasis added). The temporal zero point is usually the moment of the speech time, but it may be some other reference point. (Reichenbach 1947). To sum up, tense localizes a situation in time relative to an outside temporal point. The expressions emphasized above indicate that not all languages grammaticalize deictic temporal reference, i.e., have grammatical forms (verb-forms, usually) which primarily and prototypically express the deictic or situation-external temporal relations. Modern Punjabi has (almost) lost tense in the sense that most verb-forms in its earlier stages used primarily to localize events in time have been lost and those that have survived do not primarily do the old job. It does not mean that one cannot localize events in a Punjabi discourse. One can use

adverbials, particles, word-order, narrative strategies, prosody and, most significantly, the copular-existential verb which is still inflected for tense. Context and co-text also help. What we strongly reject in this study is the practice of many traditional grammarians (and, sadly enough) of some modern linguists of taking up a tensed construction of English, finding its translational equivalent in Punjabi and Hindi and assuming that the translation also expressed the "tense" of the original. Aspect, as opposed to tense, is a non-deictic category. It involves different ways of characterizing "internal temporal constituency of a situation" (Comrie 1976b:3), pertaining to completion, duration, repetition, inception, termination etc., of an action or situation. It has been argued (cf. Bache 1985) that some of these characterizations of time come under Aktionsart, and not under aspect. But a discussion of this would be unnecessary here for our purpose. We do sometimes deal with Aktionsart, but for us, an aspectual meaning expressed by the lexical meaning of a verb is Aktionsart and that expressed by its inflectional ending is aspect. This distinction may not be theoretically defensible but it works well for us. Aspect is ontogenetically more basic than tense (Lyons 1977:705), and probably all languages have it. Modality is the most nebulous and worst defined of the triumvirate in spite of (or perhaps because of!) the fact that philosophers have been dealing with the concept for centuries. In this study, we are not much concerned with it. For our purpose, modality is the degree of commitment of a

speaker towards the truth, possibility, necessity etc., or the degree of the intensity of his desire for, the state of affairs being talked about. (Cf. detailed treatment in Lyons 1977). The proposition expressed by a modal statement is not asserted but inferred, guessed, desired, etc.

In any natural language, tense, aspect and modality are generally inextricably mixed. (Often, the associated "voice" distinctions add to the confusion). It is more sensible to say that a certain grammatical form primarily and prototypically expresses one of the.

5.7 Tense, aspect and modality in Punjabi

The history of the study and analysis of tense, aspect and modality in Punjabi (and other modern languages like Hindi) is fascinating and disappointing at the same time. It is not possible to take up the subject here. Most traditional grammarians (and some modern linguists, sadly enough) proceeded dualistically. (The expression 'dualism' in linguistics was probably used originally by Firth, who waged a life-long crusade against this approach and the philosophy guiding it). The past, present and future tenses, and not just times, were taken as language-independent and universal categories. Then some sentences from English (whose grammatical analysis itself was modelled, at that time, on Latin) or, rarely, from Sanskrit exemplifying the supposedly universal tenses were picked up or constructed. These sentences were translated into the target language. The most

frequent verb-forms or verb combinations in the target (and victim!) language were considered as incarnations of those "universal" tenses. Then, some other verb-forms and/or verb combinations occurring frequently were picked up and were also considered "tenses". Often monstrous names like "Future Past", "Future Present", "Past Future", "Instant Present Continuous", "Past Present Continuous", etc., were given to these "tenses". No attempt was made to justify the practice of picking up some verb combinations as "tenses" and simply ignoring the existence of other combinations. In spite of the warning note of sanity sounded by John Beames (1879:99) that "it is impossible to give, as some writers do, a fixed number for the tenses of any of our languages, for the combinations are almost infinite...", heroic efforts have been, and are being, made to fit the data into a small number of pigeon holes called "tenses" (and sometimes "moods" and 'aspects" along with "tenses"). The most influential of such "tense" systems has been Kellogg's set up for Hindi (Kellogg 1893), which has been adopted, sometimes in a slightly altered form and without acknowledgement, by other grammarians working on Hindi and other Indian languages. To be fair, Kellogg does not ignore the formal features of the Hindi verb, but like any other system, this system ignores many verb combinations or simply throws them into the dustbin called "compound verb". In the field of Punjabi grammar, some well-intentioned teachers, writers and educationists formed, in the twenties of this century, a committee known as Viakaran Sudhār Kametī

("Grammar Reform Committee"), which held many meetings and discussed the categories of the Punjabi grammar in order to "reform" it. After one of these meetings came the magisterial verdict: "After a discussion lasting a full three days, the Committee has decided that the Punjabi verbs have three major tenses which can be further subdivided into nine, and no more." (Karam Singh 1929:196. Translated from Punjabi and emphasis added). Like other grammarians working on these lines, these "reformers" of Punjabi grammar never took the trouble to explain why some combinations were "tenses" and others were not. The number of the the verb combinations in any of the Modern Indic languages has never been determined. But it must be staggeringly large, if not infinite. Cataloguing all these combinations, even if it were possible, would not be linguistic analysis. Linguistics is not lexicography; it offers generalizations. Bringing ready-made schemata and frameworks, whether derived from logic (e.g., Reichenbach 1947) or from the grammars of other languages or constructed ad hoc or based on hasty generalizations from limited data consisting of decontextualized sentences will not do (as we shall see in the next chapter).

The only alternative to these dualistic approaches is the essentially Firthian monistic-dialectical approach. As indicated earlier, we have to start our study with forms which are considered as meaningful. But these forms do not have well-defined meaning(s) but only meaning potential or semantic fields. A semantic field, like a magnetic field,

tends to be stronger towards the centre and weaker as we move away from the centre. But the boundaries of a semantic field, like that of a magnetic field, cannot be demarcated. The more central part of the meaning potential or semantic field can be called the prototypical meaning of a word or grammatical category. The more peripheral parts may be called the secondary meanings. In discourse, still more interpretations can be inferred by implicature from the use of the word or the grammatical category. (Comrie 1985:26-35, Dahl 1985:9-19). These inferences, with the passage of time, may become a part of the meaning of the word. Often, secondary meanings may become primary, and the semantic field may get restructured. The present prototypical meaning of the English past tense form, for example, is not +PAST but +REMOTE. (Catford 1982, Kilby 1984). The temporally remote from the present can become, metaphorically and by implicature, the logically remote from the possible and/or the psychologically remote from the actual, as in

(1) If I met Shakespeare in a London pub today,

uttered in full knowledge of the fact that Shakespeare died nearly four centuries ago. (For the spatial symbolism of TMA categories, see, Langacker 1982a). As words and grammatical forms acquire their meaning potential from their actual use in discourse, we can view this meaning potential as a karma of the word or the grammatical form. Just as in the Hindu philosophy, a person's nature and behaviour potential is the

accumulated result of his actions or karma in this life and the previous ones, a linguistic element's meaning potential is its accumulated karma in its present life and the past lives in the earlier stages of the language (in Sanskrit, Prakrit, Apabhramsa etc. in the case of a Punjabi word or grammatical form). The karma view, properly understood, is not rigidly deterministic. The past karma does control the present and the future meaning potential, without which there would be no communication, but, at the same time, largely because of the fact that its interaction with numerous semantic fields is always going on, there are always creative innovations and evolution and new karma gets accumulated and parts of the already accumulated karma are receding into the dark oblivion of history.

The karma view makes diachronic considerations not simply desirable but positively indispensable for a proper understanding of the Punjabi tense-aspect system. The combinations of the verb-forms in Punjabi may be "almost infinite" but the forms themselves are not. We can study the most general and prototypical meaning (potential) of each form and thus have some idea of the contribution it is capable of making to a combination of forms. These forms may be stenosemous (having narrow meaning) or eurysemous (having broad meaning), but it would be wrong to hastily assert on the basis of a superficial analysis of a few sentences (without taking into consideration the fact that languages are symbolical) that these forms are polysemous. (The terms 'stenosemous' and 'eurysemous' are taken from Catford 1983).

We can never hope to compute the sum total meaning of the whole combination of forms with mathematical accuracy.

Context can and does make a lot of difference; and so does prosody. But nobody can enumerate all types of contexts, and any serious and detailed study of the Punjabi sentence prosody still remains unattempted. Each of the Punjabi dialects has some verb combinations peculiar to itself. Some creative individuals, especially children, make their own idiosyncratic combinations too. But, significantly, these combinations hardly ever present any difficulty to those who do not use them, and often their oddity remains unnoticed. In the dialect of Punjabi known as Pahari, which is spoken in the Shivalak Hills, a typical combination exemplified by the sentence

(2)	é	báú	tera	larua	šarab	pinda
	O	bride	your	husband	liquor	drinking
	karia	karda				
	done	doing				

can be heard. A speaker of a Punjabi dialect which does not use this combination can easily guess that the speaker is saying that the man has been a habitual drunkard in the past and is still so. And this, in fact, is the correct interpretation which can be verified. Many other examples of idiosyncratic combination can be given to support our point that the meaning potential of the individual verb-forms does contribute towards the meaning of the verb combination taken

as a whole. Therefore, we must start with the forms and their prototypical meanings. This implies that both of the two unilinear approaches to the problem - that of Bahl (1967, 1969), which starts with some notional categories, and that of Puar (1977), which first catalogues the combinations and then states their "meanings" are mistaken.

5.8 Verb-forms in Punjabi

Below, we briefly describe the verb forms that all the ordinary phases of most Punjabi verbs (with the glaring exception of the copula) can assume. Their consistent meaning potential or prototypical meaning is also mentioned.

(i) Unmarked Form. The meaning potential of this form is the most unspecified one; and hence the name we have used. All that we can say about the meaning of this grammatical form is that it refers to the action or event itself, with no specification of situation-external or situation-internal temporality. Beames (Book III, p. 102) uses the name Aorist for this form (probably because its semantics is similar to that of the Greek Aorist form in some respects), though he clearly says that "This tense has ... become vague, and in modern times is often used in both a future and past sense." He says that this "tense" is used to express "historic present" in Bengali and "indefinite future" in Punjabi. The reality, however, is that, given the proper context, it can convey any time sense in Punjabi.

This is probably the case in other Indian languages as well. But Beames is not altogether wrong. In Punjabi, this form is used most often to denote a potential action, which is, by nature, an action in the "indefinite future". To make this "indefinite future" definite, the modal auxiliary -ga is added. This Unmarked Form+ga is the so-called "future tense" of Punjabi and Hindi. But we cannot say that -ga is the marker of "future tense" in Punjabi. It is added to he "is" and si "was" as well to convey the idea of "definitely is" and "definitely was" respectively. The very commonly held Punjabi expression

(3) ó ot^{he} hega si
 he there BE+ga was
 "He was definitely there"

renders absurd the claim made by many linguists that he is "the present tense auxiliary", si "the past tense auxiliary" and -ga "the future tense marker" in Punjabi. There is no doubt that si is the past tense form of the copula in Punjabi (and this is the only Punjabi verb form marked for tense). But he, as the Unmarked Form of the copula, like the Unmarked Form of any verb, indicates timelessness. So it denotes bare existence with the time of the existence unspecified.

There is no denying the fact that the Punjabi Unmarked Form historically comes from the Sanskrit Present Indicative tense. But in a culture that was developing the philosophy

of time already discussed, this tense form was bound to become a-temporal. Below, we give some examples of how this form is used in modern Punjabi:

- (4) ó roz othe jave pār kamm nā baṇe
 he daily there would go but work not would become
 "He would go there daily but the task could not be
 accomplished."

It is impossible to convey the exact sense of the expression in the English translation. Within this particular context, the action is depicted as habitually taking place in the past, but it is viewed in a slightly philosophical and detached manner. The agent appears to be either a mindless idiot or as one who is not very much involved in the action. In the following sentence, on the other hand, the time referred to is the future:

- (5) je ó othe jave te kamm nā baṇe pher?
 if he there goes and task not becomes then

"If he goes there but the task is not accomplished, then?"

The "future time sense" is here imparted by the interaction of the meaning of 'if' with the meaning of the verb-form. The verb-form by itself does not merely constitute the "Contingent Future" tense form as Kellogg and his followers say.

Having descended from a personal form of Sanskrit, the Unmarked Form of Punjabi is inflected for person and number and shows agreement with the Actor. Following suffixes (with augmentation and sandhi modifications in some cases) are added to the ordinary phase of the root:

	<u>Sg.</u>	<u>Pl.</u>
I Person	-ā	-īe
II Person	-ē	-o
III Person	-e	-ən

<u>Examples</u>	<u>kār</u>	"do"	<u>kāra</u>	"get done"
	<u>Sg.</u>	<u>Pl.</u>	<u>Sg.</u>	<u>Pl.</u>
I Person	kārā	kārīe	kāravā	kāraīe
II Person	kārē	kāro	kāravē	kārao
III Person	kāre	kārən	kārave	kāraən

(ii) Imperative Form. In Punjabi there are two varieties of this form - ordinary and polite. The ordinary variety is descended from the Imperative and the polite variety from the Optative forms of Sanskrit. The following suffixes are added to the ordinary phase of the root:

Ordinary Variety

II Person	<u>Sg.</u>	<u>Pl.</u>
	-Ø	-o

Polite Variety ("Hortative")

II Person	<u>Sg.</u>	<u>Pl.</u>
	-ĩ	-lo

(iii) Imperfect Participle. This form is derived historically from the Present Stem Participle of Sanskrit. It is a participial or adjectival form and characterizes the Actor as being the substratum of both the activity and the fruit of the activity denoted by the verb. (For an interesting exception, however, see below). The activity itself is viewed as uncompleted. It is only secondarily and by implicature that this form refers to an ongoing action, which may be in the past, present or future time. (Again for an exception, see below). As we shall see, it is wrong to call this form the "Past Contingent Imperfect" tense. It is true that in some contexts it does convey the "past" contingent" meaning, but that is not the meaning or even the prototypical meaning of this form. As a true participle like the English V^{ing} form, it has its extensive adjectival uses as well. The following examples give some idea of the meaning potential of this form.

(6) ram janda ĩe

Ram going is

"Ram is going" or "Ram goes".

(7) je ram na janda ...

(unemphatic)

if Ram not going

"If Ram had not gone ..."

(8) je ram nāĩ janda ...

if ram not going

(emphatic)

"If Ram is not willing to go"

Those who have been describing this form (when used without an auxiliary) as the "Past Contingent Imperfect" tense, cannot account for the meaning it conveys in (8) above.

The forms of the Punjabi verbs described so far are descended from the Sanskrit forms of the Present Stem. The Unmarked and the Imperative are personal and non-adjectival and the Imperfect Participle is adjectival and is very rarely used nominally (e.g., as a "derived free form" to be described below). All other verb-forms used in Punjabi are either purely nominal or ambivalent, i.e., both adjectival and nominal. They are the modern descendants of the Sanskrit forms that were derived directly from the root, and not from the present stem.

There is another minor and quite idiosyncratic use of the Imperfect Participle form in Punjabi. The subtractive phase of a Punjabi verb can assume only this, and no other form. As we saw in Chapter III, the phonetic form of a subtractive phase is derived by adding the vowel -i- to the

phonetic form of the ordinary phase. This -i- come from the Sanskrit passive affix -i-. In Punjabi, however, this -i- is not stressed. Since a verb in its subtractive phase has an inherently passive meaning, the Actor is either eliminated (i.e., obligatorily omitted), being a sort of "everyman", or the Actor is a very indefinite "we", it is the Undergoer that is the substratum of the result of the activity. If the phase has zero valency, then, of course, the form refers to the activity itself. Following examples illustrate this point. (For a fuller discussion see Chapter VIII).

- (9) kutte da mas nãĩ k^haida
 dog -of flesh not (being eaten)
 "Dog's meat should not be eaten."

The nearest, but by no means good, translation of the II*B verb k^hai is "being eaten".

- (10) bacciā tō bōta kamm nãĩ kəraida
 children -from much work not (being got done)
 "Too much work should not be got done by
 children."

- (11) bōta hāssida nãĩ
 too much laughing not
 "One should not laugh too much."

It is impossible to find in English a translation (even a bad one) of hassida. The verb, which is in the neuter (homophonous to the masculine singular) form, does not agree with any nominal. In (9) and (10), it agrees with the Undergoer.

- (12) asī tā rajj ke ṣarab plidi he
 we PARTICLE to our fill wine (being drunk) is
 "We always drink wine to our fill."

The Actor may not be explicitly mentioned in (12). A boastful intonation would do. A sentence like (12) refers to a habitual activity, and the Actor in such cases is always "we". The verb, as usual, agrees with the Undergoer or is in the neuter form (i.e., there is zero agreement).

(iv) Perfect Participle. This adjectival characterizes either the Actor or the Undergoer (depending on the type and the phase of the verbal root) as the substratum of the activity and/or result of the activity which is viewed as accomplished (siddha); or, in its nominal use, it may denote an accomplished activity itself. In Punjabi, it performs precisely those functions which its ancestor, the Perfect Participle of Sanskrit, did. In its adjectival use, it agrees in number and gender (and never in person) with the nominal whose referent is the substratum of the result of the activity. In its nominal form, it shows no agreement.

The prototypical meaning of this form is +COMPLETED. It is not a tensed form, though generally, in the absence of any contextual clues, the completed action tends to be interpreted as a past action. But it must be emphasized that it would be wrong to call this form a "Past Tense" form of Punjabi simply because in some (or even most) cases it happens to be a good translation of an English Past Tense form (whose prototypical meaning is +REMOTE rather than +PAST). The following examples give some idea of the range of meanings this form can express (by implicature or otherwise) in different contexts:

- (13) *hūṁ ó vapəs nā aīa*
 now he back not come


"He is not going to come back now."

- (14) *je óne roṭi nā kḥádi...*
 if he-Agt bread not eaten

"If he does not have his meal..."

(Apprehensive)

- (15) *je tū kál oṭhe gīa...*



if you tomorrow there gone

if you tomorrow there gone

"If you go there tomorrow..."

(Warning)

(16) je tū kál othē gia...

. . . ṽ

. . .

if you yesterday there gone

"If at all you went there yesterday...."

(I doubt whether you did.)

kál is "tomorrow" in (15) and "yesterday" in (16). It is noteworthy that (15) and (16) are phonematically identical and differ in prosody only. (14) is an ergative construction because the verb agrees with the Undergoer (or "object"), which is viewed as the substratum of the result of the activity. In our chapter on ergativity, we shall argue that such a conceptualization of reality is the very soul of the Punjabi language and not simply a "superficial surface structure phenomenon".

(v) Potential Participle and Gerund. These two forms are considered together because, though of different origins, the two have converged and now have partly overlapping functions and have similar morphology.

The Potential Participle descends from the Future Passive Participle of Sanskrit, and the Gerund (some Punjabi and Hindi grammarians call it Infinitive, but either term will do) from the Sanskrit verbal nouns ending in -anam. For example, Sanskrit Future Passive Participle

form karaṇīyam of the root kr historically developed as follows:

karaṇīyam → karaṇam → karanau (→ kar(a)ne) -- karṇa
 (Skt) (Pbi)

The Sanskrit verbal noun karaṇam "doing" became the Punjabi gerund karən. Since the abstract verbal nouns in Punjabi are masculine, and most masculine nouns end in -a, the nominative form of this noun became karṇa, but the oblique form (before a postposition) continued to be karən. (Now the regularized oblique form karne has also appeared and may replace karən). On the participle side, when the verb-form agrees neither with the Actor nor with the Undergoer, it denotes a simple idea of a potential action and has the masculine singular form karṇa, homophonous to the gerund karṇa. The two homophonous forms are now coalescing semantically too, so that karṇa now means "the action, potential or actual, viewed as a whole". The participle form karṇa (and its feminine and plural forms) characterizes the Undergoer as the substratum of the result of the activity (usually but not necessarily in the future time) viewed as a whole. The gerund karṇa refers to the action itself as a whole, potential or actual, in the past, present or future. Below, we give some examples of the use of these two forms.

a. Potential Participle

- (17) é roṭi mē kál kʰaṇi si
 this bread I yesterday to eat was
 "I was to eat this bread yesterday."

- (18) mē oṭʰe kál jaṇa ʃe
 I there tomorrow to go is
 "I am going there tomorrow."

It is notable that the Potential Participle form agrees with "bread" in (17) and is in zero agreement in (18). It is not possible to say whether it is the Potential Participle form or the Gerund that is used in (18).

b. Gerund

- (19) cùṭʰ boləṇa tʰik nǎĩ
 untruth telling right not
 "Telling untruth is not right."

- (20) cùṭʰ boləṇ / boləṇe tō pərʃez karo
 untruth telling -from abstain
 "Abstain from telling lies."

Both the original form boləṇ and the now regularized boləṇa (oblique form boləṇe) are possible in (20).

(vi) Conjunctive Participle. This phenomenon, according to Masica (1976), is a characteristic feature of all the Indian languages and is thus one of the defining features of India as a linguistic area. The Modern Indic Conjunctive Participle (the name has-come-to-stay, although Conjunctive Gerund is historically and functionally more appropriate), a nominal verb form, comes historically from the Sanskrit Gerund. The Sanskrit Gerund form had one of the two suffixes -tvā or -(t)ya. The former was used with a simple root and the latter with a root with a prepositional prefix. The Conjunctive Participle verb-forms of Punjabi seem to have descended from both the types. It is mostly in the use of the serial verb constructions in which verbs in the Conjunctive Participle form are stringed that the typical Indian view of time referred to earlier is represented. In Punjabi, this form has two varieties - the simple and the emphatic. The emphatic variety is a compound form derived by the addition of the particle ke to the simple form. This particle, though a bound morpheme now, is itself a Conjunctive Participle, at least in origin. It came from the Sanskrit kṛtvā "doing" probably in the following stages:

kṛtvā --> karia --> kari --> kai --> ke

kari and kai (written as ਕੈ) are attested in Old Punjabi.

The form kar "having done" of Punjabi has the same root as the particle ke. It comes from the Old Punjabi kari, whose final short vowel was dropped in modern Punjabi.

Since the days of Pali, which is older and, therefore, more conservative than Classical Sanskrit, Indians have been using this form extensively to represent action as "a collection of parts produced in a sequence and mentally conceived as one." Two examples, one from Pali and the other from Old Punjabi will not be out of place here:

Pali

(21) uyyānamakkaṭesu eko makkato rukkhā otaritvā tato kalāye gahetvā mukhaṃ pūretvā hatthehi pi gahetvā uppatitvā rukkhe nisīditvā khāditum ārabhi (Hendriksen 1944: 113).

The words underlined in this Pali passage are Conjunctive Participles. A rather literal translation of the passage would be

"One of the monkeys living in the park having come down from the tree, having taken some peas from it, having filled its mouth (with them), also having taken some in its hands, having leapt up and having settled in the tree, began to eat them."

According to Hendriksen,

"It is very common usage, especially in later Pali, to arrange several gerunds in succession, the first one

indicating the incident that happened first, the second one the next incident and so forth, until the sentence verb concludes the whole story." (p. 112. Emphasis added).

Old Punjabi

(22) bāba nanaku jī pag bāndhi kari
(having tied) (having done)

dhotī kari kari
(having done) (having done)

cādar odhi kari
(having put on) (having done)

tarpan nem gaitrī paṛhi kari
(having recited) (having done)

simranu dhiānu parmesar kā kari kari
(having done) (having done)

bāhari dariāv ūpari te pheri ghari āikai
((having come)+kai)

parmesar kā kīrtanu kartā (Kirpal Singh 1969:84. The passage is transliterated).

"Baba nanak Ji, having put on his turban, having put on his dhoti, having put on his shawl, having recited the ritual Gayatri prayer, having meditated on God, having come out of the river and reached home, would sing hymns in praise of God."

This passage is taken from a sixteenth century biography of Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhism. There are six Conjunctive Participle constructions underlined in the passage, and each of the first five consists of two members: the Conjunctive Participle form of a verb (which can be kari itself) and the Conjunctive participle form kari "having done". It is the second member which became kai (monosyllabic word with a diphthong) at first and then the modern Punjabi ke. Even before becoming ke, kai got agglutinated to the first member, as is evidenced from the agglutinated form aikai "(having come)+(having done)". In modern Punjabi, the agglutinated form ake is a somewhat emphatic form of "having come".

This agglutination among the Conjunctive Participle forms is more common and at a more advanced stage in the Dravidian languages than in the Indic languages. According to Chatterjee (1920:1050), the Indic languages probably borrowed this linguistic feature from their Dravidian neighbours.

The use of the Conjunctive Participle is extensive in the modern Indian languages. Most compound verb constructions involving the "explicators" or "ancillaries" have the Conjunctive Participle morphologically in the root form because of the historical loss of the final syllables and vowels. Many grammarians who care little for historical considerations have thought them to be functionally conveying the bare root meaning of the verb. This is a serious mistake. We shall examine such constructions in the next two chapters.

The phenomenon of the "excessive" use of the Conjunctive Participles in the Indian languages has sometimes amused or annoyed some Western students of these languages. John Beames, who was by profession a magistrate in India, observed, in the police reports written in Bengali,

"All the verbs throughout the report are in the conjunctive participle "having done", and at the end of perhaps the fourth page one comes at last to the only finite verb in the whole, 'I have reported it'!" (Beames 1875:249).

It should be remembered that the individual actions represented by the string of Conjunctive Participle forms are viewed as forming a single action. There is always a dynamic dependence among the parts. Often the prior action is considered as taking place under the conditions specified by the later action(s), or an earlier action is viewed as having a causal relation to a later action. There can be other semantic peculiarities depending upon the lexical meanings of the verbs involved. The Conjunctive Participle forms of some verbs became postpositions or adverbs from the time of Pali onwards. Typical examples in Punjabi are karke "because of" (literally "having done") and rajke "to one's heart's content" (literally "having filled the stomach").

The sentence

- (23) ó kamm karke nã a sakia
 he work having done/ not could come
 /because of

when decontextualized, is ambiguous. It can mean either (a) "He could not come after doing the work", or (b) "He could not come because of work"; (Whether or not he did the work is irrelevant). In

- (24) asĩ rajjke jarab piti
 we to our heart's content wine drunk

"We drank wine to our heart's content."

the adverb rajjke, if taken literally, should follow the verb according to the principle of iconicity (faithful representation of the chronology of events), which is usually observed in serial verb constructions. The drinker's stomach is filled after, and not before, he has drunk. If rajjke is used as a Conjunctive Participle form, it is used according to the principle of iconicity. But in (24) it is used as an adverb, with the original associations with eating and drinking almost lost, for it can be used with almost any verb such as "play", "enjoy", "dance", "sing" and many others.

5.9 Major verb forms of Punjabi at a glance

The discussion of the major verb forms of Punjabi can be summarized in the form of the following diagrams:





Figure 2. Verb-forms of Punjabi



Notes:

1. The opposition among the forms marked for aspect is equipollent (no form being more marked than the others).
2. The Perfective system looks like a tense system, but it is not.

Figure 3. Semantic features of the Punjabi full verbs




Figure 4. Semantic features of the Punjabi post-verbs

5.10 Quasi-verb forms derived from participles

There are two relatively minor forms derived from the Imperfect Participle and the Perfect Participle forms in Punjabi. These forms are quite ancient and their ancestors can be found in the Apabhraṃśa languages. Many Punjabi grammarians have simply ignored them. Duni Chandra (1964) calls them "Derived Free Forms" (sutantar rachnāvā). The term is appropriate. These forms do not form the nucleus of the clause (unless they are regarded as derived transformationally from full clauses in the "deep structure", which is not done here). We call them quasi-verb forms because they function adverbially, i.e., in the periphery of the clause. The quasi-verb derived from the Imperfect Participle means, roughly, something like "while v^{ing}". Example is

- (25) rondiā sari rat bit gai
 while weeping all night having passed gone

The Actor of the nuclear verb group is the night. Who was weeping is made clear by the context. The meaning of the quasi-verb form derived from the Perfect Participle is very difficult to capture in simple English translation. In

- (26) roiā kúṛ nāī baṇana
 something not to become
 (=nothing)
 "Weeping will not avail"

A rather grotesque-sounding translation: "(Your/our/his, etc.) committing the act of weeping, after it is over, will have failed to bring about the desired result", may convey something of the sense of the Punjabi original.

5.11 Concluding remarks

A historical survey of how the meaning potential of all these forms developed as an integrated system would be a fascinating study, which would shed more interesting light on the phenomena of the meaning of the Modern Indic verb forms. But that would take us too far from our present purpose. Some interesting facts can be found in Pray (1982).

The meaning potential of any linguistic element is by its very nature, undelimitable and hence undefinable strictly. It can always be extended symbolically and by implicature in the context. Human imagination that reads the prototypical features of the situations experienced before in the new and first-time-encountered situations, and human creativity to use language metaphorically and symbolically to deal with the new situations are boundless. This is clearly evidenced in the semantic history of the present day verb forms of Punjabi (and in the speech of any human child). But we have to start with the meaning potential of the individual verb forms themselves, however ill-defined it may be, if we are to avoid the two dualistic extremes of modern linguistics: the Platonistic language-independent semantic categories and the excesses of the post-

Bloomfieldians who banished meaning altogether from linguistics. With the bird's eye view of the Punjabi verb forms and their meaning potential, we study the verbal groups and the so-called tenses of Punjabi in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI

TRANSITIVITY AND THE VERB - II VERB GROUPS

Deep in the human unconscious is a pervasive need for a logical universe that makes sense. But the real universe is always one step beyond logic.

- Frank Herbert

Quoted by Jantsch (1980:307)

6.0 Introduction

In the last chapter, we described, in the most generalized form, the consistent meaning potential or prototypical meaning potential of the forms which the ordinary and subtractive verb phases of Punjabi assume. In this chapter, we discuss not the meaning of the combinations of the verb-forms but how these forms contribute a (part of) their meaning potential when they are used in combinations. But it should be emphasized that our approach is contextual, and not compositional. The verb-group acts as a linguistic context in which the semantic fields of all the verb-forms interact and modify one another's meaning potential in order to determine the meaning of the whole, which is invariably far less than the sum of the meanings of the component parts. We are far from the reductionistic-compositional view which views the meaning of the whole as nothing but a sum of the meanings of the parts. Unfortunately and regrettably, most of this chapter has to be critical in tone and negative in spirit. In order to justify our approach, it is necessary for us to critically examine and reject the centuries-old and well-established approach, which is built upon the mindscape whose gravitational pull is still terribly strong and irresistible.

6.1 "Auxiliary verbs" in Punjabi

Before we come to the combinations of the verb forms used in

the Punjabi dialect under investigation, we must take care of the so-called auxiliary verbs of Punjabi. The distinction between an ordinary (or "main/full") verb and an "auxiliary" verb in Punjabi is not very clear. There are verbs like likh "write", for example, which are never observed in the role of an auxiliary verb. On the other hand, there are verbs like sək "be able to" (like the English 'can') and cuk, indicating the completion of an activity, which act as auxiliary verbs only. But there are verbs known as 'ancillary' or 'explicative' verbs whose status in actual use is unclear. The best thing to do while analysing Punjabi, Hindi and many other languages is not to think in binary or "black-or-white" terms, and to be willing to recognize many intermediate shades of grey. The Punjabi copular-existential hē is very similar, in both meaning and syntactic behaviour, to its English counterpart. It occurs in sentences like

(1) ram bimar hē

Ram sick is

"Ram is sick."

(2) ram māṁḍar jānda hē

Ram temple going is

"Ram goes/is going to the temple."

Is hē (like the English 'is') an ordinary verb in (1) and an auxiliary verb in (2)? No immediate and ad hoc answer is

possible here. In this study the only two surviving descendent forms of the Sanskrit as "be" (the "be" of "being", not of "becoming", which was bhū), are regarded as being outside the the system of the Punjabi verb in general. It is within the general system that the distinction between an ordinary and an auxiliary verb is drawn. The Punjabi copula is neither of the two: it is simply itself. Among the auxiliary verbs within the general system, some are not-so-auxiliary, while others are completely auxiliary. There are still others which can have auxiliary and not-so-auxiliary uses. Except sək and cuk, all other auxiliaries are ordinary verbs also doing a part-time "auxiliary" business. In both the businesses, the same verbs are working. But in the "auxiliary" business, the whole of their semantic fields (or meaning potential) are not involved. Sometimes, it is only the fringes (where the semantic field, like a magnetic field, is weak) that are involved and the verb is more auxiliary. Sometimes, a great deal of the original semantic field is involved, and the verb is not-so-auxiliary. A particular verb can be more auxiliary in one context and not-so-auxiliary in another.

The Punjabi copula is a class in itself. Even a cursory glance at its family history would have sufficed to warn linguists that that its blood-group is different. But the two dogmas of the most fashionable schools of modern linguistics - the synchronistic dogma (that diachronic considerations are irrelevant) and the monosystemicist dogma (that any natural language is a single coherent system) have

prevented a proper understanding of this verb. So this verb is given a special treatment in this study.

The three characteristics of the auxiliary verbs of Punjabi are

(i) They normally (i.e., unless contextual and pragmatic factors alter the order) follow the ordinary verbs.

(ii) Their semantic field is always very restricted. Though transferred from their ordinary use, they now convey notions like persistence, continuation, abruptness, vehemence, benefaction, and many other notions.

(iii) Their number is not very large.

6.1.1 How auxiliaries came into existence

The process by which some words become "function words" and, ultimately, affixes is well-known, at least since Bopp's Glossarium Comparativum. Historically, we can picture every natural language as starting at a syntactical stage, when all its words are monosyllabic and without inflections. When they are strung together, they make sentences. Depending on its position, the same word can be a noun or a verb or a particle. But, gradually, some words get specialized as nouns or verbs or other "parts of speech". Some of them, largely because of their pragmatic karma, become "grammatical words". Their informational content becomes low and predictable. So they are, generally speaking, weakly

accented or remain unaccented. This often leads to their phonetic abrasion. Now they are added to nouns or verbs as inflectional affixes. This is the agglutinative stage of the language. At this stage, the endings are separable and clearly recognizable, as in Turkish. But then comes the third stage, the inflectional one, at which the bound morphemes get fused with the forms they used to be agglutinated to. They are no longer neatly separable phonetically. But time files away these inflectional affixes too, and the words stand out denuded, as in the first stage. Then new auxiliary words have to be recruited into service. This is the analytical stage. English, Punjabi and all other Modern Indic languages are now passing through the analytical phase of their history. But this is by no means the final stage. Agglutination starts again, and the cycle repeats itself. Only God knows how many times in the history of the human languages this has happened. (This account is based on Beames (Book I), who claims to have based it on Bopp's work. This evolutionary theory is not very popular these days. But the evolution of Punjabi seems to have been on these lines. Very similar views have been expressed recently by Givón (1979). These are, however, evolutionary tendencies, and not universal rules. Within the system of a natural language, there are sub-(sub-)systems, and the individual sub-(sub-)systems can be at different stages of evolution. In Punjabi, for example, some inflectional endings have survived from the synthetical stage, but agglutination has already started as well. In the form javôge "we shall

go", we have the Unmarked form javā inflected for person and number, and ge , the plural form of ga. This ga is the abraded form of gia "gone" (Sanskrit gataḥ)", and, like any Perfect Participle, agrees with the qualified noun in number and gender (not person). The interesting point here is that the Unmarked first person plural form is jale . javā is the first person singular form. In the agglutinated first person plural form javāge , plurality is expressed once only, on ge . In the second person and the third person forms, it is expressed twice, e.g.,

jaēga "You (sg.) will go."

jaoge "You (pl.) will go."

jaega "He will go."

jange "They will go."

What has happened to the first person plural agglutinated form is probably the shadow of the coming events. Unmarked+ ga is moving from agglutination to synthesis. It may happen that by 2087 plurality is marked only once in the form, and that by 2187 the fused forms may become completely non-personal like all other participle forms, and that a linguist working on Punjabi in 2200 A.D. has to deal with *jaga and *jage only.

From what generally happens in the human languages, we can safely surmise that the Punjabi auxiliaries were (are?) ordinary verbs pressed into service to perform the "auxiliary" functions. This has led to an abrasion

(narrowing and specialization) of their semantic fields because their pragmatic use got specialized and limited. Semantic abrasion led to weakened accentuation, which, in turn, led to phonetic abrasion. Some older auxiliary verbs, e.g., ga and ke have become just particles. Others have just started the "auxiliary" business. In most cases, it is clear whether the combination has two ordinary verbs or an ordinary verb and an auxiliary. But cases in which it is difficult to decide one way or the other do occur (in the form of decontextualized sentences). Nevertheless, the distinction made by Bahl (1964) between VE (ordinary verb + explicator auxiliary) and V_1V_2 (combination of ordinary verbs) is a useful one. V_1V_2 combinations are predictably more numerous involving a greater number of verbs. In all probability, the VE combinations started as V_1V_2 combinations in the past. Explicator auxiliaries are a sub-class of the Punjabi auxiliary verbs. Since our system differs from Bahl's in the sense that we do not regard any combinations as "tenses", we divide the Punjabi verb combinations into verb sequences and compound verbs, with the provision that the classes overlap and there are borderline cases. In his book, Bahl says

"No attempt will be made here to grammatically distinguish between the VE and V_1V_2 sequences, except stating that a VE is functionally equivalent to V and V_1V_2 is not." (Bahl 1964:50).

Bahl does not define, or give examples of, functional equivalence. He, however, mentions an important fact that a V constituent can have reinforcers, so that a verbal combination is actually a verbal compound, rather like a dvandva compound of Sanskrit. Examples are

k ^h ic tù	"pull and drag"
lɛ de	"take and give"
nà tò	"bathe and wash"
k ^h a pi	"eat and drink"

That such verbal compounds function like single verbs is beyond doubt, and in this study we do no more than mention them. But that a V_1V_2 sequence does not function like a single V is difficult to say, mainly because very often it is not possible to decide which of the two categories a verb group belongs to. An action, in the Indian world-view and grammar, is actually a sequence of actions which are subordinated to the whole in such a way that the whole lives in every individual part. The prior action takes place for the sake of giving rise to the later action or under the conditions specified by the later action, which comes into existence only because the prior action has occurred. They mutually determine each other. The lexical meanings of the verbs involved and the context are also important. Let us consider a few examples:

- (3) ram mera kamm kar gia
 Ram my work having done gone
 "Ram did my work and went away."
 "Before going, Ram did my work."

- (4) ó kál mar gia
 he yesterday having died gone
 "He died yesterday."

- (5) kàra pàr gia hε
 pitcher having filled gone is
 "The pitcher has been filled."

In none of these sentences does gia receive sentence stress. In (3) it clearly conveys the sense of "going", although the speaker is interested more in the fact that his work has been done, or in the completion of his own work, than in Ram's going. In (4), the deceased is said to have died, but it is difficult to say whether "gone" conveys the sense of his going to the next world or that everything is over with him now. (Cf. the Punjabi euphemism ó pura ho gia "He became complete" used in the sense of "He died"). In (5), the pitcher is very much there. "Gone" simply indicates that the process of "filling" is over (and is "gone" in a metaphorical sense). gia "gone" is used as an auxiliary verb in (5) and as a not-so-auxiliary verb in (3). Its use in (4) is problematic.

In (3), (4) and (5) above, the same lexical verb was used as an auxiliary. Now let us see how the meaning of the "main" verb is modified by the meaning of the auxiliary.

- (6) ram ne apna kamm kar lia
 Ram -Agt own work having done taken
 "Ram did his work (for himself)."

(7) ram ne mera kamm kar ditto

Ram -Agt my work having done given

"Ram did my work (for me, not for himself)".

(8) ram ne kamm kar sutia

Ram -Agt work having done thrown

"Ram did the work (vehemently)."

(9) ram ne kamm kar chaddia

Ram -Agt work having done left

"Ram did the work (in a rather disinterested way)."

(10) ram ne roti kha lai

Ram -Agt bread having eaten taken

"Ram ate the bread."

(11) *ram ne roti kha ditti

Ram -Agt bread having eaten given

We have already discussed in Chapter III why (11) does not occur in Punjabi. The immediate benefit of eating (i.e., ingesting) is such that Ram can only "take" it but cannot "give" it to anyone else. It is clear in all these examples that the action represented in each case takes place under specific conditions or in a certain way or the Actor does it with a certain attitude of mind. The adverbials used in the English translation only roughly convey the meaning of the original. It is clear, however, that the semantic fields of

the auxiliaries are not altogether different from those the verbs have when they are used as ordinary verbs. Perhaps only the fringes of the original semantic fields get involved. But it is clear that it is the ordinary verb de "give", for example, that is working as the auxiliary de in (7) and (11). In the following decontextualized sentence, it is not clear whether de is working as an ordinary verb or an auxiliary.

(12) mē ó nū paṇi pār ditṭa

I him/her -to water having drawn given

"I drew water for him/her."

"I drew water and gave it to him/her."

Either of the two interpretations is possible. Very often, even the context does not help. No such problem can arise in the case of (7). Work can be done for others but cannot be given (in a literal sense) to others. But water can be drawn for others and, after being drawn, can be literally given to others. If the beneficiary in (12) is a cow, de would usually be interpreted as an auxiliary. But if the beneficiary is a beautiful woman and the man helping her is addicted to chivalry, de would, in all probability, be interpreted as an ordinary verb. Such phenomena are not new in the Indic languages. The following Pali sentence also has two interpretations:

(13) ath' assa pipāsitabhāvaṃ űatvā pāṇīyaṃ ussiñcitvā
doṇiyaṃ ākiritvā adāsi

"But when he understood that he (i.e., the monkey)
was thirsty, he drew water (from the well) and
gave it to him."

As Hendriksen (1944:134) points out, the expression doṇiyaṃ
ākiritvā adāsi, literally, "vessel having-filled, gave" can
also be interpreted as "filled the vessel for him."

Just how vast a range of the shades of meaning can be
expressed by an auxiliary verb in different linguistic and
non-linguistic contexts can be seen in Vincenc Pořízka's
article 'On the Perfective Verbal Aspect in Hindi' published
in five parts covering 111 pages in Archiv Orientální (1967-
69). By "perfective aspect", Pořízka understands the meaning
conveyed by the verb combinations having explicator
auxiliaries - mainly ja "go" - as related to the termination
of an activity. Pořízka's conclusion is that

"With most intransitive verbs -less often with
transitive verbs - jānā 'to go', 'to go away' is used
as a modifying verb. In this combination, jānā loses
its meaning of 'going', 'going away'" (Pořízka 1967:64)

It is admitted, however, that

"Even when denoting one and the same action, unmodified verbs and their modified counterparts with jānā present the verbal action in two different ways conditioning a significant difference in their functions. The functional range of modified verbal expressions with jānā is narrower, more restricted than that of unmodified verbs." (Pořízka 1969:40)

We would hardly disagree with most of Porizka's descriptive generalizations. But it must be pointed out that there are cases, as we have seen, where it is difficult to decide whether or not jana conveys the sense of "going away". What Hindi and Punjabi were at earlier stages from the second to the tenth centuries A.D. is, and probably will always remain, unknown. The "auxiliary" uses of jana must have evolved slowly. It is but natural to expect that, depending on the context, more or less of its semantic field could be involved. Our treatment of the "auxiliaries" of Punjabi shows that it is not always wise or even useful to think in binary terms here - whether or not jana has lost its original meaning, or whether or not jana is (unambiguously) an auxiliary or an ordinary verb, etc.

The verb sequences or the compound verbs we have considered so far have the structure

Conjunctive Participle + (not-so-)Auxiliary Verb

The auxiliaries that are most commonly found in such combinations have been given various names. The currently

most fashionable name - explicators - will serve our purpose well. Bahl has elegantly classified these auxiliaries into pairs. Below, we mention those pairs without any explanation. The terms that Bahl uses to describe their most general sense are self-explanatory. According to Bahl (1964: 55), the explicator auxiliaries convey the sense of:

1. Completion

cislocative	a	"come"
translocative	ja	"go".

2. Suddenness

commencement	utt ^h	"get up"
termination	beɬ ^h	"sit down"

3. Vehemence

indeliberate	pe	"be put"
deliberate	sutt	"throw"

4. Benefaction

egobenefaction	le	"take"
allobenefaction	de	"give"

5. Precedence

concern	rakk ^h	"keep"
indifference	ch ^h adɬ	"leave"

6. Inception

involvement	cal	"move"
alleviation	nikəl	"escape"

7. Process

cessant	cuk	? "carry, lift"
incessant	ré	"stay"

8. Accomplishment

phenomenal	ho	"become, happen"
abilitative	sak	"be able to"

We have put a question mark before "carry, lift" in the table adapted from Bahl, because we have reasons (to be discussed in the next chapter) that the auxiliary has no relation, except that of homophony with the modern Punjabi verb cuk "lift/carry". It is a rule of the Punjabi grammar that when a verb functions as an auxiliary, it does not change its valency. But, as we shall see in the next chapter, the ordinary verb cuk "lift/carry" is bivalent, but the auxiliary cuk is monovalent. For the largely semantic reasons of compatibility, some auxiliaries do not have certain forms. For example, sak "be able to" does not have an Imperative form. Again for semantic (but also partly because of historical) reasons, there are restrictions on what forms the members in a compound verb sequence, the ordinary verbs and the auxiliaries, may have. This is an interesting field of study in its own right. But space does not permit us to attempt such a detailed analysis. There can be half a dozen or more members in a compound or complex verb group. The number of all the possible combinations in Punjabi or in any Modern Indic language has not been determined yet. Puar (1977) has listed 31 combinations in what he calls the "past tense", 26 in the "present tense" and 19 in the "future tense". But it can be easily shown that he has left at least as many, if not more, combinations unanalyzed. For example, he has omitted all the combinations with the Potential Participle, arguing that such

combinations "do not occur as part of the verbal phrase. The category of tense is represented by the verbal phrase -na and -an ending forms [Potential Participles and Gerunds in our scheme], lying outside the structure of the verbal phrase, do not participate in the functioning of the verbal phrase..." (Puar 1977:45). here we should point out that not only is Puar's system very different from ours, but also that his criteria are arbitrary and inconsistent. If consistently followed, his criteria should exclude the Perfect Participle and the Imperfect Participle too. We cannot critically examine Puar's arguments here. Whether a participial form is functioning as a verb or an adjective in Punjabi is not always easy to decide (as in the case of the English sentence "The glass was broken"), and to be fair to Puar, at least some amount of arbitrariness is bound to creep in.

6.1.2 The copula in Punjabi

Before we come to larger and more complicated verb sequences, one special verb in Punjabi - the copular-existential hē "be" - has to be discussed. Both its form and meaning have been grossly misunderstood by many traditional grammarians and modern linguists, and this misunderstanding has not always been innocent and harmless. First of all, it has been confused with another verb hō "become" (mainly through its equation with the English 'be', which conveys the sense of both bare existence and becoming). The copula of Punjabi (in its Unmarked Form hē and the Past Tense Form si comes from the Sanskrit root as. Only these two

descendants of the forms of as occur in Modern Punjabi. ho, on the other hand, comes from the Sanskrit root bhū, and like all other verbs of Punjabi, has all the forms listed in the last chapter. In Punjabi, the copula is a formal oddity. It is the only verb in the language which is marked for tense (Past only, the so-called Present Tense form of the copula is the Unmarked or non-Past form). All other verbs in Punjabi have participial and gerundival forms; the copula has none. Throughout the known history of the Indic languages, there never was a time when the copula was not a formal oddity. As is often the case, the formal oddity is symptomatic of semantic oddity.

In the Sanskrit language described by Pāṇini, the root as was conjugated in the sārvadhātuka or the "general" tenses only. (Pāṇini III.4.113-114).). About bhū "become", Panini's rule is "asterbhū" or "bhū is the substitute of as when an ārdhadhātuka or special tense affix is to be applied." (Panini II.4.52). Whether or not there were semantic reasons why as did not have special tense forms is unknown. But this peculiarity of the root is ominous. The root bhū, which according to Pāṇini, replaced the root as in the special tenses (but did it?) is conjugated in all the tenses. The modern Punjabi descendant of bhu (ho) occurs in all the forms, at least as an ordinary verb. But only two forms of as - he and si - with personal endings have come down to Punjabi. Throughout the Middle Indic period, as behaved idiosyncratically. In Sanskrit, the root belonged to the Second (or ad) class. In the Middle Indic, all the roots

except as were regularized and made to behave morphologically like the roots of the First (or bhū) class. as was thus considered to be outside the general system of the Middle Indic verb.

The semantics of this verb has always been something of a headache for the Indian grammarians, not only for the minor ones but also for giants like Patañjali (Iyer 1969: 327). The reason is that while all other verbs convey the sense both of some sort of activity ("with parts arranged in a sequence and mentally conceived as one") and of the result of the activity, as conveys the sense of the result only. "Assuming a form" (svarūpadhānam karoti), which was said to be the meaning of as (Rao 1969:122), is actually the meaning of bhū. as is a timeless verb, with no component parts arranged in time. It conveys the sense of bare existence. While the developing Indian philosophy of time affected all other verbs, as failed to develop along with other verbs. Its participial and gerundival forms do not exist in the Modern Indic languages. Rather, it got abraded, lost its forms and went on becoming more and more of a marginal verb. The Indian mind intuitively realized that it was not a true verb after all! The linguists who confuse the forms of ho (√bhū) with those of he (√as) betray not only an ignorance of the history of the language but also lack of understanding of the contemporary linguistic phenomena themselves. ho has always been a "becoming" verb and he a "being" verb; the former conveys the meaning of "assuming a form" and the latter just "existence". That the semantic

fields of the two verbs overlap to some extent does not mean that the two verbs are the same or synonymous.

Not only has the Punjabi (and Hindi) copula been confused with ho, the semantics of the copula itself has been grossly misunderstood. It is said to convey many different "meanings". This reminds us of Catford's comments on Suzanne Langer's assertion (Langer 1953:56) that the verb 'is' conveys the meanings indicated against the following sentences:

- | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. The rose is red. | : ascribing a property |
| 2. Rome is greater than Athens: | asserting a dyadic re- |
| | lation "greater than" |
| 3. Barbarossa is Frederick I. | : identity |
| 4. Barbarossa is a legendary | : membership of a class |
| hero. | |
| 5. To sleep is to dream. | : entailment |
| 6. God is. | : existence |

Catford's comment is that

"Since the only item that remains constant through all six sentences is the copula is, it is extraordinarily perverse to attribute difference in meaning to that particular word! As we pass from sentence to sentence we observe that meanings change; as we look for concomitant changes in the text we see that these occur everywhere but at the copula. The inference is that it

is those other changes - in subjects and complements - that correlate with the meaning changes ... In every case, the word is can be said to have pretty much the value that Langer attributes to it in sentence (4), that is, it indicates that the referent of the preceding term is a member of the class named by the following term, even though this "class meaning" may be performed elliptically, implicitly or metaphorically, that is, in ways perfectly acceptable to the "logic of the language", though strange to the formal logic of logicians." (Catford 1983:19).

A similar, but worse, interpretation of the Hindi copula (applying fully to the Punjabi copula as well) was made by Aum-Sinha (1980). Sinha not only confuses, in the standard modern fashion, the copula with ho, but also uses English as filter language to study Hindi. The copula by itself conveys the following meanings according to Sinha. (We have supplied our own Punjabi translation and English glosses).

(i) Possession

(a) temporary

(14) Hī mere pas ek pustak hē

Pbī mere kol ik pustak hē

my near a book is

"I have a book."

(b) permanent

(15) Hī mere do hat^h hē

Pbī mere do hat^h hān

my two hands are

"I have two hands."

(c) psychosomatic

(16) Hī us mē utsah hē

Pbī óde vic utfá hē

him -in courage is

"He has courage."

(ii) Relational

(a) Equative

(17) Hī/Pbī sumān daktar hē

Suman doctor is "Suman is a doctor."

(b) Attributive

(18) Hī/Pbī kamra saf hē

room clean is "The room is clean."

What Catford says about Langer's views about the alleged meanings of the copula can be said about Sinha's treatment of the Hindi copula too. Our argument is that sentences (14) and (16) indicate something's existence is space. It is the lexical meanings of the words other than the copula that indicate the sense of "possession". (15) is a straightforward existential sentence. Since the hands of the speaker are an inalienable possession, he does not or cannot imagine them as separate from himself. So he conceptualizes the situation as "My two hands exist" and does not use the spatial expression as he does in (14). These sentences "have" the meaning of possession simply because English is

used as a filter language. It is the vicious habit of equating the "meaning" of an expression with its English translation that is creating all sorts of problems. One cannot help thinking, rather cynically, that if, by some historical accident, Hindi had assumed a status which English enjoys in the modern world, modern linguists would today be arguing that 'He has courage' and 'I have a book' are "really" spatial expressions (at the level of an "abstract deep structure") and that 'I have two hands' is "really" a pure existential sentence. The Hindi copula, then, would be monosemous and the English 'have' become polysemous! The English translation is simply English translation, and nothing more than this. It is not the abstract language-independent meaning. Similarly, it is not difficult to see that the copula in the so-called "relational" sentences conveys very much the same sense as it does in the "possessive" sentences.

It is not the case that the copula as a morphological oddity was not noticed by grammarians. Many Punjabi and Hindi grammarians did, in fact, notice it. To give just one example, Yamuna Kachru (1966:37-38) noted that the Hindi verb hona (the root is ho) had two forms more than the number of the forms that other Hindi verbs had. These forms are he "is" and tha "was" (si in Punjabi). She did appropriately call them the present and the past tense forms respectively. (Though past and non-past would have been better). But, keeping diachronic considerations out of her account, she misunderstood these two as the extra forms of

ho. But the reality is that he and tha (si in Punjabi) are NOT the forms of ho. They are totally independent forms and are different from ho not only for genetic but also syntactic and semantic reasons as well.

All grammarians of Punjabi and Hindi, however, agree that ho (also) behaves regularly like any other verb in the language. Since ho functions like an auxiliary verb too, and in both these uses it can occur with the copula, let us look at how it functions as an ordinary verb with the copula. Like any other auxiliary, ho retains essentially the original semantic field of its use as an ordinary verb. A typical construction called (by Sinha) the "process-of-being" construction (quite an odd name, in fact), is worth examining. The following examples are taken from Sinha(1980: 116), and the Punjabi translation and English glosses are ours.

(19) H1 rat kali hoti he

Pbi rat kaḷi hundi he

night black happening is

(Imperfect participle of ho)

"Nights are dark."

(20) H1 ḡakkār mit^ha hota he

Pbi ḡakkār mit^t^hi hundi he

sugar sweet happening is

"Sugar is sweet."

(21) H1 gae ke ek pū^h hoti he

Pbi gā de ik puc^h hundi he

cow of one tail happening is

"A cow has a tail."

(22) Hi yΛhũ durg^hætna foti hε

Pbi it^he durk^λætna fundi hε

here accident happening is

"Accidents take place here."

The Hindi sentences clearly show that Sinha first of all took up the English sentences and then translated them into Hindi, rather than the other (and proper) way. In the natural Hindi form of (21) ek "one" (the equivalent of the English article) would not be used. Sinha everywhere translates fota / foti as 'is', which from our point of view is wrong. This again betrays the use of English as a filter language. But he correctly uses the plural forms 'nights' and 'accidents' as translations of the Hindi singular nouns. The Imperfect Participle verb form of Hindi and Punjabi, strictly speaking, qualifies the Actor as being the substratum of the activity and the result of the activity which is viewed as incomplete. But let us forget this cumbersome description for a moment, and say that this form, indirectly, refers to an on-going or incomplete action. By only a slight extension of its prototypical meaning by implicature, it refers to an iterative action or process (in a way very similar to that of the English sentence 'He was sneezing.'), because an iterative process is incomplete after all simply because it happens again and again. Moreover, accident-happening is a punctual event. If a verb denoting a punctual meaning (Aktionsart) has a grammatical morphology indicating progressive aspect (the English

verb-form 'sneezing', for example), it is natural to interpret it as referring to an iterative event. This iterative process can be located in the past or the present or the future time. hɛ in Punjabi indicates timeless existence, which includes present existence, unless some adverb alters or modifies the unmarked meaning of hɛ. However, hɛ cannot denote iterative happenings because it is a "being" verb, and not a "happening" or "becoming" verb. To convey the notions of "happening", we have to use ho. Sentence (22) conceptualizes the situation, roughly, as:

(22') Iterative incidents of accident-happening here exist timelessly.

i.e., accidents have been happening here in the past and may continue happening in future. Since it is the quality of sugar's being sweet, of nights' being dark and of cows' possessing tails that are universal, and not the individual samples of sugar or nights or cows, that are universal and exist timelessly, each of the sentences given above conceptualizes the situation as an iterative process, as something like: "Whenever you encounter an X, you will find that it has the quality Y." So the X in each case is qualified by the verb ho "happen" in the Imperfect Participle form. Plural nouns "cows", "nights" and "accidents" in such sentences are possible in Hindi and Punjabi and would create little difference in meaning.

It must be pointed out that "timeless" in the Punjabi and Hindi grammar means "to which the distinction of past present and future is not applicable". It does not mean "eternal". Given the Indian cosmological view of universal flux, the sentence

(23) ʃakkər mīṭʰī hē
sugar sweet is

can refer only to the sample of sugar under observation, not to sugar in general or to the universal idea of sugarhood. Such notions are Greek, not Indian. For the Indian mind the processes of the individual samples of sugar happening to be sweet have been taking place for an indefinite length of time and may continue in future for a similar indefinite length of time. There are very few sentences like

(24) īṣṡər antaryamī hē
God omniscient is
"God is omniscient."

(25) *īṣṡər antaryamī hunda hē
God omniscient happening is

(26) məḥātma gāndī da nā amər hē
Mahatma Gandhi -of name immortal is
"Mahatma Gandhi's name is immortal."

(27) *maḥātma gāndī da nā āmēr hunda hē
 Mahatma Gandhi -of name immortal happening is

which, as complete expressions, and not solely because of the use of the copula, express the notion of eternity. It is not difficult to see why sentences like (25) and (27) are not possible in Hindi and Punjabi. There are no individual samples of God or of Mahatma Gandhi's name.

This rather metaphysical discussion is an absolutely necessary prelude to the discussion and analysis of the complex sequences of the Punjabi verb forms in Punjabi, most of which have hē and/or ho in them. If we want to do a linguistic analysis (as opposed to the Anglo-linguistic analysis we have been discussing), we must not ignore the socio-cultural dimension of the language and the world-view of its speakers.

6.2 "Tenses" in Punjabi and Hindi

In the last chapter, we pointed out that the history of the study of TMA (tense, mood, aspect) in Punjabi and Hindi is fascinating and disappointing at the same time. True and genuine Punjabi and Hindi linguistics hardly exists. These two and some other Modern Indic languages deserve to be ranked with Russian and other Slavonic languages as paradigm cases of aspect-prominent languages. Yet this true character of these languages is hardly ever noticed, and in fact, very few linguists know about this.

It is not the case that form was altogether ignored by the past grammarians. Very detailed phonological and morphological analyses (some of them anticipating the Chomskyan-Halleian generative phonology) of the forms found in the vast range of languages and dialects were made, particularly by Kellogg (1875, 1893), Beames (1872-79) and Hoernle (1880). This Herculean work is not likely to be repeated now or in future.

The system of the "simple" and the "periphrastic tenses" set up by the Western grammarians for the Indian languages was based on purely formal considerations, and the basic principle underlying the division was apparently accepted by all the grammarians working on the North Indian languages. Trouble arose only when they succumbed to the dualistic temptation of setting up a small number of "tenses" for these languages. Nearly all of them had studied Sanskrit before they took up the study of the modern Indian languages. The small number of tenses in Sanskrit (as in Latin and Greek, for genetic reasons) reinforced their dualistic outlook. The most neat, elegant and, consequently, most influential system of the Hindi "tenses" has been Kellogg's (1875, 1893). With some minor additions and changes (for the worse), it has been adopted by many grammarians of Hindi, Punjabi and other Indian languages until quite recently. The warning note sounded by Beames (who, because he challenged the orthodoxy rather prematurely, is the least popular and least studied of the classical grammarians) went unheeded. It was very rarely

taken note of (in order to be dismissed, of course). As a true monist, Beames was justifiably suspicious of the dualists' enthusiasm for attaching semantic labels to the "tense" forms. He knew that no "tense" form consistently conveyed the meaning of that "tense" throughout the language. Moreover, the number of the "tenses" in each language would be infinite if the programme were consistently followed. About Kellogg's system of the Hindi tenses and about a similar system set up for Sindhi by Trumpp, Beames observed :

"Trumpp and Kellogg have been, for the most part, led away by giving their attention in the first place, if not exclusively, to the meanings of the various tenses. This practice has led them to lose sight of the primary idea as evolved out of the structure of each tense. Had the structure been first considered, it would have been easy to discover which of the many conventional senses of a given tense was its primary and legitimate one, and by adhering to this process, a more simple and natural classification of tenses would have been arrived at... Kellogg does, indeed, clearly grasp the principles of the structure of the Hindi verb, but he is too metaphysical about the meaning of each tense, and has adopted a phraseology which cannot but prove bewildering to the student and which scientific linguists are not likely to adopt." (Beames 1879: 99-100).

By a curious irony of history, scientific linguists did adopt Kellogg's phraseology (and many did it without mentioning Kellogg's name as the originator of the system). Most major Punjabi grammarians, .e.g., E.P. Newton, Ram Singh and Duni Chandra, were happy with Kellogg's system or with the systems based on it. While the additions made to Kellogg's system do show its limitations without having made any substantial improvements in it, any change in the schema, such as change of the name of the "tense", has generally been a change for the worse. We look at a few of these predictably unsuccessful attempts. But we must look at the original system first.

6.3 Kellogg's system of Hindi "tenses"

Kellogg (1893:221-57) starts with the formal classification of the Hindi "tenses" he divides them into three classes:

- (a) Formed from the root
- (b) " " " Imperfect Participle
- (c) " " " Perfect Participle

(a) Formed from the root

(The Punjabi examples are ours)

1. Contingent Future

Hi ■ē jaū

Pbi ■ē javū "I may go"

2. Absolute Future

Hi mē jaūga

Pbi mē javāga "I shall go."

3. Imperative

Hi (tu) ja

Pbi (tū) ja "(You) go."

We put the term "tenses" within quotation marks because Kellogg himself calls these forms "tenses". Given our definition of tense in the last chapter, it is absurd and misleading to call many of these forms, especially the Imperative, a tense.

(b) Formed from ParticiplesFrom Imperfect Participle1. Indefinite Imperfect

Hi mē jata

Pbi mē jānda

"I would go."

2. Present Imperfect

Hi mē jata hū

Pbi mē jānda hū

"I am going."

3. Past ImperfectHi mē jata t^ha

Pbi mē jānda sī

"I was going."

4. Contingent Imperfect

Hi mē jata hoū

Pbi mē jānda hovā

"I may be going."

From Perfect Participle1. Indefinite Perfect

Hi mē गया

Pbi mē गिा

"I went."

2. Present Perfect

Hi mē गया हू

Pbi mē गिा हू

"I have gone."

3. Past PerfectHi mē गया t^ha

Pbi mē गिा sī

"I had gone."

4. Contingent Perfect

Hi mē गया hoū

Pbi mē गिा hovā

"I may have gone."

5. Presumptive Imperfect

Hī mē jata hūga

Pbī mē jānda hovāga

"I must be going."

6. Past Contingent Imperfect

Hī mē jata hōta

Pbī mē jānda hunda

"Were I going."

5. Presumptive Perfect

Hī mē gaya hūga

Pbī mē gia hovāga

"I must have gone."

6. Past Contingent Perfect

Hī mē gaya hōta

Pbī mē gia hunda

"Had I gone."

6.4 Kachru's Hindi "tenses"

Yamuna Kachru (1965) probably felt (rightly) that Kellogg's Imperfect "tenses" do not clearly and consistently convey the sense expressed by the English "continuous tenses": 'I am going', 'I was going' etc., which everyone who learnt his/her English through J.C. Nesfield's grammar is familiar with. So she added the following "tenses" to Kellogg's list. (The Hindi and the Punjabi examples are ours).

1. Present Continuous

Hī mē ja rāha hū

Pbī mē ja rīha hū

"I am going."

2. Past Continuous

Hī mē ja rāha thā

Pbī mē ja rīha sā

"I was going."

3. Presumptive Continuous

Hi mē ja rāḥa hūga

Pbi mē ja rāḥa hovāga

"I will be going."

4. Contingent Continuous

Hi mē ja rāḥa hoū

Pbi mē ja rāḥa hovā

"I may be going."

5. Past Contingent Continuous

Hi mē ja rāḥa hōta

Pbi mē ja rāḥa hōnda

"Were I going."

She omitted Kellogg's Indefinite Imperfect and rechristened Indefinite Perfect as Simple past. The innovation is singularly unfortunate. As we have seen, the Perfect Participle form (Kachru's Simple Past "tense") conveys the sense, both in Hindi and Punjabi, of a completed action, not necessarily in the past time. It is an aspectual, and not a tense, form. But since what she adds are genuine Hindi verb sequences, this shows that Kellogg's schema was incomplete. But why she did not include the Present Perfect Continuous ("I have been going.") and the Past Perfect Continuous ("I had been going") etc. is known to her only. These are important "tenses" in English according to Nesfield.

6.5 Duni Chandra's Punjabi "tenses"

At about the same time (1964), the Punjabi scholar Duni Chandra noticed that the "tenses" formed with the Potential Participle should be listed. So he renamed (for the worse, like Kachru) some of Kellogg's "tenses" and added some "tenses" formed with the Potential Participle to the list. These "tenses" are:

1. Present Potential

ਮੈਂ ਜਾਨਾ ਫਿ

"I am going to go."

2. Perfect Potential

ਮੈਂ ਜਾਨਾ ਸੀ

"I was going to go."

3. Contingent Potential

ਮੈਂ ਜਾਨਾ ਫਿਓ

"(Possibly) I may have to go."

4. Dubitative Potential

ਮੈਂ ਜਾਨਾ ਫਿਓਗਾ

"(Perhaps) I was going to go."

5. Conditional Potential

ਮੈਂ ਜਾਨਾ ਫਿੰਦਾ

"(If) I had had to go."

Duni Chandra's grammar is in Punjabi. The English translation of the names of the "tenses" and the Punjabi examples are ours. All these constructions occur in Hindi as

well, with the difference that instead of the nominative ਮੈਂ, as in Punjabi, they have the accusative ਮੇਰੇ "to me". Why Kachru did not pay attention to these "tenses" and Duni Chandra ignored the "tenses" which Kachru found necessary to mention, and why both of them ignored the "Perfect Continuous Tenses" is explained by neither of them.

One could imagine a hundred more such notional "tenses". Punjabi, like any other natural language, should be able to provide verb sequences which, roughly, could express any TMA notions, given the appropriate context. How many "tenses" are there in Punjabi then?

6.6 Bahl's system of the Punjabi "tense forms"

While working on his Grammatical Sketch of Panjabi (1964), K.C.Bahl decided to abandon the Kelloggian system, but not the dualistic assumptions underlying it. He took up the verbal categories set forth by Jakobson in 'Shifters, verbal categories, and the Russian verb' (Jakobson 1957), and attempted to study the TMA system of Punjabi in terms of the Jakobsonian categories. His brief account (six pages) of these categories as applicable to Punjabi is remarkably unreadable. No examples are given in these six pages. The verbal categories are:

1. Voice (which takes care of causativization)
2. Aspect
3. Mood
4. Tense

5. Status
6. Person
7. Gender
8. Number

The formal distinction between the simple and the periphrastic "tenses" is recognized.

In his article on Punjabi contributed to Current Trends in Linguistics, Vol 5 (Sebeok 1969), Bahl critically examined some of the earlier views about Punjabi "tenses". He rightly observed that "the dimension of tense, i.e., past, present and future, is not a primary dimension in the language" (Bahl 1969:172). But this critical examination did not deter him from a search for the small number of "tense forms" of Punjabi.

Adapting the Jakobsonian schema for Punjabi, Bahl sets up the following set of rules to specify the "tense forms" of Punjabi

Ending	→	[±Aspect]
[+Aspect]	→	[±Perfective]
[+Perfective]	→	[±Tense]
[-Perfective]	→	[±Tense]
[-Aspect]	→	[±Indicative]
[+Indicative]	→	[±Tense]
[+Tense]	→	[±Past]
[+Past]	→	[±Status]
[-Past]	→	[±Status]

[+Status]	→	[±Deictic]
[-Indicative]	→	[±Injunctive]
[+Injunctive]	→	[±Hortative]
[-Injunctive]	→	[±Presumptive]
[-Presumptive]	→	[±Optative]

These rules specify 26 "tense forms" in Punjabi. It can only be regretted that a linguist who correctly understood the difference between tense, aspect and modality used the misleading term "tense forms" for some verb forms and verb sequences which do not express the notion of tense at all. "Tense form" 7 (e.g., kitta), for example, is clearly marked as -Tense by Bahl himself. So are "tense forms" 14 (karda) and 21 (e.g., karna). Thus Bahl selected 26 "tense forms" in Punjabi, some of which are single verb forms and some are two- or three-verb sequences. The uneasy question why these 26 are "tense forms" and countless others are not is never faced, let alone answered, by Bahl. Surely his categories and rules can be made to apply to some other verb sequences too. If Bahl had considered only the single verb forms, his system would have had some justification. He claims that his features and rules "take care of all the tenses except the 'iterative imperfect aspect'..." But the whole enterprise is circular. The rules "take care of" almost all the "tenses" because the "tenses" are defined by the rules themselves. Bahl is "not sure of the advisability of the treatment" of some combinations as "tenses" because these combinations would not fit into his framework. Some of these sequences

have an Imperfect Participle form of a subtractive phase of a verb. e.g.,

(28) ʌsĩ kʰúb naccida sɪ

"We used to dance a lot."

But do these 26 "tenses" exhaust all the possibilities in the language? The clear answer is "No". Bahl objected to Duni Chandra's system because it is "incomplete". But so is Bahl's own system. Duni Chandra at least kept the forms of the language in mind and did not proceed, as Bahl did, in a strictly unilinear fashion from some supposedly language-independent categories and force Punjabi into them.

Bahl, however, did make some very valuable observations about Punjabi in this article. For example:

"The tense endings traditionally labelled as future of one kind or another are primarily modal tenses, and those labelled as past or present are aspectual tenses. The tenses of the infinitive are also non-aspectual tenses but more specific in their meanings than the purely modal tenses." (id. 172).

He also observed that the usages of the so-called "future tense" as well as the "future contingent" (or "hortative") can refer to an event occurring in the past. He was able to make these true observations because he did not follow the usual practice of studying decontextualized sentences, but

put them into life-like discoursal context. In short, Bahl's is a bold attempt to break the tradition but is unable to do so completely.

6.7 Puar's treatment of "tense" in Punjabi

Another very interesting non-Kelloggian attempt (not system) is found in J.S.Puar's Ph.D. thesis 'A Grammatical Study of Time and Tense in Punjabi' (1977). In this study, there are internal inconsistencies, confusions and arbitrary omissions of a great many verb sequences. For example, Puar dismisses the Potential Participle form as a nominal form (by confusing it with the homophonous Gerund), though this form functions as a verb like the other participles which Puar includes. He groups the verbal sequences into the "past", "present" and "future" "tenses", but goes on stressing after every few pages that these labels are purely formal and not semantic. But this clarification does not help. There surely are better ways of assigning purely formal labels than using the semantic labels "past", "present" etc. misleadingly as "formal" labels. The reality, however, is that Puar does implicitly use semantic criteria (i.e., whether or not a form seems to refer to past or present or future time in a decontextualized sentence) for the grouping of the forms into "tenses". For example, the Past Tense form of the copula and the Perfect Participle form by itself are both "Past Tense" forms (number 1 and 2 respectively) in his system. This is highly misleading

because, as we have already seen, the first is a tensed form with the basic meaning +PAST, and the other is a tense-neutral aspectual form with the basic meaning +COMPLETED. Thus, Puar's criteria for the allocation of forms into the allegedly formal category "past", "present" and "future" are arbitrary, confused and inconsistent. Still, the positive value of this study is great. Puar's approach, for the first time in the history of Punjabi linguistics is honestly and boldly (unashamedly, a theoretician of dualistic persuasions might say) empirical. He does not start with any elaborate borrowed system. It is rather the facts of the language that make him invent the bare minimum of the theoretical apparatus required. He omits certain things because of some conceptual confusions, not because his cherished system would break down under their weight. It is unfortunate that he uncritically accepted some basic concepts like "tense" in their old-fashioned and traditional sense.

Puar studied some published Punjabi texts, including some creative writings containing conversational passages, and collected his samples from them. Naturally, his data contain some sentences with verb sequences which would make all the previous Punjabi grammarians panic. He discusses 31 "past tense", 26 "present tense" and 19 "future tense" verb forms and sequences. Each "future tense" form occurs in two varieties: with the informal and colloquial -u ending, and with the more formal -ga ending. These forms have different historical origins. Thus, he could have turned his 19

"future tense" forms into 38 (19x2). (In our discussion, we have omitted the -u variety as we have omitted a large number of dialectal variations)..

Puar has brought together all sorts of combinations - the traditionally so-called "passives", "compound verbs", "conjunct verbs" etc. He implicitly seems to say that they all are first and foremost verbal sequences. It is at a level of greater delicacy that they are "passives", "conjunct verbs", etc.

Puar's attempt, like Bahl's, is a bold step in the right direction but, unlike Bahl's, lacks theoretical sophistication. If at all we learn any lesson from the failure of these attempts, it is simply this: We must start with the meaningful form which does not have any well-defined meaning but only meaning potential, only a part of which is realized when the form is used in a real life situation in the company of other forms which delimit and help realize one another's meaning.

6.8 Analysis of some Punjabi verb sequences

We discussed and criticized some attempts at studying the TMA system of Punjabi and Hindi, only to support our contention that each language is a unique phenomenon and, therefore, should be studied ultimately in its own terms. This argument is, of course, unacceptable to any linguist who believes in "abstract" language-independent universals. Our stand, however, is that even if these "universals"

exist, we can never discover them without studying individual languages and respecting their individuality. There is no Archimedian point above all languages where categories exist in their pure Platonic form. Those who believe this only delude themselves and others, for all that they are able to do is impose the categories of one language or a group of language on all others. The best way to study Punjabi is not to fondly search for some simple universal TMA categories and imagine them in Punjabi sentences. For us, there are first and foremost, highly complex verb sequences in Punjabi. The hope that there may be simplicity behind this complexity is only a vain dogmatic hope, a blind faith. The fact that a grammarian's description has to be simple does not mean that the reality of language itself is simple. A linguist has to treat the meaning of a sentence as if it were divisible into component parts for the sake of grammatical analysis. He has no right to imagine that this meaning is divisible in reality too. It is with such theoretical caveats that we attempt an analysis of some Punjabi sentences in this section. The sentences we select give an indication of their context of use. The lexical meanings of the words, the meaning potential of the grammatical forms and the "auxiliaries", and the interaction of the semantic fields of all the linguistic elements and, above all, the interaction of the interlocuters in the speech situation, create the meaning of each sentence. The first sentence we discuss represents one of the "present tense" structures (number 17) in Puar's list:

-da + root + ríña + hē

Imperfect participle + root + "stayed" + "is"

What Puar mistakes as a "root" is historically and functionally the Conjunctive Participle form, which has become homophonous to the root. In terms of our system, the structure is

Imperfect Participle + Conjunctive Participle + Perfect Participle of the auxiliary ré ("stay") + Unmarked Form of the Copula

In our analyses, we use the following abbreviations:

Imp Par	Imperfect Participle
Conj Par	Conjunctive Participle
Per Par	Perfect Participle
Pot Par	Potential Participle
Pt	Past Tense
Pr	Non-Past Tense (of the copula)
Unm	Unmarked Form

This is a moderately complex structure, exemplified by the following sentence:

(29) kār baṇḍa ja rīḥa. hē
 house becoming having gone stayed is
 Imp Par Conj Par Per Par Pr

"The house is building."

"The house is being built."

We have glossed the not-so-auxiliary verb ja as "having gone" because we cannot dogmatically claim that it has completely lost its original meaning. Binary or all-or-none thinking is dangerous in this field of linguistic enquiry. Once we recognize the fact that languages are metaphorical and symbolical and that it is the spatial imagery and metaphorization that is most common and omnipresent in languages, this translation of ja should not trouble us. As we have already said, a Conjunctive Participle + auxiliary combination indicates that the action denoted by the verb in the Conjunctive Participle form takes place under the conditions specified by the lexical meaning of the auxiliary. The additional complication here is that ja itself is followed by a not-so-auxiliary verb rē here.

The auxiliary verb rē "stay" in Punjabi is seemingly a very odd and semantically anomalous verb. Its Perfect Participle form indicates that the action denoted by the preceding verb is going on. This use of the perfective form of rē to indicate Progressive Aspect does not seem odd if we consider the lexical aspectual meaning (Aktionsart) of rē. The lexical meaning of this verb conveys an idea of duration. The Perfect Participle form of this verb indicates

the completion of the attainment (i.e., commencement) of a state, and not the completion of the state itself. In other words, this form indicates the ingression, and not the termination of the state denoted by the preceding verb. Grammatical aspect and lexical Aktionsart thus interact in an interesting way. So the sequence ja rɪɦa with rɪɦa agreeing with the Actor indicates that the Actor started the action of "going" and now persists in that state (of "going"). In other words, the action is viewed as going on (metaphorically, as in the English translation too). But this does not exhaust the meaning of ja, a verb whose primary meaning is "movement away from the point of reference." This signifies, symbolically, that the state of affairs is moving in the positive direction towards a time further on, which happens to be future time in this particular context. In other words, the house is still incomplete.

The principal verb baɳda "becoming" in the Imperfect Participle form agrees with the Actor kàr "house". Thus the house is viewed as the substratum both of the activity and the result of the activity. So the expression signifies "a/the house that started "becoming" (i.e., getting built) and whose process of "becoming" is going on (i.e., moving towards completion)."

But such a house could be imagined as existing at any time, present, past or future. That the existence of this particular house under reference, with all its qualifications, is not a simply past existence nor a mere

potentiality, definite or indefinite, (and is, therefore, a present reality) is indicated by the use of the copula in the Unmarked or the non-Past form.

That this analysis is tedious and cumbersome is undeniable. But this is the only safeguard against Anglocentrism or Eurocentrism in linguistics. If the form is complex, it would be an unpardonable shirking and neglect of scholarly duty to fool oneself with the idea that the underlying meaning must somehow be simple.

It would be useful to analyse some more complex verb sequences (in an outline form now) to bring home the fundamental principle guiding this study: that a sentence must be studied as a form-meaning complex.

- (30) e cāgəra kai salā tō calia
 this dispute many years -from started
 Per par
 a rīha hē
 having come stayed is
 Conj Par Per Par Pr

"This dispute has been going on for many years."

The following points are worth noting:

(i) calia "started". The Perfect Participle form shows that the starting of the dispute is completed.

(ii) a ríña "having come, stayed". As stated earlier, the Conjunctive Participle forms of a verb followed by the Perfect Participle form of the auxiliary ré "stay" shows

that the event is represented as having begun and then persisting in that state. The dispute's "coming" towards the present has not stopped. It is notable that the auxiliary Ja "go" is not used here. The state of affairs is represented as simply "coming" towards the present. There is no indication that it is "going" into the future too. So there is no suggestion that the dispute is going to continue.

(iii) he "is". The Non-Past form of the copula shows that the state of affairs under reference is relevant to the present time, and that the state of affairs still obtains.

The typical Indian view of action as being actually a sequence of actions viewed as one and subordinated to the whole is fully represented here, as everywhere else in the language.

(31)	ram	kàr	nũ	mur	gia
	Ram	home	-to	having turned back	gone
			Conj Par		Per Par
	hoia		si		
	happened		was		
	Per Par		Pt		
	"Ram had gone back home."				

(i) si "was". Past Tense form of the copula. The situation is laid in the past time relative to the speech event.

(ii) hoia "happened". Perfect Participle form. Even at that point in the past time, the situation had already happened.

(iii) mur gīa "having turned back, gone". The situation is simply this: Ram turned his face homeward and then completed his home-going.

(32)	sīta	ot ^h e	rē	rāhī	japdī	sī
	Sita	there	having stayed	stayed	seeming	was
			Conj Par	Per Par	Imp Per	Pt

"Sita seemed to be staying there."

(i) si "was". The situation was obtaining in the past time.

(ii) japdī "seeming". Imperfect Participle form. At that point in the past time, Sita was continuing to seem in a certain state.

(iii) rē rāhī. The Conjunctive Participle form of the ordinary verb "stay" followed by the Perfect Participle form of the same verb used as an auxiliary. This particular combination, as elsewhere, indicates the commencement but not the completion of the state denoted by the main verb. So the situation in which Sita seemed to be is: Sita started staying there and continued in that condition, i.e., staying there.

(33)	ram	bākda	hoṇa	hē
	Ram	talking nonsense	to happen.	is
		Imp Par	Pot Par	Pr

"Ram may be talking nonsense."

(i) hona "to happen". Potential Participle. It is not the reality but simply the (rather strong) possibility of the situation that is being asserted.

(ii) bakda "talking nonsense". Imperfect Participle. The possibility is that of Ram's continuing talking nonsense.

(iii) he "is". The inferred situation is only relevant to the present time.

The speaker is removed from Ram in space and/or time. So he cannot hear Ram talk and thus cannot make any definite judgement about the intellectual content of Ram's speech. The present time is the time of the speaker's judgement, not necessarily of Ram's talking, which may be in the past or the present. Alternatively, the speaker may be making predictions about Ram's future behaviour (on the basis of his present judgement of Ram's character).

(34)	kál	tək	ram	gia	hoid	hove
	tomorrow	till	Ram	gone	happened	to happen
				Per Par	Per Par	Unm

"(It is desirable that) Ram should have gone by tomorrow."

(i) hove "to happen". Unmarked Form. Just the happening of the action (not necessarily actual) is in view. Within the context, kál means "tomorrow". This shows that the action is potential. Depending on the intonation, it can be an order or a request or a wish.

(ii) hoia "happened". Perfect Participle form. However, it is emphasized that what is requested or ordered or desired must have happened by tomorrow.

(iii) gia "gone". Perfect participle form. What is desired is Ram's going as a completed action.

If this sentence is preceded by the sentence adverb aid "perhaps" and is spoken with a tentative intonation, it would indicate the speaker's inference or guess, about a past or a future happening, depending on whether kai means "yesterday" or "tomorrow". All this shows that there are more things in the Punjabi TMA system than have been dreamt of by the Punjabi grammarians so far. Forcing individual verb forms or verb sequences into the pigeon holes called "tenses" is the greatest imaginable violence that can be done to the living reality of this language.

(35)	<u>dadi</u>	<u>sanũ</u>	<u>kahaniã</u>	<u>sunaiã</u>
	grandmother	us-to	stories	told
				Per Par
	<u>kardi</u>	<u>si</u>		
	doing	was		
	Imp Par	Pt		

"Grandmother used to tell us stories."

(i) si "was". The situation obtained in the past time.

(ii) kardi "doing". Imperfect Participle form. In this particular context, the form indicates an iterative activity of the grandmother "doing" something.

(iii) sunāia "told". Perfect Participle form. It is significant that the verb does not agree with any noun and is in the neuter form. So the verb represents the action of the verb itself without making someone the substratum of the result of the action. Story-telling is viewed as an activity in its own right. Of course, the grandmother is the Actor, but she is not symbolically viewed as very much involved in the activity.

The sentence just refers to a past situation in a matter-of-fact way. The following sentence is very different in emotional tone, though it can be said to "have the same meaning."

(36)	dadi	sanū	kəhāniā	sunōdi
	grandmother	us-to	stories	telling
	fundī	sī		Imp Par
	happening	was		
	Imp Par	Pt		

The grandmother's activity is denoted by a verb in the Imperfect Participle form, which agrees with the Actor grandmother. Thus she is the substratum of both the activity and the result of the activity, which is viewed not as completed, as in (33) above, but as ongoing and thus symbolically made vivid (in a characteristic Punjabi way by using an Imperfect Participle form of the verb). This effect is reinforced by the use of the form fundī, the Imperfect

Participle form of ho "happen". The grandmother is vividly presented as happening to be in a certain state (telling stories) again and again. The emotional tone of this sentence is such that the speaker seems to be lovingly remembering a dead grandmother. Whatever the truth-conditional variety of semantic may say, (35) and (36) do differ subtly in their significance. Since this difference is communicatively important in a real life situation, and is formally indicated in the language, a grammarian must take account of this. These sentences clearly show that the agreement of the verb with one nominal or the other or with no nominal is significant. It is not simply a "surface structure" or "just morphological" phenomenon. In the next chapter, we shall describe in some detail what this "morphological" phenomenon signifies in the language.

6.9 Concluding remarks

An analysis of all the possible verb combinations in the language (How many are there?), even if it were possible, would be a tremendous and theoretically uninteresting task. But we have established our standpoint, and from this standpoint we shall deal with some much discussed topics in the contemporary linguistic theory - ("split") ergativity and passive constructions - in the form they are found in Punjabi. As throughout this study, Hindi will have to be brought into the picture for reasons already mentioned. It will be our contention that we do not need well-defined and

discrete categories like "passive voice", "ergativity" or even "subject" and "object" etc. The two major systems of Punjabi grammar - valency and transitivity - take care of all these phenomena and are thus of paramount importance. In terms of the categories set up within these two systems and against the background of discoursal-pragmatic factors, we shall attempt to explain (in our sense of explaining, discussed earlier) some of the grammatical peculiarities of Punjabi.

CHAPTER VII

CASE-MARKING AND VERB SERIALIZATION IN PUNJABI

Prolix explication astonishes the philosopher, who would prefer to believe that explication is always limited to unfolding the complex, to demonstrating the simple within the composite. But true scientific thought is metaphysically inductive;...it reads the complex in the simple, states the law that covers the fact, the rule that applies to the example.

- Gaston Bachelard (1984:6) .

7.1 Dependency, Principal Qualified and Principal Qualifier

Our use of the valency model in the preceding chapters clearly commits us to the Dependency genre of the modern syntactic theories. As we have already said, this genre is generally opposed to the Constituency genre typically represented by the American Structuralists' Immediate Constituent (IC) analyses and its derivatives like Chomsky's tree diagrams. There is no doubt that the two approaches share a great many features and may be "weakly" or even "strongly" equivalent. But many linguists are now arguing that there are languages which do not exhibit English-like constituent structure, or at least cannot be satisfactorily described within the framework of a Constituency grammar. Warlpiri (Hale 1981) and Kalkatungu (Blake 1983) and several other languages (Foley and Van Valin 1984) are claimed to be such languages. They have been called "non-configurational" languages or "flat" languages. Blake says about Kalkatungu:

"Not only can the verb and its arguments be arranged in any order, but where an argument is represented by more than one word, these words can appear in any order and may be scattered among the other words of the sentence." (Blake 1983:143).


To a great extent, this is the case with Punjabi too, though it is useful to regard the co-called SOV order as the basic or unmarked word order in Punjabi. It is often claimed that

"flat" languages do not "have" a constituency structure. We cannot discuss the validity of this claim here. A closer examination may reveal a constituency-type structure in the clauses of even a "flat" language. Which of the two rival approaches - Constituency or Dependency - is the better one has also been debated. (Cf. Hudson 1980a, 1980b, Dahl 1980). But a discussion of this interesting topic is not necessary here. As already said in earlier chapters, our hocus pocus stand is that a language does not "have" a Constituency or Dependency structure; rather, it lends itself more easily to a sensible, neat and explanatory grammatical analysis in terms of one theory or the other. Whether or not Punjabi "is" a flat language is a non-sensible question. We proceed as if it were. The latter half of this chapter and the next chapter, where we deal with the complex verb sequences with intricate interaction of their valency sets and the semantic complexities resulting partly from this, will clearly demonstrate that our choice is guided by the fact that the Dependency technique gives us neater and more manageable explanatory analyses.

There is no "standard" Dependency framework comparable to Chomsky's "Standard Theory". Even for the best studied of the modern languages - English - differing analyses of some constructions are offered. For example, in a determiner + noun structure in English, the noun is the head or the qualified and the determiner that is the qualifier according to Matthews (1981a). But according to Hudson (1984), the opposite is the case. Matthews's

the sleek thrushes

(p. 87)



is comparable to Hudson's

the cat

(p. 92)



Predicative adjectives, when studied in detail, are sure to be analysed in differing ways. Again, Matthews's

[all animals] are equal

(p. 115)



is comparable to Hudson's

Anyone is wrong

(p. 101)



The problem is difficult to settle in one way or the other. Matthews gives two arguments against the analysis

[all animals] are equal




(i) There is a collocational link between the predicative adjective and the subject.

"This suggests a constructional relationship - between, for example, equal and all animals - which our diagram does not show. In the subject complement constructions ... (It tastes nice, He sounded a fool), there are restrictions relating the subject complement and the verb: for example, it would be unusual to say His mother is turning old or The milk grew sour (compared with His mother is growing old and The milk turned sour). But no such restrictions involve the copula BE." (Matthews 1981a:114-115).

(ii) An adjective can have semantic properties akin to valency. The adjectives EQUAL, SIMILAR, EQUIVALENT, for example, must have a plural subject as verbs like MEET have.

The correct analysis of such "equational" or "intensive" sentences involving the copula, according to Matthews, is



Matthews argues that

"The form of BE is then a marker... we may regard the copula as a means by which a predicator which is

lexically non-verbal, and grammatically uninflected for tense and verbal categories, is assimilated to a construction in which a verb is an essential element." (id. 116).

Very similar views were expressed earlier by Lyons (1966: 219), who suggested that the copula in such constructions "may be regarded as a 'dummy carrier' of tense, mood, aspect and number in surface structure..." Evidence of some languages like Chinese, Russian, Arabic and Sanskrit may be brought in support of this argument. In these languages,

(1) John is a scholar.

would literally be

(1') John scholar.

Such sentences are not the rule in Punjabi, but utterances like

(2) baba bākale

Master Bakala-in

"The Master is in Bakala."

are not uncommon. A popular children's story has a very long copula-less sentence

(3) kã kaṇa, telli laṅgəṛa, baṇia kaṁla

Literally, "Crow one-eyed, oilman lame, merchant crazy ..."

The role of the copula as a carrier of verbal categories is not in doubt. But the assertion that it is nothing more than a "dummy carrier" (like the "dummy subject" in It is cold today) is open to question. (cf. Allerton 1982:38), even for English. The situation in Punjabi, with which we are exclusively concerned in this study, is not that simple. We have already met the Punjabi sentence

(4) mere do ḥattḥ ḥan
my two hands are
"I have two hands."

We argued in Chapter VI that it is best and proper to regard this sentence as an existential sentence asserting the existence of my two hands. Similarly, we can regard the following sentences

(5) ram pəlvən ḥe
Ram wrestler is
"Ram is a wrestler."

(6) ram boḷa ḥe
Ram deaf is
"Ram is deaf."

as existential sentences. It is true that some non-Indo-European languages have different lexical verbs for the existential and the copular functions. A single verb serving the two functions may be an exclusively Indo-European phenomenon. But we must respect the form. The Indo-European copular-existential verb does not become two different homophonous words any more than the English word 'camel' becomes three hundred different homophonous words because of the existence of the Arabic language.

In the spoken form of sentences like (5) and (6), the nuclear stress usually falls on the complement for pragmatic reasons. It is far less common for the speakers to assert the existential element than to assert the complementary part in such utterances. The very mention of an entity usually (but not invariably) takes the contemporary existence of the entity for granted. So the copula is often conventionally omitted, unless some "marked" meaning, e.g., past existence, is to be conveyed. Logicians have raised this fact to the status of a fundamental principle: "Existence is not a predicate." This may be the right principle to adopt in the artificial language of logic. But in a natural language used in real life situations, it is common to assert the existence of entities, as in

(7) 'Ifvər "fi

God is

with the strongly stressed copula. The mere mention of

entities like God, Devil, King of France, Atlantis, UFO, unicorn, barren woman's son, hare's horn, etc. does not presuppose or imply their real physical existence, past or present. Leaving logic aside, existence is a predicate in (4) and (7); therefore, the copular-existential verb (copula, henceforward) is more than a mere carrier of verbal categories.

But it is also undeniable that many Punjabi adjectives do function like verbs (or, which amounts to the same thing, vice versa). The following sentence, when used to describe Ram's profession, conveys practically the same information as (5) does:

(8) ram kùlḍa hē

Ram wrestling is

"Ram wrestles." (=Ram is a wrestler).

The grammatical function of predicatively used adjectives and nouns is very similar to that of verbs in sentences like (8). It can be convincingly argued that the situations symbolized in (5) and (8) are, respectively,

(5') Ram, characterized by the situation of being a wrestler, exists.


(8') Ram, characterized by the still continuing (and iterative) activity of wrestling, exists.

If we regard kùlḍa "wrestling" as the qualified head in (8), consistency demands that we also regard pəlvàn "wrestler" as the qualified head in (5). But it must not mean that we should regard the auxiliary/copula in these sentences as nothing more than a "dummy carrier" of verbal categories because that line of argument, if consistently followed, would make (4) and (7) headless sentences, because the verb must be regarded as the head or the Principal Qualified entity in such sentences.

Whether or not the English sentences Napoleon was alarmed and Napoleon was defeated are structurally similar is not a topic for this study. (Cf. the ambiguity of The glass was broken). As far as Punjabi is concerned, we must regard (5) and (8) as structurally similar, each having a complex nucleus or head. Later on in this chapter, we deal with such nuclei or heads. But it is important to mention here that a compound or complex nucleus or core does not make a sentence compound or complex in the "deep structure" or in the "surface structure". (Cf. Schachter 1974, Foley and Van Valin 1984, Foley and Olson 1985).

This study deals with dependency at the least delicate level - at the level of the verb and its arguments. It is uncontroversial among the Dependency theorists that the verb is the head and the NP arguments are its dependent qualifiers. We omit the mention of any other dependencies. The verb, in our schema, is the Principal Qualified (PQd) element in the sentence, and its arguments are Qualifiers (Qrs). There can be a Principal Qualifier (PQr) among the

qualifiers. The PQr is simply the NP with which the finite form (capable of agreeing and standing alone in the nucleus) agrees either in person and number or in number and gender. That this agreement is not simply a "superficial surface structure" or a "mere morphological" phenomenon is one of the basic tenets of this study. In our functional analysis of Punjabi, we are concerned with meaning in use in real life situations, and not with simply "truth-conditional" meaning. An illustration from Punjabi will make our point clear. Punjabi has a verb whose IB phase is lia "bring". Historically, it originated as a serial verb le + a "take+come" (phases IIB + IA). Like any serial verb with the membership of non-finite Conjunctive Participle bivalent (transitive) form and a finite monovalent (intransitive) form, it is the second member that agrees with the Actor when it is in the Perfect Participle form, and the serial verb group as whole is regarded as monovalent (intransitive). (We shall discuss this in detail below). But a new usage has also developed. The verb is also being reanalysed as a single, non-derived, bivalent (transitive) verb, so that the Perfect Participle form of this verb, like that of any other transitive verb, agrees with the Undergoer. The English sentence "The girl brought milk for me" is now translatable into Punjabi in two different ways:



PQr

(10) kuṛi ne mere lai dūd liānda

girl -Agt me -for milk brought



The arrows above indicate the PQr in each sentence. These two sentences were presented to a number of native speakers of Punjabi, who were asked to describe the differences in the meaning(s) of the two sentences, if they noticed any. While they all agreed that the two sentences referred to the same situation, they "discovered" interesting differences in what they called the "overhead meaning" or "deeper meaning" or "literary sense" etc. Some of the differences noticed by them were:

(i) In (9) it is the girl and in (10) it is the milk that is "somehow more central to the description" or is "nearer the mind of the speaker" or is "the focus of attention."

(ii) (9) describes the situation "from the point of view" of the girl and (10) does not.

(iii) (9) is the "more romantic" of the two.

(iv) In (9) the speaker has "empathy" with the girl and has her in mind. (10) is more likely to be spoken when the speaker is interested more in the milk than in the girl.

In our chapter on ergativity, we shall take up the subject of empathy and point of view. Here it is enough to point out that if the native speakers of Punjabi have an intuition (however vague) that the sentences differ in meaning (however "overhead"), we ought to take this fact into account. We have been speaking of a verb form characterizing an Actor or an Undergoer as being the substratum of the result of action. This by no means contradicts our assertion that the verb is the qualified element in the sentence and that the Actor or the Undergoer are its qualifiers. The Principal Qualifier, which gives its gender/person and number to the verb stands in a special relation to the verb. An analogy can make this point clear. Let us imagine a country ruled by a woman sovereign. Among her subjects (equivalent to our qualifiers) there is a man who is her husband, whom she obeys like any devoted wife and whose family name she and her children bear. This "principal subject" is the equivalent of our PQr. A Punjabi sentence can have a verb without any PQr, just as a country can have a virgin queen like Elizabeth I. The zero-agreement of such a verb (whose neutral form is homophonous to the masculine singular form) denotes the verbal action (bhāva) itself according to the Sanskrit grammarians. Such a "virgin" verb in Punjabi always expresses perfective aspect.

7.2 Case-marking postpositions (CMPs) in Punjabi

The choice of the PQr in Punjabi depends, generally speaking, on the valency set of the phase and on the

transitivity expressed by the form of the verb. This precisely is the case with the choice of the CMPs too. But we must hasten to add that contextual-pragmatic factors also play their part. Whether or not the Undergoer is definite is also significant. The Undergoer can be definite in several ways. Proper nouns and the first and the second person pronouns are always definite. Common nouns and third person pronouns can be definite for discoursal-contextual and pragmatic reasons. The examples given below in this section illustrate the use of the Punjabi CMPs. An actant or a core argument in Punjabi can have only one of the three CMPs - ne, nũ and \emptyset (zero). Below we briefly discuss the use of each;

(a) ne

This CMP is used with the Actor NP (except, for historical reasons, with the first and the second person pronouns) when this core argument is NOT the PQr. In such a construction, either the Undergoer is the PQr or there is no PQr. ne comes historically from the Sanskrit instrumental case-ending -ena which some nouns and third pronouns (but not the first and second person pronouns) in their instrumental and some actorial case roles had. While Hindi has started using ne with the first person and second person pronouns too, on the analogy of nouns, some Western Punjabi dialects have dropped this CMP altogether on the analogy of the first and second person pronouns. In Modern Punjabi and Hindi, ne is a marker of (a rather strongly

agentive) Actor. Its origin from the instrumental case-ending of Sanskrit is no longer semantically relevant.

(b) nũ

This is basically a spatial postposition meaning "to". So its use as a marker of the Recipient NP does not require any discussion or explanation.

But the use of this CMP as a marker of a definite Undergoer NP needs some discussion. Every grammarian who has dealt with case-marking in Punjabi (and Hindi) has dealt with the use of nũ (ko in Hindi) as a CMP. A recent attempt has been made by Saksena (1983) in her paper 'A case marking constraint' to discuss some of the constraints on the use of ko to mark both the Recipient and the Undergoer (Saksena's "dative" and "patient" respectively) within the same clause. She also deals with the so-called "dative subject" which we shall discuss in Chapter IX. She mentions many "grammatical" restrictions on the use of two kos within the same clause in Hindi. Most of her examples, however, are unnatural and concocted just to illustrate the pre-conceived "rules". In our opinion, there is only one pragmatic meta-constraint: communication must not suffer on account of the ambiguity resulting from the use of two (or more) nũs in Punjabi or kos in Hindi. If the highly flexible word-order (with appropriate prosody) can be manipulated in such a way that it is clear which nũ or ko marks the Recipient and which marks the definite Undergoer, there is no reason why two or more nũs or kos should not occur in a Punjabi or Hindi sentence.

Very often, the discoursal context itself is enough to eliminate any chances of ambiguity. A very old woman was observed as giving the following (not seriously intended) threat to a boy who was teasing her by imitating her style of speaking:

(11) [ˈtɛnnũ tã mẽ ˈvɑd̪d̪ ki ˈkuttĩã nũ kʰə ˈlɔ̃nã yã]

/tɛnũ	tã	mẽ	vɑd̪d̪	ke	kuttĩã	nũ
you-to	PARTICLE	I	having cut		dogs	-to
kʰɪlɔ̃nã	ɦɛ/					
to feed	is					

"I am going to cut you and feed you to the dogs."

It is a perfectly grammatical and acceptable sentence. The word-order and the prosody make it very clear that the speaker is threatening to cut the addressee to pieces and then feed the pieces to dogs. The interpretation that she may be thinking of slaughtering the dogs and feeding their meat to the boy is not possible here. Even without the use of any particles or any special prosody, it is very clear in the following sentence who is to be shown to whom:

(12) Pbi bacce nũ tusĩ jaldi kise dakt̪ər nũ dɪkʰao
 Hi bacce ko tum jaldi kisi dakt̪ər ko dɪkʰao
 child -to you soon some doctor -to show

"Get the child examined by a doctor soon."

While it is normal to "show" a child to a doctor, the reverse is highly unusual and unlikely. So notwithstanding grammarian's "rules" barring sentences like (12), such sentences are frequently heard in real life.

..... There is, however, a more interesting theoretical issue. Many languages mark the definite Undergoer in some way and distinguish it from a non-definite one. In Turkish, the special accusative suffix -i is given only to a definite direct object (or Undergoer in our terminology), and Persian uses the suffix -ra for this purpose. (Comrie 1981a:125). A detailed study of this cross-linguistic phenomenon cannot be attempted here. In the case of Hindi and Punjabi, it appears that zero-marking of an Undergoer NP does not show its definiteness even when it is the PQr. (A PQr is always zero-marked in Punjabi and Hindi, as we shall see below). The Actor PQr, because of its semantic role, stands prominent and gains some definiteness. But an Undergoer role makes an NP just what the name denotes. A zero-marked Undergoer, especially when it is not the PQr is often regarded as a de-individualized simple qualifier of the verb and nothing more. There are in these languages, composite verbs in which the noun element is so indefinite that it has got semantically almost fused with the verb and can never have a marker of definiteness. Some Punjabi examples are:

c ^h al marna	"jump" (lit. "strike a jump")
ser karna	"stroll" (lit "do a stroll")
capeɾ marna	"slap" (lit "strike a slap")
gapp marna	"tell lies" (lit. "strike lies")

A definite Undergoer marked with nũ never occurs in such expressions (except sometimes in jokes), though the verb, if in the Perfect Participle form of Potential Participle form, still agrees with the Undergoer according to the general rule. It appears that the merger of the verb and the Undergoer is well on its way in such cases. Somewhat similar examples from Modern Persian are:

dast dādan	"shake hands" (lit. "give hand")
anjām dādan	"accomplish" (lit. "give result")
zahmat dādan	"cause trouble" (lit. "give trouble")
zahmat kašīdan	"take pains" (lit. "draw trouble")
khajālat kašīdan	"be ashamed" (lit. "draw shame")

(Mace 1971:147).

A definite Undergoer ought to be represented as not just a qualifier of the verb in the abstract formula NOUN + VERBing, but as a definite (in the rather general sense, discussed above) and individualized entity that is the intended (by the Actor) target of the result of the action. So it ought to be marked with the postposition nũ (or kō in Hindi). With this postposition, it loses its right to be the PQr of the verb showing a completed action. But the definiteness it attains with nũ more than compensates the loss. When the verb represents the action as completed, the implication is that the target has been affected by it. (As far as other languages that mark a definite Undergoer are concerned, only a study of their general symbolic system can make sense of the devices they use).

Another related, and more significant, issue has been discussed by W.S.Allen (1984). He has pointed out that many languages from other families mark the direct object (DO) and the indirect object (IO) (corresponding to the Undergoer and the Recipient respectively of our system) with the same marker. Harauti, Georgian and some North Caucasian languages exhibit the same, or very similar, phenomenon. Allen suggests, for such languages, a

"'fusion' of what one might a priori think of as separate cases... for their surface identity... suggests a more general underlying identity." (Allen 1984:10).

Without invoking a deep structure, we can say, for Punjabi and Hindi at least, that the Undergoer and the Recipient share some semantic properties. If we view the Actor as the source of the action (as the postposition tõ "from" used for marking a backgrounded Actor in the passive constructions clearly shows), the Undergoer is the goal of the (result of the) action. The Recipient is also a sort of goal. So it is but natural for many languages to mark the two case-roles in the same way.


(c) Ø (zero)

Zero or absence of postposition marks

(i) The Actor or Undergoer which is the PQr,

(ii) A non-definite Undergoer whether or not it the PQr.

Thus we see that in Punjabi a PQr must be zero-marked, although every zero-marked NP is not necessarily the PQr. As already said, a PQr must also agree with the finite verb(s) in the nucleus of the sentence. Below, we give some illustrative examples with brief comments:



"Ram catches/is catching fish."

The abbreviatory letters in the diagrams stand for

A = Actor

R = Recipient

U = Undergoer

PQr = Principal Qualifier


Ignoring the copula for the moment, we find that in (13)

(i) The verb in the IB phase is bivalent with the valency set <A,U>.

(ii) The form of the verb is the Imperfect Participle, marking the action as uncompleted. Since the U cannot be the substratum of the result of the action, A should be the PQr and the verb should agree with the zero-marked A.


(iii) The U is also zero-marked because the context

shows that Ram does not catch any definite or special type of fish but any fish.



"Sita desires (=loves) Ram."

Here, the definite U is marked with nũ, but it is the A that is the PQr.



"Ram drank tea."

The Perfect Participle, which represents the action as completed, also implies that it is the U that is the substratum of the result of the action. So it is the U that is the PQr. So the A, which is not the PQr, is marked with ne.

(16) daktər ne bimar nũ dek^hia

doctor -Agt patient -to seen

"The doctor saw (=examined) the patient."

The verb is in the Perfect Participle form whose PQr can be a non-definite U. Since the U is definite here, the verb must remain without any PQr. So the verb does not agree with any NP and is in the neutral form (which is homophonous to the masculine singular form).

PQr

(17a) (et^he) bāndər naccəne fən

(Here) monkeys to dance are

"Monkeys are going to dance here."


(17b) (et^he) bandərā ne naccəŋa fε

(Here) monkeys -Agt to dance is

(Same English translation).


The verb in both these sentences is monovalent and is in the Potential Participle form (which denotes a potentially completed action, and hence expresses perfective aspect).

For historical reasons (because of the origin of the form in the Sanskrit Future Passive Participle), its Actor can have ne even when the phrase is monovalent. But on the analogy of the marking of the Actor of a more frequently used Perfect Participle form (which also expresses perfective aspect), zero-marking has also come into use. As always happens in such cases, a subtle semantic distinction between the two uses can be observed. The Actor marked with ne in (17b) is more agentive. (17a) suggests that a dance show of captive monkeys (a sort of mini circus) is going to take place, while (17b), in which the Actor is marked with ne, suggests a dance of wild and free monkeys. As is the rule in Punjabi, an NP marked with a postposition cannot be the PQr. So (17b) is without any PQr. An Actor which is the PQr may appear more involved in the action denoted by the verb, but, at the same time, like a non-definite Undergoer, it appears to be more under the shadow of the verb than an Actor marked with ne, which appears to be freer, more self-possessed and more agentive. So being a PQr and being an independent, free-standing and agentive Actor are different things in Punjabi.




"I got food served to the ascetics."

The trivalent causative verb (Phase IID) is in the Perfect Participle form. The non-involved Actor-causer (Acn) would be marked with ne if it were a noun or a third person pronoun. As usual, the non-definite U is the PQr. The semantics of the phase of the verb implies a Causer-mediator (who served the food) which is syntactically optional and can be mentioned (marked with tō "from"). It may be noted that both the R and the U can be marked with nū, as in (11) and (12) discussed above.



"Such stories should not be narrated to children."

The verb is in Phase II*C which we have called a subtractive phase. As we saw in Chapter III, subtraction in such constructions involves the elimination of the Actor, which must not be mentioned, not even as an optional NP in the periphery. Also, the subtractive phase can have only the Imperfect Participle form. The A is the PQr of the normal phase of a verb in the Imperfect Participle form. But since the Actor is eliminated here, the U is the PQr. If the U in such a sentence is definite and is marked with nũ, the verb has no PQr. There is, however, another use of the subtractive phase - to represent a habitual action of the first person plural Actor "we". In such uses, the Actor can be mentioned, but it cannot be the PQr. An example is



"We drink a lot of wine."

It is the U that is the PQr in (20). The mention of the A is not obligatory in such a sentence. A boastful intonation is enough. In the written form, however, the A has to be mentioned to avoid ambiguity, because (20) without A could be interpreted as "A lot of wine should be drunk" on the analogy of (19). Since subtraction involves the elimination of the Actor (except in sentences like (20)), the

subtractive counterpart of a monovalent phase must be zero valent. A sentence having as a nucleus a verb in such a phase cannot have any NP in its core. Naturally, the nuclear verb in such a sentence must be without any PQr and be in the neutral form, as in

(21) et^he fàssida nǎĩ
 here to laugh not

"One should not laugh here."

or "Laughing should not be done here."

(21) is a totally nounless sentence (unless we regard the verb as being in the nominal form). Such sentences can be a challenge for the Constituency approaches, which assume that every sentence has an NP+VP structure, and for Relational Grammar, which assumes that every sentence has a Subject. (But, of course, the magical "deep structure" and "logical structure" etc. can always be invoked, and in such an "abstract structure" a "Universal Subject" - a sort of Everyman - can at first be brought in and then deleted with the help of the equally magical "transformations". But the scientific value of such ad hoc devices is much more in doubt today than it was fifteen years ago).

7.3 Verb sequences in Punjabi

So far, we have not attempted any theoretical structural analysis of the Punjabi verb sequences. In fact, no grammarian in the past attempted any theoretical analysis of

such sequences in Punjabi, though every grammarian mentioned these sequences and some of them made some descriptive generalizations about them. This more or less applies to Hindi, but the detailed descriptive analysis of Hindi "compound verb" by Hook (1974) does make important and insightful theoretical observations. Our approach, however, is very different from Hook's. The descriptions of the phenomenon produced so far are valuable. It is from descriptive analyses that interesting theoretical questions emerge. Bhartrhari's most penetrating observation about the meaning of the verb, referred to in the preceding chapters, is a descriptive statement pregnant with theoretical issues. In the last chapter, we saw how the verbs in a series modify one another's meaning and how the cumulative meaning, which is anything but an exact mathematical sum of the meanings of the parts, emerges. The semantics of the verb sequences must now be accounted for (inevitably in a partial manner) in terms of their syntax as well. If linguistics is the study of meaning at all levels, as Firth rightly stressed, we must now examine the syntactic meaning of the verb sequences. (It must be admitted, however, that it is impossible to exactly point out which part of the meaning is semantic and which part is syntactic).

Recently (1984), Foley and Van Valin published their insightful analysis of serial verbs in terms of junction and nexus. Their analysis is in perfect harmony with the implications of Bhartrhari's view about the meaning of the verb. Serial verbs are found in many languages and

genetically unrelated language families scattered all over the world. Foley and Van Valin's is the first attempt to draw samples from a wide variety of languages and to apply to them a theoretical analysis within a framework prepared specially for the languages which differ structurally from the familiar European languages. Of additional significance for us is the fact that Foley and Van Valin do not analyse any Indian language while dealing with the phenomenon of serial verbs. The Punjabi serial verb constructions should therefore be a good touchstone to test their theory. Of the key concepts of their theory, we have already adopted (sometimes in an adapted form) Actor, Undergoer, nucleus, core and periphery, although these concepts are not unique to their theory. Some more concepts of their theory, particularly juncture and nexus, need a little explanation.

(a) Juncture

Juncture is the joining or linking of the token of any two layers of the clause - nucleus, core or periphery - to another token of the same type, i.e., a nucleus with a nucleus, a core with a core, and a periphery with a periphery. The individual members thus joined are called juncts. A nuclear juncture (represented by three horizontal parallel lines \equiv) is a construction with a complex nucleus. In a core level juncture (represented by $=$), two cores, each with its own nucleus and core arguments are joined. In a peripheral juncture (represented as $-$), two clauses, each with its own nucleus, core and periphery, are joined. In

Foley and Van valin's words,

"A nuclear juncture is a construction with a complex nucleus. It is a single unit, and all core and peripheral arguments are arguments of this complex nuclear element. In core-level junctures, two cores, each with its own nucleus and core arguments, are joined together to form a larger complex core. The peripheral arguments must be shared by both cores, as they form a single complex unit within the peripheral layer. Peripheral junctures involve the joining of two clauses with independent peripheries. Differences within the juncts are permitted at the level of juncture and below, but everything above it must be shared by both juncts." (Foley and Van Valin 1984:188. Emphasis added).

In defining and elaborating the concept of juncture, Foley and Van Valin use words like 'two' and 'both' again and again. They seem to have in mind (and give examples of) junctures of two elements only. But there is no reason why more than two elements should not be thus joined. A juncture of three or more elements (found in Punjabi) surely does not go against the spirit of their theory.

(b) Nexus

Nexus refers to the nature of the syntactic linkage between the two clauses. Two types of nexus - coordination and subordination - are too well known to need any elaborate

explanation here. A third type of nexus - co-subordination - is also proposed and elaborately explained by Foley and Van Valin. In this type of nexus, the joined clauses are neither wholly independent (as in coordination) nor is one of them dependent on, or ~~is~~ embedded within, the other (as in subordination).

Nexus and juncture are independent of each other, and, theoretically, any type of nexus is possible with any type of juncture at any level. The three types of juncture and the three types of nexus give nine juncture-nexus combinations. While the occurrence or non-occurrence of all these combinations in Punjabi and other languages is of considerable theoretical interest, we shall be concerned in this study largely with the co-subordinate nexus and with juncture at the level of the nucleus and the core only. The Punjabi verb sequences (especially the serial verbs) involve junctures at these two levels only. The individual members in the sequence are generally co-subordinated. They depend on one another because they share arguments. Cases involving subordination (or embedding) are less common.

Serial verbs, according to Foley and Van Valin, are of two types:

(a) nuclear layer junctures

(b) core layer junctures

Following Schachter (1979), they argue against the derivation of these verbs from underlying structures consisting of conjoined clauses.

"In these languages the nucleus is actually related to a single logical structure, albeit derived, rather than two logical structures linked together by juncture."
(Foley and Van Valin 1984:202)


They observe, as we did while discussing the meaning of the Punjabi auxiliary verbs like de "give", sutt "throw" etc., that similar verbs in the languages they discuss

"are not simply meaningless auxiliaries added to introduce a second core argument. Rather they contribute their own meaning to that of the whole nucleus." (id. 204).

7.4 An analysis of some verb sequences in Punjabi

Although many alternative interpretations of the Punjabi verb sequences, especially the serial verb constructions, are possible, we think that an analysis in terms of juncture and nexus is the most revealing one. Let us consider some typical Punjabi constructions.

(22)



"A letter was written."

The following points in this analysis are worth noting:


(i) lik^hia "written" (Phase IB, Perfect Participle) is bivalent with the valency set <A,U>, with the non-definite U as the PQr.

(ii) gia "gone" (Phase IA, Perfect Participle) is monovalent with the single argument A as the PQr.

The interesting thing about the verb sequence is that the valency of the sequence is controlled by the valency of the second member. The A of lik^hia, though lying within the valency set of the phase as an obligatory complement, does not appear in the sentence. We call such an A a syntactically backgrounded argument (as compared with the lexically backgrounded argument or the optional complement implied by the meaning of the phase itself, e.g., the Actor implied by a subtractive phase). If this otherwise obligatory argument is to be mentioned at all in (22), it is marked by the postposition tō "from", and not with ne. If the simple nucleus consisted of lik^hia only, the A of this verb would be obligatory. (22) is a typical instance of passivization in Punjabi. We shall discuss passivization in detail in the next chapter. While the second member controls the valency of the complex nucleus as a whole, all the core arguments of the construction (one in this case) are shared by both the verbs. All the finite verbs in the sequence must have the same PQr. This is a nuclear juncture and co-subordinate nexus in Foley and Van Valin's terminology.

But junctures at the level of the core are also found in Punjabi. In such cases, all the core arguments are not

shared by all the members in the sequence. An example is



"The teacher went and wrote a letter."


"Having gone, the teacher wrote a letter."

The first verb, ja "having gone", is monovalent and the second likh'ia "written" is bivalent. But the valency set of each verb is fully represented and no argument is backgrounded. The A of the first verb is the A of the second too. But the juncture cannot be called coordination with a coreferential deletion of the A of the second member. The first verb assumes a non-finite (Conj Par) form, so that the linking of the two verbs is tighter than in coordination. But there is no embedding either. The juncture clearly takes place at the level of the core because all the arguments are not shared. Case-marking is controlled by the transitivity and valency of the second verb (bivalent Phase IB, Perfect Participle). The first member, being in a non-finite form, has no PQR. The second verb has a PQR perfectly in accordance with its valency and transitivity.

But what should the nature of the juncture be if both the verbs in (23) were monovalent as in (24) below?


- (24) munji s̃ gɪa
 teacher having gone
 "The teacher went to sleep."

Consistency demands that (23) should be analysed on the pattern of (22), although the single argument is shared by both the verbs. Its analysis should be



There is no reason why more than two juncts should not be joined, though Foley and Van Valin do not seem to have explicitly considered this possibility (or perhaps such complications are not found in the languages they analyse). In (25) below, there is a juncture of three nuclei:

(25)




"The clothes got washed."

The first member of the complex nucleus is bivalent (with the valency set $\langle A, U \rangle$), and the second and the third members are both monovalent. Under the influence of the second verb, the A of the first verb gets syntactically backgrounded. The single argument is shared by all the members. This argument is the U of the first member and A of the second and the third members. Since the first two members are in the non-finite (Conjunctive Participle) form, only the third member has a PQr, which is the single argument of the complex nucleus. Because of the backgrounding of the A of one of the members (the principal verb) the construction has a passive meaning.

There can be more than two juncts at the level of the core as well, as in (26) below:


(26)



"Grandmother used to tell us stories."

We have already met this sentence in Chapter VI. The first verb in the verb sequence is trivalent (Phase IIC, Imperfect Participle). All the three arguments are present, and none of them is backgrounded, although both of the following verbs are monovalent. (We provisionally assume here that the copula used in the sentence is monovalent, although we have not attempted any detailed study of the syntactic behaviour of the copula). The A of the first verb is shared by all the members and is the PQr of all the three verbs. Here we make an interesting observation that in a Punjabi sentence with an "unmarked" word order as in (26), the PQr of an earlier-occurring verb is the PQr of all the later-occurring verbs if the nexus is of co-subordinate type, i.e., without embedding. If this is not the case, we can be sure that some sort of embedding is involved.

With a complex core, there can be juncture both at the level of the nucleus and the core. This is exemplified by (27).



"The clothes used to have got washed."

We have already discussed the sequence [tò ≡ fɔ ≡ gæ] as a complex nucleus in (25) above. In (27), this sequence could be replaced by a single verb in a finite participial form, which would give us a structure similar to that of (26), where we have regarded the singular equivalent of [funde] = [sən] as a juncture at the level of the core. Although both funde and sən share an argument (each can have only one) with the earlier verbs, just sharing of arguments is not enough, as we have seen in the case of (25). Sharing of argument(s) is a necessary but not a sufficient condition

for the juncture at the nuclear level.


But all the junctures at the level of the core in Punjabi are not of co-subordinate type. There can be embedding (and thus subordination) as well. A very simple example is

- (28) ó ne (ji pàr ke) fàss līa
 he -agt (having filled having laughed taken
 his mind)

"He laughed to his heart's content."

For the sake of simplicity, we ignore the adverbial clause within the brackets. The first member fàss of the nucleus of the main clause is monovalent and the second member līa is bivalent. The case is the exact opposite of the one in (22) above. It is the second member in (28) that controls case-marking of the argument shared by the two verbs. "He" is the A of both the verbs. But where is the U of the bivalent second member līa "taken"? If it is backgrounded, it should be readily understood, at least as something indefinite or unknown. But this certainly is not the case, as any native speaker can testify. Actually, Punjabi does not allow the backgrounding (which is different from contextual omission) of the U in this way. The only possibility is that the U of līa is the verbal action (bhāva) of fàss. In Punjabi (and Sanskrit), a verb that indicates perfective aspect and does not agree with any nominal expresses the verbal action itself. So the analysis of (28) should be (28').


(28')



fàss is also the PQr of līa. Perfectly in accordance with the rules of the Punjabi grammar, the bivalent verb in the Perfect Participle form in (28') has a non-definite U as its PQr and the A is marked with ne. fàss can also be replaced in (28) by a nominal, e.g., ■Δza "enjoyment" or any other semantically compatible non-definite noun.

A more complex example of embedding at the level of the core is found in (29)

(29)



"Akbar used to play chess."


The first verb is bivalent and in the Perfect Participle form. But, significantly, neither is its A marked with ne nor does it agree with its U, which is perfectly non-definite. This is at variance with the general rule for a single-verb nucleus in Punjabi. The second verb, which is in the Imperfect participle form, agrees with its A, as is the rule. But where is the second argument (the U) of this bivalent verb? The case is similar to that of (28'). It is the action of the first verb (which is in the Perfect Participle form and does not agree with any nominal and thus has no PQr) that is the U of the second verb. As usual in Punjabi, the PQr of the second verb is the PQr of the third verb too.

Last of all, let us examine, in the light of the theory of juncture, the syntactic behaviour of the Punjabi explicator auxiliary cuk, which is glossed as "lift/carry" by Bahl (1964:55. Cf. Chapter VI). Punjabi grammarians have believed that all the explicator verbs except sək "be able to" also function as ordinary verbs in Punjabi. We have argued that when these verbs function as auxiliaries, their original meaning is not completely lost. Their syntactic behaviour (valency, case-marking of A, U etc.) is always the same in both the roles. The auxiliary indicating the completion of an action or event, is believed by Punjabi grammarians to be the ordinary verb cuk "lift" used as an auxiliary. But in order to accept this claim, we have stretch our metaphoric imagination much more than we have to do in the case of other explicator auxiliaries. The claim is

not impossible, but it is worth examining. The ordinary verb cuk is bivalent, as in

- (30) kuṛiã ne pàr cukkia
 girls -Agt weight lifted lifted
 "The girls lifted the weight."

But the auxiliary cuk does not behave as a bivalent verb in (31) below.



"The girls had finished drinking tea."

The verb cukiã is in the Perfect Participle form. If it were bivalent, it would either agree with the U cá "tea" or be in zero agreement (and in the neuter form). But in (31), this verb clearly agrees with kuṛiã "girls" (feminine plural) in number and gender. If a verb in the Perfect Participle form agrees with the A, it must be monovalent, and not bivalent. The presence of the copula does not affect all this because the sentence is perfectly possible without it (with a difference in meaning, of course). Moreover, the verbal action expressed by pi "having drunk" cannot be the U of cukiã, because in that case cukiã should be in the neuter (and not feminine plural) form. This shows that the explicator auxiliary cuk is monovalent. Therefore, it is

unrelated to the ordinary verb cuk "lift". Since the explicator auxiliary cuk indicates the cessation of an activity, it is possible that it comes from some Reduplicative Perfect form of the Sanskrit verb kr "do". The Reduplicated Perfect form cakre (with the "middle ending") had a participle form cakravant. The Punjabi auxiliary comes probably from this participle form. The girls in (32) are represented as having completed the work they started doing.

7.5 Operators and verb sequences

Some observations about the morphological marking of the verbal categories like tense, aspect, modality and status in a verb sequence in Punjabi are worth making here. We have already defined tense, aspect and modality in Chapter V. Status, as a verbal category, relates to the distinction between the realis and the irrealis. According to Foley and Van Valin, aspect is an operator at the level of the nucleus, modality at the level of the core, and tense and status at the level of the periphery. Every outer operator has within its scope the inner ones. We need not discuss these operators in any detail here. But as far as the Punjabi verb forms are concerned, they can be classified as vehicles for these operators as [+aspect], [+tense], [+status] and [+modality], as follows:

(i) [+aspect]. The four participles, which describe the action as completed, ongoing, iterative etc.

(ii) [+tense]. The past tense form of the copula.

(iii) [+modality]. The Unmarked Form, in spite of its origin from a [+tense] form of Sanskrit, this form in Punjabi is [-tense]. It represents an action as simply happening and very often, but not always, as potentially happening. With the addition of the status-denoting particle -ga, this potentially is turned into a real potentiality. Many linguists have called this agglutinated form the "future tense" form of Punjabi.

(iv) [+status]. The auxiliary particle -ga, as we have said above, is the marker of status in Punjabi.

Most interestingly for our purpose, the order of the operator-bearing verb forms in a Punjabi sentence with the "unmarked" word order is exactly as predicted by Foley and Van Valin's theory. The [+aspect] forms invariably come first, and are thus "innermost". Then come the [+modality] form, followed, in this order, by [+status] and [+tense] forms. Most often, we do not find a [+status] and a [+tense] form within the same sequence. As we have said, -ga generally creates a meaning equivalent to the meaning of the future tense form. When -ga is added to the [-tense] hi form of the copula, it can be followed by the [+tense] form. There is only one agglutinated form si+ga (si+ga) in Punjabi in which a [+status] form follows a [+tense] form. Since, according to Foley and Van Valin, operators can be inner and outer, as shown below,

$$\left[\left[\left[\text{aspect} \right] \text{modality} \right] \text{status} \right] \text{tense}$$

the order of the operator-bearing forms in Punjabi is, with the single and minor exception of sga, is what their theory predicts. In many other languages, however, slightly different orders of these operators can be observed (cf. Bybee 1985: Chapter 10)

7.6 Concluding remarks

As we have said repeatedly in the preceding chapters, the number of all the possible combinations of the verb forms in Punjabi has never been determined. Verb combinations more complex than the ones we have discussed and with more complicated dependency networks and multiple layer embeddings are definitely there in Punjabi. We have attempted in this chapter to give a brief introduction to the challenging mammoth task of analysing these combinations. But we have done enough to establish a theoretical framework which should enable us to handle the phenomena of ("split") ergativity and passive constructions in the following chapters.

CHAPTER VIII

"PASSIVE" CONSTRUCTIONS IN PUNJABI

Some day probably the arguments about the supposed universal nature of terms active, passive, subject and object will seem as fruitless as trying to decide the number of angels that can stand on the head of a pin. The latter words will never be defined satisfactorily in universal terms."

- W.R.Schmalstieg (1980:167)

8.1 "Passive voice" as a formal universal

Only a few years after Schmalstieg wrote, one feels that he need not have used the adverb "some day". If coming events cast their shadows before, the demise of these four and many other formal universals (to be described below) is certain within a few years. In the next chapter, we shall see what is happening to subject and object. The formal universal category passive that is parasitic on these categories will become redundant. While subject is the subject of the next chapter, something must be said here about a formal universal.

In his classic 1976 paper, Keenan attempted to define the nebulous notion of subject. He suggested about thirty odd properties that subjects in various languages tend to have. Subject in language A may have sixteen and subject in language B may have just one. Thus there are degrees of subjecthood. Even in one language, the subject of the construction X may be more subjecty than the subject in construction Y.

Predictably, such a definition of subject was objected to by many formalists (e.g., Johnson 1977, Pullum 1980). In defending his variety of Relational Grammar, Johnson suggested that subject be taken as an undefined primitive theoretical term. Pullum said that the meaning of subject and object is simply the role they play in a theory that defines (in principle) empirically testable grammars. (Pullum 1980). That this cure is as bad as, or perhaps worse

than, the disease will be discussed in the next chapter. Our view is the same as Schmalstieg's quoted above - that the grammatical category subject is either useless or language-specific, where it can be defined in terms of the syntactic relationships found within the language. But we would add that it applies only to the formal notion of subject (and to the formal notion of passive as well).

A formal notion or category, in our sense, is a binary feature or notion like the feature [aspirate] in Generative Phonology. An NP in Relational Grammar has to be either a subject or a non-subject. Let us say that it is either [+subject] or [-subject], and not more-or-less a subject, just as in Generative Phonology, a consonant has to be either [+aspirate] or [-aspirate]. Degrees of aspiration, which every linguist can hear, are "low-level phonetic phenomena", and "higher-level phonological rules" must not deal with them unless degrees of aspiration are phonologically significant or functional (i.e., phonemic).

Now it is well known that aspiration is non-phonemic in English and phonemic in Hindi, Punjabi and many other Indian languages. The mere fact that the English /p/, /t/ and /k/ are aspirated in many positions and sound like the Punjabi /p^h/, /t^h/ and /k^h/ does not warrant the setting up of the phonological feature [aspirate] for English. The language-specific phonological rules simply do not require it. The same can be said about the formal syntactic feature [subject] or [passive]. The mere fact that an NP in a Punjabi sentence seems to be working like its translational

equivalent in English does not license a grammarian to assign the feature [+subject] to the Punjabi NP. Yet it is precisely this practice that has been going on for nearly two centuries. In language-specific studies, it is perfectly legitimate to start with formal categories like subject and passive. But at the same time, we must have Occam's razor ready to shave them off, in the interests of economy, if they prove to be superfluous. It is equally legitimate, on the other hand, to start without them, retaining them in the tool kit, however, for need may arise for them. The fact that a formal category [subject] or [passive] is (or appears to be) necessary for some languages does not license linguists to fit, by violence and mutilation, all other languages into the mould of these languages for the purpose of cross-linguistic studies.

Continuing our analogy of aspiration, aspiration in language A may not be exactly the same thing as aspiration in language B, though it may be functional or phonemic in both. Physiologically, aspiration can be produced in various ways, e.g., by more energetic lung activity, more open glottis, longer hold phase of the consonant, etc. These processes may work in isolation or in combinations of two or three or more. Each of these processes, alone or in combination, may be involved in the production of other phonological features such as stress, voice, tone etc. Interaction of aspiration with voice, tone, stress and various articulatory gestures may be significant in diachronic and synchronic phonological processes. (Cf. Bhardwaj 1980). Aspiration in different languages may figure

differently in these processes. Even within a single language, there may be different types of aspiration. Sanskrit, Hindi, and many other Indian languages (but not Punjabi) have voiced and voiceless aspirations which are produced differently. Only the voiced aspiration historically resulted in the modern Punjabi tones (Bhardwaj 1980). Taking aspiration as an undefined primitive may answer the "how" question in the following way:

$$\left[\begin{array}{l} +\text{voice} \\ +\text{aspirate} \end{array} \right] \longrightarrow [+ \text{tone}]$$

But many linguists are incurably addicted to asking "why" questions, and "how" answers are no answers to "why" questions. Outlawing the "why" questions, as some American Structuralists did, will not do. Taking the feature [aspirate] as an undefined primitive may have a limited validity and usefulness in some areas and at certain levels of phonological analysis. It may be useful for the phonological analysis of a few languages. But in a phonological theory with universal ambitions and pretensions, this move will be suicidal. The brute fact that there can be, and are, different types and degrees of aspiration, and that these differences are phonologically significant in some languages, cannot be winked at by any responsible theoretician. If such a notion of aspiration cannot be formalized or cannot serve as a term in a formal theory, so much the worse for such a theory.

We have spent so much time on aspiration because phonological facts are always more concrete, immediate and impersonal and serve better in arguments. The analogy of aspiration with the syntactic categories like passive, ergativity,, subject, object, etc. is clear. Like aspiration, subject (or any other syntactic category) is not a discrete, single and unified category, cross-linguistically and often even within a single language. (See next chapter). Keenan is right. Studies have shown that even passive, ergativity, and many other syntactic categories are similar to the subject. A recent cross-linguistic study of the passive says on its page 1:

"The analysis of the various constructions referred to in the literature as passive leads to the conclusion that there is not even one single property which all these constructions have in common." (Siewierska 1984).

This reminds one of Wittgenstein's famous observation that there is not even a single feature shared by all the activities which are known as "games". The last sentence in Siewierska's book is

"Languages are not uniform and do not lend themselves to uniform analyses."

Gone are the days when linguists could comfortably and naively set up the feature [+passive] or, which amounts to

the same thing, "be+V^{en}" or (in the case of Hindi or Punjabi, "perfect participle + ja" in the "deep structure" and then, with the help of an ad hoc machinery of transformations, could derive the actually occurring "surface structure". Some modern transformational avatars are still doing essentially the same thing today by setting up different types of "subjects" at different "levels". But many self-respecting linguists have tasted the fruit of knowledge of the structure of different languages and have walked out of the paradise of naive formalistic universals.

Although notions like subject, object, passive, ergativity etc. are not discrete, yet in spite of what Sierwierska says about the passive, these notions are not useless. Nobody would argue that we should give up the notion of game because, as Wittgenstein (1953) says, there is not even a single feature shared by all the games. Wittgenstein himself would retain the concept of game, saying that there are "family resemblances" among these activities. Sierwierska mentions more than 200 languages in the index of languages in her book. Now the burden of proof lies with the proponents of the passive as a formal universal to show that all the passive structures in all these languages share features which can be used for defining the passive as a well-defined category. The argument that features are shared "at an abstract level" or that we should take the passive as an undefined primitive would simply be lame excuses to run away from the problem of the cross-linguistic diversity in order to stick to this formal category.

8.2 The "family resemblances" view of the passive

Punjabi is missing from Siewierska's book, where Hindi figures prominently, however. As we have pointed out earlier, Punjabi and Hindi are very similar languages. But the structures which have traditionally been described as passive are more numerous in Punjabi than in the "standard" variety of Hindi. Linguists working on Hindi generally tend to ignore the structures which will not fit into their chosen frameworks. They appear to be interested more in upholding their theories than in describing and analysing the language. Hindi does share many passive structures with Punjabi (i.e., the structures which are very often phonologically translatable). We shall consider only these structures, and not their past analyses, here.

Ignoring troublesome data is a natural human weakness. Therefore, to be on our guard, we take up the most comprehensive list prepared by Ram Singh (1924). Ram Singh, who taught English and Punjabi in Khalsa College, Amritsar, Punjab, intended to write a pedagogical grammar. But he was too refined a linguist to be constrained by his immediate purpose. The fact that he taught both English and Punjabi is significant. It can be suspected that he designated some of these structures as passives only because their English translation would be in passive voice. This in itself is interesting. There must be some functional similarities between these "passive" structures and the English passives. In other words, they must be functionally equivalent in at

least some contexts. Like many linguists of today, Ram Singh faced the problem of deciding whether he should select the passive structures on formal or on notional/functional grounds. He found some structures which were "formally passive but notionally active." (Now we call them "ergative", but the term was not available to him, although his knowledge of traditional comparative philology was quite good). He finally decided to prefer notional criteria (pp. 273- 274) and not to regard such structures as passive. He did not explicitly define or describe his notional criteria. Presumably, he followed what modern linguists call "native speaker's intuitions" and the testimony of English translation. But he says briefly that "Voice is a transformation (rūpāntar) of verbs which indicate whether something is said about the agent (kartā) or the patient (karam) or about the mere action (bhāv) denoted by the verb." (id. 269). He clearly distinguishes voice (vāc) from verb-agreement (prayog), which can be of three types - agreement with the agent (kartrī prayog), agreement with the patient (karmanī prayog), and "agreement with the verbal action" (bhāve prayog) which we have called zero agreement. While the agreement with the agent is found in the active voice only, and agreement with the patient is found both in the active and the passive voice, the third type of agreement is found in all the three voices. The three voices, according to Ram Singh are active voice (kartrī vāc), passive voice (karmanī vāc) and impersonal voice (bhāv vāc). (The English translation of Ram Singh's Punjabi terms

is ours).

In this chapter, we do not wish to present a detailed analysis of the Punjabi "passive" structures (which would require a full length detailed study). Our aim is far more modest. We wish to see how our theoretical framework handles them and which of their notional "passive" features that have intuitively been felt (by others) to exist can be captured by the framework which was partly independently motivated, i.e., designed to deal not simply with the passive structures but with some other structures as well.

"Passive" structures may have a thousand and one different functions in the languages of the world and a hundred and one in Punjabi. They cannot all be mentioned, let alone discussed, here. But most of these functions can be grouped into three clines or macrofunctions or functional domains (Givón 1981). On these domains, according to Givón, "a number of more-or-less distinct points may be plotted along a functional continuum." These domains are:

- (a) Clausal topic assignment: "The subject/agent of the active clause ceases to be the topic, and a non-agent argument of the active then assumes, by whatever means, the clausal topic function."
- (b) Impersonalization: "The identity of the subject/agent is suppressed by whatever means."
- (c) De-transitivization: "The clause becomes semantically less-active, less-transitive, more-stative."

Givón also gives the major syntactic properties involved , cross-linguistically, in the structural characterization of the various passive types. These major syntactic properties are:

- (a) "The degree to which the new (non-agent) topic of the passive clause assumes the characteristic case-marking properties of the subject/agent of the active clause."
- (b) "The degree to which the identity of the subject/agent of the active clause is suppressed in the passive clause."
- (c) "The degree to which the passive clause retains the semantic and syntactic characteristics of 'activeness' or 'transitivity'."
- (d) "The degree to which the various non-subject/agent arguments of the active clause can become the topic/subject of the passive clause." (id. 168).

Givón's words might suggest a derivational relation between the active and the passive sentences - the latter being transformationally derived from, or at least more marked and less basic than, the former. But this need not be the case. The passive sentence and a corresponding active sentence (if any) may have the same ideational or truth-conditional meaning. But they are hardly ever the same functionally (as Givón and many other linguists, including Sanskrit grammarians, have argued).

8.3 The "prototypical" view of the passive

A more recent view of the function of the passive has been proposed by Shibatani (1985). Shibatani explicitly states that his view is different from Givón's mentioned above. According to Shibatani, "agent-defocusing" is the primary and prototypical function of the passive. This implies that all other functions mentioned by Givón and others are secondary.

"...the defocusing of an agent in the passive is not merely a consequence of an object promotion or of topicalization, but rather is the basic and primary function of the passive construction. This view accounts for the occurrence of passive in many non-typical circumstances." (id. 833-834).

Shibatani characterizes the "passive prototype" in the following way:

- (a) Primary pragmatic function: Defocusing of agent.
- (b) Semantic properties:
 - (i) Semantic valence: Predicate (agent, patient).
 - (ii) Subject is affected.
- (c) Syntactic properties:
 - (i) Syntactic encoding: agent \rightarrow 0 (not encoded).
patient \rightarrow subject
 - (ii) Valence of P[predicate]: Active = P/n;
Passive = P/n - 1.

(d) Morphological property:

Active = P;

Passive = P[+Passive].

We need not make a choice here between the "family resemblances" view (a term which Givón does not use) and the "prototypical" view. As far as Punjabi is concerned, Shibatani's view does seem correct. We remarked in an earlier chapter that grammarians have smelt "passive" almost everywhere in the Punjabi and Hindi grammar. On analysis, it invariably turns out that in all these constructions, the agent seems to be defocused, in one way or the other, whatever other "passive" features may accompany this. But it should be added here that Siewierska's observation is by no means refuted by Shibatani, who commits the standard "inductivist fallacy" discussed by philosophers from Hume to Popper. On the basis of data from a few languages, one cannot assert (the way Shibatani does) that agent-defocusing is the prototypical function of the passive in all the languages. Siewierska's language sample is much larger and analysis more detailed than Shibatani's. Moreover, Shibatani's view is not as different from Givón's as he claims. Givón does recognize the suppression of the identity of the agent as one of the functions of the passive. His stand is definitely less dogmatic and more sensible to adopt, considering the fact that we still know so little about a majority of the world languages. We shall not discuss these theoretical positions any more, and simply observe that we can profit from both of them.

8.4 "Attention flow" and "viewpoint"

The most fundamental assumption of this study, as we point out again and again, is that a sentence is a form-meaning complex, whose form "has" meaning only in the sense that I "have" a body. We are concerned with formal meaning and meaningful form - the two being just two perspectives on the same phenomena. Moreover, we view the syntactic level as the symbolical level of language. So, for us, there are no "merely morphological" facts. The fact that two of the postpositions which the core arguments take in Punjabi - nũ "to" and tõ "from" - are spatial postpositions, and that the agent of the action in a passive construction mostly takes tõ, so that it is symbolically represented not as a performer but a source of the action, is significant for us. This may contribute significantly to the meaning of a passive sentence. According to those linguists who believe that languages (including their syntax) are thoroughly symbolical and metaphorical (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Langacker 1976, 1982, DeLancey 1981), spatial symbolism in grammar is of utmost significance. This basic assumption underlies DeLancey's theory of split ergativity (1981, 1982), which deals with aspect and voice too. His views are relevant not only for an analysis of the variety of ergativity found in Punjabi (to be dealt with in the next chapter) but also for an analysis of the Punjabi passive. (The two cannot be neatly differentiated, ultimately). So it is appropriate to consider his theory in this chapter.

8.4.1 DeLancey's theory of split ergativity

DeLancey mentions three split ergativity patterns:

(a) The EH-pattern. Some participants in the action or situation represented by the sentence are (morphologically) treated differently from some other participants. These participants are higher on the Empathy Hierarchy (EH), which is

1st per > 2nd per > 3rd per > non-human animates >
inanimates

1st person and 2nd person are called Speech Act Participants or SAPs.

"...there is a cut-off point somewhere along the EH; agents which rank above that point are not marked for case, while those below it are marked for ergative case." (DeLancey 1981:628).

This Empathy Hierarchy is very similar to Silverstein's (1976). This split does not seem to occur in Punjabi, but we should not rule out the possibility.

(b) The aspectual split. Ergative morphology is associated with perfective aspect or past tense, and accusative morphology is associated with imperfective aspect or with present or future tense.

(c) The active/stative split. An NP is marked like the intransitive subject in some constructions but differently

in others. According to DeLancey, this split is found in "active"-type languages, and is misleadingly called split ergativity. Punjabi is not usually regarded as an "active"-type language, but there are some constructions (a microscopic minority, it must be admitted) where the split very similar to this does seem to occur. Sentences (17a) and (17b) in Chapter VII are examples of this type of split. More examples are given in the next chapter.

In this study, we are concerned mostly with the "aspectual split" (related, ultimately, to transitivity, cf. Hopper and Thompson 1980) because the sentential semantics (some will call it pragmatics) responsible for the "aspectual split" in ergativity operates more vigorously in the passive constructions. Those who claim that the ergative constructions of the Modern Indic languages are derived from the "passive" constructions of Sanskrit may be wrong historically (as we shall see), but they have certainly grasped an important truth which can be stated, very inelegantly, as: Punjabi ergativity is diluted passive, and Punjabi passive is concentrated ergativity.

Even those who do not accept the "localist" theory of case admit that spatial metaphor and spatial symbolization are clearly recognizable in the case-marking systems of various languages. According to DeLancey, two psychological primes - Attention Flow (AF) and Viewpoint - are important here:

(a) Attention Flow (AF) determines the order of NPs.

"The NPs in a sentence are presented in the order in which the speaker wishes the hearer to attend to them. Alternate NP orderings, as found in voice alternations and topicalizing shifts, are mechanisms for managing AF." (DeLancey 1981:632).

The unmarked (or the most natural) AF is

Source	-->	Goal
Agent	-->	Patient
Onset	-->	Termination (DeLancey 1982:172).

If no moving entity is involved, as in events of perception, the most salient object, typically the animate perceiver, is selected over the perceived as the natural starting point.

(b) Viewpoint. An event can be described from various points of view, e.g., the external viewpoint or from the points of view of the participants in the situation - agent or patient or others. According to DeLancey, the marked or unnatural AF in many languages is motivated by viewpoint, whether the situation is described from the point of view of the commencement of the activity or of the termination of the activity. The leftmost position is the property of the starting point of the linguistic AF. Nominative/absolute case and verb agreement in many languages is the property of the viewpoint NP.

"If there are languages in which viewpoint and starting point need not coincide, we would expect that these three 'subject' properties might be distributed between two different NPs." (DeLancey 1981:639).

DeLancey applies his theory of AF and Viewpoint to the structures where the performer of the action can be more agentive or less agentive. The performer is more agentive when he does something intentionally and is less agentive when he does it inadvertently, more agentive when his action is under his control (e.g., drinking tea) than when the action is not under his control (e.g., feeling cold). Some languages, including Punjabi, mark the more agentive and the less agentive Actors differently in some constructions. When the performer of an action does something inadvertently, he is aware only of the termination of the action, but in the case of a deliberate act, all the phases from the commencement to the termination are there in the consciousness of the performer. While the natural viewpoint is the commencement of the action, an inadvertent action in many languages is viewed from the point of termination. The so-called "dative subject" in many languages is the performer whose action is involuntary and beyond his control, e.g.,

(1) tũẽ vɪc ɾam nũ kʰáŋg ai
 smoke -in Ram -to cough come

"Ram coughed (involuntarily) in the smoke."

Compare it with

(2) kuṛi nũ vek^h ke ram kh'āṅgia
 girl -to having seen Ram coughed

"On seeing the girl; Ram coughed (to attract her attention)."

We shall deal with the "dative subject" in the next chapter. But how AF and Viewpoint are involved in such sentences is relevant to the analysis of the Punjabi "passive" structures as well.

8.5 Ram Singh's "passive" structures

In his grammar of Punjabi (1924), Ram Singh mentions some "passive" structures without claiming that these are the only ones found in Punjabi. Of course, there are in this list structures whose "passive" status can be disputed, and there are other structures not included in the list for which this status can be claimed. But we are not interested in strictly defining the passive, language-specifically or universally (The latter would amount to either imposing an arbitrary formula on all languages or to a Quixotic venture). Our chief concern here is knowing why these structures have been called "passive" (on whatever grounds) by others. The structures given below are not in the same order as in Ram Singh's grammar. Some of the examples given by Ram Singh have been replaced or simplified, and new examples have been added.

STRUCTURE IPerfect Participle + ja

(3) k^hΛt lɪk^hɪɑ giɑ

letter written gone.

"A letter was written."

(4) (?) k^hΛt nũ lɪk^hɪɑ giɑ

letter -to written gone

"The letter was written."

(5) k^hΛt nũ dobara lɪk^hɪɑ giɑ

letter -to again written gone

"The letter was written again."


(6) mɛt^hõ / mere kolõ k^hΛt lɪk^hɪɑ giɑ

me-from my near -from letter written gone

"A letter was written by me."

(Very bad translation)

We have already analysed (3) in Chapter VII as:



We observed there that

(i) $l\dot{a}k^{h}ia$ "written" (Phase IB, Perfect Participle) is bivalent with the valency set $\langle A, U \rangle$, with the non-definite U as the PQr.

(ii) $g\dot{a}$ "gone" (Phase IA, Perfect Participle) is monovalent with the single argument A as the PQr.

It must be added here that it is most unnatural in natural usage (as opposed to examples in grammars) to mention the performer of the action in such sentences, unless some special meaning is intended. (6), for example, suggests that the action was not fully under the control of the writer. (Perhaps he was emotionally excited or drunk or drugged).

Now let us see what light DeLancey's theory sheds on the phenomena. Both the verbs in the complex nucleus agree with the the U of the main verb. This shows that the action is presented from the viewpoint of the U or the terminal point of the action. The A or the source of the action is syntactically backgrounded (cf. Chapter VII) and is usually not mentioned unless there are special reasons for doing so. The special reason for mentioning the A of the main verb in (6), is to show that the action, though performed by him, was not under his conscious control. Perhaps he became aware of it (if at all) only after the completion of the action. So he is not a fully agentive Actor: he is just a source of the action that proceeded from him and whose terminal point is the letter.

The "passive auxiliary" $g\dot{a}$ "gone" (root form $j\dot{a}$) needs

a little explanation. As we have seen, it is not just a passive auxiliary but an explicator auxiliary verb like many others in the language. It is only in combination with a Perfect Participle form of a transitive verb that it plays its "passive auxiliary" role. It is important that its A is, technically at least, the U of the main verb. ja has not completely lost its original meaning. Even now it symbolically represents the movement of the action (regarded as symbolically completed) and of the result of the action from the A to the U of the main verb. The purely syntactic function (assuming that there is such a function) of ja is to help push the A of the main verb out of the valency set of the complex nucleus. As we saw in Chapter VII, the valency of the complex nucleus is controlled by the last member (other than the copula). In these examples, ja is monovalent and lik^h is bivalent. The only argument shared by the two verbs is k^hat "letter", which is the U of lik^h and the A of ja. So the A of lik^h, the person who wrote the letter, is syntactically pushed out of the valency set of the complex nucleus. Agent-defocusing in Shibatani's sense is achieved in this way.

Natural languages being what they are, it would be surprising if ja were playing only this, and no other, role in the sentence. The very fact that it agrees with the U of the main verb and that that U is the A of ja, makes that NP prominent in the sentence. It becomes the centre of attention, the NP which the speaker empathizes with, the NP from whose perspective the situation is described, etc. It

is difficult to say whether the primary purpose of the sentence is agent-defocusing and patient-focusing results from that or that the reverse is true.

There can, however, be "passive sentences" with zero agreement, where the verb does not agree with any NP and is in the neuter form. In (5), the U of the main verb is marked with nũ "to" and the verb is in the neuter form. As we saw in the last chapter, a definite U is marked in this way in Punjabi. The action is described here not from the viewpoint of any NP. Rather it is the action itself that is the focus of attention. Focusing attention on the action itself and not describing it from the viewpoint of any participant goes back to Sanskrit. According to Cardona (1976:11), the Sanskrit sentence

(7) devadattenāsyate

usually translated as "Devadatta is seated" would be more literally translatable as "Sitting as performed by Devadatta is taking place." Similarly, we suggest that while the English translation given under (5) is all right because of the definite article, the translation which is true to the spirit of the Punjabi sentence would be "The writing of the letter took place again." (4) is considerably less likely to occur in natural speech and writing. The letter comes into existence as a result of the process of writing (unless it is viewed as fully conceived in mind or first recorded in the spoken form on a tape). It is more commonly an effected

patient than an affected patient. So the letter in (4) is less referential. It is, therefore, odd to describe the letter as definite. In (5), the (badly or illegibly written) letter, which is now definite, is represented as being written again. This letter is referential and its existence is taken for granted. The speaker is emphasizing the action of writing again. Symbolically, the letter is the target at which the action is aimed.

Ram Singh points out that passive sentences like (8) convey a sense of "subtle arrogance" (sūkham hankār).

- (8) kēdi nū peḥ kita jāve
 prisoner -to present done to go
 "Let the prisoner be brought."

The authoritarian tone or "subtle arrogance" is expressed mainly by the brusque intonation, but the form of the sentence harmonizes perfectly with the intonation. The speaker in (8) does not give a direct order by using the Imperative form. The whole action is described from the viewpoint of the activity itself. He is a person in authority and is interested in the action itself. He does not bother about who does the job. And why should he attach any significance to the definite ("given") wretch by "empathizing" with him? It should be pointed out, however, that the mere fact that a situation is described from the viewpoint of the activity itself, as in (7), is not enough to convey a sense of "subtle arrogance."

STRUCTURE IIPerfect Participle + ho/pe

ho = happen

pe = fall

(9) kh^hAt lik^hia hoia si

letter written happened was

"The letter had been written."

(10) kh^hAt lik^hia pia si

letter written fallen was

"The letter lay written."

(11) ó kh^hAt mera lik^hia hoia si

that letter my :written happened was

"That letter had been written by me."


(12) *o kh^hAt met^hõ lik^hia hoia/pia si

that letter me-from written happened/fallen was

(13) *o kh^hAt met^hõ lik^hia hoia/pia

that letter me-from written happened fallen

We analyse (9) and (10) as



This structure is syntactically very similar to (3'). But the auxiliary symbolizing the horizontal movement of the action or of its result from the source to the goal of the action (i.e., the auxiliary ja "go") is missing. The focus on the goal is rather sharp: pia "fallen" symbolizing the termination of a downward vertical movement represents the action as if resulting "out of the blue". The focus and the emphasis are on the resulting state itself, and the process preceding this state is completely out of the picture. So the performer of the action is completely out of the picture too and must not be mentioned. This accounts for the non-occurrence of (12) and (13). If the performer of the action has to be mentioned, he should be mentioned as the possessor of (the responsibility for) the state of affairs (cf. Seiler 1973), and not as the origin or source of the action, as in the unacceptable non-sentences (12) and (13).

STRUCTURE III

This structure is simply "notionally" passive in the sense that the lexical meaning of the verb is such that an agent is implied, though the verb is monovalent with a single Actor argument. Examples are

- (14) saman bájj gia hē
 luggage having got packed (?) gone is
 "The luggage has been packed."

- (15) é kītab bót vīkegi
 this book o lot will sell
 "This book will sell well."

- (16) é kappara chēti nāĩ paṭṭa
 this cloth soon not tearing
 "This cloth will wear well."

In Chapter III, we classified the verb phases used in these sentences as monovalent. There is no trace of any "passive morphology" or "passive syntax" (of the variety found in structures I and II). In (14), the auxiliary gi "go" follows a Conjunctive Participle form, and not a Perfect Participle form, as in earlier structures. With animate, and especially human Actors, and with verbs like "laugh", "dance", "run" etc., these structures would be perfectly "active". As we have already discussed in Chapter IV, it is the lexical meanings of the verbs that give the "passive" meaning to

sentences (14)-(16). There must be someone to bind the luggage, to sell the book and to tear the cloth (by force or by wearing it down by use). The semantic valency set of these verbs is larger than their syntactic valency set. One feels that these sentences are "semantically passive". But are they? (14) may be. But (15) praises the book by imagining its own intrinsic qualities, rather than the bookseller, responsible for the sale. This is captured even by the natural English translation. (We discussed all this in detail in Chapter IV). Similarly, (16) focuses on the strength of the cloth, rather than the cautiousness of the wearer or the weakness of the tearer, as responsible for the stipulated age of the cloth. Whatever the notional or semantic "voice" of these sentences may be, they are perfectly "active", syntactically. As we pointed out in Chapter IV, some verbs used in such structures are indeed derived historically from the Sanskrit Middle or Passive forms. (Cf. Duni Chandra 1959:360-361). As we have already pointed out (in Chapter IV), most verbs in Phase A can be used to convey a somewhat "passive" meaning if the initiator or causer or inspirer of the action is mentioned as a peripheral argument marked with the postposition tõ "from". A repetition of the discussion would be unnecessary here.

STRUCTURE IVConjunctive Participle + ho(+Ja)

- (17) ʌje svetər buŋ nǎĩ hoia
 yet sweater having knitted not happened
 "The sweater has not been knitted yet."

- (18) met^hõ svetər buŋ nǎĩ hoia
 me-from sweater having knitted not happened
 "I could not knit the sweater."
 "The sweater could not be knitted by me."


- (19) (*) met^hõ svetər buŋ hoia
 me-from sweater having knitted happened

- (20) met^hõ fʌss ho gia
 me-from having laughed having happened gone
 "I could not help laughing."
 "I happened to laugh."

- (21) met^hõ fʌss nǎĩ hoia
 me-from having laughed not happened
 "I could not laugh."

- (22) galti naɭ met^hõ cá vic luŋ
 mistake -with me-from tea -in salt
 pa ho gia
 having put having happened gone
 "By mistake I put salt into tea."

Some of these sentences are "peculiar passives". The designation "peculiar passives" was given by Alice Davison (1980). But what is "peculiar" about them? We shall discuss Davison's views later on in this chapter. But let us first analyse their structure. We can analyse (17) as



This analysis is very similar to the one in (9'). The A of the bivalent main verb bun is syntactically backgrounded. So the structure is "passive" in the sense of Structure I. But many linguists will at once attack this analysis with the argument that when the Conjunctive Participle is employed with another verb in this way, both the verbs must "have the same subject." But, as we shall see in the next chapter, this is an over-hasty generalization. (18) has (in)capabilitative meaning. We have already said something about this in Chapter IV. Here we may add that the sweater, on which the attention is focussed is the A and PQr of the auxiliary "happened". Its assuming its final form through an action of

knitting, whose starting point is "I", has not taken place. (As we have observed earlier, in many Punjabi sentences the action expressed by a verb in the Conjunctive Participle form is causally related to the action expressed by the following verb). The sweater can assume its form if I can bring the action of knitting to a completion. As the sweater did not assume its final form, the sentence shows my incapability. Interestingly enough, (19), the affirmative version of (18), does not occur in Punjabi (though children sometimes use it). (19) represents a static situation and is unacceptable exactly for the reasons that (12) is. But the agent can be mentioned for special reasons (e.g., for the purpose of contrast) as strongly stressed "new" element of information, as in

- (19') é svetar "meth^hõ ði bun foida .
 this sweater me-from only having knitted happened
 (with a strong nuclear stress on meth^hõ)
 "Only I was able to knit the sweater."

(20) and (21) both express incapability. In (20) I am incapable of restraining myself from laughing and in (21) I am incapable of starting laughing. In both these sentences, the performer of the action is depicted as a source. I did not consciously and deliberately start the action of laughing in (20). Either it happened accidentally and I became consciously aware of it after the action had started or I wish to disown any responsibility for the indiscretion.

So the action is described from the viewpoint of the action of laughing itself. (The verb hass does not agree with "I"). But the first person pronoun is higher than the abstract noun "laughter" on the Empathy Hierarchy. So it is mentioned before the action of laughter for the purpose of Attention Flow. In (22), I discovered my mistake only after the action was over. So the viewpoint adopted is that of the salt, the affected entity. In (21), the action of laughing could not assume its existence because the source from which it had to proceed did not play his part.

STRUCTURE V

Passive Form (+auxiliaries)


(23) ram kuṭinda pia i
 Ram being beaten : fallen is
 "Ram is being beaten."

The Passive Form of the verb is found only in some Western dialects of Punjabi and not in the dialect being studied here. Another dialectal variant of (23) is

(23') ram kuṭijda pia i

In the Passive Form, the main verb has a long and stressed /-i-/ in the penultimate syllable. This form comes from the Sanskrit passive form with an accented passive affix -(i)y-. The analysis of the structure is

(23")



The A of the main verb is backgrounded . If it is to be mentioned at all, it has to be a peripheral argument marked with the postposition tõ "from".

STRUCTURE VI

Subtractive Phase of the verb

(24) gurdvare vic sir tʌkida fε

Sikh temple -in head being covered is

"In a Sikh temple, the head should be covered."


(25) εtʰe fʌssida nʌĩ

here to laugh not

"One should not laugh here."

We have already said a great deal about the morphological and syntactic behaviour of the subtractive phases of the Punjabi verb. We may add here that, like the Passive Form of

Structure V, the form of the subtractive phase also comes from the Sanskrit passive form but with a changed stress pattern. The agent of the action in a sentence exemplifying this structure is either eliminated (i.e., it must not be mentioned, being a sort of Everyman), or it is the first person plural "we". When eliminated, the agent is lexically backgrounded. It is implied by the meaning of the verb phase but it is not explicitly mentioned. We do not need another verb in a complex nucleus to push it out of the valency set (as in Structures I and II). The fact that the verb in such a sentence can have only the Imperfect Participle form means that action represented is an iterative one. Zero-valent verb phases are often used in such sentences. (25) is a good example. The verb either agrees with the U (even if the A is mentioned) or there is zero agreement (if the U is missing or is definite). We can analyse (24) as



This analysis clearly brings out the typical "passive" character of the sentence: agent-elimination (not simple defocusing) and patient-focusing by making it the PQr of the copula/auxiliary.

There is nothing particularly interesting about the rest of the "passive" structures mentioned by Ram Singh. So we shall have a cursory look at them.

STRUCTURE VII

Gerund + vic + a

"into" "come"

- (26) é gall mere suṇan vic ai fi
 this matter my hearing -in come is
 "I have heard about this thing."

The sentence is about the thing that has "come into my hearing." The hearer is so passive a receiver that he is represented as the goal. More accurately, it is not he but his act of hearing that is the goal of the "thing". There is only one other gerund vek^han "seeing" that is used in this structure.

STRUCTURE VIII

Abstract verbal noun ending in -ai + de ("give")

- (27) menũ rɔla suṇai dit̪ta
 me-to noise hearing given
 "I heard a noise"

- (28) cʌnd menũ dɪk^hai nãĩ dɪnda
 moon me-to seeing not giving
 "I cannot see the moon (now)."

(29) é sēḥa menũ pharai nãĩ dinda
 this hare me-to catching not giving

"This hare does not come within my range where I
 could catch it."

There seem to be only three abstract verbal nouns in Punjabi used in Structure VIII. (27) and (28) are semantically very different from (29). The reason why Ram Singh regards this structure as passive is understandable. In (27) the hearer of the noise is the perceiver who became aware of it when it actually reached him. He did not hear the noise as a proper agent of the action of hearing; rather the noise "gave" him the result of his own involuntary action of hearing.

Depending on the context of situation, (28) can mean either that the moon is not visible (because of clouds etc.) or that the man cannot see the moon because of his own poor eyesight. In both the cases the viewpoint adopted is that of the (un)perceived object. The man is not the initiator but the goal of the result of the action. The agent is defocused in all these sentences.

8.6 Causativization and passivization

There is another important structure in Punjabi (and many other languages) which is sometimes described as a passive structure or as very similar to it. It is the causative construction. For example, T.G.Bailey (1935:504) says that the Urdu sentence

(30) malik əsbab lədva rʌɦa ɦɛ
 master furniture caused to load staying is

should be translated as "The master is getting the furniture loaded." according to Bailey, lədva does not mean "cause to load." It is undeniable that the only natural English translation of (30) is the one suggested by Bailey. The master is not doing the work himself. In other words, he is the non-involved Actor-causer (Acn). The real performer of the action (the Causer-mediator or Cm), though implied, lies outside the valency set of the verb phase. Though the action in (30) is being described from the viewpoint of the Actor-causer (so that the viewpoint and the AF do not clash), English has no means of presenting the situation except through a sentence with a verb-form in the passive voice. ((30) can be translated into Punjabi by changing rʌɦa into rɪɦa).

But when we mention the Causer-mediator or the real agent of the action, as in (31),

(31) malik nəkər se əsbab lədva rʌɦa ɦɛ
 servant -from

two English translations are possible:

(31') "The master is causing the servant to load the furniture."

(31'') "The master is getting the furniture loaded by the servant."

Bailey's observation could not have been based solely on the English translation. He was too refined a linguist to do that. In a causative construction having a non-involved Actor-causer, the immediate performer of the action is lexically backgrounded (cf. Chapter III), as in many passive constructions. Though the action in (30) and (31) is described from the viewpoint of the Actor-causer and not from that of the Undergoer, the sentences do share one "passive" feature. The viewpoint adopted to present the situation in (30) is the exact opposite of the one in the ergative construction (32).

(32) malik ne əsbab laddia (Urdu lada)

master -Agt furniture loaded

"The master loaded the furniture."

where the action is described from the viewpoint of the U, and the A (the performer) is not backgrounded. A construction can, however, be both ergative and causative. An example is

(33) malik ne əsbab lədvaiə

master -Agt furniture got loaded

"The master got the furniture loaded."

The immediate performer of the action is backgrounded in (33), and the action is described from the viewpoint of the U, but the Actor-causer is there and is the starting point of the AF.

If there can be degrees of "passivehood", we can say that (30) and (32) are each about 33% passive, while (33) is about 66% passive. But Punjabi grammarians have not regarded causative constructions like (30), (31) and (33) as passive constructions. It is mainly the European grammarians of Indian languages who noticed "passive" features in such constructions. English translation is surely responsible for this to a great extent. It appears that for a construction to qualify as a true passive construction, it is essential that the semanto-syntactic Actor (of whatever variety) must be backgrounded (i.e., pushed out of the valency set) either lexically or syntactically. In the causative constructions discussed above the non-involved Actor-causer, marked like an Actor of a non-causative construction is very much there in the valency set of the verb-nucleus. In the passive construction in which the mention of the performer of the action cannot be omitted, we find that this is because of pragmatic reasons: the sentence is such that it seems to be about the performer, or at least the mention of the performer is an indispensable part of the "new" information. A rather similar example from English would be

(34) Duncan was murdered by Macbeth, not by Macduff.

8.7 A discussion of the "passive" features in Punjabi

A great deal more could be said about the form and function of the Punjabi passive constructions. But let us now have a

look at where the phenomena stand in relation to the "functional domains" suggested by Givón.

(a) Clausal topic assignemnt

According to Givón, "The subject/agent of the active clause ceases to be the topic, and a non-agent argument of the active then assumes, by whatever means, the clausal-topic function." But we have to define the topic first. It could be the viewpoint NP, or it could be the "new information" which the sentence presents. Moreover, it is not clear whether we can sensibly relate every passive structure to a corresponding active one. In most passive structures in Punjabi, the situation is described from the viewpoint of the patient or Undergoer. But there are some cases (i.e., those described as Impersonal Passive constructions) where the action denoted by the verb is the focus of attention, if not the viewpoint. (5), (21) and (25) are such sentences. But the Undergoer/patient or the verbal action can be the viewpoint NP or the focus of attention even in the ergative constructions which are not regarded as passive. In many passive structures with (in)capabilitative meaning, the performer of the action must be mentioned. But we can discount these cases by observing that this happens for pragmatic reasons, as we have said above. Sentences like (14), (15) and (16) (Structure III) are bound to remain troublesome. It is solely because of the lexical meaning of the verbs that they are felt to be "passive". But are they really so? There is no simple answer.

(b) Impersonalization

"The identity of the subject/agent of the active is suppressed by whatever means." Again in most Punjabi passives, the agent of the main verb is backgrounded and sentences occur without any explicit mention of the agent unless there are special pragmatic reasons for mentioning the agent. This is more or less the case in English and many other languages too. But suppressing the identity of the agent, strictly speaking, does not apply in some cases. For example, in most sentences of Structure VI, the agent has no identity to be suppressed. Even in the English sentence "Nelson was killed in the battle of Trafalgar", the identity of the agent can hardly be said to be "suppressed". In the constructions expressing the (in)capability of the agent, the identity of the agent is highlighted rather than suppressed.

(c) De-transitivization

"The clause becomes semantically less-active, less-transitive, more stative." Again the "more-or-less" feature does apply to many passive structures in Punjabi. The verb-form used in most of these structures is the Perfect Participle or the Conjunctive Participle. Both these forms represent the action as completed, actually or symbolically, thus concentrating more on the result of the activity than on the activity itself. Structure II is the most stative one in this sense, and very often the mention of the source of the action, which suggests (the preceding) activity is not

allowed in such sentences. But sentence (23) is a conspicuous exception. The passive verb in (23) has the Imperfect Participle form, suggesting an on-going activity (a rather vigorous one because of the use of the auxiliary piā "fallen"). This sentence is passive because the patient (i.e., the victim) is the focus of attention and the identity of the agent is irrelevant (or suppressed). Whether the clause is less active or more active very often depends on whether we view it from the syntactic angle or from the semantic angle.

What we have said above is no criticism of Givón, who suggests three functional domains on which "a number of more-or-less distinct points may be plotted along a functional continuum." this is the same thing as suggesting that the passive structures have family resemblances. This, as we have seen, is true of the Punjabi passive structures.

We need not discuss here the syntactic properties of the passives mentioned by Givón. We have already discussed the syntactic properties of the Punjabi passive constructions. Givón very explicitly says that there are degrees to which, for example, the new (non-agent) topic of the passive clause assumes the characteristic case-marking properties of the subject/agent of the active clause. We have already mentioned the difficulties involved in deciding which NP (if at all) is the topic of the passive clause. If Structure III is passive, then the topic has all the properties of an Actor of the active clause. In the "impersonal passive" constructions, on the other hand, the topic (if such a sentence has a topic) has none. We can say

that the action denoted by the verb in sentence (5) is the topic and it is marked as such because the auxiliary verb agrees with it. But then the similar topic in (25) has no auxiliary to agree with.

We can conclude that the only characteristic shared by most of the passive structures in Punjabi is agent-defocusing taken in the purely syntactic sense. Syntactically, the agent lies outside the valency set of the simple or complex verb-nucleus of the clause. We have to distinguish between syntactic and the pragmatic obligatoriness of an NP. In the sentences (20) and (21) with the the verbs hō "happen" and ja "go" are both monovalent. Their single obligatory argument is there. It is important that hass is in the Conjunctive Participle form that denotes a completed action. As in many other Punjabi constructions, as we have seen in Chapter VII, a completed action can be an argument of an auxiliary verb. In (20), hass can be replaced by an NP - é kamm "this work", for example. So we conclude that the performer of the action marked with tō lies outside the valency set of the verb nucleus, as in all other constructions in the language. It is obligatory for pragmatic reasons: it is the (in)capability of the performer that the sentence is about. Thus we can say with certainty that agent-defocusing is the prototypical meaning of the syntactically passive constructions in Punjabi. Shibatani's theory does apply to Punjabi, whatever its status as a general theory may be. Structures III, VII and VIII, to which this does not apply are, syntactically very much

"active". Their meaning is felt to be somewhat "passive" because the meanings of the verbs involved is such that a human or at least animate perceiver or doer is implied, and this doer/perceiver is higher on the Empathy Hierarchy than the semanto-syntactic A of the verb nucleus. We find that in such sentences, the doer/perceiver is either backgrounded or semantically very inactive. We regard such sentences as syntactically (and thus symbolically) active, though semantically they may be regarded as pseudo-active like the English sentence

(35) The book is selling well.

8.8 Some theoretical considerations

The passive voice is one of the most extensively and intensively studied and discussed phenomena, language-specifically and cross-linguistically. Many linguists have put forth proposals for the characterization of the passive. In most cases, their proposals were based on the analyses of the well-known European languages, but sometimes other language families were also considered. It is only recently that studies based on data from a wide variety of languages have been attempted. Even if it were possible for one scholar to know everything that has been said about the passive, this would be no place to discuss that. So we consider some of the important analyses suggested and questions asked recently.

(a) Is the passive a promotional or a demotional phenomena?

If the word 'or' in the question is a stressed "exclusive" 'or', the question deserves to be unmasked (i.e., rejected). A passive can be neither or both. The promotional view is favoured by the Relational Grammarians like Johnson (1974, 1977) and Perlmutter and Postal (1977, 1983a, 1983b), while the demotional view is favoured by scholars like Keenan (1977) and Comrie (1977). Shibatani's agent-defocusing is a sort of demotional view. There are also linguists who believe that both the possibilities are attested in the world languages. For example, Foley and Van Valin (1984), who use the terms foregrounding and backgrounding for promotion and demotion respectively, present examples of both the types. Put rather simply, the promotionists argue that promotion of a non-subject NP to the subject position is the primary thing in the process of passivization and demotion of the subject to the status of a non-term or non-core argument is secondary and happens as a result of the promotion. The demotionists argue that things are the other way round. Cross-linguistic studies such as Siewierska's already mentioned clearly favour Foley and Van Valin's stand.

Now, coming to Punjabi, what is promoted to the status of the "subject" in the "impersonal passive" constructions (20), (21) and (25)? Either nothing or the verbal action itself. But the verbal action is not a "term" (i.e., a "direct object" or "indirect object") promoted from a

corresponding active sentence (assuming that there exists one). On the other hand, what is demoted in (25)? Try undoing the demotion and you get nowhere. There simply is nothing to be demoted. Of course, the proponents of both the analyses could bring in an ad hoc machinery of "deep structures" and "transformations" and present "powerful arguments" by juggling with concepts.

In the next chapter, we shall argue that the very concept of "subject" is meaningless (useless at best and confusing at worst) in Punjabi linguistics. However, the Punjabi passive structures are (predominantly, at least) demotional in the sense we have already discussed. But this demotion need not be followed by the promotion of any NP to the place thus vacated.

(b) Passive and aspect

Beedham (1979), who argued against the derivation of the passive from a corresponding or underlying active, suggested, on the basis of his study of the passive constructions in English, German and Russian, that the Passive be regarded as an aspectual form "be + past participle", as the Perfect form in English is "have + past participle" and the Progressive form in English is "be + present participle". (Beedham (1979:142). Earlier, Langacker and Munro (1975), and earlier still, Hasegawa (1968) made very similar suggestions. That some passive constructions are related to the perfective and the perfect aspects is undeniable. (cf. Comrie 1981b). Also, the fact that some

passive constructions are almost as stative or intransitive as a "be + adjective" construction is also undeniable. Again, that most passive constructions are adjectival is pretty uncontroversial. But still it would be wrong to set up "be + past participle" in the underlying structure of all the passive constructions. The argument that "copula + past participle" is a universal passive formula is no longer acceptable. Frajzyngier (1978) shows, on the basis of an analysis of the passive constructions in thirty languages, that the copula is not a typical device in all passive constructions. As we have seen, a Punjabi passive construction can have both the Perfect Participle and the copula, but not necessarily in combination, and there are, in Punjabi, some passive constructions in which neither of the two appears.

(c) Impersonal passive and the indefinite human agent

Frajzyngier (1982) suggests that

"Whenever there is a passive form of intransitive verbs in several languages, such a form implies that the sentence has an indefinite human agent." (p. 267).

Frajzyngier's definition of an impersonal passive is:

"the term impersonal passive stands for passive forms of verbs in sentences for which one cannot postulate an underlying subject." (ibid.)

Our concept of an impersonal passive is, however, much broader. In our analysis, an impersonal passive construction is a construction in which the viewpoint adopted is that of the action denoted by the verb, and not of a participant NP. The passive constructions that Frajzyngier has in mind are included in our category. Sentence (25) is an impersonal passive sentence in Frajzyngier's sense, and it does not contradict his observation. Whatever the case in other languages, the reason why the agent in such a sentence is indefinite and human is not difficult to understand. Such a sentence expresses a message of admonition which is presumed to be universally applicable (and not merely in the present context) to the generalized "other" (and very often to the speaker too). So the agent of the action is indefinite. It is human as well, because nobody would normally preach such a message to non-humans or to inanimate objects. Of course, one could preach to pet animals or, if one were a poet, to forces of nature. But in that case, the addressee is regarded as if it were human. But Frajzyngier's observation does not apply to all the passive sentences having intransitive verbs. The Sanskrit sentence (5), translated by Cardona as "Sitting as performed by Devadatta is taking place", has a human and definite agent. The Punjabi sentence

(20) $\text{met}^h\tilde{o}$ $\text{h}\tilde{\lambda}\text{ss}$ ho gio

"I happened to laugh."

is more literally translatable as "Laughter happened from

me." It is an impersonal passive construction in Frajzyngier's sense. No doubt, it has a human agent. But it is difficult to imagine anything more definite than the first person singular pronoun.

(d) "Peculiar passives" and the Gricean maxims

Alice Davison (1980) suggested that in the case of the "peculiar passives" (which include the Hindi counterparts of the Punjabi passive sentences with (in)capabilitative meaning), the

"Extra 'meanings' can...be factored out from individual constructions so that they are not part of the syntactic or pragmatic conditions on rule application."
(Davison 1980:63).

This, according to her, can be done by assuming

- (a) "a meaning-preserving passive rule;
- (b) "representation of topic in the underlying structure or whatever level of structure is relevant both to syntax and to representation of the speaker's rhetorical intentions);
- (c) "and a set of Gricean principles for cooperative conversation." (id. 63-64)

Since passive structures with (in)capabilitative and other "extra" meanings do occur in Punjabi (and probably in all

human languages), Davison's proposal arguably applies to Punjabi as well. Before examining her proposal, it is important to remember that that she is working in a tradition that is incommensurable, on the whole, with ours, and it would be unfair to judge her views by our standards. But since we have rejected her tradition, we also reject her views on the grounds that

(i) "Peculiarity" is in the eyes (contact lenses, more accurately) of the linguist and not in the language or its constructions.

(ii) It is misleading to divide the meaning of a sentence into "extra" and non-"extra" (or "essential", "proper", "propositional", "truth-conditional", etc.). One linguist's "extra" is another linguist's "essential". For us, sentences and constructions (or words or phrases or grammatical morphemes, for that matter) have meaning potential, a part (and never the whole) of which is realized in the linguistic and the non-linguistic context. Though the division is useful, we reject the suggestion that semantics and pragmatics are essentially different fields of meaning analysis.

(iii) An enormous amount of literature arguing against the "meaning-preserving passive rule" has appeared (and a considerable amount was in existence in 1980 too). It is impossible for us to ignore it.

(iv) In our framework, a separate component consisting of Gricean principles is superfluous. This is not to deny or to underestimate the great contribution of Grice. His

principles of cooperative behaviour and his theory of implicature are extremely useful tools for handling metaphorical interpretation, indirect speech acts, assertions of tautologies and contradictions, ironical statements etc. (Cf. Lyons 1981:213). It is useful to view words and constructions as having a basic or prototypical meaning and its (generally symbolical and metaphorical) extension in particular contexts by implicature. But like every useful tool, Grice's insights can be misused. Any semantic theory can be defended by invoking Grice. What the framework captures or is capable of handling is the "basic" or the "real" meaning, and the rest is the "extra" meaning accountable by the "Gricean maxim of cooperative behaviour" or "Gricean implicature". Trying to defend a theory of the "meaning-preserving passive rule" against mounting evidence by invoking Grice is such a move.

8.9 Concluding remarks

For us, all the passive structures in Punjabi discussed in this chapter, are normal, and not "peculiar". All of them are symbolical and metaphorical. Each has a meaning potential which we have described and discussed in some detail. Throughout this chapter we have used "passive" as a non-discrete category. Some structures have been described as "passive" by Punjabi grammarians. In order to stop our own theoretical prejudices from influencing the selection of the data, we chose a list prepared more than sixty years ago by

the Punjabi grammarian Ram Singh. Our analysis shows that there is not even a single feature shared by all the structures listed as "passive". Agent-defocusing in the syntactic sense of Actor-elimination from the valency set of the verb nucleus, by whatever means, is shared by the structures which we have described as syntactically passive. If the passive is defined in this rather narrow sense, the structures which do not share this feature are pseudo-passive structures. But the pseudo-passive structures do share semantic features with the passive structures in the narrower sense. But that all the passive structure (of whatever variety) studied in this chapter have family resemblances is very clear.

CHAPTER IX

ERGATIVITY IN PUNJABI

The Copernican struggle for science to overcome the stubborn, narrow-minded, self-confident egocentrism still continues. We have come to know that our space as well as our time is only one among the innumerable varieties both of space and time. Boas's task in the development of linguistics could be compared with the historical role of Lobačevskij, Einstein, and other fighters against self-centred tradition..... when a native of far North saw a camel for the first time, he put it down as a distorted horse. Similarly, we are subconsciously inclined to take unfamiliar remote linguistic structures as backward, defective or perverted. We are stubbornly still living in the Ptolemaic universe, and we still believe we stand in the centre of the world.

- Jakobson (1944:481-483)

9.0 Introduction

Today, more than forty years after Jakobson wrote, many linguists are still living in the Ptolemaic Eurocentred Universe. In spite of the heroic struggle of the linguists who have always upheld the Boasian spirit, whether or not they regard Boas as their intellectual ancestor, it is the thoroughly reactionary and (intellectually) ethnocentric movements in linguistics that are enthusiastically greeted as "revolutions".

How ergative languages were regarded as reflecting the savage and primitive mentality of their speakers is now well known. A short, but representative, sample has been collected by Seely (1977). For the Ptolemaic Eurocentered consciousness, the very thought of a language without a subject and predicate and a grammar which does not recognize these categories are abominations. One of Whitney's objections against Pāṇini's grammar was

"...there is no recognition of the grammatical category of subject of a verb; and this leads, as could not be helped, to numerous obscurities and difficulties."
(Whitney 1972 (1893):166).

While Pāṇini is able to manage without the grammatical category of subject (cf. Cardona 1967, 1976), the irony is that in Punjabi, as we shall argue below, it is the category of subject which "leads to numerous obscurities and

difficulties". That this is the case in numerous other languages as well is becoming clear now. But many modern linguists are still cherishing the fond hope that subject and object must be lying hidden somewhere in the deep structure of all the languages. They must be discovered so that it could be demonstrated that the offending languages do have subject (of whatever variety, or to whatever extent) and that ergativity is simply a "superficial surface structure phenomenon" in these languages.

There is nothing wrong in the hypothesis of morphological ergativity, and the linguist who suggested it (Dixon) is also responsible for bringing a serious study of ergativity to the centre of contemporary linguistics. He will be the last scholar to resort to such a practice. But the way many other linguists have carefully selected evidence for, or carelessly or carefully ignored the evidence against, their hypotheses are not entirely beyond suspicion. The worst offenders are the linguists who are native speakers of ergative languages. Many of them, for reasons not difficult to guess, have accepted the hegemony of, and co-operated with the "superficial ergativity" theorists.

We do not claim that our way of looking at ergativity is the only valid, or even good, one. Evidence may prove us wrong, and it will be a great misfortune for the science of linguistics if ways better than ours are not suggested in the future. What is bad about the the activities of the "superficial ergativity" theorists is not their not doing

things in our way but their doing things badly by the general and accepted standards of doing science. It is the duty of the researcher himself (and not simply of others), especially if he is a native speaker of the language under analysis, to try his best to find (from actual social usage) and construct all the possible counter-examples. This basic rule is more often flouted than followed for the purpose of upholding cherished theories.

Before we take up a theoretical discussion of the phenomenon of ergativity in Punjabi (and also sometimes in Hindi), we must discuss and analyse the ergative constructions (within our framework, of course).

9.1 Ergative constructions in Punjabi

We could put the terms "ergativity" and "ergative" within quotation marks, as we did with the term "passive" at numerous places. We do not do this because ergativity in Punjabi is relatively well-defined. But it should be noted at the very outset that ergativity in Punjabi is not the same thing as ergativity in the so-called "true ergative" languages like Dyirbal (Dixon 1972). In a cross-linguistic study, the Punjabi ergativity could be treated as pseudo-ergativity. But since this study focuses on Punjabi, we have to explain (in our sense, discussed earlier) the phenomena. The semantic logic of the Punjabi grammar is such that ergativity fits well into it as an integral part. System-internally, there is nothing "pseudo" or "split" or "just

morphological" about the phenomena. It is useful to divide ergativity and related phenomena in Punjabi into three groups

9.1.1 Group I: Perfect Participle Group

The traditional formulation of ergativity in this group is: the subject of a transitive clause whose verb is in the perfective aspect (or past tense) is marked differently from the subject of a transitive clause whose verb is in the non-perfective aspect (or present or future tense); in the former case, the verb agrees either with the object or there is no agreement at all. Intransitive clauses remain unaffected in this respect. As in earlier chapters, we shall use the terms Actor (A) and Undergoer (U) respectively in place of subject and (direct) object. As we shall see, the difference is not simply terminological. Some examples of ergative constructions of this group are

PQr

(1) munḍe- -ne kītab pāṛī

boy -Agt book read

"The boy read the book."

(2) munḍe- -ne us kītab- -nū pāṛīa

boy -Agt that book -to read

"The boy read the/that book."

Some examples of non-ergative constructions are given below

for comparison:

PQr

- (3) muṇḍa kṛtabā pāṛda hē
boy books reading is

"The boy reads/is reading books."

PQr

- (4) muṇḍa éṇā kṛtabā nū pāṛega
boy these books -to will read

"The boy will read these books."

PQr

- (5) muṇḍa sāvere et^hō gīa
boy morning-in here-from gone

"The boy went from here in the morning."

PQr

- (6) é muṇḍa roz māṇḍar ṣḍa hē
this boy daily temple coming is

"This boy comes to the temple daily."

We have not called this group a Perfective Aspect group because perfective aspect, in the semantic sense, can be indicated in many other ways as well. It is with sentences having the main nuclear verb in the Perfect Participle form that we are concerned here.

9.1.2 Group II: Potential Participle Group

This group is not found in Hindi. (Or at least its Hindi equivalent has not been treated as such). The traditional

description of ergativity in this group would be: the subject of a clause, irrespective of whether the clause is transitive or intransitive, is marked with the postposition ne; in a transitive clause the verb either agrees with the object or there is zero agreement; in an intransitive clause, there is always zero agreement. (We shall see below that this traditional description is not very accurate).

Examples are

- (7) munḍe ne c^heti jaṇa ḥe
 boy -Agt soon to go is
 "The boy is going to go soon."

PQr

- (8) munḍe ne cá piṇi ḥe
 boy -Agt tea to drink is
 "The boy is going to drink tea."

- (9) munḍe ne is kiṭab nū nāĩ páṛna
 boy -Agt this book -to not to read
 "The boy is not going to read this book."

PQr

- (10) et^he bandar naḥcəṇe ḥan
 here monkeys to dance are
 "Monkeys are going to dance (=be made to dance)
 here."

- (11) et^he bandarā ne naḥcəṇa ḥe
 here monkeys -Agt to dance is
 "Monkeys are going to dance here."

- (12) mere bandərā ne tere kʌhe te nāĩ nʌccəŋa
 my monkeys -Agt your telling -on not to dance
 "My monkeys are not going to dance if you ask them
 to."

The Hindi sentence corresponding (7) is

- (13) lʌrke ko jana he
 boy -to to go is

9.1.3 Group III: "Dative Subject" Group

Lest the situation should seem less complex and problematic than it actually is, we set up a third group, a monster group sometimes called the "Dative Subject" Group. Whether the structures in this group are ergative or not will be discussed later. "Dative Subject" has been enclosed within quotation marks because we are marking it for Occam-razoring. It is not simply a totally useless but also a positively confusing and harmful concept inflated to life-size proportions (but not actually created) by superficial ergativity theorists. A detailed examination of this mythologized pseudo-category is included in this chapter in order to demonstrate that the syntactic category of subject is totally confusing and thus unnecessary for a grammatical analysis of Punjabi, which is perfectly manageable in a neat and economical way without it. The notion of "morphological ergativity" is based on the assumption that even in an ergative construction there is an

NP that syntactically behaves like the subject of a non-ergative construction, in spite of the fact that some other NP is morphologically marked like a subject. But if it is not possible to unambiguously identify the subject in Punjabi clauses, the idea that Punjabi is only morphologically ergative ceases to make any sense. Some examples of the "dative subject" constructions are

(14) mē nū fārəm ai
 me -to shame come
 "I felt ashamed."

(15) muṇḍe nū buxar cārīa
 boy -to fever rose
 "The boy got fever."

(16) muṇḍe nū sapp dīśia
 boy -to snake become visible
 "The boy saw a snake."
 "A snake came into the boy's view."

(17) (mēthō koi pūll hoi
 me-from some mistake happened
 hē is karke) surāj devta ne
 is this because of Sun-god -Agt
 aṛṛ mēnū nāī dīśia
 today me-to not to be visible

"(I have (unconsciously) committed some mistake today; therefore,) the Sun-god will not show himself to me today."

- (18) *he suraj devta meri pull maf kar*
O Sun-god my mistake having forgiven
de te mēnū dis pe
give and me-to having become visible fall

"O Sun-god, forgive my mistake and show yourself to me."

- (19a) Sham:

andar ja. je tēnū t^hāṇḍ lag gāi
inside go if you-to cold having struck gone
tā buxar cāṛ javega
then fever having risen will go

"Go inside. If you get cold, you will get fever."

- (19b) Ram

mēnū buxar? buxar sale ne
me-to fever fever brother-in-law -Agt
mēnū cāṛ ke marna hē?
me-to having-risen to die is

"Fever to me? Does this damned fever intend to die, having come to me?"

- (20) (jəd jʌmā ne teri jon kʌddən
 when angels of death -Agt your life to take out
 ɔŋa hɛ tã) ónā ne sirf tēnū hɪ
 to come is then they -Agt only you-to Emph.
 dɪsŋa hɛ
 to be visible is

"(When the angels of death will come to take out your life,) they will show themselves to you only."

In the English glosses, "be visible" or "show oneself" is only a very rough translation of the Punjabi monovalent (Phase IIA) verb dis. In (17), (18), (19) and (20), clauses had to be added to indicate the context of situation. Without this "contextual" evidence, the clauses under consideration would immediately be rejected as "ungrammatical" or "unacceptable" by the protagonists of the "Dative Subject", against which they are intended as counter-examples. (It should be added here that all these sentences, as complete utterances, and spoken with proper stress, intonation and "style", were fully acceptable to all the native speakers to whom they were presented for judgement). Anyone who has an ear for the common speech of the masses (an indispensable qualification for a linguist) can hear such sentences in the common Punjabi speech. (19b) does sound boastful, but no speaker intends such utterances to be taken literally. (sala "wife's brother" is, for obvious reasons, also a term of abuse in Punjabi and many other Indian languages).

9.2 Discussion of ergativity in Punjabi

Attention Flow (AF) and Viewpoint, in terms of which we analysed the "passive" constructions, are fully applicable to the "ergative" constructions. We said (only informally and half seriously) that an ergative construction is about 33% passive. In other words, an ergative construction, though its Actor is not backgrounded, nevertheless has some family resemblances with the passive construction whose A is lexically/syntactically backgrounded. In an ergative construction the A is not the PQr. In other words, the event or the situation is NOT described from the viewpoint of the Actor. Either the U is the PQr or there is no PQr. As in other constructions, the PQr (if there is any) is zero marked. The A is marked with ne. In the earlier chapters, we discussed the case-marking postpositions tō and nū. These postpositions are clearly spatial and are used as such in other contexts. The agentive postposition ne used in the ergative constructions is not spatial in origin (as far as our knowledge of its origin goes). There is evidence that it comes from the Sanskrit instrumental case-ending -ena, which may have had a spatial origin in a remote past. Some grammarians have described the NP+ne in Hindi (and this would apply to Punjabi too) as being in the "instrumental case" form. This is certainly erroneous. In Hindi, it is the postpositions se "from" and ke sat^h "with", and in Punjabi it is na "with" that are true instrumental postpositions. The most commonly used unstressed form [nə] of na also

probably came from -ena and was reinterpreted as the comitative postposition nal. But this is beside the point. ne in Punjabi and Hindi simply and unambiguously marks an Actor in an ergative clause. Its "instrumental" past left it at some time during the Middle Indic period in what Hendriksen (1944:54) calls "inverted constructions" - constructions passive in form and active in meaning (i.e., in which the Actor was fully agentive and was not backgrounded, because when it was omitted, the constructions resumed a passive meaning).

9.2.1 Ergativity in Group I

With these preliminary remarks, we take up Group I. Everything that is relevant about these constructions has already been said in the previous chapters. Here we may only repeat that the Actor in (1) is as much agentive as in (3), and it is the source (but not a mere source) of action in both. Since the action described in (1) is viewed as completed, it is described from the viewpoint of the Undergoer. So the book is the PQr, and it controls verb-agreement. In (2), the book is contextually given and is thus definite. Its existence is taken for granted, and the centre of attention or the viewpoint shifts to the completed action itself. Languages very often grammaticalize pragmatic categories. Punjabi and Hindi have, in this way, grammaticalized the pragmatically given or definite Undergoer or patient. By contrast, the action presented by

the verbs in (3)-(6) is presented as ongoing or uncompleted or iterative. So the result of the action is not viewed as having reached the Undergoer. Therefore, the action is presented from the viewpoint of the initiator or the agent which is syntactically the Actor in all these sentences.

In short, there is no mystery in the ergativity in the constructions in Group I. As this is the only ergative group that is found (or is commonly believed to be there) in Hindi, the elaborate mythology of ergativity in Hindi is uncalled for.

9.2.2 Ergativity in Group II

It is Group II that is more interesting in many ways. Historically, the form of the main verb in a construction belonging to this group comes from the Future Passive Participle form of Sanskrit. As we pointed out in Chapter V, the Potential Participle form of Punjabi used in these constructions is now homophonous to the Gerund which has a different origin. The agentive postposition ne used in this construction is undeniably passive in origin. But as in Group I, this ne is fully agentive now. In Sanskrit, even the intransitive verbs could have a Future Passive Participle form and could be used in what are now called impersonal passive constructions. So the ergative constructions in Group II are descended both from the Sanskrit personal and impersonal passive constructions involving the Future Passive Participle form of the verb.

But a significant change has occurred. The Actor is not backgrounded now. The action in each of the sentences (7)-(9) is viewed as a whole, as if it were completed, though it is viewed as potential rather than actualized. An English translation of (7) closer to the Punjabi meaning would be "Going performed by the boy is to take place soon." A shade of definiteness and a sense of imminence is always there in such sentences. When this sense is not intended, the sentence employs the agglutinated Unmarked+ga form of the verb, as in

(7') munda c^heti javega
 boy soon will go
 "The boy will go soon."

The Unmarked form jave, indicating potentiality is followed by the particle-ga which indicates that the potentiality is real. We have already said why in situations presented in (7)-(12) the transitive verb agrees with the Undergoer and why there is zero agreement when the Undergoer is definite or contextually given.

The change brought about by Hindi in this structure (exemplified by (13), where ne has been replaced by ko "to") is certainly an innovation, and Punjabi is more conservative. It could be suggested that the more philosophical speakers of Hindi took an imminent action almost fatalistically as something pre-determined which has to happen to a person rather than as something that he is so

confident of accomplishing that he can view it as if it is already completed. Whether or not related to the psychology of the speakers, the Hindi version does have slightly fatalistic shade of meaning, and the Punjabi version does indicate confident optimism of some sort. More interestingly, if we negate the verb in (7), the meaning will be something like

"The boy is determined not to go...."

"The boy is forbidden to go..."

But the negation of the Hindi sentence (13) would be considerably milder

"The boy need not go..."

Although the Hindi-like development did not take place in Punjabi, another theoretically more interesting one did, and is probably still going on. The agentive postposition ne started getting dropped in the case of an Actor of an intransitive verb. It is either the analogy of group I constructions or the semantics of ne (or perhaps both) that is responsible for the development. Exactly when this started is difficult to say. This innovation is found in the oldest available Punjabi prose texts of the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries. (We are ignoring verse here, where metrical considerations are also important. We are also disregarding those dialects which do not use ne, but still

use the oblique form of the noun which does not control verb-agreement, all this indicating that the postposition ne was once there). In the constructions exemplifying the development under consideration, the noun is in the nominative form and controls verb-agreement, as in the case of intransitive verb constructions in Group I. Invariably, when ne is not used with the Actor of a monovalent verb in the Potential Participle form, the Actor turns out to be less agentive. It is either a (non-personified) inanimate object or force of nature or an animal or a human agent acting non-volitionally or under some sort of compulsion or according to a fixed programme. Sentence (10) is a good example. It is about a dance to be performed by captive monkeys. (12), on the other hand, mentions a dance by wild monkeys or at least the more free ones. In the variety of Punjabi being studied here, (12) would be unacceptable without ne because the monkeys are capable of making a choice. (Even in those dialects which do not have ne, the Actor noun in such a construction must be in the oblique form and must not control verb-agreement, as is the case in our dialect).

In sentences like (10), the Actor NPs also tend to be less referential and less definite and lower on the Empathy Hierarchy. They are, so to say, less nouny, grammatically, in the sense that they are not usually inflected for case and/or given postpositions to follow them. (Cf. Hopper and Thompson 1984). The action is described from the viewpoint of the agent because it (the action) is not viewed as

moving, and also because the general Punjabi pattern is for the verb to agree with the morphologically unmarked NP. But what we have said here should not apply to the Actors in the constructions where there is no choice in marking them. In some constructions, the grammar of the language requires that the Actor NP should or should not be marked morphologically. But where the possibility of a choice is there or is still developing, as in (10) and (11), a universal tendency of human languages (according to Hopper and Thompson 1984) manifests itself, although the original motivation for differentiation may have been the analogy of intransitive constructions like (5).

The split represented by (10) and (11) is, in some respects, similar to the active vs. stative split found in some languages of the "active"-type. In Batsbi, for example, an intransitive subject is marked like a transitive agent if the event occurs as a result of the subject's action or deliberate inaction, but is marked like a patient if the causes of the event are entirely external to the subject. (DeLancey 1981:629). The Actor in sentences like (10) is not free enough to be regarded as the true agent that is responsible for a definite, certain and imminent action. The motive force seems to lie elsewhere, and the Actor is almost a patient-like agent. But since it is not backgrounded, it is taken not as the source of the action but as a substratum of the intransitive action. However, its agentivity is not completely lost, and it definitely is not fated to act out its destiny as the boy in the Hindi sentence (13) is. The

destiny-like sense can be expressed in Punjabi, but then the sentence would be

(7') munde nũ jaṇa peṇa hē

boy -to going to fall on is

"The boy will have to go...."

More literally, (7') is translatable as "Going is going to befall the boy." A hint of suddenness and vehemence associated with the explicator auxiliary pe "fall on" is there. The suggestion of the agent accepting the destiny in a spirit of resignation (so that the action of going simply has to "happen", as in Hindi) is missing. Instead, the human agent in most such cases in Punjabi acts either freely, willingly and confidently, or abstains from acting in the same spirit. In the latter case, the action has to "fall" to him, and he has to be forced, usually against his will. Such hints of force and vehemence are not surprising in the language spoken by the people who have always been known as strong and vigorous people and whose language has hundreds of words and idioms for the different types of beating, just as the various Arabic dialects have hundreds of different words for different types of camels.

The force motivating the change in this construction, in addition to analogy already mentioned, seems to be the semantics of the postposition ne. When the action is viewed as completed, it is natural to view the Actor marked with ne (which is a part of the valency set and is not backgrounded)

as being a very agentive Actor. In the case of the transitive verbs, this use of ne seems all right. But when it comes to the intransitive verbs, trouble starts. A performer of an action that does not pass on to an Undergoer and is performed robotically, non-volitionally or under the force of some external compulsion has to be symbolized either as the substratum of the activity and of the result of the activity or as someone to whom something "happens" or "befalls".

9.2.3 "Dative Subject" constructions

With the above considerations in mind, we approach the so-called "Dative Subject" constructions. First of all, let us see how our framework, which does not have the category of subject (of any variety), can handle these constructions. The situation presented in (16) is something like this: There was a snake, and there was also a boy, and some sort of light was also there. The light that reflected from the body of the snake fell on the boy's retinas and formed an "image" of the snake in his central nervous system. The snake did not make any effort to be visible to the boy. Nor did the boy see the snake intentionally. It just happened because his eyes were open. We do not accept, as Bloomfield would have, this little story as the "meaning" of (16) "out there" in the world. But let us see what the meaning is "in here" in (16) or how the sentence symbolizes the situation. The verb form dis (Phase IIA) "be visible" is monovalent

with the "seen" as the Actor for all the grammatical purposes. That the meaning of the verb also implies a "see-er" is not a syntactic fact in Punjabi, and the sentences in which the "see-er" is not mentioned (or is non-contextually omitted) are perfectly possible and quite common in Punjabi. But most real life situations are such that the "see-er" is pragmatically more significant and higher on the Empathy Hierarchy than the "seen". So the "see-er" is not only mentioned but also occupies the sentence-initial position for the purely pragmatic reason that the sentence is about the "see-er". Since the verb is intransitive, the Actor does not take the postposition ne in many constructions. But even in those constructions where there is a choice between \emptyset and ne (as in constructions of Group II), the "seen" is mostly a non-agentive Actor and is thus marked with \emptyset . If an astrologer were to tell me that it is pre-determined by my stars that I shall see a snake, he would say

(16') tuhànũ sapp dīsnā hē

you-to snake to be visible is

"You are going to see a snake."

The action (But is there any "action" at all?) is not seen as moving from the Actor (snake) to anywhere else. It very much remains there, and hence the intransitive or monovalent verb is used. On the other hand, the totally unwilling or unprepared or inadvertent perceiver is the goal of the

sensations resulting from the "action". dis simply means "exposed to the reflecting light" irrespective of whether or not this light reaches any eyes. The latter fact, which is part of the "meaning of things" is not grammaticalized (yet) by Punjabi.

Sentences (14) and (15) are very similar to (16). In (14), the man feels ashamed, whether he likes it or not. Here, shame is viewed as coming to the man, who himself plays no active role except that of being the goal of the shame's symbolic journey. That the goal must be mentioned in (14) does not make a "come/travel" a transitive verb any more than the adverbial "to Manchester" in "I travelled to Manchester" makes the English verb "travel" a transitive one. Syntactically, the verb a in (14), as elsewhere in the language, is completely monovalent, as case-marking and verb-agreement clearly show. However, it could be argued that the verb is ʃarəm a "shame come". That is a possibility worth exploring, but there is considerable evidence against it. In (14), the verb a "come" agrees with "shame". But this noun is referentially so indefinite and thus so poorly nouny that it seems to be more or less fused with the verb. Whatever the semantics of the expression, and whatever may happen to its syntax tomorrow, in today's Punjabi, ʃarəm "shame" is syntactically the Actor in (14). (15) is syntactically very similar to (14). We need not say anything about it except that it considerably weakens the case for setting up ʃarəm a as the verb in (14).

It needs no pointing out that sentences like (14) and (15) are metaphorical and symbolical. There is probably no syntactic structure that is not metaphorical. And there is no limit on metaphorization. (The word "metaphor" itself is originally a metaphor!). Anything under (and beyond) the sun, whether living or non-living, can be personified. In (17), the Sun-god, viewed as a person is fully agentive. A devout Hindu who does not have his breakfast without seeing and offering water to the Sun-god (and such people actually exist) can be imagined as uttering (17) or (18) on a cloudy day. It may be repeated here that all the sentences used in this study were accepted by a number of native speakers. As an agentive Actor of a monovalent verb in the Potential Participle form, the Sun-god takes the postposition ne. The angels of death in (20) can also choose whether to be visible or not. There is nothing strange about (19b). Nobody intends such sentences to be taken literally. Whatever the science of medicine may say about fever, (19b) is not only perfectly grammatical and acceptable, it is also frequently used, sometimes even by qualified physicians. An idiosyncratic but the most frequently used "Dative Subject" construction in Punjabi is exemplified by

(21) munḍe nū kītab cañīdī hē
 boy -to book being desired is

"The boy wants (=is in need of) a/the book."

The Hindi version of (21) is

- (21') laṛke ko pustək cañie
 boy -to book be desirable

The verb used in (21) is in Phase II*B and is, predictably, in the Imperfect Participle form. cá "desire" is bivalent; so its subtractive phase must be monovalent with the single argument U (the book in this case) in the valency set. The A is backgrounded. The sentence describes the state of affairs from the viewpoint of the book, as the verb-agreement clearly indicates. The book possesses the quality of being in demand or being desirable. Normally, the use of the subtractive phase of other verbs in Punjabi indicates that the state of affairs is universally (un)desirable. We called (21) an idiosyncratic construction because it is only with the verb cañi- (the subtractive phase of cá) used in this type of construction that the explicitly mentioned peripheral Actor is other than "we" and is marked with nū "to" as a Recipient would be. This may be a signal for a new development in Punjabi grammar. The NP referring to the boy is obligatory and occupies the sentence-initial position for pragmatic reasons. It is not syntactically obligatory in construction with the subtractive phase of cá.


A more complicated example of this type is

- (22) munde nū jaṇa cañida hē
 boy -to going being desired is

"The boy ought to go."

"It is desirable that the boy should go."

In (22), the situation depicted is such that it is desirable either for the boy or for someone else that the boy should go. The action of going is the U of the main verb, as the book is in (21). The boy is not the A of the main verb. It is of secondary importance that the boy is the (very non-agentive) A of jaŋa, which occurs in a nominal (gerund) form. Our analysis of (22) would be



The boy is the peripheral argument Actor/Recipient of the main verb in the subtractive phase. It is important and indispensable here for pragmatic reasons. It is possible to have sentences in which cañi- is used as the main verb but the Actor/Recipient is not mentioned at all. Imagine a librarian telling his assistant

(21") es kɪtab nũ nã ñɪlaĩ. é cañidi ñe
 this book -to not move it needed is

"Don't move this book. It is needed."

As in other passive structures using a subtractive phase of a verb, the indefinite "someone" is not grammatically obligatory in (21"). It cannot be said to be contextually omitted here. The Recipient NP in such constructions in Punjabi, until now, remains syntactically a peripheral argument, however important it may pragmatically be. Since pragmatically significant things are usually grammaticalized by languages, situation may change in the future. But we are concerned with the present day Punjabi in this study.

To sum up the discussion of the structures in the "Dative Subject" Group (but not the concept of the "Dative Subject" itself, which we shall resume later), the structures under consideration are intransitive. In other words, their nuclear verbs are monovalent, having a single obligatory argument - the Actor. However, the situation described in each of the cases discussed is such, and the semantics (not the syntax) of the verbs is such that a beneficiary or goal is implied. This beneficiary or goal happens to be pragmatically more salient and higher on the Empathy Hierarchy. But it still remains outside the valency set of the nuclear verb. Verbs like ੴ "come" and ਚੱਲ "rise" are used rather metaphorically here, but they retain their usual syntactic behaviour and behave like any other monovalent verb. While many linguists, as we shall see, treat the Recipient NP in such constructions as the "Subject", according to our framework, it is not even a core argument or a "term" in the Relational Grammar sense.

9.3 The nature of ergativity in Punjabi

The Punjabi ergativity can be described in only a few sentences. The verb in a clause (or simple sentence) represents some real or imagined action. Either the Actor or the Undergoer (if there is any) or the action itself can be the viewpoint from which the situation is described. If the action is imagined as uncompleted or ongoing or iterative, the Actor is the viewpoint. If, on the other hand, the action is viewed as actually or potentially completed or complete, it is usually the Undergoer that is the viewpoint. (If there is no Undergoer, then, of course, it is the Actor that is the viewpoint). If, in numerically less frequent cases, the Undergoer of a completed action is contextually or pragmatically "definite", it is the action denoted by the verb that is the viewpoint. A viewpoint NP controls verb-agreement (or, in other words, is the PQr or the verb). In the absence of such an NP, the verb shows no agreement.

This observation is terribly anticlimactic, and those who would desire the employment of an elaborate machinery of structures and levels of varying depths, syntactic trees. (bushes, preferably), an orgy (Givón's term) of logical and algebraic symbols, and opaque jargon expressing opaquer concepts, will be sorely disappointed by our description of the Punjabi ergativity. Our rather lengthy treatment of the subject was designed to demythologize the concept (as Martinet (1979) would say). But this is not the end of the story started in this chapter. We have to prove that a great

deal of what has been built around the concept of ergativity is indeed mythology, as far as Punjabi is concerned. We are only indirectly concerned with Hindi and other languages and with ergativity in general.

It is remarkable that the post-Pāṇinian Indian grammarians, who, as linguists, were in no way inferior to the modern linguists, never noticed the existence of ergativity, though it was there in the languages they spoke, and many constructions in classical Sanskrit, which was largely modelled on the native tongues of the writers, could be described as ergative like the Punjabi constructions we have studied. Ergativity, like "peculiarity", lies more in the theory of the linguist than in the language itself. Put rather uncharitably, there would have been no ergative languages in the world if there had been no entity identifiable as the subject in the European languages. The Indian grammarians, who worked with the syntactic karakas of Pāṇini and with the semantic categories like the substratum of the fruit of action etc., found no mystery in the fact that the verb that depicted the action as completed agreed with the karman (usually the patient in semantic terms). It was only when the European scholars noticed that the very foundation stone of their grammars - subject - seemed to be missing from some languages that the study of the phenomenon which later on came to be known as ergativity started. As we mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter, the ergative languages were often treated (like their speakers) as inferior and defective. Now efforts are being made to

prove that most of these languages are only "morphologically ergative" in the "surface structure" and that they do have subject in their "deep structure".

Confining our attention to Punjabi and Hindi, we find that efforts have been made to "prove" that these languages are only "morphologically ergative" and that syntactically they are nominative-accusative. In other words, they have, after all, a clearly identifiable subject even in the ergative constructions, in which a non-subject NP is only "superficially" marked like a subject. As we have said many times, the concept "morphologically X and syntactically Y" makes no sense in our system. But that is not the point here. Every theorist has a right to choose or set up his own theoretical framework, and all frameworks have their strong and weak points. There is no framework given by Jehovah. The real point is that the work of the "superficial ergativity" theorists on most languages was carried on in such a way that the very intentions of the scholars who did all this are under suspicion.

First of all, something about "morphological ergativity." This concept makes sense only within the Transformational Generative theory and some of its offshoots, in which there are structures of varying depths and varying degrees of "abstractness" related by transformations of various types. To those who reject these theories, deciding what is "just" morphological and what is "purely" syntactic can be nothing but arbitrary. Is verb-agreement, for example, just morphological in spite of the

fact that it indicates syntactic relations? The same can be asked about case-marking. If these processes are morphological, in what sense is reflexivization syntactic? All these processes are action-at-a-distance processes creating syntactic cohesion and indicating syntactic and semantic relations, among other things. Adding a morpheme like a postposition is morphological and adding a reflexive pronoun is syntactic. Why? Appeal to deep structures (set up by the theorist himself and unavailable to verification, being "abstract") will not do because one can "prove" anything with the help of such an ad hoc machinery. The reality, however, is that those processes which favour the hypothesis of the existence of the subject in an ergative construction are "syntactic"; those that go against the hypothesis are "morphological". We shall elaborate and exemplify all this in the next section. The theory of "morphological ergativity" in Punjabi crucially depends on the assumptions that (i) one and only one NP in a non-elliptical and non-imperative clause is unambiguously identifiable as the subject of the clause, and that (ii) a change in the form of the nuclear verb to express a different tense/mood/aspect and the accompanying change in verb-agreement and the case-marking of NPs do not change the subject, in spite of the fact that a different NP is now marked like the subject of the original clause. The first of the two assumptions is more basic, and the second depends on it. But is this fundamental assumption true? The "Dative Subject" constructions pose the most serious challenge.

These constructions are included in this chapter for an in-depth analysis in order to demonstrate that the notion of the subject is highly problematic in such constructions. Any theory of grammatical relations must take these constructions into account in order to establish that subject is indeed a valid and useful category for analysing and explaining all the constructions in the language without creating internal problems and contradictions. If we can manage our analyses without a grammatical category, we must shave it off with Occam's razor. And once subject is shaved off, the theory of "morphological ergativity" which is parasitic upon this notion is automatically abandoned.

9.4 A closer scrutiny of the "Dative Subject" in Punjabi

Upto now, we have been managing our analysis of the Punjabi sentences without making use of the syntactic relational category of subject. Our Actor, as we have already said, is not an equivalent of subject as the latter has been known traditionally and by the Relational Grammarians. In this section, we critically analyse and examine in greater detail the "Dative Subject" constructions of Punjabi. Put rather bluntly, the "dative" NP in such constructions is instinctively felt to be the "subject" by many linguists simply because they use English as a filter language. In English, the translational equivalent of this NP would be the subject. Their arguments remind one of F.H. Bradley's definition of metaphysics: finding bad reasons for what one

believes on instinct. We shall demonstrate that the arguments given to establish the "Dative Subject" in Punjabi and Hindi are not only bad but have been based on carefully coined sentences to prove the point and by carelessly or carefully ignoring some of the commonest expressions found in the natural living language which would go against the theory. The more basic urge was to prove that the category of the grammatical relation subject is valid for an analysis of these languages. Keenan's views (1976) about the cross-linguistic characteristics of grammatical subject are made use of in a totally arbitrary manner. From Keenan's list, just those syntactic (?) properties are selected which would apply to an NP already selected (on the testimony of English translation) as the subject. The properties which might prove troublesome are ignored. Since some of Keenan's subject properties apply to the "dative" NP in these constructions, the hybrid category "Dative Subject" had to be launched into the theoretical space (where it has been orbiting splendidly for a number of years). A few protests about the absurdity of the hybrid category, such as Anjani Kumar Sinha's (1976) have, predictably, remained unheeded.

A linguist studying a language other than the ones (s)he can fluently speak might be excused, but a linguist studying his/her own mother tongue is expected, by all the reasonable standards of doing science, to find (or try to construct) counter-examples to his/her rules and generalizations before (s)he publishes the findings. This, sadly enough, is seldom done by those who are bent upon proving

the universality of the notion of subject.

As far as Punjabi is concerned, the only study of the subject widely known and quoted is that of Kachru, Kachru and Bhatia's 'The notion of 'Subject': a note on Hindi-Urdu, Kashmiri and Panjabi' published in the volume The notion of 'subject' in South Asian languages (Verma (ed.) 1976). Out of the thirty odd properties of subject listed by Keenan, the authors select only four "behavioural properties" - Reflexivization, Equi, Raising, and Conjunction Reduction - and apply them to what they consider are subject NPs in the various types of constructions in the three languages. "Semantic properties" such as being the agent, and "formal properties" such as verb-agreement and case-marking are rejected as "unreliable".

"As far as the semantic properties are concerned, none of them, or not even a cluster of them, is either necessary or sufficient to characterize the notion of subject in Hindi-Urdu....[and] in attempting to characterize the subject of a Hindi-Urdu sentence in terms of the formal properties of verbal agreement and case-marking, one immediately faces several problems." (Kachru et al 1976:85).

The authors discuss only Hindi-Urdu in detail and simply extend their findings to Kashmiri and Punjabi, saying that "Punjabi and Kashmiri both are similar to Hindi-Urdu." (id. 95). There is no denying the fact that these languages do

share certain important features, but to say that they are similar to one another as far as the subject under investigation is concerned is a hasty and erroneous generalization. But we cannot undertake a comparison of the languages here. Our aim is to explode the myth of the "Dative Subject" and thus demonstrate that the category of subject is unnecessary at best and confusing at worst for an analysis of Punjabi.

The first question that arises when we examine Kachru et al's analysis is about their arbitrary decision to divide the subject properties into the formal and the behavioural ones. Why is controlling Equi, Reflexivization and Conjunction Reduction a "behavioural" property and controlling verb-agreement a "formal" property? The only reason for this arbitrary decision has already been mentioned: the authors first selected an NP as the subject on the basis of English translation and then called those properties that would justify their choice the "behavioural" properties. Although the authors come to the conclusion that subject is not a discrete category in the three languages (in other words, some subjects are more subjecty than others), they took the existence of an unambiguously identifiable subject in each clause in these languages (and thus the validity of the category) for granted. It is this initial assumption that is without any justification in a truly scientific study. The summary of their findings is

<u>Rule</u>	<u>Controller</u>	<u>Accessible</u>
Reflexivization	SI, ST, S DAT S OBL, SP	--
Equi	same	SI, ST, S DAT
Conjunction- Reduction	SI, ST, S DAT, S OBL	SI, ST
Raising	SI, ST	SI, ST (p. 94)

The terms used by the authors are:

SI	Subject of intransitive clause
ST	Subject of transitive clause
S DAT	Dative Subject
S OBL	Oblique Subject (=our Source NP in a passive construction)
SP	Derived Subject of a passive clause

On the basis of this analysis, Kachru et al establish a hierarchy of subjects in the three languages:

SI ST \leq S DAT \leq S OBL \leq SP

(ibid.)

This conclusion is a hybrid of Keenan and Relational Grammar. Kachru et al clearly start with the RG assumption that the subject is a universally valid category, and therefore, every clause in the languages under investigation has a subject. Whatever controls or is accessible to such and such "behavioural" rules is the subject. The Keenan part is that some subjects are more subjecty than others. So far, so good (or bad). But the authors never consider the possibility that the situation in the three languages may be the same as in many other languages - that within the language some of the "behavioural" properties may be possessed by one type of NP and other "behavioural" properties by another type, and that this may be the case within the same clause. Linguists like Foley, Van Valin and Schachter have shown that the so-called subject properties can be divided into two classes - role-related properties and reference-related properties. (We believe that some overlap of the two should not be ruled out). In Tagalog, for example, the Topic NP controls Relativization and Floating Quantifiers etc., and the agent NP controls Reflexivization and is the addressee of an imperative clause. A similar, but not identical, situation exists in languages like Navajo, Lakota and some Mayan languages. (Cf. Van Valin 1977, 1981; Van Valin and Foley 1977). Foley and Van Valin (1984) suggest the terms 'Semantic Pivot' and 'Pragmatic Pivot' for the NPs having, respectively, the role-related and the reference-related "subject" properties. A discussion of all the different types of "subjects" discovered by Kachru et al

is not possible here. What concerns us here is a critical examination of their claim that the three "behavioural" properties - Reflexivization, Equi and Conjunction Reduction unambiguously establish the "Dative Subject" as a member of the set called the Subject. But we must first of all say something about the rules involving the three "behavioural" properties as far as Punjabi is concerned.

(a) Reflexivization

The Punjabi parallel to

John went to his house.

is

ram	apne	kār	giā
Ram	own	house	gone

Where English uses my, our, your, his, her, its, their, John's etc. as possessive determiners in such constructions, Punjabi uses apne "self's/own", provided, the claim goes, the antecedent is the subject of the clause. This is Kachru et al's view of Reflexivization in Punjabi. (Henceforth, we shall omit mentioning Hindi-Urdu and Kashmiri). If, however, the antecedent is not the subject, ordinary possessive determiners are used, as is the case in English. The ordinary possessive determiners in Punjabi are

mera	"my"
soḡa	"our"
tera	"your" (sg.)
tuàḡa	"your" (pl.)
éda	"his her its" (proximal)
óda	" " " (distal)
énāda	"their" (proximal)
ónāda	" " (distal)

Now let us examine this claim by considering

- (23) tēnū $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{apḡa} \\ \text{tera} \\ \text{tera apḡa} \end{array} \right\}$ ḡissa mīl ḡavega
 you-to your share having met will go
 "You will get you share."

- (24) met^{hō} $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{apḡa} \\ * \text{mera} \\ \text{mera apḡa} \end{array} \right\}$ kamm nā ḡoia
 me-from my work not happened
 "I could not do my work."

- (25) mē $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{apḡe} \\ * \text{mere} \\ * \text{mere apḡe} \end{array} \right\}$ kār ḡaḡa ḡe
 I my house to go is
 is
 " I am going/have to go to my house."

These examples show that the situation in Punjabi (and also in Hindi) is actually more complicated than many theorists have so far imagined it to be. This gives rise to some questions. Why is it that both the ordinary possessive determiner and the refelexive determiner apna, as well as a combination of the two are all acceptable in (23), that the ordinary possessive is not acceptable in (24) but the other two are, and that only apna is possible in (25)? The clear implication is that the "subject" in (23) is, in some way, different from the "subject" in (24) and (25). But most linguists would admit this. Our argument, however, is that the antecedent of apna need not be the "subject" as the notion is generally understood. apna historically comes from the Sanskrit ātmanah "self's". So its antecedent NP must stand for an entity that has a "self". Human and personified animate and inanimate objects are regarded as having a "self". If, however, there are two or more entities which qualify to be antecedents of apna, the agentive Actor NP has the priority right. It all depends on the situation that is symbolized and the participants in the situation or activity. The category of subject is superfluous. In (23), the noun hissa "share" is the Actor, as the standard rules of verb-agreement etc. show. But a non-personified noun hissa does not have a "self". So the antecedent of apna is "you". But since it is the Actor that has the priority right over apna, "you" can have an ordinary possessive too. Historically, apna appears to have originally been a sort of

is the grandfather that is the subject of the second clause. Since it is the pronoun standing for the grandfather that is co-referentially deleted across coordinated clauses, the grandfather should be the subject of the first clause too. But we see that in the first clause it is the grandson that controls Reflexivization. Now what are we going to make of the claim that the NP that controls Reflexivization is the subject of the clause? It is a curious state of affairs because a clause cannot have two subjects. It is not without significance that Kachru et al have not considered co-referential deletion across coordinate clauses as one of the test.

Co-referential deletion across coordinate clauses is neither a "formal" nor a "semantic" property. It is one of the most "behavioural" ones. Let us consider another example.

- (27) ik var ónu apni patni te gussa a jave
 once him-to his wife -on anger comes
 tã pher cheti nãĩ utārda
 and then soon not going down

"Once anger comes to him on his wife, then it does not go down soon." (Literal).

"Once he gets angry with his wife, he does not cool down soon."

It is clear that what is co-referentially deleted in the

second clause in (27) is gussa "anger". So one NP in the first clause controls Reflexivization and another controls co-referential deletion across coordinate clauses. Does the first clause have two subjects? The very possibility is a reductio ad absurdum of any attempt to discover the subject in the clauses in (26) and (27). Either we should admit that one of these tests is unreliable (but which one?) or we should abandon the notion of subject altogether. We follow the latter alternative. In the "Dative Subject" clauses in sentences (17), (19b) and (20), the non-backgrounded and non-dative Actor NP is marked with the fully agentive postposition ne. In (18) such an NP is the addressee of the imperative clause. It is only by transgressing all the limits of credibility that one could assert that it is the dative NP, the not the Actor marked with ne or the addressee of the imperative clause, that is the subject in these clauses. According to Keenan, being an addressee of an imperative clause is one of the qualities of the subject.

(b) Conjunction Reduction

Instead of simple co-referential deletion across co-ordinate clauses, Kachru et al chose to consider what they inappropriately call Conjunction Reduction. Later, M.H.Klaiman (1978) used a much better term Conjunctive Participle Formation (CPF). Since we have already studied the process in detail, a simple example will do here.

(28) ram ne kàr ja ke cá piti

Ram -Agt home having gone tea drunk

"Having gone home, Ram drank tea."

When two or more actions occur in succession, the verbs except the last one are in the Conjunctive Participle form provided that they share the same subject. This is Kachru et al's claim. As a general tendency this is true, but this is not a strict syntactic rule in Punjabi (and it has never been so in the Indic language since Sanskrit). The following examples are instructive:

- (29) ram nū gussa cáṛ ke p^her c^heti
 Ram -to anger having risen then soon
 nāĩ utārda
 not going down

"(Once) Ram gets angry, he does not cool down soon."

Separately, the two clauses in (29) would be

- (29'a) ram nũ gussa cÁrda hε
Ram -to anger rising is
- (29'b) { gussa } cheti nãĩ utārda
 { *ram
 { *ram nũ }
anger soon not coming

that CPF or Conjunction Reduction does not establish the "dative" NP in such constructions as an unambiguous subject. Now we can re-consider (18)

- (18) he suraj devta meri pūll maf .kar
 O Sun-god my mistake having forgiven
 de te mēñũ dis pē
 give and me-to having become visible fall

"O Sun-god, forgive my mistake and show yourself to me."

The verbs+conjunction sequence kar de te can be replaced by the Conjunctive Participle form kar ke "having done". The addressee of both the clauses, the Sun-god, also controls CPF. In what sense is the "Dative NP" the "subject" in the second clause? Now a really interesting sentence of the type frequently heard in the colloquial Punjabi speech (known for its generous use of abusive expressions!) can be studied.

- (30) tɔyya saɭa je bande nũ cār ke
 malaria brother-in-law if man -to having risen
 apna rang nũ dikhave tã ó tɔyya káda?
 its colour not shows then it malaria of what sort

"If this damned malaria attacks a person and does not show him its real nature, what sort of malaria is it?"

By calling malaria brother-in-law (i.e., wife's brother, a term of insult in Punjabi), the speaker personifies it and endows it with a "self". Now this Actor having a "self" can control Reflexivization as well, in addition to controlling CPF, and thus acquires two "subject" qualities. Where does the "Dative Subject" stand in (30)? A comparison with (31) below is instructive:

(31) tɔyɔ mēnũ ap̃i kar vic

malaria me-to my car -in

hi cār giɑ

Emph. having risen gone

"It was while I was in my car that I got an attack of malaria."

It is clear that it is "I" that controls Reflexivization in (31). (Malaria has no car!). It must be a curious fact of Punjabi (and Hindi) that by calling a non-subject NP a brother-in-law, you make it a subject of the clause!

(c) Equi

The third and the last "subject" quality of a "Dative Subject" in Punjabi, according to Kachru et al, is that it controls and is accessible to Equi, as in (32) and (33) respectively (Kachru et al's examples):

(32) sita nũ oth̃e jaŋ di gall yad h̃e

Sita -to there going -of matter remembers

"Sita remembers having gone there."

(33) ram ne pukk^h laggən di gall dassi

Ram -Agt hunger striking -of matter told

"Ram spoke of being hungry."

The usual interpretations of (32) and (33) are

(32'a) sita nū gall yad fε

Sita -to matter remembers

(32'b) sita ot^he gai

Sita there gone

(33'a) ram ne gall dassi

Ram -Agt matter told

(33'b) ram nū pukk^h laggi

Ram -to hunger struck

It is a tacit principle of co-operative behaviour in Punjabi discourse that (32) is interpreted as mentioning Sita's going and (33) Ram's hunger. But this is by no means a strict rule of Punjabi syntax. Sentences with non-usual (but not unusual) interpretation occur frequently. People in real life situations are not mindless robots incapable of using any imagination and programmed to respond to formal clues only. Let us consider (34).

- (34) daktər ne pukkʰ laggəŋ di gall puccʰi
 doctor -Agt hunger striking -of matter asked
 "The doctor asked about the appetite."

It is highly unusual for a doctor to ask someone about his own appetite. So the proper interpretation of (34) is

- (34'a) daktər ne gall puccʰi
 doctor -Agt matter asked

- (34'b) bimar nũ pukkʰ lagdi hɛ
 patient -to hunger striking is

(34) shows that the "deletion" of an NP in the embedded clauses in such constructions is something other than a simple "Equi" phenomenon. Let us now have a critical look at the claim made about the accessibility of the "dative Subject" to the Equi process. We can imagine a man shouting to women celebrating a marriage in the Punjab:

- (35) é sáb band karo. bapu ji nũ naccəŋa tɒppəŋa
 this all stop father -to dancing jumping
 pəsənd nãĩ
 likeable not

"Stop all this. Father does not like dancing and jumping."

Clearly, it is the dancing and jumping by the women that is being referred to in (35). There is deletion of an NP in both (34) and (35), but it is not the deletion of an Equi NP (assuming, for the sake of argument the validity of the transformational analysis). It is highly doubtful whether the structures under discussion exemplify the Equi transformation of the orthodox Standard Theory. But a discussion of this dead issue is not needed here. This "Equi" test no more establishes the "Dative Subject" than the other two tests do. In fact, the whole endeavour to set up the hybrid category of the "Dative Subject" by such carefully cooked data and by ignoring the reality of the living language is woefully flawed.

Now the anxiety of many linguists about the "Dative Subject" becomes understandable. Desperate, for theoretical, or rather ideological, reasons to establish the universality of the notion of subject or to conceal the fact that they use English as a filter language, they coin bad arguments. The hybrid concept itself is a reductio ad absurdum of the endeavour. A peripheral NP or non-term is being raised to the status of the subject of the clause, and that, too, by ignoring extremely familiar counter-examples. We need not examine other types of "subjects" in Punjabi. The results would be the same as we have seen. What does our analysis of the three most "behavioural" properties of the "Dative Subject" show? The "Dative Subject" controls Reflexivization, but if its "brother-in-law" is present in the clause, this "subject" property passes on to the latter.

The "Dative Subject" controls and is accessible to the so-called Equi transformation, but some other NP in the construction can also have this property. An NP other than the "Dative Subject" in the construction can also control the so-called Conjunction Reduction. The proposed tests do not unambiguously identify the "Dative Subject" in the constructions. Worse still, one "behavioural" test identifies one NP and another test identifies a different NP as the "subject" within the same clause. It now seems clear that Punjabi is one of the languages in which the "subject" properties are distributed among different types of NPs. It is neither possible nor desirable to have a clearly definable category of subject in this language. If so, where does the notion of "superficial ergativity" that is parasitic upon the notion of subject stand as far as Punjabi is concerned?

It must be admitted that much more research than has been possible for this study is needed to determine the true nature of the qualities attributed to grammatical subject by Keenan. But taking this notion as an undefined primitive only postpones the difficulties. It does not solve them. A Relational Grammarian, who favours this "primitivist" view, has to select one (and only one) NP in a clause as the subject, and the problem appears, at least as far as Punjabi is concerned.

Many linguists studying other individual languages are bringing evidence against the validity and usefulness of grammatical relations as tools of analysis. Vennemann (1982)

shows that the notion of subject is problematic in a language - German - in which one would expect it to be most easily identifiable. Collinge (1984) argues that when it comes to direct object, the difficulties and problems are of the same magnitude and proportions. Indirect objects are sure to prove at least doubly problematic. A theory of "superficial ergativity", which takes for granted the validity of the notion of grammatical subject, can no longer be seriously maintained.

Moreover, we have learnt enough about the diverse nature of ergativity in a wide variety of languages now (cf. Van Valin 1981) to see the absurdity of sweeping generalizations such as S.R. Anderson's much quoted one about many ergative languages:

"from a syntactic point of view these languages are organized in the same way as are the accusative languages, and that the basically syntactic notion of 'subject' has essentially the same reference in both types." (Anderson 1976:16).

Following Anderson's methodology, any Christian chauvinist could collect a few statements from the books of the major religions and "prove" that God has "essentially the same reference" in all these religions. But do Zeus, Jehovah, Allah, Brahman, Dharma and Tao have "essentially the same reference"? There is nothing wrong in studying religions and languages comparatively. But the scholars must not lose

sight of the role that a particular category or concept plays within each religion and language. If such a detailed knowledge is not available yet, the wiser thing is to go on searching and suspending judgement or giving only tentative suggestions. Sweeping statements based on scanty knowledge and pronounced in a magisterial tone, especially if given by a well-known and established linguist, only misguide and deflect the course of further research.

9.5 Two typological questions

9.5.1 Is Punjabi an SOV language?

There is no doubt that the word-order in Punjabi is very free in the sense that it plays no syntactic role in the narrower sense it plays in English. But an "unmarked" word-order traditionally known as the SOV word-order can also be seen in Punjabi, as in all the major Indian languages except Kashmiri. As far as the relative order of adjectives and nouns, main verbs and auxiliaries etc., is concerned, Punjabi is almost consistently SOV. This has been the general and undisputed view of linguists so far. A theory that doubts the validity of grammatical relations like S(ubject) and O(bject) must account for these regularities which have so far been explained by the SOV hypothesis.

Aum Sinha (1980) gives a rather pathetic reason based on the SOV hypothesis for assigning the status of subject to laṛka in

(36) lārke ko dār lāga.

boy -to fear struck

"The boy felt fear."

"The boy got frightened."

The Punjabi version of (36) is

(36') munde nū dār laggia

The reason he gives is that this analysis would "confirm" Greenberg's analysis of the word order in the world's languages (p.6). If we regard "fear" as the subject, taking into consideration verb-agreement etc., the word order in (36), *Sinha was afraid*, would be OSV. But Greenberg had said that this word order was either non-existent or excessively rare. lārka in (36) is our old friend the "Dative Subject". Greenberg (1963) indeed said this. But it must be pointed out here that hypotheses are first tested and, if they pass the test, are only tentatively confirmed. It was Greenberg, not God, who suggested this hypothesis. Instead of trying to test Greenberg's hypothesis by imagining and trying other possibilities, *Sinha* simply "confirms" it by interpreting his data according to it.

First of all, what is the reality of the "unmarked" word order? How "unmarked" is it? The fact that a sentence is not used in the real life context and has been created solely for the purpose of grammatical analysis does not mean that it "has no context". We cannot wish away the context

and its influence in this way. Such a sentence is used in a context of citation. In Punjabi at least, it is impossible to make it free from the pragmatic influences such as Empathy Hierarchy, just as it is impossible to cite a spoken word or sentence without any intonation (as every phonetician knows). In an actual Punjabi sentence produced in discourse, the pragmatically given or more salient information or an NP higher on the Empathy Hierarchy tends to precede its opposite in the sentence. It is true that the unmarked Attention Flow (AF) is from the agent to the patient or from the source to the goal, and thus the Actor/agent VPs tend to precede the Undergoer/patient NPs. But this is not the law. Unmarked AF, as in the passive constructions is resorted to quite often, for pragmatic reasons. In (36), the concrete and living human being larka is higher on the Empathy Hierarchy and pragmatically more salient than an abstract entity called fear. The grammar of Punjabi is such that the monovalent verb has to agree with dar "fear", the Actor NP. The peripheral goal argument is, quite naturally marked with the spatial postposition nū in Punjabi and ko in Hindi (both meaning "to"). But the very fact that larka "boy" occurs initially does not make it the subject. If all this goes against Greenberg's hypothesis (It does not, because larka, being a peripheral argument, can be neither the subject nor the object) so much the worse for the hypothesis.

The work of scholars like Lehmann (1973, 1978) and Vennemann (1972, 1974) suggests that what really matters is the relative order of V and O. According to Vennemann

(1972), there are two major types of languages - the Operator-Operand (OV) type and the Operand-Operator (VO) type. The position of S depends on more complicated factors. In our analysis, the verb is the Principal Qualified element and the NPs are its Qualifiers. This is the same thing as saying that the verb is the Operand and the NPs are its Operators. When the word-order is "unmarked" in Punjabi, the Operators precede the Operand, as they should in a consistently OV language. The Actor in Punjabi tends to precede the Undergoer or other arguments partly because in about 90% of the cases it is either higher on the Empathy Hierarchy or is pragmatically significant in some other way. Moreover, the usual order of NPs in most languages follows the principle of iconicity - the source NP tends to precede the goal NP. But non-usual word order can always be used for special effects, e.g., in passive constructions. In the so-called "Dative Subject" constructions, the peripheral argument "dative" NP precedes the Actor not because it is the "subject" but because it is nearly always higher on the Empathy Hierarchy than the Actor. Calling Punjabi an SOV (S=Source, rather than Subject) does no harm as long as this is not taken dogmatically or as a "primitive" concept. But if it is used for establishing useless categories like the "Dative Subject", then, of course, serious theoretical objections must be raised. It is more accurate to describe Punjabi as a topic-prominent language, for the analysis of which the grammatical category of subject is totally redundant.

9.5.2 What type of ergativity is there in Punjabi?

Where does Punjabi stand as far as the universal concept of ergativity is concerned? The plain answer to this naive question is that there is no such universal notion of ergativity that is also useful at the same time. A general notion is that some languages treat the subject/agent of a transitive clause differently from the subject/agent of an intransitive clause, and that most such languages treat the latter like the object/patient of a transitive clause. This rough idea is a good starting point and nothing more than that. But this idea is the source of a very useful set of symbols and concepts whose greatest merit is that they are so general that they can be almost universally applied to all languages. These concepts and symbols are


S = Intransitive Subject/Agent/Actor

A = Transitive Subject/Agent/Actor


O (or P) = Object/Undergoer (of a transitive clause)

Languages have been classified on the basis of how these three can be grouped in them on the basis of direct marking on the NPs and/or indirect marking or agreement. Survey shows that languages can belong to one of the following categories:

(a) Accusative



(b) Ergative



(c) Active

S is split into agentive and non-agentive S, irrespective of whether the verb is transitive or intransitive.

(d) 3-way

All the three are treated differently.

In the Accusative and the Ergative languages, it does not matter whether A or S is less agentive or more agentive.

These are the ideal or "pure" classes, and such typologically "pure" languages are said to exist. But Punjabi, according to this classification, must be one of the most "impure" of the languages. A careful analysis reveals all the four types of markings in Punjabi.

- (a) Accusative: when the main nuclear verb in the clause is in the Unmarked or the Imperfect Participle form.
- (b) Ergative: when the main nuclear verb is in the Perfect Participle form, except when (d) obtains.
- (c) Active: when the main nuclear verb is in the Potential Participle form.
- (d) 3-way: when the Undergoer in a transitive clause that would normally be marked on the ergative pattern is contextually given or definite in some other way.

Below, we exemplify all these four types of markings:

(a) Accusative

PQr

- (37) sita-ǵ ram- -nũ cǝ́di ɦɛ
 Sita Ram -to desiring is
 "Sita loves Ram."

PQr

- (6) munda-ǵ ǝda ɦɛ
 boy coming is
 "The boy ... comes."

(b) Ergative

PQr

- (1) munde ne kitab-ǵ pǎ́ri
 boy -Agt book read
 "The boy read the book."

PQr

- (5) munda-ǵ ɡia
 boy gone
 "The boy went...."

(c) Active

- (10) ...bandar naccəɲe ɦən
 monkeys to dance are

"Monkeys are going to dance (=be made to dance)..."

- (11) ...bandarā -ne naccəŋa hε
 monkeys -Agt to dance is nce is
 "Monkeys are going to dance...."

(d) 3-way

PQR

- (5) munḍa-Ø... gia
 boy gone
 "The boy went ..."

- (2) munḍe- -nekitab- -nū pāṛia
 boy -Agt book -to read
 "The boy read the book."

We have already discussed in detail (in Chapters VII and VIII) the phenomena of case-marking and verb-agreement in Punjabi.

The fact that all the four groupings are found in Punjabi (and probably in many other languages as well) can be taken either pessimistically as demonstrating the vanity and futility of many linguists' wishes to set up neat typologies of languages, or optimistically as a good opportunity to compare Punjabi with other languages and see what features it shares with them. We would certainly opt for the latter alternative. But this is no place for such an enterprise.

Is Punjabi inconsistent then? The clear answer to this question is NO. Punjabi is no more inconsistent than those non-decimal currencies which cannot be matched on one-to-one

basis with the system of the English or the American currencies. As we have seen, the Punjabi syntax symbolizes situations in accordance with its own logic, and this logic is followed consistently. It is perhaps the greatest merit of DeLancey's theory of ergativity (some of whose insights we have been using) that without becoming imperialistic (i.e., forcing all languages into the mould of one language or into the mould of one supposedly universal "logic"), it beautifully explains (in our sense - relating something more specific to something more general and more encompassing) the phenomenon. That grammar is symbolism is perhaps the greatest insight of some schools of modern linguistics. At the same time, this insight is very ancient too. It is already implicit in Pāṇini's grammar and explicit in the writings of his followers, as well as in the theory of Planudes.

In our analysis of the Punjabi ergativity, we have deliberately avoided a discussion of some non-questions. For example, the question "Are the ergative constructions passive?" is now a non-question in the light of what we have said in this and the earlier chapters. Historically, they do not come from the best known -i- passives of Sanskrit. But their ancestors did play some sort of "passive" role. This role, as we have seen, can never be neatly defined in semantic/syntactic terms, at least in Punjabi. The ergative constructions play some sort of "passive" role even today, as we have seen in the earlier chapters. But are they or are they not passive? The question makes no sense.

CHAPTER X

THE PETTY DONE, THE UNDONE VAST

Look at the end of work, contrast
The petty done, the undone vast,

- Robert Browning
(The Last Ride Together)

It is said about the great French mathematician Poincaré (one of the greatest in history) that in the last part of a postgraduate examination he conducted, he would ask the candidate to turn his back to the blackboard and explain briefly in ordinary prose, i.e., without using equations etc., what his thesis was. (Charon 1983:58). To those who imagine mathematics as an "abstract" science consisting of nothing but symbols and equations, Poincaré's conduct will appear crazy in every respect. That this is not so is effectively demonstrated by the great success of a famous lecture delivered by Reimann (one of the founders of the non-Euclidean geometries and an immortal name like Poincaré) on a most abstract topic - the foundations of geometry - at the University of Göttingen. In this lecture, which was attended by the University's entire faculty of learned scholars, Reimann did not use a single equation. (Guillen 1984:6). These great mathematicians believed that formalisms, formulas, equations etc. are aids and means to the attainment of insight, and not insight in themselves. True insight must be expressible in ordinary prose. We have mentioned Poincaré and Reimann not because we want to compare our modest work to theirs but as an argument against the assertions of the fervent devotees of formalisms in linguistics. The final results of any linguistic investigation presented in ordinary prose elicits from them the prompt cry "Commonsense!" Some of these linguists "attach no importance" to the grammars that, in their final form, are not formalized. Needless to say, such compliments

are generously reciprocated by those at whom they are directed. This ignoble strife ultimately does no good to linguistics. The guiding principle of our research was beautifully stated by Firth. He said that a linguist is like a physicist who, with the help of a glass prism, breaks up a beam of light into its spectrum of colours, and then turns the spectrum again into a beam of light with the help of another prism, so that when he (and others) look at the beam of light after examining the spectrum, their understanding of the beam is deepened, widened and heightened. In other words, linguistics must start and end with commonsense. To quote T.S.Eliot,

"We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time."

(Little Gidding)

And where have we arrived?

Punjabi, like every other natural language, has a unique character (or "spectrum") of its own, but there is not a single feature of that "spectrum" which Punjabi does not share with at least a few languages. This is the "commonsense" that every schoolboy knows. But this did not stop many linguists from forcing all languages into the mould of one language. We hope to have shown that this intellectual Procrusteanism hinders not only a proper

understanding of individual languages but also is the greatest impediment to the construction of a genuine universal grammar. The construction of an armchair universal grammar (Comrie's term; Comrie 1976a:304) on the basis of a "deep" investigation of a single language conducted in Chomsky's "Galilean Style" of enquiry will benefit linguistics as much as the Inquisition benefited physics in the seventeenth century by persecuting Galileo. It is one of our fundamental assumptions that respecting the individuality of each language and describing it ultimately in its own terms is not only compatible with the construction of a genuine universal grammar, it is the only scientifically respectable way of doing this.

We argued that every sentence of a language (and thus the language as a whole) should be viewed as a form-meaning complex. Form and meaning are inseparable like the two sides of a coin. Theoretically, we can start an investigation either with the meaningful form or with the formally expressed meaning. We cannot start with mere form by ignoring all meaning (the post-Bloomfieldian American Structuralist's mistake) or with disembodied meaning (as many Generative Semanticists thought they did). A linguist is concerned with the world as (symbolically) represented by the language, and not with the world as it is. Leave the latter to philosophers and scientists. The syntax of each language is not just metaphorical; it is thoroughly so. It is becoming increasingly evident now that the psychology of human perception is such that the world is perceived largely

in terms of entities and their movements and interactions. The syntax of a clause or sentence in each human language presents this interaction symbolically. Languages may (and always do) symbolize these interactions in diverse ways but, at the same time, interesting similarities can also be observed. Typically, the entities and their movements have both spatial and temporal dimensions. It is this metaphorical and symbolic representation of reality that is the starting point of grammatical analysis.

In Punjabi (and in most, if not all, languages), a word or a group of words representing some sort of action or event is the nucleus of a clause or simple sentence. (A state is a special type of event). Events are generally represented by verbs. Each verb requires a certain number (from zero to three in Punjabi) of the words of the noun class, representing entities that must be mentioned in order to give the representation of the situation some sort of organic unity or completeness. Of course, other entities co-operating, in one way or the other, with those that are principally involved are implied and can be mentioned, but it is the set of the principally involved with the action that is grammatically significant. We have called this set the valency set of a verb. In Punjabi, the valency set of a verb can be both expanded and squeezed. The form of the verb is a good indication of the valency set it has. We have used a special term phase of a verb to refer to the form that indicates its valency set.

Nouns, or groups of words acting as if they were single

noun words (We call them NPs) in a valency set are symbolically all actors in the situation denoted by the verb. They play different types of roles. In Punjabi, the most important of these roles are three. The Actor is symbolically viewed as the agent or the source of the action, the Undergoer is the goal of the action or the goal of its result, and the Recipient is seen as benefiting from the action in some way. In the case of some phases of the verb, there is one more entity that causes the Actor to start the action. Very often, when such an entity is brought into the valency set, an old member is pushed out of the set. In our terminology, that member is backgrounded. According to Comrie (1974) this backgrounding phenomenon is found in many unrelated languages. This shows that human languages share many features. But we must not jump to the conclusion that this backgrounding phenomenon in all these languages is exactly the same thing.

Verbs express, among other things, the temporal dimension of situations and events. The speaker may locate himself imaginatively at a certain point in time (usually the time of the speech event) and look at the events as past, present or future in relation to that point in time. Verbs viewed as representing time in this way are said to express tense. But there is another way of representing the temporal dimension of events. A speaker may not locate himself (imaginatively, of course) at any fixed point in time, but move along with the event, adopting a situation-internal perspective, and may view events as completed, on-going,

iterative etc. without relating them to any external point in time. Verbs representing events in this way are said to express aspect. Verbs may also express the speaker's emotional or intellectual attitude towards the events - whether he regards them as possible or impossible or probable or certain, etc. This attitude is called modality. Tense, aspect and modality are expressed by different languages in different ways and in different degrees. In Punjabi, the role of the category of tense is marginal. Like all other Indian languages, Punjabi is primarily interested in expressing aspect. Only one verb in Punjabi - the "being" verb ਛੇ - expresses tense. A completed action implies that the result of the action has reached the Undergoer which has thus been affected by the action. A non-completed action does not imply this. So we call the part of the Punjabi grammar dealing with the temporal dimension of situations the transitivity part. (Transitivity symbolically expresses the transition of an action or its result from the source to the goal).

Valency and transitivity are the two basic and major components of the grammatical framework of Punjabi in our system. Their interaction is of vital importance for an understanding of the syntax (the organization of a clause or sentence) of Punjabi. If the action is viewed as completed, the "fruit" of the action can be, by implication, viewed as having either reached the goal (if any) or as a complete entity capable of existing in its own right. In the case of an uncompleted action, the "fruit" still lies with the agent

or the source of the action. In Punjabi, the action or its fruit is symbolically viewed as moving in space from its source to its goal. Thus the action can be described from the viewpoint of the source or of the goal or of the action itself. If the action is viewed as uncompleted, it is usually described from the viewpoint of the Actor (or the source) . A symbolically completed action is usually described from the viewpoint of the Undergoer (or goal). But if the Undergoer is contextually given or already definite enough, the viewpoint adopted is that of the action itself. The choice of the viewpoint is indicated by the agreement of the main verb with the viewpoint NP. When the completed action itself is the viewpoint, there is , of course, no verb agreement. A viewpoint NP (also called the Principal Qualifier of the verb) takes no word called postposition after it. A non-viewpoint Actor NP takes ne and a non-^{Undergoer}viewpoint NP takes nũ "to". To rather oversimplify the situation, this is the mystery behind the phenomenon called ergativity in Punjabi. But this ergativity is intimately related to the meaning of the sentence. The way a language symbolizes the reality is the most important part of its meaning potential. So the variety of ergativity found in Punjabi is by no means superficial. It is something very deep and profound. What can be deeper or profounder than the human imagination or man's ability to make sense of the reality by symbolizing it?

The interaction of valency and transitivity described above is the usual one. Let us call it the unmarked

interaction. But there can also be highly complicated types of non-usual (but not unusual) or marked interaction. A speaker might like to suppress the identity of the Actor or to focus all his attention on the Undergoer. Or he may have in mind only the result of the action and may consider the preceding action irrelevant. He might also wish to portray the would-be the Actor as incapable of starting or completing the action. Punjabi has grammatical devices to symbolically represent all such and many other situations. The syntactic distinctions that arise in this way are known as voice distinctions. Our analysis shows that we cannot, without doing gross injustice to the richness of Punjabi syntax, force the Punjabi sentences into the two voice categories - 'active' and 'passive' - as many traditional grammarians did.

This brings us to the question whether the traditional grammatical categories like 'subject', 'object', 'active voice', 'passive voice' etc. and the not-so-traditional category 'ergative' are universal. They are definitely not universal if they are to be defined clearly, precisely and unambiguously in "necessary and sufficient" terms as the geometrical concept of the 'triangle' can be. If, however, they are to be characterized in terms of a number of functional features, all of which may may not be present in language-specific or construction-specific instances, then they are certainly useful for an analysis of a large number of languages, and some of them may indeed be universal. The main consideration is not whether 'subject' is there in Punjabi or any other language. What is significant is

whether or not the concept is useful. The concept appears to be useful for a grammatical analysis of English. As far as Punjabi is concerned, it seems to be more a liability than an asset. Of course, our judgement is not final. No judgement in science should be.

A Punjabi clause or simple sentence presents what is regarded as a single situation (action or event) but it may have more than one verb words. Symbolically, these verbs represent the various stages or facets of the single situation. Since each verb has its own valency set and represents the aspectual nature of that particular phase or the facet of the situation in its own way, the internal complexity of the situation, as it unfolds in time, gets represented by the cluster of verbs. But the complex situation is also viewed, at the same time as having an organic unity (such as possessed by a living organism) with the various facets, phases or component parts dynamically depending upon one another and modifying one another's meaning potential.

One of the outcomes of our work, we believe, is that language universals should be sought not in the categories set up on the basis of a "deep" study of a single language or in the supposedly universal categories of some "logic" but in what is really universal about the human race as a whole - the Naked Ape's unique God-given faculty of imagination or his power to represent reality symbolically, and in his bio-cultural needs. Languages are ever dynamic symbolic systems constructed by man for the fulfilment of

his bio-cultural needs. A search for the really explanatory language universals must start from here. This most certainly does not contradict our earlier observation that investigations of particular languages should start with the form(s) of that language. We hope to have made a modest demonstration of the fact that the study and analysis of a language that starts from its (symbolic and meaningful) forms should ideally go hand in hand with an analysis of language universals. There is no entity called Language (with a capital L). There are only individual languages, and they are, first of all, diverse. This diversity must be cheerfully embraced in the Greenbergian way, rather than shunned and escaped from in the Chomskyan way. Language with a capital L is the ideal towards which we should strive with the aid of comparative linguistics which must respect the individuality of every human language.

Punjabi was never studied in the past in this way. So we did not include in this study a chapter or section called "review of the literature". The little relevant literature that exists is mentioned, or quoted or critically examined throughout Part II of this study. A separate section would have been redundant.

Our aim was to lay down a framework for an analysis of Punjabi which should respect the individuality of the language and, at the same time, make some contribution to the genuine (non-armchair) universal grammar. The heading of this chapter aptly sums up the overall achievement of our project. We have largely dealt with relatively simpler

sentences. But there are Punjabi sentences of enormous complexity. It is hoped that the framework, with minor changes and adjustments if need be, can handle this complexity. We have already remarked that the number of all the possible combinations of verb-forms in Punjabi must be staggeringly large. Each combination has its own unique dependency network. If this observation is correct, what we have left undone is indeed terribly vast.

We have said as little as possible about the discourse pragmatics of the constructions we have analysed. We have tried to keep the discorsal factors affecting the choice of aspect, voice, ergativity etc., in the background. The reason is obvious - to make the complexity manageable enough for us to make a start. But full complexity must not be permanently avoided. It is again in the interests of simplicity (and space) that we have not analyzed the peculiar behaviour of the Punjabi copular-existential verb and the constructions employing adjectives attributively and predicatively.

We have said nearly nothing about the order of words and constituents in the Punjabi sentences actually spoken in real life situations. This is one of the most important areas of Punjabi grammar. We neglected it because it is very important and interesting. Trying to deal with this phenomenon in so short a space as we could afford to give it here would amount to belittling its importance by caricature. It is an area where several forces interact, as far as Punjabi is concerned. Some of these forces are

(a) The OV factor. Operators or qualifiers tend to precede the operand or qualified in Punjabi. The Principal Qualified element in the clause - the main verb - tends to occur at the end.

(b) Discourse pragmatics. Pragmatically more salient or contextually more definite or given elements tend to come before their opposites in an utterance. It may be for such reasons that an Actor NP in Punjabi normally precedes an Undergoer or a Recipient NP.

(c) Rhythmic factors. Punjabi is developing a tendency for stress-timed rhythm (Bhardwaj 1980). Jain (1926) observed that in a Punjabi utterance, stressed syllable tend to occur at approximately equal intervals and that this may be effected by changing the order of words if it is permissible by grammar. In a highly inflected language in which the order of words does not play a syntactic role in the narrower sense it plays in English, it is possible that the requirements of rhythm influence the order of words in an utterance. New developments in metrical phonology (dealing with stress and rhythm) may shed important light on this. Jain's observation is plausible and probably true, but its validity has not yet been tested experimentally.

(d) Intonational factors. Punjabi is a tone language which also has intonation. The interaction of the movement of pitch at the level of the word (tone) and at the level of the utterance (intonation) is rather delicately adjusted in Punjabi. (Bhardwaj 1980). It appears that sharp rises and falls in the intonational pitch are avoided in Punjabi in

order to avert any confusion with the rather sharp tonal rises or falls. Since Punjabi, being an inflected language, can allow considerable amount of freedom in its word order, it is possible that the order of words is adjusted in such a way that the word receiving the nuclear accent (where the intonational contour changes its direction) is placed in the utterance in a way to achieve an intonational contour of the desired shape. Any serious study of word order in Punjabi must consider all these possibilities seriously.

The list of the undone presented above is not exhaustive. There may be more things in Punjabi than have been dreamt of by grammarians (even by the native ones) so far. The undone IS vast, infinitely so perhaps.

The framework we have designed to deal with the petty done may prove too frail or inflexible or limited to deal with what remains undone. It may have to be revised or extended or even entirely abandoned. We attempted to discover some order in the apparent chaos. For example, we hope to have shown that the Punjabi passives are by no means "peculiar", that the Punjabi serial verb constructions are a linguistic manifestation of the culture's (by no means irrational) way of symbolizing time, that there is a perfectly consistent logical order underlying Punjabi ergativity which has so far been regarded as "split", and so on.

What we emphatically deny here is having achieved a "revolutionary" finite formula or a magic key which can unlock all the doors onto theoretical certainty.

"Only a fool looks for truth in a finite formula; only a knave would want to acquire it without toil and heartache. Final truth is tantamount to stagnant knowledge; there is no substitute for self-correcting, progressing, ever-searching understanding. Dismiss your quest for truth in final formulation and embrace the greatest human virtue, called Unending Search for Truth."

- LeShan and Margenau (1982:70).

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Abbreviations used:

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BLS	:	Berkeley Linguistic Society (Proceedings of the nth Annual Meeting of the)
CLS	:	Chicago Linguistic Society (Papers from the nth Regional Meeting of the)
FL	:	Foundations of Language
IL	:	Indian Linguistics
JIP	:	Journal of Indian Philosophy
JL	:	Journal of Linguistics
Lg	:	Language
LI	:	Linguistic Inquiry
SL	:	Studies in Language
SLS	:	Studies in the Linguistic Sciences
TPS	:	Transactions of the Philological Society

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